Affairs in Syria—Letters of Sir Charles Smith to Lord Palmerston—Course
that ought to have been pursued after the Battle of
Boharsof—Ignorance as to Ibrahim’s Movements and Intentions—General
Michell to Lord Palmerston—M. Steindl’s Report respecting the
Advance upon Gaza—Capt. Stewart to the Admiral—General Michell’s
and Captain Stewart’s Opinion as to Lord Ponsonby’s
Orders—Correspondence between Captain Stewart and General Jochmus.
It will now be necessary to go back to Syria, and give an account of
what took place there after the rejection of the Convention.
It appears, by Sir Charles Smith’s letter to Lord Palmerston, dated
November 24th, 1840[18], that Ibrahim retired from Zachle and Malaka on
the 21st of that month.
Without at all putting my experience in comparison with Sir Charles
Smith’s, I must differ in opinion from him about the propriety of
attacking Ibrahim Pacha. When Sir Charles Smith took command of the
troops, Ibrahim had lost Sidon, been beat on the heights of Ornagacuan
and Boharsof, and been forced to evacuate Beyrout, Tripoli, and the
passes of the Taurus, and retire on Zachle. My opinion at the time was
for a forward movement. Ibrahim ought not to have been allowed to
concentrate at Zachle and Malaka. He ought not to have been allowed
breathing-time, and most probably the greater part of his army would
have deserted or been captured. I cannot say the Turkish troops were
well organized, but, nevertheless, they had done very well; their wants
were few, and after getting possession of Beyrout, the means of
transport was not wanting, and they were capital marchers. I do not say
that we ought to have followed them across the plain of the Bekaa
without cavalry, but we ought to have followed him up to Zachle and
Malaka, and afterwards been guided by circumstances. It appears that he
was enabled to collect 50,000 men at Damascus, of which 30,000 were
effective. Such a force being collected, there was a very good reason
for accepting a Convention, but a very bad one for rejecting it.
Sir Charles Smith further writes, under date of the 29th of
November[19], that the troops from Aleppo had commenced their retreat
from Damascus on El Mezereib on the 26th instant, and that Ibrahim Pacha
had ordered his secretaries to be ready to depart with him by the same
route, and the whole of the force under his command had moved, or was in
order of march. On comparing dates, it is impossible that Ibrahim’s army
could have moved from Damascus on the 26th, as he only left Zachle on
the 21st, the distance from thence to Damascus being three days’ march,
and it surely would have required more than two days to put in motion an
army of 50,000. I am disposed to think the intelligence was incorrect.
It is not impossible that a division might have gone to El Mezereib, but
I do not believe that Ibrahim began his final retreat till the 29th of
December.
Sir Charles further writes from Beyrout, under date of the 6th of
December[20], that a courier from Alexandria had stopped the progress of
the Egyptian army in retreat, and that Ibrahim Pacha, by intelligence of
the 2nd from Damascus, “had returned to the city, with the intention of
quartering his whole force within the walls, wisely preferring, to the
hazard of a retreat through the Desert, the guarantee of the Convention
for embarking all he possesses, (plunder as well as military stores,) at
the points we hold on the coast; such stipulation having been made clear
to his understanding, as being binding on the Allies. The contrary,
however, being the fact, he will now find himself, (accidentally as it
were,) master of a stronghold in the heart of Syria, of which he had
been virtually, if not totally, bereaved.”
