Examination of the Conduct of General Jochmus regarding Ibrahim Pacha’s
Retreat—Sir Robert Stopford styled by him Commander-in-Chief of
the Allied Forces—The General’s Reports to Sir Robert
Stopford—Unwillingness of the Admiral to prolong the War—Reported
Destruction of the Egyptian Army—Advance upon Gaza—Colonel
Alderson’s Narrative of the Skirmish of Medjdel.
Whether Sir Robert Stopford, as commanding the allies by sea and land,
wrote also to General Jochmus, as well as to General Michell and Captain
Stewart, I am not aware. In the official correspondence laid before
Parliament Sir Robert Stopford’s orders to these officers do not appear,
and we only learn the fact from General Michell and Captain Stewart’s
letters, but it is evident though General Jochmus commanded the army of
operation he still considered himself under Sir Robert Stopford’s
orders, for he writes to him officially from Jaffa, on the 13th of
January, 1841[29], sending him the details of his operations, in which
he styles him Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces. It appears by his
letter that he took charge of the army of operation on the 16th of
December, 1840; at that period he could not have known of the submission
of Mehemet Ali, and therefore he was quite right to make his
arrangements for driving Ibrahim from Damascus, particularly after the
rejection of the Convention, but he must have been quite aware of his
submission by the 22nd, the day he shifted his head-quarters to Hasbeya.
In one paragraph of the General’s letter he says Ibrahim had resolved to
maintain himself as long as he could in Damascus; in another he states,
that should circumstances force him to retire he had determined to march
by El Mezereib, the bridge of Moïadjumah on the Jordan, D’Jenin, Ramla,
and Gaza, to El-Arish, and this was corroborated by the Admiral having
authorized the embarkation of the sick, wounded, and women at Gaza, and
the Carysfort frigate being then in the harbour of Alexandria. What does
this prove? Why that General Jochmus must have known of the Pacha’s
submission, and of the unwillingness of the Admiral to prolong the war.
In the next paragraph he writes (remember this is to his
Commander-in-Chief, who disapproved of carrying on hostilities), “Under
such circumstances I considered it a most positive duty on my part to
defeat the intention of the Egyptian commander, and oblige him to quit
Damascus, and follow the route of the Desert; for if a Convention had
actually been signed while Ibrahim Pacha remained at Damascus, the
military question remained undecided, and the complete conquest of Syria
by the allied arms could be denied on the ground of our inability of
driving a much superior force from its capital; while, if the Egyptian
army made forcibly its way through Palestine to El Arish, its losses and
sufferings would be small, the country being rich in every resource, and
large government stores existing still at Safed, Tiberias, Ramla, and
Gaza.” Now what does this mean? that neither General Jochmus nor Lord
Ponsonby, under whose orders it appears, by General Michell’s letter, he
was acting[31], cared one straw about conventions or submission, but
were determined, if they could, to destroy as many human beings as
possible to give éclat to themselves, and please the Sultan or his
ministers. After describing what his plans were, the General writes, “It
was at this time, and it remains still, my firm conviction[30], that
victory would have crowned the Sultan’s arms in a few hours, and that
the whole of Ibrahim’s army would have been annihilated, or obliged to
surrender; the only force of his still in some state of organization
being his cavalry, and they would have been of no use in the rocky
grounds of D’Jenin.”
Here the General reckoned without his host, for there was no necessity
for Ibrahim passing by D’Jenin at all. He might have kept through the
extensive plains of Esdraelon, until he arrived at the defiles of Kakoun
between Mount Carmel and the Naplouse range, which he must have
traversed to gain the sea shore; at this point he might have been
attacked advantageously. But it appears that Ibrahim had no intention of
taking that route; his apparent hesitation at El Mezereib for three days
was probably, as General Jochmus says, to reconnoitre the Jordan, but he
had another object in view, and which it will be seen he executed with
great skill. By General Jochmus’s account he appears to have arrived at
Remtha on the 7th or 8th of January, 1841; and on the 9th a foraging
party was repulsed near Es-Salt.
“The Egyptian army,” says the General, “fairly launched into the
Desert[32], has not since been authentically heard of. When last seen,
between El Mezereib and Kalat Mefrek, its infantry was reduced to 15,000
disorderly men; its artillery, though still numerous, was utterly
disorganized, principally by desertion.”... We shall shortly see where
this wandering, disorganized army next makes its appearance.
