Fruitless Journey of the Envoys sent in quest of Ibrahim Pacha—Arrival
of part of the Egyptian Army at Gaza—Promised Neutrality of the
Turks—The Egyptians informed of the Cessation of Hostilities by the
English Officers—Terms recommended by Mr. Wood to be imposed upon
Ibrahim Pacha—Colonel Napier’s Narrative of the Retreat of Ibrahim
Pacha.
On the 30th January, General Jochmus writes from Jaffa to the Admiral:
“Hamid Bey, Major Wilbraham, and Selim Bey (the Turkish Commissioner,)
after fruitless attempts to communicate with the Pacha (Ibrahim), have
returned to Gaza[41].”
This is not to be wondered at: no assistance was given them, as will be
seen hereafter by Lieutenant Loring’s report, and they were reluctantly
obliged to return to Gaza on the 22nd of January. Ahmed Menikli Pacha
had arrived there the day before with the main body of the cavalry, and
Ibrahim himself came in on the 31st, with the rest of the army, the
greater part of whom must have been resurrection men, as we have seen
they had been destroyed in the retreat.
It has been seen that General Jochmus’s report of the 17th of January,
to the Admiral, of the affair of Gaza[42], affirms that he intended to
resume his operations when the ground became practicable, but on his
arrival at Jaffa he was officially informed of the complete submission
of Mehemet Ali, and the consequent cessation of the state of rebellion
of his army; “our troops,” he adds, “have been ordered to cease
offensive hostilities. His Excellency, the Seraskier Ahmed Zacharias
Pacha, commanded in person since we left Ramla.” I presume General
Jochmus means that Lieutenant Loring arrived with my despatches to the
authorities in Syria.
These despatches were certainly sufficient authority for the Allies to
suspend all hostilities against Ibrahim Pacha, but we shall see that
notwithstanding the opinion of the British officers, difficulties were
endeavoured to be thrown in the way, both by General Jochmus and Mr.
Wood. It has before been shown that both General Michell and Captain
Stewart, in consequence of the submission of Mehemet Ali, and the
instructions from Sir Robert Stopford, had decided on taking only
precautionary measures, and the Turkish authorities, acting under the
Admirals orders, were bound to follow the same course, notwithstanding
any directions to the contrary they might have received from the
Ambassador at Constantinople, whose orders, Captain Stewart justly
remarks, must be subordinate to those of Lord Palmerston.
Two days after my despatches arrived at Jaffa the Seraskier received his
instructions from Constantinople; the nature of them will appear in Mr.
Wood’s Protest, at which I shall presently arrive: nevertheless the
Seraskier, after holding a council, gave General Michell and Captain
Stewart a positive assurance that no further act of hostility should
take place, and that he had no wish to deprive Ibrahim Pacha of either
his arms, baggage, or guns[43]. The Seraskier was a wise man, he knew
very well he had not the power to deprive him of either the one or the
other. Captain Stewart and General Michell most properly wrote to
Ibrahim Pacha and the Egyptian officer in command at Gaza, to inform
them of the cessation of hostilities[44], and of their intention to give
every possible facility for the evacuation of Syria, and the embarkation
of the women, children, and sick at Caiffa, or any other more convenient
port; and Captain Arbuthnot and Colonel Colquhoun were despatched with
the letters to Ibrahim Pacha and the Egyptian officer commanding at
Gaza, and they were instructed to protest against any act of hostility
the Turks might commit[45].
So ignorant were the Turkish authorities of the movements of Ibrahim,
who they fancied was wandering in the Desert, without an army, that on
the very day on which Captain Stewart signed the instructions to Captain
Arbuthnot and Colonel Colquhoun, to insist on Ibrahim retiring by Gaza
in successive columns of 3000 men each, Ahmed Menikli Pacha arrived at
Gaza with the main body of Ibrahim’s cavalry in excellent order, and the
infantry in three columns. Ibrahim himself bringing up the rear was
shortly expected: and on that day also General Jochmus and Mr. Wood, the
emissary of Lord Ponsonby, wrote to the Seraskier[46] to inform him that
the Baron Dumont having destroyed the magazine at Maan, Ibrahim’s army
being cut in two, and gone back in thorough disorder, and his 150 guns
being already in their power, according to the official orders read at
the council of the preceding day Ibrahim would only be allowed the
choice of two conditions,—viz.
“1. To march upon El-Arish by the south of the Dead Sea, also upon Suez,
with the men, arms, and conveyance which he now possesses.
“2. To come in detachments of 3000 men by Gaza upon El-Arish, leaving
his cannon in our hands, in consideration of the power which is granted
to him of being permitted to follow this road, provided that he leaves
all the Syrians in their country.”