How a courier could stop the progress of the Egyptian army I cannot
comprehend. The Convention was signed on the 27th of November; on the
28th Mehemet Ali sent an officer to Beyrout by a British steamer, with
orders to Ibrahim to commence his retreat; the Egyptian was to be
accompanied by a British officer to see it carried into execution. What
object, then, could Mehemet Ali have in sending a courier, even if it
was possible, which he declared it was not, in consequence of the
distracted state of the country, to order them to return? It will be
seen, by my correspondence with Boghos Bey, that Mehemet Ali always
objected to embarking his troops. I proposed that he should do so,
thinking it much better for the peace and happiness of the country, that
they should proceed by sea to Alexandria in preference to marching
through a country where the inhabitants would be exposed to all the
devastations of a retiring army. I never contemplated that his army
should be destroyed after signing a Convention; quite the contrary. The
moment the Convention was signed, Mehemet Ali could only be considered
the Sultan’s servant, and the Egyptian troops the Sultan’s army, and not
a hair of their heads ought to have been touched; and as to embarking
plunder, no part of the Convention sanctioned that, and if it had been
permitted, the blame would have rested with our own officers.
I cannot either understand how Ibrahim Pacha could have known of the
Convention which only left Alexandria on the 28th in the afternoon, so
as to have allowed him time, had he quitted Damascus on the 27th, to
return on the 2nd of December; nor can I understand how he could suppose
the Convention should be binding on the Allies, when it was immediately
rejected by the authorities in Syria, and his officer sent back without,
I believe, landing at Beyrout; nor do I see how he had either been
virtually or totally bereaved of his stronghold in Syria, seeing that if
he had ever quitted Damascus and returned, it was his own act and deed.
Sir Robert Stopford received the intelligence of Ibrahim’s retreat at
Marmorice Bay on the 13th of January, which he communicated to the
Admiralty, adding, “my orders to Commodore Sir Charles Napier may by
this time have been the means of facilitating his retreat[21].”
Captain Stewart writes to the Admiral from Jaffa, January the 10th[22]:
“General Jochmus reached this from Jerusalem yesterday morning early;
and we find that he has given such orders as will complete a line of
twenty-eight battalions betwixt this place and Jerusalem, and that all
will be in position by sunset this evening. The chief object of this
advance seems to be to induce Ibrahim Pacha to retire by the Desert, and
not by the coast. We have been somewhat in doubt and suspense as to
which road he would retire by; but news reached the Seraskier last
night, which is believed to be authentic, stating, that Ibrahim’s
vanguard was already thirteen hours’ march to the south-east of
El-Mezereib, and that, consequently, there was no longer any doubt of
his taking the Desert route. It is very difficult to get information,
and still more so to know how much to believe; but my own opinion, and
(what is of much more importance,) General Michell’s opinion is, that
Ibrahim is positively evacuating Syria. General Michell and I are both
determined to confine ourselves strictly to precautionary and defensive
measures; and we shall use every endeavour to prevail on our allies to
do the same, and not to obstruct, but rather to facilitate, Ibrahim’s
retreat.” By this it appears that Captain Stewart and General Michell
had also orders to facilitate Ibrahim’s retreat; and with the exception
of the irregulars and mountaineers harassing, and occasioning some
losses, unavoidable in a retreating army, but very much exaggerated by
the officers sent by General Jochmus, who reports them to have lost
10,000 or 15,000 men, on the 5th of January nothing had been done by the
Turkish army who occupied Acre, Jerusalem, defiles of D’Jenin, Jaffa,
and Ramla.
General Michell writes to Lord Palmerston, dated Acre, December 31,
1840[23]:—
“On the departure of Sir Charles Smith, the Sultan’s commission was
delivered to General Jochmus, and a few days afterwards he left Beyrout
for Sidon, and proceeded thence with some light cavalry to Hasbeyah in
the hill country on the Upper Jordan, for the purpose of giving
encouragement and direction to the mountaineers, and of obtaining
accurate intelligence concerning the Egyptian army.
“The most vague and conflicting accounts were arriving daily as to the
intentions of Ibrahim Pacha. He had concentrated his forces about
Damascus, and the general belief was that he would immediately commence
his retreat to Egypt.