Ibrahim, the reader already knows, quitted Damascus on the 29th of
December, 1840; General Jochmus says he left in consequence of his
military dispositions, and being blocked up within the walls of
Damascus; but surely irregular troops only, without either pay or
commissariat, were not capable of blocking up an army of upwards of
50,000 men, including about 8000 cavalry, known to be in splendid order,
150 pieces of artillery, together with 4000 or 5000 irregulars, for he
does not acquaint the Commander-in-Chief that there were any regular
Turkish troops near Damascus. The fact is, Ibrahim had received orders
from Mehemet Ali to return to Egypt, he knew of the enemy’s army
advancing by land, and it would have been imprudent, even if he had not
received orders, any longer to have delayed his retreat. Captain De l’Or
reports that in three days he lost 10,000 men and 20 guns. “The hail and
intense cold,” writes the General, “caused numerous deaths amongst the
nearly naked soldiery, in summer clothing, and the sword of the fierce
and revengeful Haouranees, the victims of Ibrahim’s abominable
oppression, was unmerciful to small detachments of straggling
deserters.” All this reputed loss of life took place after Mehemet Ali’s
submission, and after that submission was known, and the unfortunate
wretches destroyed, _if they were destroyed_, were the Sultan’s own
subjects.
General Jochmus also tells the Commander-in-Chief the valour of the
Imperial and Allied troops had done much in the conquest of a vast
country like Syria, in a short period of glory and success. How he makes
this out I am at a loss to know, for up to this time the Allied and
Imperial troops had not fired a shot since the capture of Acre, so if
the reports sent to General Jochmus were correct the whole mischief was
done by the mountaineers and irregular cavalry.
“The God of battle,” says the General, “may lead Ibrahim and his
shattered forces through the desert, and bring some troops back to the
banks of the Nile.” (We shall shortly see how many he brought to the
banks of the Nile.) “I have taken, as in duty bound, such means as may
as much as possible delay his march or diminish his chance of escape.”
And again, “It is to me an agreeable duty to state to your Excellency
the perfect unanimity which has actuated all the men of the Turkish and
allied forces during these late and extensive operations[33], which by
mere strategic combinations and movements, and with very little loss of
life, have produced great and important results; the clear proof of
Ibrahim’s having lost Syria by force of arms, and without negotiations,
the salvation of Palestine from pillage and destruction, and finally,
the enormous loss of the Egyptian General, only as far as El-Mezereib,
since he left Damascus, without calculating those reserved for him by
the sufferings of the Desert.”
By this dispatch one would suppose that the gallant General had been
destroying the Russians, the natural foes of the Porte, and not the
Egyptians, who had submitted to Turkish sway, and who ought to have been
preserved instead of destroyed. What could have been the use of all this
boasted destruction of human life? Syria would have been evacuated, the
country would have suffered less, and humanity would not have been
outraged, had not a single Turkish soldier quitted his cantonments, or
at least, had they confined themselves to precautionary and defensive
measures, so strongly recommended by General Michell and Captain
Stewart.
We now come to General Jochmus’ report of the affair of Gaza[34],
against which it has already been shown that both General Michell and
Captain Stewart protested so strongly. It appears the division intended
for the attack arrived at El-Medjdel on the 15th of January, where it
halted. Here the General changed his mind, and decided on returning to
Jaffa, and against this movement General Michell protested as strongly
as he had before done against the advance: the first he thought quite
unnecessary, and the last he thought quite improper.
Before the General retired, a party of the enemy’s irregular horse
reconnoitred his position, and were fired upon by several field-pieces
planted in an open grove, in advance of Medjdel. At this moment Colonel
Rose, who had been in search of some stray baggage with a small party of
irregular horse, accidentally coming up, charged them in the most
gallant style, and beat them; this being observed by Captains Harvey and
Wilbraham from the Turkish camp, they sallied out with a few horse,
joined Rose, and pursued the enemy for a considerable time, until the
Colonel was severely wounded, when the pursuit ended. Whether it is to
this that the General alludes I do not know, but it appears strange that
no mention is made of the British officers in the dispatch to Sir Robert
Stopford.
