STATE OF PARTIES, AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS.
In dedicating a chapter to the consideration of the state of parties,
and the probable political prospects of Spain, I am anxious to avoid the
imputation of any assumption of superior knowledge, or exclusive
information. My knowledge upon these subjects has no farther claim to
superiority than that which arises from its having been gathered upon
the spot: this ought, no doubt, to count for something; both because a
resident in a country is better situated for judging of the authenticity
of information, and is able to avail himself of a greater number of
sources; and because, from personal observation, many helps are
obtained. During the several months that I remained in Madrid, my
acquaintance lay among men of all parties. With Carlists, Royalists, and
Liberals, I was upon terms of equal intimacy; and I never found, among
men of any party, the least backwardness in speaking privately the
sentiments of their party; or in avowing its views, and speculating upon
its prospects. Many have been so candid as to avow themselves
hypocrites. Military men in Madrid, and at Barcellona, sworn to support
the government, have admitted to me that they were Carlists,--associated
in private societies of that party which held their meetings every
second night: and employées in Toledo, dependents upon the existing
government, who, in that hot-bed of ultraism, found it prudent even to
pretend some sympathy with the opinions of the Carlists, have told me in
confidence, that they were neither Loyalists nor Carlists, but Liberals.
From this it may be gathered, that a person residing in Spain, and
unsuspected of any improper object, may, without much difficulty, learn
the opinions and views of men of different parties. The conclusions
which I may occasionally draw, many may think erroneous. I will only
say, that I am unconscious of being biassed by prejudice; and whatever
I set down shall be based as much as possible upon fact and observation.
I left England in the belief that there existed in Spain two great
parties,--the Constitutionalists, and the adherents of the government;
the latter party indeed somewhat divided,--and comprising many shades of
opinion, ranging from absolutism, to a point somewhere between that and
moderation. But this estimate I discovered to be very erroneous. I found
three parties in Spain: the Absolutists, there denominated Carlists; the
Government party, there called the moderate party; and the Liberals. The
most influential of these parties is, beyond all question, the first.
Reckoning the total population of Spain, this party is by far the most
numerous; it comprises the great mass of the lower orders throughout
Spain; and in many parts, almost the whole population,--as in Toledo,
the towns and villages of the Castiles, and the provinces of Murcia and
Catalunia. It comprises, with few exceptions, the 130,000 friars, and a
great majority of the clergy, and it comprises a considerable
proportion of the military, both officers and privates; but chiefly the
former. With such components, it is evident that this party does not
depend for its power, solely upon its numerical superiority. Every one
knows, that there is uncounted wealth in the convents and churches of
Spain. I do not speak merely of the wealth in jewels, and golden urns,
and images, locked up in Toledo, and Seville, and Murcia, and the
Escurial, and elsewhere,--though much of this would, without doubt, be
made a ready sacrifice to the necessities of the party; but also of the
more available riches, well known to be possessed by many orders of
friars; among others, by the Carthusians, the Dominicans, and
Hieronomites. Hundreds of the convents in Spain have no possible way of
consuming their revenues--for it is a fact, that the poor orders are
invariably the most numerous; and we generally find a very limited
fraternity in those convents whose revenues are the largest. In the
Carthusian convent, at Granada, there are only nine monks; and the land
for more than half a league round, and comprising numerous country
houses, and hamlets, is the property of this convent. In the Convento
de los Reyes, in the neighbourhood of Valencia, there are indeed
twenty-seven monks; but one of their number admitted to me, that the
revenues of the convent exceeded 500,000 reals, (5000_l._ sterling): and
in the neighbourhood of Murviedro, (the ancient Saguntum), there is
another convent of Carthusians, which owns seven villages, and a tract
of land as rich as any in Spain, nearly a league square, and which
contains only seven monks.
In place of three of these examples, as many hundreds might be given.