“General Jochmus, notwithstanding his nearer approach to Damascus, has
been still kept in doubt as to what is going on there; but he seems to
be fully of opinion that Ibrahim Pacha is about to move, and that he
will, if possible, retreat on Gaza. His proposal, therefore, is to cause
the Egyptian Army to be harassed on its flanks and rear by the mountain
levies, and having assembled the regular Turkish troops at points along
the coast, to operate with them as occasions may offer, in the defiles
between the Jordan and the coast. In the mean time General Jochmus has
been very desirous of attacking Gaza, and of capturing or destroying the
provisions which are said to be in store there for the Egyptian army,
and he has repeatedly urged my co-operation for this purpose with
men-of-war or steamers on the coast. There have been, however, and are
still, many difficulties opposed to such an undertaking. The whole of
the fleet had taken shelter at Marmorice, leaving only one steamer to
watch the wreck of the Zebra in the Bay of Acre, besides the Hecate,
which brought me to Beyrout; yet three French vessels, a corvette, and
two brigs of war, remained upon the coast and were generally at anchor
near Beyrout. I took the earliest opportunity of making this known to
the Admiral, Sir Robert Stopford, and he most kindly and promptly sent
Captain Houston Stewart with the Benbow, seventy-two, and the Hazard
sloop. They arrived on the 24th of December, but the heavy surf
prevented their communication with the shore, and it was not until the
27th that I could get the detachments of artillery and sappers, which
came from England in the Hecate, disembarked at Acre. In the mean time,
however, Lieutenant-Colonel Colquhoun of the Artillery, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson of the Engineers, had made a visit to that
fortress, and likewise to Tyre and Sidon.
“The Admiral, while he sent me this naval aid, expressed a great
unwillingness to have it employed against Gaza or in any offensive
operations; first, on account of the storms prevailing at this season;
secondly, because the negotiations opened by Captain Fanshawe were still
pending, and he had consented to a request, made by the Pacha of Egypt,
Mehemet Ali, that Egyptian steamers might go off Gaza to embark the
sick, the women, and the children, of Ibrahim Pacha’s army, for
Alexandria.
“Captain Houston Stewart had instructions from the Admiral based upon
these reasons; and they of course weighed also with me as to any
operations against Gaza; besides I had received information of the
Egyptian force there, and at El-Arish, having been largely reinforced.
“Nothing has been seen of the Egyptian steamers from Alexandria, to
receive the sick of Ibrahim Pacha’s army. When that permission was given
by Captain Fanshawe, it was supposed the army was already on its march
to Gaza, and not likely to linger at Damascus. Probably Ibrahim Pacha
delays his movement from that city, now, in consequence of the
Convention commenced with his father by Captain Fanshawe. Our situation
will be very embarrassing until the negotiations are terminated, since
any act of hostility on our part may be construed into a breach of
faith, and may disturb arrangements half concluded. I am, therefore,
anxiously expecting orders from Lord Ponsonby upon the subject. In the
meantime his Excellency’s latest instructions to General Jochmus, and
upon which he is prepared and resolved to act with energy, dictate a
continuance of offensive operations.”
As I have before stated, we now see the Commander-in-Chief of the allied
force by sea and land giving directions to his officers to facilitate
the retreat of Ibrahim Pacha, and the Austrian Ambassador declaring he
would disavow any attack upon him, thereby maintaining good faith with
Mehemet Ali; and the Ambassador at Constantinople giving orders to his
general to continue offensive operations, thereby compromising not only
the honour of England but of the Allied Powers.
M. Steindl, in a letter to Baron Stürmer, dated the 10th of January,
writes from Jaffa[24],—
“General Jochmus, escorted by 100 Turkish cavalry, continued in the mean
time to traverse the mountains of the Naplouse and the districts
situated between the Jordan and the Haouran, in order to assemble as
many mountaineers as possible. He formed several corps of them, the
command of which he entrusted to M. Dumont and Count Szechenyi, his
aides-de-camp, for the purpose of harassing Ibrahim Pacha during his
retreat, whilst he ordered Omar Pacha, who was stationed at Ramla, with
2500 men, to form a junction with a portion of the garrisons of Jaffa
and of Jerusalem, and to attempt a sudden attack upon Gaza, in order
there to burn the considerable magazines of provisions which Mehemet Ali
had caused to be transported thither to facilitate the retreat of his
son’s army by that road.