The account of this affair, by Colonel Alderson, of the Royal Engineers,
one of the British officers engaged, is so graphic that it cannot fail
to be highly interesting to the reader. I give it at length:
“We selected an encampment at the outskirts of the village of Medjdel,
but whilst the tents were being pitched, the assembly sounded, and it
was understood the enemy were advancing to attack our position.
“It appeared that Colonel Rose, not being able to find his servant and
baggage mule, had taken the Gaza road, to ascertain if they were in
advance, and in doing this fell in with one of our picquets patroling
the outskirts of the village; and, whilst in their company, perceived
some cavalry advancing, the main body of which appeared to consist of
several hundred men, with a picquet like our own in front. Having
therefore sent to inform the Commander-in-Chief of the advance of the
enemy, and finding that our troops were forming, he induced the Turkish
picquet to charge that of the enemy. Whilst Colonel Rose, who was
gallantly leading them on, was in the act of cutting down one of the
enemy, he received two slight wounds,—one in the breast and the other in
the back.
“By this time the whole of the Turkish force had got under arms, and the
light artillery were placed in position, and opened fire on the main
body of cavalry, now within cannon-shot. The fire of the artillery took
effect, and, as we afterwards learned, killed their colonel. They
retired immediately, and our irregular cavalry commenced the pursuit.
“I had, with two other officers, gone to Ascalon to ascertain if it were
possible to communicate with the steamers, and finding it not so, owing
to the heavy sea and thick state of the weather, was returning with
them, when we heard the report of the artillery, and putting spurs to
our horses, and gaining the summit of the high sandy ridge separating
the sea shore from the plain of Medjdel, (or possibly those of Ascalon,
the scene of the encounter of Richard Cœur-de-Leon and Saladin, at
the end of the twelfth century,) perceived our regular cavalry at the
caravanserai forming, and several other horsemen, apparently flying or
pursuing.
“We were not long in coming up with them, and found Colonel Bridgeman
and Major Wilbraham encouraging the irregular cavalry to pursue and
attack the flying foe. We joined them, and for upwards of an hour
continued the pursuit, the regular cavalry bringing up the rear, though
at a slower pace.
“As it may never be my lot to witness so extraordinary a sight again, as
the one which now took place, I will endeavour in a few words to explain
the affair of Medjdel. The irregular cavalry, on both sides, appeared to
consist of several tribes; each tribe had its standard bearer, and
little drums or tom-toms[35]. The standard-bearer is, I suppose,
selected for his bravery; as he gallops in advance, shouting with all
his might, when his followers rush up to defend the standard. If the
enemy is too strong, and he has to retire, they cover his retreat; the
object appearing, in each case, to out-manœuvre each other,
principally by feats of horsemanship. If the retiring party are
under-horsed, their pursuers seldom fail to do execution. If, on the
other hand, they have a superiority, the retreat is a feint only to
separate a portion from the main body, when they suddenly wheel round
and become in turn the assailants, cutting down those in advance before
they can rejoin their companions.
“There did not appear, as far as I could see, any desire to cross spears
or weapons. Their dress was of the most picturesque description, from
the embroidered mushalla to the simple sheepskin; nor were their arms
less various,—the musket with the bayonet fixed, the lance, blunderbuss,
pistol, sabre, dagger, and crease; and I confess the danger appeared to
me greater from our own troops in our rear, who were firing over our
heads, than from the retiring foe, who had to turn half-round to
discharge his piece, whilst his horse was at speed. Our pursuit lasted
for upwards of an hour, during which time about twenty-five of the enemy
were killed, and twenty-seven taken prisoners; when, finding General
Jochmus did not advance from his position, and the regular cavalry had
halted on a high sand-hill, some distance in the rear, we counselled our
motley brothers in arms, with whom we were enabled to communicate
through Major Wilbraham, to call together their separate tribes, and
return to the camp, as the enemy had now joined their main body, and we
were no match for them.
“We returned by the Gaza road, our pursuit having been on the sandy
hills, partially covered with grass, between it and the sea.
“The rain fell in torrents, and we returned to as wretched an encampment
as I ever remember to have witnessed. Late that night General Michell,
having received no communication from General Jochmus, sent a staff
officer to ask for the orders. They were, to march at daylight,—not,
however, to our surprise, on the road to Gaza, but back to Jaffa,
General Jochmus assigning as a reason, that the heavy rains had rendered
the roads impassable for artillery.