The same monk who admitted to me the amount of the revenues of the
Convento de los Reyes, said, in reply to my question as to what they did
with so much wealth, that “times of need might come;” and there can be
little doubt that other friars might make a similar reply. Nor can it be
doubted, that many of the reputed poor orders, who live upon charity,
have no need of it. The prayers, blessings, and other godly offices of
the Franciscans, bear the highest value in the market of superstition;
and in those convents in which the visitor dare not put money into the
hands of the friar, I have frequently been reminded, that a certain
little golden saint, or silver virgin, accepted the _pecetas_ which were
laid upon their altars. This cannot be considered a digression, because
it explains another source of influence, besides physical strength,
possessed by the apostolicals.
It scarcely requires that I should adduce any proof of the fact stated,
that the lower orders, and the friars, are attached to the party of
Carlists. The present government of Spain is considered by the friars to
be guided too much by moderate principles. They perceive that they lose
a little ground; and, shut out as they are in a great measure, from
commerce with the world, they are ignorant of the pace at which the
world moves: and the secret is breaking upon them but slowly, that the
strength of governments lies in free institutions. They still fancy that
men are to be governed by the scourge and the cowl; and believe that
another Philip II. would elevate the fortunes of Spain, and raise up all
the props of the Roman Catholic faith. I have myself heard one of the
monks in the Escurial say, that the king was no friend to them: and
then, pointing to the urn of Philip, pass an eulogium upon _his_ virtues
and piety. If any other proof were needed, of the attachment of the
friars to the Carlist party, the circumstance mentioned in a former
chapter might be stated; that the chief of the Franciscan order was
detected in a conspiracy to overturn, or at least to overawe the
government. I need say nothing of the lower orders, because, with few
exceptions, they and the friars are one.
I have said, that a great proportion of the regular clergy also are
Carlists. I know that many are not; because many are intelligent men,
who have at all events the acuteness to perceive, that a more despotic
government would not secure its permanency; and whose alarm at the
progress of liberalism in the world, is not so great as that of the
friars. But the majority of the priesthood are ignorant; and the
majority are therefore Carlists. Besides, their interest lies that
way--the head of the church in Spain, the Archbishop of Toledo, is the
head of the party; the Archbishop of Seville is one of its warmest
partizans; and almost all the archbishops and bishops, hold similar
sentiments: the curate, therefore, who envies the luxuries of a canon,
must both profess his adherence to that party, and employ his influence
in its favour.
To the friars, the priests, and the lower orders, I have added a part of
the military, as partizans of the Carlists; I might also include a
considerable number of the employées. That such is the fact, I have had
many personal proofs, as well as information from the most authentic
sources. The reason alleged by those in government employment, whether
civil or military, for being favourably disposed towards that party
which would rather see Don Carlos than Ferdinand at the head of the
government, is, _the indecision of the king’s character_. They say that
merit is not rewarded; that services are not requited; that promotion is
not upon a footing of justice; and that neither in civil nor military
service, is there any dependence upon government favour, which shines or
is withdrawn by caprice--which favouritism purchases, and slander
destroys. All this they ascribe, and probably with justice, to the
king’s _want of character_: and the idea among them is very general,
that under Don Carlos, a system of greater justice, and impartiality,
and decision, would be pursued in every department of the state. I have
sometimes wished, when I have heard these good qualities attributed to
Don Carlos, that he possessed, along with them, some of those other
virtues which Spain requires in a sovereign: there might, in that case,
be a more speedy prospect of happiness for Spain.
Such appear to me to be the elements of the party called Carlists,--the
strongest in numbers and wealth, and the weakest in intelligence.