The march of Ibrahim on Gaza, by the south of the Dead Sea, shows very
clearly that he never had the intention of entering Palestine, and that
his crossing the Jordan was a manœuvre to mislead the Turks, in which
he completely succeeded, and arrived safe at Gaza, without having
encountered a single outpost of the Turkish army.
Colonel Napier was attached to the Turkish division that Ibrahim forced
to return to Jerusalem: the following is the Colonel’s account of their
movements, as well as of what he knew of Ibrahim’s retreat.
“Junior United Service Club,
December, 1841.
“You wish me to give you some information as to the retreat of Ibrahim
Pacha from Damascus. All the notes I took at the time being with my
baggage at Gibraltar, I cannot be very accurate in dates; but will
furnish whatever I remember on the subject from the time you left me at
Beyrout in November 1840, until my embarkation at Gaza for Egypt, in
January 1841.
“When the Powerful left St. George’s Bay, I think the Princess
Charlotte, the Benbow, and Bellerophon remained off Beyrout, with a
steamer and a couple of Austrian vessels.
“From the time of your driving back Ibrahim,—in the action of the 10th
of October,—from the heights of Boharsof, nothing certain had been
known at Beyrout relative to his movements, and we,—to all
_appearance_,—remained in a state of complete inactivity.
“We continued quietly in our quarters all November, which leisure I
employed in learning Arabic, in visiting the neighbouring parts of
Lebanon, and keeping up the acquaintance I had been enabled to
form,—through your introductions,—with the principal Emirs and Sheikhs
of the mountain, with several of whom I became very intimate.
“About the latter end of November, I was sent with Colonel Bridgeman to
make a reconnoissance on the enemy, who was supposed to be still at
Zachle. On arriving there we found he had retired across the Boccah two
days before. Next morning, Colonel Bridgeman and myself, each
accompanied by some fifty or sixty irregular horse, pushed on in
different directions towards them. The Colonel fell in with a body of
300 or 400 cavalry deserters from the Egyptian army, whom he brought
back to Zachle;—whilst I traversed the range of the Anti-Lebanon, and
descending into the plain of Damascus reached the village of Zebdeni,—a
few hours’ distant from that city,—on which the Egyptians had fallen
back; the last of their rear-guard having left that place on the
previous day.
“It was now certain that Ibrahim occupied Damascus, but whether or not
he intended to make it his winter quarters was still unknown. However,
the good people of Beyrout considered his presence even at the holy city
of ‘El Sham,’ as much too near to be pleasant; and when the gale of wind
of the 2nd of December drove all our vessels from the coast, serious
apprehensions were entertained, that some fine morning he would walk
quietly into the town;—which undertaking he might have accomplished with
little or no opposition.
“Things continued in this state at Beyrout, till the beginning of
December, at which period I received written instructions to the
following effect from Sir Charles Smith: ‘That I was in the first
instance to proceed to the head-quarters of the Emir Bechir with certain
communications, and then to go, without loss of time, to Naplouse; that
Selim Pacha would have orders notifying my official employment within
his pachalic, and requiring him to attend to any requisition I might
make (with the exception of troops,) on the garrison of Acre.
“Having arrived at Naplouse, I was to order Soulyman Abdul Hadi, the
Governor of that place, to levy 1500 men within his district, and with
these I was to do my best to guard the passes of Agiloun, Djebail Khalil
(Hebron), or Khan Younus[47]; directing my movements according to the
intelligence I should receive of the enemy.
“I was further instructed to ‘investigate and inquire into the conduct
of the said Governor of Naplouse;—he being suspected of adhering to the
Egyptian interests,—and to ascertain whether there was any foundation
for the numerous complaints preferred against him from different
quarters.’
“In the execution of this ‘important trust[48],’ I was left to the
guidance of my own military judgment. In fact, I had a sort of
independent roving commission, which pleased me much, and I lost no time
in proceeding to take up my command.
“It was evident, from the nature of these instructions, that we were
still completely in the dark as to the line of retreat which Ibrahim
Pacha might eventually fix on.
“I was surprised to find, on arriving at my destination, that,—contrary
to the tenor of my instructions,—no notification had been received by
the authorities, as to the nature of the mission on which I was about to
be employed; and had it not been for the kindness of Selim Pacha, I
should have found myself placed in an extremely awkward predicament.
“Not to lose time, whilst my ‘forces’ were being assembled, I went to
Jerusalem, to ascertain the state of the Turkish garrison there,—and had
an interview with Sheikh Abderrahman, the chief of the Bedouin tribes
about Hebron, who was said to be able to bring into the field 10,000
men. After strongly urging on him the necessity of assembling his people
to be ready to strike a blow,—as I had still some days to spare,—I
determined, with 100 horsemen, to push across the river Jordan and the
Agiloun hills, in order to gain some positive intelligence of the enemy,
about whom the most contradictory reports were now afloat.
