Words to our Ideas even when we only Meditate, we shou’d free them from
all Equivocation, not make use of any Word, which has not a Distinct
Idea annex’d to it, and where Custom has join’d many Ideas to one
Word, carefully separate and distinguish them. For if our Words are
Equivocal, how can we by Pronouncing such and such, excite the same
Idea in another that is in our own Mind, which is the End of Speech,
and consequently how can we be Understood? And if sometimes we annex
one Idea to a Word, and sometimes another, we may for ever wrangle
with those who perhaps wou’d be found to agree with us if we Understood
each other, but can neither Convince them, nor clear up the Matter
to our own Mind. For Instance: Shou’d I dispute Whether Evil were
to be Chosen? Without defining what I mean by Evil, which is a Word
customarily apply’d to things of different Natures, and shou’d conclude
in the Affirmative, meaning at the same time the Evil of Pain, or any
Corporal Loss or Punishment, I were not mistaken, tho’ another Person
who annexes no other Idea but that of Sin to the word Evil, might
Justly contradict me and say that I was. Or if in the Process of my
Discourse, I shou’d without giving notice of it, substitute the Idea
of Sin instead of that of Pain, when I mention Evil, I shou’d argue
falsly. For it is a Maxim that we may Chuse a less Evil to avoid a
greater, if both of them be Corporal Evils, or if one of them be so,
and we chuse it to avoid a Sin, between which and the Evil of Pain
there is no Comparison: But if the two Evils propos’d to our Choice
be both of them Sinful, that Principle will not hold, we must Chuse
neither, whatever comes on’t, Sin being Eligible no manner of way.
Thus many times our Ideas are thought to be false when the fault is
really in our Language, we make use of Words without joyning any, or
only loose and indeterminate Ideas to them, Prating like Parrots who
can Modify Sounds, and Pronounce Syllables, and sometimes martial them
as a Man wou’d, tho without the use of Reason or understanding any
thing by them. So that after a long Discourse and many fine Words, our
Hearer may justly ask us what we have been saying? And what it is we
wou’d be at? And so a great part, of the Good Breeding of the World,
many Elegant Complements pass for nothing, they have no meaning, or
if they have, ’tis quite contrary to what the Words in other Cases
signifie.
From the Companion of two or more Ideas clearly Conceived arises
a Judgment, which we may lay down for a Principle, and as we have
occasion Argue from. Always observing that those Judgments which we
take for Axioms or Principles, be such as carry the highest Evidence
and Conviction, such as every one who will but in the least Attend may
Clearly see, and be fully convinced of, and which need not another
Idea for their Demonstration. Thus from the Agreement which we plainly
perceive between the Ideas of GOD and of Goodness singly consider’d,
we discern that they may be joyn’d together so as to form this
Proposition, _That GOD is Good_: And from the evident disparity that
is between GOD and Injustice, we learn to affirm this other, _That
he is not Unjust_. And so long as we Judge of Nothing but what we see
Clearly, we can’t be mistaken in our Judgments, we may indeed in those
Reasonings and Deductions we draw from them, if we are Ignorant of the
Laws of Argumentation, or Negligent in the Observation of them.
The First and Principal thing therefore to be observed in all the
Operations of the Mind is, That we determine nothing about those things
of which we have not a Clear Idea, and as Distinct as the Nature of
the Subject will permit, for we cannot properly be said to Know any
thing which does not Clearly and Evidently appear to us. Whatever we
see Distinctly we likewise see Clearly, Distinction always including
Clearness, tho this does not necessarily include that, there being many
Objects Clear to the view of the Mind, which yet can’t be said to be
Distinct.
[Sidenote: _Les Princip. de la Philos. de M. Des Cartes._ Pt. I. §. 45.]