Classing the parties according to their numerical strength, I must next
mention the party called Liberals; but generally, in England, known by
the name of Constitutionalists. If, by this party, be meant those who
desire a return to the Constitution of 1820; or who would be satisfied
to leave the settlement of the government to the wisdom of an army of
refugees,--there is no such party in Spain: but if, by the liberal
party, we are to understand those who perceive the vices of the present
government, and who dread still more the ascendancy of the Carlists;
those who view with satisfaction the progress of enlightened opinions
in politics and in religion, and who desire earnestly that Spain should
be gradually assimilated in her institutions, with the other civilized
nations of Europe,--then the liberal party comprises the principal
intelligence of the country; and subtracting from the population, the
lowest orders, the employées, the friars, and the priests, it possesses
a great numerical majority. In any other country than Spain, this party
would wield an influence to which its numerical strength would not
entitle it; but in Spain, the light of intellect spreads but a little
way; for it has to struggle with the thick mists of ignorance and
superstition; and when we say that the liberal party comprises nearly
all the intelligence of the country, it must be remembered, that
intelligence is but scantily sprinkled over the face of Spain; and that,
therefore, enlightened Spain, and enlightened England, ought to convey
very different ideas of numerical strength.
It is a curious fact, that the adherents of the existing government
should be the fewest in number; yet, this is certainly the truth. With
the exception of perhaps the majority of the employées, a part of the
regular clergy, and the greater part of the army, its friends are very
thinly scattered; and its influence scarcely extends beyond the sphere
of its actual benefits. Its patronage has been greatly circumscribed
since the lost of the Americas; its lucrative appointments are centred
in a few; and above all, its power and patronage are held by so
uncertain a tenure, that few, excepting those in the actual enjoyment of
office, feel any assurance that their interests lie in supporting that
which seems to hang together almost by a miracle.
The only security of a despotic government is strength; and this
security the Spanish government wants altogether. It has no strength in
the affections of the people generally; and even among the military and
employées, which are its only strength, there are many disaffected. When
the king returned, after the overthrow of the constitution, every
measure was adopted that might give a fictitious strength to the
government: a clean sweep was made of all the employées, from the
highest to the lowest; and whether holding their offices for life, or
at pleasure. These, under the constitution, had been selected from
amongst the best educated classes; but all who had been connected with
the liberal party being excluded from employment under the succeeding
government, the public offices were necessarily filled up with persons
of inferior station. Another stroke of policy was intended, in the
_distribution_ of office: in no country is there so great a division of
labour in public employments as in Spain; the duties of an office
formerly held by one person, were delegated to three, and the emoluments
split in proportion,--by which policy, a greater number of persons were
interested in upholding the government.
A third measure of policy I have mentioned in a former chapter; that of
remodelling the universities, and seminaries of learning, and putting
them under the superintendence of Jesuits: and a fourth, was intended to
secure the fidelity and increase the numerical strength of the military.
To effect the first of these objects, a new body of guards, in all
nearly 20,000 men, was raised, and _officered_ by children. The king
said, he would not have a single officer in the guards old enough to
understand the meaning of the word constitution; and even now, that
several years have elapsed, the officers are, almost without exception,
boys.
To protect the government by the numerical strength of military, his
majesty invited the organization of a force to be called Royalist
Volunteers, to come in place of the national volunteers who existed
during the time of the constitution. The term volunteer was a misnomer;
because government held out temptations irresistible to the lower
classes,--a new suit of clothes, and pay two days in the week, besides
some other little gratuities: the consequence was, that a body called
Royalist Volunteers, amounting to about 160,000, was speedily embodied.
Such were the measures adopted by a government that sought to base
itself, not upon the affections of the people, or upon its own merits;
but which trusted rather in the zeal of hirelings, the precepts of
Jesuits, and the purchased bulwark of bayonets. But these acts of
political sagacity have added little to the real strength of the
government: the change of all men in public office, made as many
enemies as friends; and the exclusion of so many educated men, created a
necessity for the employment of many low and unprincipled men, who by
their bad conduct, have helped to lower the government in public
opinion. The fetters put upon education offended many,--because the
change from a better to a worse plan of education was soon perceived by
the heads of families, in the more limited range of knowledge offered to
their children; and the establishment of a volunteer force, is well
known throughout Spain to have endangered, rather than strengthened the
government. That force is composed for the most part of the lowest
orders; and it is quite a matter of notoriety, that the great majority
of these men are Carlists,--a thing proved indeed by the discovery of
the conspiracy, in which they had agreed to take an active part.