“Amongst other things, it was however positively said that he was making
El Mezerib his head-quarters, preparatory to passing the Jordan at the
bridge of Moïadjumah[49], a few miles south of Lake Tiberias; for this
point, I therefore, in the first instance proceeded, and having
carefully reconnoitred the neighbouring ground, I sent from thence a
report to General Michell[50], and also to Selim Pacha, requesting that
some barrels of gunpowder might be immediately forwarded from Acre for
the destruction of the old Roman arch, which here singly spanned the
river.
“Crossing the Jordan on the 31st December,—accompanied by Captain Laué,
Count Tchezeni, and Mr. Hunter,—the following day we pushed on to
Hareemi, a small village on the elevated plateau overlooking the
fortress of El Mezerib. The greatest consternation prevailed here
amongst the inhabitants, who were flying in every direction, as it was
reported the Egyptian advanced guard was already at Mezerib, and would
push on the next day to Hareemi, which was only a few miles distant.
“Having come thus far, I was determined to obtain all the information in
my power,—and accordingly, at daylight on the morning of the 2nd January
1841, I got my troop in their saddles, with the design of making a
forward movement,—but, as soon as I had expressed my intention of
proceeding direct to El Mezerib, the greater part positively refused to
advance, and the remainder only followed with the utmost reluctance.
After proceeding thus for two or three miles, we observed, on the
opposite side of a ravine, a number of horsemen,—probably a vidette of
the enemy, whom we could easily have driven in;—but this sight was quite
enough for my brave troops; with the exception of the European party and
my dragoman, one and all took to their heels; I returned alone to
Naplouse; nor did I ever again behold my valiant cavalry[51]!
“However, appearances strongly leading to the supposition that the
Moïadjumah bridge was the point on which Ibrahim was directing his army,
I lost no time in hurrying thither the mountaineers who had been already
assembled at Naplouse; and, on the 5th of January, I marched off my
first detachment of a few hundreds,—certainly not the most
soldierlike-looking fellows in the world,—to Jennin, which I had fixed
on as the point of assembly.
“After despatching as many of these ragamuffins as could be gathered
together, I myself proceeded to Jennin, and arriving there late at
night, found General Jochmus and his aide-de-camp, Captain De l’Or; the
latter very much elated at the wonderful exploits he said he had
recently been performing on the rear of the Egyptian army.
“To my surprise, however, I learnt that the General had given orders for
my Naplousians to return, in consequence, as he said, of the positive
intelligence received, that Ibrahim no longer intended taking the route
of Jennin. This was all very well; but having been placed in command by
the British General, I did not at all consider myself under the orders
of Jochmus Pasha; and accordingly told him, that since he had divested
me of my command, he might do what he pleased with the mountaineers, of
whom I washed my hands; and immediately mounting my horse, I made the
best of my way to Jaffa, not sorry at having an opportunity of going to
what was now likely to become the scene of active operations before
Gaza.
“Shortly after reaching Jaffa, I was sent by General Michell, along with
Reschid Pacha, to accompany and advise the movements of the left column
of the Turkish army, consisting of twelve battalions, and a dozen
field-pieces. This body was then concentrated at Jerusalem, and
instructed to join the main force in a contemplated advance on Gaza. The
whole Turkish army, including 3000 of the Emir Beschir’s cavalry, might
have amounted to between 22,000 and 25,000 men, distributed as follows:
“At Jerusalem, near Jaffa and Ramlah, 21 battalions of regular
infantry,—each battalion consisting of about 500 men,—with 18 field
pieces.—At Medjdel (to the south of Jaffa) 3500 regular cavalry.—At
Hebron 3000 irregular cavalry, composed of the Desert tribes. These,
together with the Emir Beschir’s people, were now to the number of
20,000 men concentrated on the southern frontier of Syria. The garrisons
of Beyrout and Acre being added, will make up the Turkish force to the
above amount.
“On the 13th of January, the column moved from Jerusalem, but had
scarcely proceeded half a dozen miles when intelligence arrived that
Ibrahim had crossed the Jordan at Jericho, and was advancing in our rear
on Jerusalem.
“It was resolved to halt for the night at Abou Hosh, and should this
intelligence be confirmed, to return at daybreak to Jerusalem. The news
proved correct; and we accordingly fell back on the Holy City, which we
re-occupied on the following day.
“Ibrahim Pacha had positively crossed the river; but from the incessant
rain, which for the last three days had fallen,—as I concluded he could
not possibly have got over a larger number than our own force,—as his
men were, moreover, wearied and starved, whilst our’s were fresh,—I
proposed, that after giving our people a few hours’ rest, we should
immediately advance and strike a blow, whilst his army was yet separated
by a deep and rapid torrent; and I wrote as follows to Reschid Pacha,
who, from having been educated in France, spoke and wrote the French
language with the greatest fluency:
“Jérusalem, ce 15 Janvier,
à 7 heures du soir.