“The English loudly disavowed this attack, less, as it appears, because
they despaired of success, than because Admiral Stopford had indicated
to Mehemet Ali that town as the place where the Egyptians should
concentrate themselves to be embarked for Alexandria, in case an
arrangement could be brought about between the Sultan and his vassal.
For this purpose, Rechid Mehemed Pacha, appointed Chief of the Staff at
head-quarters, was sent on the 5th instant from St. Jean d’Acre to
Tiberias to General Jochmus, with orders to invite him to proceed to
Jaffa to be present at a great council of war, whilst the same order was
sent by Tatar to Omar Pacha, with a prohibition against attacking Gaza.
General Jochmus arrived here in the course of yesterday, still leaving
his aides-de-camp at the head of the armed peasantry.”
On the 17th of January Captain Stewart again writes to the
Commander-in-Chief from Jaffa[25]:—
“My letter of the 10th instant[26], forwarded by Gorgon, would inform
you of General Michell’s and my own determination to confine ourselves
strictly to precautionary and defensive measures. It will be therefore
necessary to explain the circumstances attending a late advance of the
Turkish troops upon Gaza, and for this purpose I transmit herewith
copies of a letter I addressed to General Jochmus, immediately after our
last conference on the 12th instant, also of a note which I received
from General Michell, after he had reached Ramla, and my reply to that
note, sent by a staff officer to General Michell, at Ashdod.
“General Michell expressed, in the most decided and unequivocal terms,
his disapprobation of the expedition. We both appealed to the Seraskier,
who refused to put his written veto on the advance, without which
General Jochmus declared he would persevere, and accordingly he left
Jaffa for Ramla within an hour. General Michell then felt that he was in
a peculiarly awkward position, but with the true spirit of an English
soldier determined to accompany and render every assistance to the
Turkish generals.
“I also felt myself bound, notwithstanding my protest, to go down with
the Vesuvius and Hecate, and make a demonstration on the coast,
especially as I thought I might render material assistance, by either
threatening a descent on the Egyptians’ rear to the southward of Gaza,
by which their retreat on El-Arish would be endangered, or in case of
the Turks retreating, protecting with the great guns that hazardous
operation.
“At 4 A.M. of Friday the 15th, we weighed in the Vesuvius and Hecate,
and proceeded as far as Ascalon, when the weather became so thick, and
blew so hard, with a heavy increasing sea, that after showing ourselves
again off Jaffa, I requested Captain Henderson to run out fifteen or
twenty miles for an offing, bank up the fires, and put the vessels under
canvass. At 2 A.M. on the 16th, it being then more moderate, we bore up,
and at daylight we put the steam on and steered towards Ascalon, but on
getting sight of the beach, the surf was so excessive as to preclude all
hope of being able to communicate with the shore for many hours to come.
We therefore unwillingly returned off Jaffa, where we were not able to
effect a landing until sunset, when I found General Michell just
returned, having preceded the returning Turkish troops. The Seraskier
had reached Jaffa about two hours previous to General Michell.
“I ought to have stated, that by General Michell’s desire, twenty-five
marines were embarked on board the Vesuvius under command of Lieutenant
Anderson, and a like number on board the Hecate; these have all since
been disembarked here.”
General Michell writes to Capt. Stewart[27], “Mr. Wood is prepared to
give us in writing very powerful arguments in favour of a continuation
of active offensive operations; his letter from Lord Ponsonby, after
Captain Fanshawe’s arrival at Constantinople, is strong upon the
subject.” To which Stewart replies[28], “We know Lord Palmerston’s and
the British Government’s wishes and orders. Lord Ponsonby’s orders must
with us be subordinate to Lord Palmerston’s; we have promised the
Admiral that we will act strictly on precautionary and defensive
principles.”