With such elements as those which compose the adherents of government,
and with so total an absence of that kind of support to which alone an
absolute government dare trust, it seems impossible that the existing
government can long maintain its authority; and the probability of its
dissolution will appear the greater, by citing a few facts, proving its
utter rottenness; its perfect contempt of honour and justice in its
dealings with its subjects; and its constant and flagrant acts of
oppression. I cannot well separate the examples, because the bad acts of
the government are not simply oppression, or injustice; but compounds of
oppression, injustice, and weakness. I shall take them as they present
themselves to my memory.
While I was in Madrid, a grandee, a favourite at court, whose name I
regret I cannot recollect, being deeply in debt, and harassed by his
creditors, and unwilling, although extremely wealthy, to limit the
number of his enjoyments, went to the king and laid the case before his
royal master; who, sympathizing in the pecuniary distress of the noble,
exercised the prerogative of a king who is above law, by immediately
presenting him with a royal order, by which he was secured in the
undisturbed possession of his revenues for ten years,--his creditors
being interdicted during that time from making any demand upon their
debtor. The grandee called his creditors together; and when they
supposed they were about to be paid, he produced the royal order,
against which there was no appeal. No act of oppression could be more
base than this; it was a total suspension of law, exercised without
reason; a royal license to commit robbery; and of the worst kind, the
robbery of the poor by the rich. It is more than probable, however, that
before the lapse of ten years, the signature of Ferdinand VII. will have
ceased to inspire fear, or exact obedience.
The following circumstance I know to be true. The Duke of Liria
(Berwick) having got into difficulties, put himself under, or was put
under _secrésto_ (sequestration), and was allowed 10,000_l._ per annum
from his revenues. It so happened that the duke had an attack of gout,
and that he was obliged in consequence to absent himself a few weeks
from court. One evening, while he was sitting at home, a letter was
delivered to him, sealed with the royal seal; and, upon opening the
letter, he found it to be an order of the king, that he should pay
2500_l._ of his income yearly to his grandmother in Paris. Thus, without
process, without cause, without any previous intimation made to the
Duke of Berwick, without any opportunity being given to him of objecting
to this inroad upon his property, he was deprived, by a dash of the
king’s pen, of 2500_l._ per annum. This was accomplished by the intrigue
of the duke’s grandmother. The sequel to the story, by which it will be
seen that the duke regained his money, does not in any respect alter the
act of tyranny that deprived him of it; but only exemplifies the
indecision of the king’s character. The duchess, who happened to be a
spirited woman, and who knew the character of the king, immediately
ordered her coach, drove to the palace, asked an audience, saw the king,
and returned in less than an hour with the revocation of the order in
her hand.
While at Seville, I learned some very gross instances of injustice
practised by the government in its dealings with its subjects. My
authority could not be more authentic, because my informant--an old and
highly respectable merchant--was himself the person who had suffered. A
debt of 1600_l._ was due to him by government, upon a contract for
supplying cartridge boxes; this debt had been some years due, and he
had applied for payment often, and in vain. At length, having some other
business in Madrid, he resolved to attempt the recovery of the debt, by
preferring his claim in the proper quarter. Day after day, he went to
the minister; sometimes he was denied admittance,--sometimes he saw the
minister, and was always treated by him with the utmost rudeness: this
was his first transaction with government, and he had yet to learn its
way of doing business. One day, when he was leaving the minister, and
slowly passing towards the stair, a reverend gentleman touched his
sleeve, and begged to know what was the cause of his frequent visits to
the minister: the merchant told him his business. “And do you expect to
receive payment of the debt?” demanded the priest. “I despair of it,”
replied the merchant. “Then,” resumed the priest, “you would probably
sacrifice a small part to obtain the rest;” and upon the merchant
admitting that he would gladly do this,--“Come,” said the priest,
“to-morrow early, and I’ll undertake that you shall have your money!”