That (to use the Words of a Celebrated Author) may be said to be
“Clear which is Present and Manifest to an attentive Mind; so as
we say we see Objects Clearly, when being present to our Eyes they
sufficiently Act on ’em, and our Eyes are dispos’d to regard ’em. And
that Distinct, which is so Clear, Particular, and Different from all
other things, that it contains not any thing in it self which appears
not manifestly to him who considers it as he ought.” Thus we may have
a Clear, but not a Distinct and Perfect Idea of GOD and of our own
Souls; their Existence and some of their Properties and Attributes
may be Certainly and Indubitably Known, but we can’t Know the Nature
of our Souls Distinctly, for Reasons too long to be mentioned here,
and less that of GOD, because he is Infinite. Now where our Knowlege
is Distinct, we may boldly deny of a subject, all that which after a
careful Examination we find not in it: But where our Knowlege is only
Clear, and not Distinct, tho’ we may safely Affirm what we see, yet
we can’t without a hardy Presumption Deny of it what we see not. And
were it not very common to find People both Talking and Writing of
things of which they have no Notion, no Clear Idea; nay and determining
Dogmatically concerning the intire Nature of those of which they cannot
possibly have an Adequate and Distinct one, it might seem impertinent
to desire them to speak no farther than they Apprehend. They will tell
you Peremptorily of Contradictions and Absurdities in such matters as
they themselves must allow they cannot Comprehend, tho others as Sharp
sighted as themselves can see no such thing as they complain of.
As Judgments are form’d by the Comparing of Ideas, so Reasoning
or Discourse arises from the Companion or Combination of several
Judgments. Nature teaches us when we can’t find out what Relation one
Idea bears to another by a Simple view or bare Comparison, to seek for
a Common Measure or third Idea, which Relating to the other two, we may
by Comparing it with each of ’em, discern wherein they agree or differ.
Our Invention discovers it self in proposing readily apt Ideas for this
Middle Term, our Judgment in making Choice of such as are Clearest and
most to our purpose, and the excellency of our Reasoning consists in
our Skill and Dexterity in Applying them.
Invention indeed is the hardest part, when Proofs are found it is not
very difficult to manage them. And to know precisely wherein their
Nature consists, may help us somewhat in our enquiries after ’em. An
Intermediate Idea then which can make out an Agreement between other
Ideas, must be Equivalent to, and yet Distinct from those we compare by
it. Where Ideas agree it will not be hard to find such an Equivalent,
and if after diligent search we cannot meet with any, ’tis a pretty
sure Sign that they do not agree. It is not necessary indeed that our
Middle Idea be Equivalent in all respects, ’tis enough if it be in such
as make the Comparison: And when it is so to one of the Compar’d Ideas
but not to the other, that’s a Proof that they do not agree amongst
themselves.
All the Commerce and Intercourse of the World is manag’d by
Equivalents, Conversation as well as Traffick. Why do we Trust our
Friends but because their Truth and Honesty appears to us Equivalent
to the Confidence we repose in ’em? Why do we perform Good Offices to
others, but because there’s a proportion between them and the Merit
of the Person, or our own Circumstances? And as the way to know the
Worth of things is to Compare them one with another, so in like manner
we come to the Knowlege of the Truth of ’em by an Equal Ballancing.
But you will say, Tho I may learn the value of a _Spanish_ Coin by
Weighing, or Comparing it with some other Money whose Standard I
know, and so discern what proportion it bears to those Goods I wou’d
exchange; yet what Scales shall I find to weigh Ideas? What Hand so
even as to poize them Justly? Or if that might be done, yet where shall
I meet with an Equivalent Idea when I have occasion to use one?