“General Michell had not been consulted, nor had any questions been
asked of Colonel Bridgeman, Majors Robe and Wilbraham, or myself, as to
the state of the Gaza road, although we had been nearly halfway to that
place. I will merely add, (having, since that period, twice travelled
the road by daylight,) that nearly the whole of it is a sandy soil, and
I should say the rain which had fallen had rather been beneficial than
otherwise.
“If we had disapproved of the expedition in the first instance, how much
greater was our mortification at having to abandon it after having come
in contact with the enemy.
“We learned afterwards that the Egyptian cavalry, with whom we had been
engaged at Medjdel, was making its customary reconnoissance to ascertain
if any movement had been made on the part of the Turks, as well as to
forage: and that, in all probability, the action had been brought on by
the dashing conduct of Colonel Rose in charging their advanced picquet.”
Footnote 29:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 288.
Footnote 30:
_General Michell to Viscount Palmerston._
December 31, 1840.
Our situation will be very embarrassing until the negotiations are
terminated, since any act of hostility on our part may be construed
into a breach of faith, and may disturb arrangements half concluded. I
am, therefore, anxiously expecting orders from Lord Ponsonby upon the
subject. In the meantime his Excellency’s latest instructions to
General Jochmus, and upon which he is prepared and resolved to act
with energy, dictate a continuance of offensive operations.
Footnote 31:
Alluding to the probability of his retiring by D’Jenin.
Footnote 32:
He does not give the date.
Footnote 33:
Captain Stewart and General Michell do not confirm this.
Footnote 34:
_General Jochmus to Admiral Stopford._
Head-quarters, Jaffa,
Jan. 17, 1841.
Sir,
I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that on the 14th instant
I directed a division of ten battalions of infantry, 1800 irregular
and Tatar horse, 150 regular cavalry, and 14 pieces of artillery, to
march from Ramla towards Gaza.
This latter village is abandoned by the enemy, who has a flying camp
of 1200 regular and 1800 irregular horse, with eight pieces of horse
artillery, at three-quarters of an hour’s march south of Gaza, whence
he draws his forage and provisions: but ravages, at the same time, the
country, carrying off cattle and mules to a great extent from most of
the villages south of Ramla.
The object of my movement was the protection of these villages, but
principally the destruction of the enemy’s provisions at Gaza, in case
Ibrahim Pacha, distressed in the Desert, should have struck off south
of the Dead Sea towards Gaza.
On the 14th of January the division encamped at Ashdod; on the 15th it
could only make a march of three hours to El-Meshdel on account of the
incessant heavy rain, which poured down ever since it left Ramla.
Towards the afternoon, a reconnoitring party of the enemy of 500 horse
approached the camp; but the commanding officer making a very silly
manœuvre was taken in flank and rear by about 400 or 500 of our
cavalry, who pursued him for two hours, taking between forty and fifty
prisoners, and killing and wounding as many. Our loss was about four
killed and twelve wounded.
Hearing nothing positive about Ibrahim’s immediate approach, and the
low country towards Gaza having become a complete marsh by the
continued floods of rain up to the 16th in the evening, and the troops
having been completely drenched day and night in the bivouacs, I
suspended the movement, and sent the infantry and guns to Jaffa,
advancing, at the same time, the cavalry detachments to the
neighbourhood of Ascalon and some villages towards the river of that
name, with their head-quarters at El-Mesde, intending to resume the
operations the moment the ground had become practicable; but on my
arrival here, informed officially of the complete submission of
Mehemet Ali Pacha, and the consequent cessation of the state of
rebellion of his army, our troops have been ordered to cease offensive
hostilities. His Excellency the Seraskier Ahmed Zacharias Pacha
commanded in person since we left Ramla.
I have, &c.,
(Signed) A. JOCHMUS, _Lieut.-Gen._
Footnote 35:
“Very small kettle-drums, or basins, about six inches in diameter,
covered with a parchment, and fixed on each side of the pommel of the
saddle as holster-pieces are, and beat with pieces of leather straps.
They make a monotonous noise, and always accompany Arab cavalry.”