The merchant kept his appointment; the priest was waiting--the merchant
never saw the minister; and in less than half an hour, the priest put
into his hands an order for 1200_l._, upon the treasury at Seville; the
remaining 400_l._ being the perquisite of the minister and his
emissary:--yet even after this, it was necessary to sacrifice another
100_l._, before payment of the order could be obtained at Seville. All
this is according to usual practice: no settlement of any government
account can be obtained without making a large sacrifice; sometimes as
much as a third, or even a half. The system of bribery is universal,
from the minister to the lowest official: sometimes the individual is
robbed, sometimes the treasury. If the transaction lie between the
government and an individual, the minister and his go-between are the
gainers, and the contractor is robbed. If the affair lie between
individuals and employées--as officers of the customs--a false return of
duties is made to government; the merchant and the employée pocket the
difference; and the government is robbed: this is a regular part of the
settlement of every custom-house transaction. At Malaga, I learnt a
curious instance of this, adding another to the many proofs of a weak
and disorganized government. All vessels chartered from Gibraltar for
Malta, Corfu, or any foreign port in the Mediterranean, but carrying
part cargo for Malaga, are obliged, while they remain at Malaga, to
deposit all goods _in transitu_ in the custom-house, as a preventive
against smuggling. Such vessels are well known to be freighted with
English goods, or with tobacco, or with other goods either prohibited,
or upon which high duties are payable: in fact, the vessel is a
smuggler,--and how is this matter arranged? The captain deposits a
hundred bales of goods in the custom-house, being the whole of the goods
entered for the foreign port; and when the vessel leaves the port, the
same number of bales must be shipped,--and so they are; but during their
deposit in the custom-house, they have suffered a wonderful diminution
in bulk. Bales which measured a yard square, are reduced to the size of
footballs; the bales, such as they are, are reshipped;--the vessel has
disburdened herself of her contraband cargo, and in place of proceeding
to Malta, returns to Gibraltar. I relate this, not of course as an
example of government oppression or injustice, but as a proof of the
lax and unhinged state of the government, and of the total want of
integrity that pervades every department of the public service: and
before recurring to other instances of government oppression or
injustice, let me mention another incident, proving that the same system
extends even to the army. A regiment of cavalry arrived at Granada
sometime last spring; and the soldiers being in want of new spurs, the
colonel sent for a tradesman, and told him what he wanted. The tradesman
named a certain price: “No,” said the colonel, “you must let me have
them at half that price;” the tradesman agreed, premising only that the
spurs would not last a week. This was of no importance to the colonel;
the spurs were delivered, the account was made out at _the price first
demanded_, and being presented to the government office, the money was
paid; one half of which went to the blacksmith, and the other into the
pocket of the colonel.
The following case of extreme hardship was related to me by an English
merchant at Seville, a man once extremely wealthy, but who has suffered
irreparable losses from the unjust acts of the government. He entered
into a contract with government to supply the whole accoutrements for
12,000 cavalry. An order so extensive required great outlay, and
constant attention. The accoutrements were completed; and one half,
according to the contract, delivered; and when the time nearly
approached for the delivery of the remaining quantity, an intimation was
received, that no more could be taken, because, to please the people of
Madrid, it was necessary to employ the workmen of the capital. Not only
was there no indemnification made for the breach of the contract, by
which goods to the value of 36,000_l._ were thrown upon the merchant’s
hands; but the price of the delivered goods is to this hour unpaid. Four
years have now elapsed, and he has no expectation of ever receiving one
farthing; the debt being too large to be adjusted by the sacrifice of a
part.