Captain Stewart’s letter to General Jochmus, above referred to, and the
reply, were as follow:
“British Head-quarters, Jaffa,
January 12, 1841, 3 P.M.
“Sir,
“In order that there may be no misapprehension on the subject of our
conferences yesterday and to-day, I think it right to put the
particulars into writing.
“When Rechid Pacha came to General Michell and myself yesterday morning,
he stated that Ibrahim Pacha’s army being now fairly entered on the
Desert, there could be no reason for the 3000 Egyptian men quartered at
Gaza being permitted to remain there, and asked us if we would concur in
an advance which should have the effect of ridding the Syrian country of
the plunderers. General Michell and I both said that our instructions
being to facilitate the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians, there
could be no political reason to prevent our co-operation, and that,
provided the forces advanced were so great as to make resistance
hopeless, and certain information received of Ibrahim Pacha having
advanced south of any road by which he could march upon Gaza, there
appeared to be none of a military nature.
“Very shortly after this, Rechid Pacha returned with your Excellency,
when the same points were distinctly stated, and you expressed your
conviction of the impossibility of Ibrahim’s coming upon Gaza; that we
should advance close to it, and you would send notice to the Egyptian
troops, that they might have twenty-four hours to retreat, after which
you would attack and occupy Gaza. Rechid Pacha said he would go
immediately to Jerusalem, from whence he would write positive
information, upon which we might safely rely; that we should not move
from this place until we received his communications. After his
departure, General Michell and I paid your Excellency two visits, in
which we found out, on examination of maps and Egyptian officers who had
deserted from Gaza, that it was not only possible but very probable that
Ibrahim might come on Gaza by the end of the Dead Sea, and that he might
reach it within two days of the time in which your troops could. You
then avowed that your aim was not to facilitate his retreat, but to
annihilate his army, and prevent a single Egyptian getting back to his
own country.
“The Seraskier Zacharias Pacha, your Excellency, General Michell, and
myself had a meeting this forenoon, at which you stated it to be your
determination to advance; that you had ordered the troops at Jerusalem
to make a combined movement on Gaza with those from Ramla; and that 6000
men and 1400 cavalry (900 of them being irregular), with twenty-four
guns, would attack Gaza, destroy the provisions, and immediately retire,
leaving two battalions in the place; that if Ibrahim Pacha appeared you
would retire, and that, if he pressed you, you could retreat on the
mountains near Jerusalem. There appeared to General Michell and to me
such an evident and imminent hazard in this operation, and so inadequate
an object to be gained, so much evil would result from a retrograde
movement, such disaster from defeat, that I declared I could be no party
to it, and that so long as it was not ascertained beyond doubt that
Ibrahim Pacha was not coming on Gaza, I could not afford any naval
co-operation.
“It is with sincere pain that I have come to this resolution; your
Excellency has had no reason to doubt the hearty co-operation hitherto
of Her Britannic Majesty’s naval forces in promoting the Sultan’s cause;
but I should be betraying my trust, and acting in direct opposition to
my orders, if I concurred in any operations which had for their object
the prevention or suspension of Ibrahim Pacha’s evacuation of Syria.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “HOUSTON STEWART,
“_Captain and Senior Officer commanding
H.B.M. ships and vessels on the Coast of Syria_.”
“Head-quarters, Jerusalem,
“January 25, 1841.
“Sir,
“I had the honour to receive your letter of the 12th of January only on
the 17th, and active operations have prevented my answering this before.