“Mon Général,
“Cette pluie continue aura tellement grossi le Jourdan, qu’il sera
maintenant impossible d’y faire passer des troupes. Il n’est pas
probable que le nombre de l’ennemi qui si trouve maintenant sur la rive
droite, excède de beaucoup nos propres forces.
“Marchons demain matin une heure avant le jour, avec dix battaillons, et
fions nous à la fortune de la guerre et de nos bonnes épeés. Il me sera
superflu d’obsérver que nous ne pouvons pas éspérer que cette pluie dure
beaucoup plus long temps.
“‘Tout à vous.
“‘E. E. NAPIER,
‘_Asst. Adjt.-Gén._”
“‘A Son Excellence Reschid Pasha,
Chef de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée Ottomane, &c.
“Reschid Pasha’s reply was:
“'Mon cher Napier,
“‘Après que vous m’avez quitté j’ai vu un Arabe qui a été à Reyha
(Jericho) qui a causé avec Ibrahim, cet Arabe m’a dit qu’il pouvait
avoir à peu près trois mille hommes d’infantérie; et qu’il n’avoit point
de canons; cet homme pretend qu’ Ibrahim est parti de Reyha ce matin de
bonne heure en prenant le chemin de Chalil, ce qui indiquerait de la
part de l’ennemi l’intention de se rendu à Gaza; si cette nouvelle est
réelle, il ne faudrait pas hésiter un instant d’attaquer l’ennemi;
puisque nous avons plus d’infantérie que lui, nous avons des canons, et
si cette coquette qu’on appelle la ‘Fortune’ n’est pas avec nous: c’est
le Diable.
“‘Tout à vous,
“‘MEHMED RESCHID PASHA.”
“‘Au Major-Général[52] Napier,
&c. &c. &c.’
“Now, although the feasibleness of an attack on the Egyptians was hereby
fully allowed;—although Reschid Pasha at the time imagined that Ibrahim
was exposing his right flank in this rumoured advance on Hebron
(Chalil);—and although I not only urged, but entreated them to make the
attempt, the Turks were afraid to try the experiment; and it was decided
that the following day we should make a reconnoissance, which
accordingly took place, when we found Jericho in flames, and that
Ibrahim, after its destruction, had just recrossed the Jordan, and thus
slipped through our fingers!
“His object had evidently been to delay our junction with head-quarters,
and having effected this purpose, he was at present retiring unmolested
by the south of the Dead Sea.
“I now proposed to make a diagonal movement by Mount Hebron to try and
cut him off in that direction, as we heard that General Jochmus had
already advanced on Gaza, which, ere this, we concluded must have been
captured.
“Notwithstanding my urgent entreaties for expedition, _two_ days elapsed
ere we reached Hebron, a distance of about twenty-two miles!
“The Osmanlis, I plainly saw, still feared their old conqueror; and, on
our arrival at Hebron,—meeting there Major Wilbraham and Lieutenant
Loring, R.N., the bearers of your Convention to Ibrahim Pacha,—the
exuberant joy of the Turkish Chiefs, at the termination of hostilities,
led them, in some slight degree, to infringe the injunction of the
Prophet.
“E. NAPIER.”
“To Commodore Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.”
Footnote 36:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 294.
Footnote 37:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 295.
Footnote 38:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 295.
Footnote 39:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 295. Tahir Bey reports that after
Ibrahim re-crossed the Jordan, he lost all his infantry, and arrived
at Kerek with his cavalry only.
Footnote 40:
See page 124.
Footnote 41:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 298.
Footnote 42:
See page 128.
Footnote 43:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 270.
Footnote 44:
Ibid., pp. 271, 272.
Footnote 45:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 272.
Footnote 46:
Ibid., p. 276.
Footnote 47:
“The latter,—by the bye,—being no pass at all, but an open place in
the plains to the eastward of Gaza.”
Footnote 48:
Although these instructions from Sir Charles Smith were so termed,—and
Colonel Napier has documents from his successor, General Michell, to
prove that they were satisfactorily executed,—it appears strange that
this mission of the Colonel’s should never have been publicly made
known.
Footnote 49:
“Moïadjumah, literally meaning the ‘meeting of the waters.’”
Footnote 50:
“He had lately succeeded Sir Charles Smith.”
Footnote 51:
“Mr. Wood, in one of his official reports, gives General Jochmus the
credit of this reconnoissance, whereas I am not aware that the latter
was, at this period, ever across the Jordan.”
Footnote 52:
This title was conferred in consequence of a promise made by the
Sultan, through Lord Ponsonby, that Colonel Napier should receive the
nishan or order of that rank—which promise has as yet been kept with
true “Turkish faith.”