While I was at Seville, considerable discontent was produced by a most
unjust act of the government. All arrears of taxes due upon houses for
the past thirty years, were claimed from the actual proprietor: the
consequence of which was, that upon the mere shewing of the government
officer, proprietors were forced to pay arrears for a period in which
the house was in other hands, and even in many cases, before the actual
proprietors were born!
But more flagrant, at least more violent, acts of injustice and
oppression are sometimes committed. After the return of the king,
between two and three hundred persons who had served in the national
volunteers during the constitution, were seized in Barcellona, and
shipped to Ceuta,--the Spanish Botany Bay,--where they now remain. Their
crime was said to be, unadvised talk in the coffee houses; but this was
never ascertained, because no form of trial was gone through; and three
years have not elapsed, since a man was hanged at Barcellona, without
any one knowing what crime he had committed.
The truest proofs of a good government, are just laws; and the best
evidence of a well organized government, is to be found in their strict
execution. Judging the Spanish government by these tests, it will appear
the worst and weakest government that ever held together. Justice of no
kind, has any existence; there is the most lamentable insecurity of
person and property: redress is never certain, because both judgment,
and execution of the laws, are left to men so inadequately paid, that
they must depend for their subsistence upon bribery. Nothing is so
difficult as to bring a man to trial who has any thing in his purse,
except to bring him to execution; this, unless in Madrid, and in
Catalunia, where the Conde de España is captain-general, is impossible;
for money will always buy indemnity. Every thing in Spain connected with
the following out of the laws, is in the hands of the escrivanos; these
are the friends of all bad men: for whatever be the action a man may
commit, or meditate, he has only to confide in the escrivano, and pay
for his protection.
The following remarkable fact, I had from the lips of an eye-witness, a
highly respectable American merchant, of Malaga. One day last winter,
two butchers quarrelled in the market-place, and got to high words; and
one of them, according to the usual practice in such cases, put his hand
under his girdle, and half drew forth his knife. All the while, an
escrivano, of known talent in his profession--a man who never allowed
any one who confided in him, to be either tried or executed, stood close
by. While the man still but half shewed his knife, as if uncertain
whether to use it or no, the escrivano continued to jog him on the
elbow: “_Da le_,” (give it him), said the lawyer, “_aqui estoy yo_;”
(don’t you see that I am here, so that no harm can come to you). The
butcher, however, had not been sufficiently roused, for he put up his
knife; and the escrivano, turning to him with a look of contempt, said,
“_Alma miserable!_” (mean-spirited creature), “and so, for the sake of
400 or 500 reals, you would not revenge yourself upon your enemy.”
Before concluding these examples of a bad, weak, and tyrannical
government, I cannot refrain from mentioning the case of a man, who has
been in prison ever since the evacuation of Spain by the French army;
and who has still many years of punishment before him.
Shortly after the Duke D’Angouleme took possession of Barcellona, the
inhabitants were one morning awoke by the ringing of bells, and other
tokens of rejoicing: the cause of this was soon announced to be, that
the Virgin of _Monte Serrate_, an image of silver or wood,--I forget
which,--had come to Barcellona, of her own free will, probably
considering herself more secure there, than in the convent of
_Montserrat_; and about a year afterwards, when it became evident that
the French intended no outrage upon the convent, it was given out that
the virgin had signified her intention to return; but it was determined,
upon this occasion, that she should not be allowed to return by herself,
but that she should be carried with great pomp. A Catalunian peasant,
who stood in the line of procession, perhaps with better
eye-sight--perhaps with less faith, than his neighbours,--unfortunately
expressed aloud, the thought that passed through his mind: “She’s only
made of wood,” said he;--and for this offence, he was arrested, tried,
and condemned to ten years’ imprisonment in the citadel!
These various facts will suffice, I think, as proofs of that which I
intended they should illustrate: the despotism and the weakness of the
Spanish government--the total want of integrity that characterizes all
its dealings--and its absolute inefficiency to execute the laws, either
for its own protection, or for the redress of others.