“It would be superfluous to enter now into any details on its varied
contents, since fortune and victory have declared on all sides for me by
the total rout of the Egyptians, thus consoling me, in a certain degree,
for that want of confidence in my judgment which it is evident you
entertain, with respect to my operations in the field. Unskilful as I
may be deemed as a military commander, it must at least be confessed,
from the recent march of events, that I am certainly a very fortunate
one. I must, however, most distinctly advert to, and refute two points
upon which a great part of the critical acumen, contained in the letter
in question, appears to be erroneously based; stating first, that I am
not aware of any person in Syria being in the secret of my operations,
and cognizant of all my plans, until after their execution, since I
consider secresy the mainspring of success; and secondly, that I do not
admit the right of any naval officer, on a special station, to attempt
to control those operations, in the way you have thought proper to
assume, upon the same principle, as I suppose would guide you, were I to
presume to give you a lesson on the best mode of managing your ship. At
the same time I am, and have always been, most happy to receive any
opinion or explanation, provided they be given with the courtesy and
respect due to the General intrusted with the operations of the army.
“It is to me a matter of regret, that after the transcendant services
rendered by the British fleet in the very last operation, you should
have thought proper to decline any naval co-operation in the projected
movements on Gaza, but it certainly is to me much more a cause of
surprise, that you should have thought proper to write an official
letter, on an occasion where naval co-operation could not even make any
serious impression on the inland position of the enemy, and where the
sole column of Ramleh was more than doubly sufficient to attain my
object. It is well known, that after the defeat of part of the Egyptian
cavalry at El-Maishdell on the 15th instant, the enemy never ventured
again to meet our troops beyond the river Ascalon, although I advanced
our cavalry, which was not half his in number, on the following day, and
left it encamped within an hour and a half’s march of Gaza, whilst, at
the same time, I sent the infantry and artillery into Jaffa, on account
of the inclement weather and impracticable state of the roads. Under
these circumstances, it would, in my opinion, have been perfectly
consistent with your responsibility, not to have given any naval
assistance in this operation, but without officially declining it after
my return to Jaffa, the more so, as I fully agreed with you on the
impossibility of the steamers being of any immediate use; but it seems
to have been your particular desire to have made the whole transaction a
matter of official correspondence, which, although I do not decline, I
would fain hope is now brought to a close.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “A. JOCHMUS, _Lieut.-General_,
“_Commanding the Army of Operation_.”
“To Capt. Houston Stewart, R.N.,
Commanding the Naval Forces off Jaffa.”
Footnote 18:
_Major-General Sir C. F. Smith to Viscount Palmerston._
My Lord, Head-quarters, Beyrout, Nov. 24,
1840.
I have great satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship that a prudent
adherence to my instructions from the Foreign Office has struck a
heavier blow on the army of Ibrahim Pacha than a series of general
actions could have achieved. Each succeeding victory could only have
withdrawn us so much farther from our resources, without advancing, in
any degree, the cause we have in hand. I take not merit to myself,
unless it be for my forbearance. For the number and the nature of the
troops under my command, and the extended line of coast I have to
guard, compelled me to be strictly on the defensive in the towns
already in our possession, whilst a forward movement would have been
unmilitary and unmeaning.
Wearied in waiting for an opportunity of practising his
well-disciplined cavalry and artillery upon a detachment of Turkish
infantry, Ibrahim, on the 21st instant, broke up from Zachle and
Malaka in full retreat on Damascus, where he now is with 30,000 men,
including 7000 cavalry and artillery. He has pushed a corps of 3000
irregular cavalry to El Mezereib, on the road towards Mecca,—the only
route now open to him for a final retreat into Egypt,—whither I
calculate on his going the moment he receives from Alexandria the
political news brought by the Oriental.
In as far as regards the sway of Mehemet Ali in Syria, I look upon the
military part of the question as determined.
I have, &c.,
(Signed) C. F. SMITH, _Major-Gen. Commanding_.
P.S. The Emir Effendi and other chiefs who left Ibrahim near Damascus,
report his force to exceed 50,000, of whom 40,000 are said to be
effective.
C.F.S.
Footnote 19:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 119.
Footnote 20:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 119.
Footnote 21:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 163.
Footnote 22:
Ibid., p. 164.
Footnote 23:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 202.
Footnote 24:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 204.
Footnote 25:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 265.
Footnote 26:
See p. 103.
Footnote 27:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 268.
Footnote 28:
Ibid., p. 268.