Such being the condition of the Spanish government, we are naturally led
to ask ourselves, “What are its prospects?” Is it to be expected that a
government, without one element either of virtue or of strength--without
the physical strength that may long support a bad government--and
without the moral strength of virtue, will be able long to maintain
itself? One naturally answers,--“No,” the thing cannot be; the whole
system requires ploughing up, and it is impossible that there should not
be a change, and that speedily!! But the question is, what change? After
the French revolution broke out, a change of government in Spain was
generally expected throughout both France and England; but the
expectations upon this subject were certainly grounded upon an erroneous
notion of the state of public feeling in Spain. I have no party to serve
in giving my opinion; it is formed, I think, without prejudice, upon
what I have seen and heard while in the country; and I feel a confident
persuasion, that the change hoped for by every friend of mankind, is
still at a distance; and that the present government must yield to the
_strongest_ of the two parties that seek its downfal. Spain, I believe,
has yet to pass through a fiery trial, before her days of freedom and
happiness arrive: the change first to be expected, is one from despotism
and weakness to greater despotism and greater strength: and this will be
a new reign of terror. I am not stating my own opinion merely, but the
opinion of the most thinking and best informed classes in
Spain--liberals, as well as Carlists and royalists. With many, it is a
miracle that the party of Carlists have not, long ere now, obtained the
upper hand; a fact only to be accounted for, from the uncertainty that
prevails as to the sentiments of the army. I recollect reading, in one
of the French or English newspapers, a statement, that about the time
the constitutionalists prepared to enter Spain, the minister sent for
the different commanding officers of the guards stationed in Madrid, and
demanded of them whether they could answer for their respective
regiments; and that the reply was, they could answer for themselves
only: this statement was true, but the interpretation put upon the
answer was erroneous. The government had at that time greater fears of
the Carlists than of the Constitutionalists; and the meaning of the
officers, when they said they could answer only for themselves, was
not--according to the interpretation annexed to the statement--that the
troops were supposed to be of liberal sentiments, but that it was feared
they might be attached to the Carlists. The conspiracy for elevating
that party,--detected during the autumn,--cannot be supposed to have
crushed it. I know that after that period, meetings of its partizans
were regularly held; the intrigues of the clergy still continued in
active operation; and subsequently to that period, the birth of a
princess left the male succession open to the sons of Don Carlos.
That the probabilities of a change to greater in place of to less
despotism, may be more obvious, not only the strength and influence of
parties must be looked to, but also the peculiarities of Spanish
character. Viewing the present state of Spain, there appears to exist a
necessity for a more enlightened government; and one with difficulty
persuades himself of the probability of a revolution which would pull
down one despotic government to raise another more despotic in its
place. But an Englishman would judge very erroneously of the prospects
of Spain, who should measure Spanish feeling by his own; and considering
what the people of England would do under similar circumstances,
conclude that Spain will do likewise. The Spanish government will fall
by its weakness, rather than by its vices; it is the prospect of a
stronger, not of a more virtuous government, that incites the exertions
of the Carlists. The mass of the population of Spain take little heed of
the vices of the government, and are entirely indifferent about
political privileges. The Basque provinces, which are the most
enlightened, have little to complain of; for they enjoy a multitude of
privileges and exemptions which are well defined, and jealously
maintained: and as for the Spaniard of the southern provinces,--give him
his shade in summer, and his sunshine in winter; his tobacco, his
melon, his dates, his bread, and his wine; give him a hole to creep
into, and put him within sound of a convent bell, and he asks no more:
or if you rise a degree or two in society, and speak of the respectable
peasant, then give to him his embroidered jacket, his tasseled hat, his
guitar, and his _maja_, (sweetheart, in the dialect of Andalusia), and
it is matter of indifference to him, whether Spain be ruled by a
Caligula or a Titus.
The love of ease and pleasure, and the proneness to indolence that
distinguish the character of the Spaniard, especially in the provinces
south of Castile; and his total ignorance of the uses and nature of
political freedom, will yet, for many years, prove a barrier to the
progress of free institutions in the Peninsula. It is true that this
contentedness with his condition,--this unripeness for political
freedom,--this ignorance of the claims of his species, ought not to be
alleged as any reason against the attempt to force free institutions
upon him. It is that very ignorance, that unripeness, that false
contentedness, that hasten the necessity for revolution; because
instruction, without which no country can be rendered fit for the
enjoyment of political rights, could never carry its light to the
people, under a government like that of Spain.
A series of attempts to establish liberal institutions in Spain may be
necessary, before it be found possible to sustain them; but I believe
that every new attempt will be attended with fewer obstacles. The most
unsuccessful struggle against despotism, must produce good effects:
accordingly, I do not agree in opinion with those who contend, that the
movements of 1812 and 1820, retrograded the cause of liberty. It is
certain, indeed, that the Spanish liberals then attempted
impossibilities; they based the constitution upon principles of liberty,
which Spain, nursed so long in despotism, was unable to support; yet the
glimpse which Spain then caught of the light of freedom,--the knowledge
that was conveyed through the medium of a free press to every part of
the kingdom, and especially to all ranks in the metropolis,--and the
unrestrained interchange of sentiment, opened the eyes of many, and
prepared all, for a future and wiser attempt. Such an attempt may yet
be at some distance; a more despotic, but a more vigorous government,
may be able to repress, for some years, the declaration of principles
hostile to those by which it is maintained: but opinion will advance
nevertheless; and the epoch will certainly arrive in the history of
Spain,--as it must in all countries in which government stands
still,--when men’s opinions, which change, clash with institutions which
change not.
The attempt upon the Spanish frontier which followed the revolution in
France, would scarcely deserve notice, but for the ignorance which it
shewed of the state of public feeling in Spain. I was then in Madrid;
and I think I may venture to say, that this movement created less
sensation in Spain than in any other country in Europe. An attempt far
better organized, could not at that time have met with any success. The
plans of the Carlists were then advancing; and the party was becoming
every day more a subject of embarrassment and alarm to the government;
but the views of that party were a sufficient security against the
designs of the other, whose ascendancy would at once have annihilated
the hopes of the Carlists. It was therefore sufficiently obvious, that
if the aspect of things on the frontier became formidable, the interest
of the Carlists would lie in strengthening the hands of government. But
all the well-informed classes, of whatever party, looked upon the
attempt as ill advised, and certain of failure. I conversed at that time
with many persons of liberal sentiments, who, with scarcely an
exception, deprecated the attempt as rash and useless; and expressed
deep regret that so many unfortunate men should expose themselves to the
merciless policy of the government. It was well known, that both the
Basque Provinces and Catalunia,--the two points at which the entry was
made,--were to be depended upon for their loyalty, or their
ultraism--sentiments alike hostile to the liberals. The Basque
Provinces, which enjoy peculiar privileges, were the least interested in
the liberal cause; and Catalunia, one of the strong-holds of the
Carlists, was governed by the _Conde de España_, whose great experience,
staunch loyalty, and decided character, are always considered a
guarantee for the tranquillity of Catalunia. It was never contemplated
by the Spanish Government, to meet the attempt by any other weapon than
force; and even if the strength of the Constitutionalists had been far
more formidable, and their success far more probable, conciliatory
measures would have been impossible; it is perfectly understood that any
act of the government savouring of liberalism, would at once be sealing
it over to the power of the Carlists.
The result was as all had anticipated: no indication of favourable
feeling, on the part of the peasantry, attended the movements of the
invading force; and without this, it was impossible that it could
maintain itself. The events that took place upon the frontier, were
probably better known in England than in Spain: at all events, it does
not fall in with my object to enter into a detail of them.