In answer to this Demand I consider, that as Light is always visible
to us if we have an Organ to receive it, if we turn our Eyes towards
it, and that nothing interpose between it and us; so is Truth, we are
surrounded with it, and GOD has given us Faculties to receive it. If
it be ask’d, Why then do we so seldom find it? The Reason is, because
instead of making right use of our Faculties we employ them in keeping
it out; we either shut our Eyes, or if we vouchsafe to open them,
we are sure to view it thro such unsuitable Mediums as fail not to
misrepresent it to us. As for those few Noble Spirits, who open the
Windows of their Souls to let in Truth, and take the Films of Interest,
Passion and Prejudice from before their Eyes, they will certainly be
Enlighten’d, and cannot miss of obtaining as much Truth as they are
capable of Receiving. For, to go on with the Comparison, as we can See
no farther than our own Horizon, tho the Light shine never so bright
around us; and as we cannot discern every Object even within that
Compass Clearly, nor Any Distinctly but what we particularly apply
our selves to; So neither are our Capacities large enough to take in
_All_ Truth, as has been often said, nor are we capable of attaining
_Any_, without Attention and diligent Examination. But if we carefully
Consider those Ideas we already have and Attend to those Truths we
are acquainted with, we cannot want Mediums to discover more, if our
Enquiries be after that which is within our Reach. He who is the
Fountain of Truth is also a GOD of Order, and has so regularly connex’d
one Truth with another, that the discovery of one is a step towards a
further Progress; so that if we diligently Examine those Truths which,
we Know, they will clear the way to what we search after: For it seldom
happens but that the Question it self directs us to some Idea that will
serve for the Explanation or Proof of it.
There is no Object, no Accident of Life but affords us matter of
Instruction. GOD has so dispos’d all the Works of his Hands, all the
Actings of his Providence, that every one of ’em ministers to our
Improvement, if we will but Observe and Apply them. Indeed this Living
_Ex Tempore_ which most of us are guilty of, our making no Reflections,
our Gay and Volatile Humour which transports us in an Instant from one
thing to another, e’re we have with the Industrious Bee suck’d those
Sweets it wou’d afford us, frequently renders his gracious Bounty
ineffectual. For as the Diligent-hand maketh Rich, whil’st the Slothful
and Prodigal come to nothing, so the Use of our Powers improves and
Encreases them, and the most Observing and Considerate is the Wisest
Person: For she lays up in her Mind as in a Store-house, ready to
produce on all Occasions, a Clear and Simple Idea of every Object that
has at any time presented it self. And perhaps the difference between
one Womans Reason and anothers may consist only in this, that the one
has amass’d a greater number of such Ideas than the other, and dispos’d
them more Orderly in her Understanding, so that they are at hand, ready
to be apply’d to those Complex Ideas whose Agreement or Disagreement
cannot be found out but by the means of some of ’em.
But because Examples are more familiar than Precepts, as condescending
to shew us the very manner of Practising them, I shall endeavour to
make the matter in Hand as plain as I can by subjoining Instances to
the following Rules, which Rules as I have not taken wholly on Trust
from others, so neither do I pretend to be the Inventer of ’em.
We have heard already that a Medium is necessary when we can’t discern
the Relation that is between two or more Ideas by Intuition or a
simple View. Could this alone procure us what we seek after, the
addition of other Ideas wou’d be needless, since to make a shew of Wit
by tedious Arguings and unnecessary Flourishes, does only Perplex and
Incumber the Matter, Intuition being the Simplest, and on that account
the best way of Knowing.
_Rule_ I. And therefore we shou’d in the first place, _Acquaint our
selves throughly with the State of the Question, have a Distinct Notion
of our Subject whatever it be, and of the Terms we make use of, knowing
precisely what it is we drive at_: that so we may in the second.
_Rule_ II. _Cut off all needless Ideas and whatever has not a necessary
Connexion to the matter under Consideration_, which serve only to
fill up the Capacity of the Mind, and to Divide and Distract the
Attention. From the neglect of this comes those causless Digressions,
tedious Parentheses and Impertinent Remarques which we meet with in
some Authors. For, as when our Sight is diffus’d and extended to many
Objects at once we see none of them Distinctly; so when the Mind grasps
at every Idea that presents it self, or rambles after such as relate
not to its Present Business, it loses its hold and retains a very
feeble Apprehension of that which it shou’d Attend. Some have added
another Rule (_viz._) _That we Reason only on those things of which
we have Clear Ideas_; but I take it to be a Consequence of the first,
and therefore do not make it a distinct one: For we can by no means
Understand our Subject, or be well acquainted with the State of the
Question, unless we have a Clear Idea of all its Terms.
_Rule_ III. Our Business being stated, the next Rule is _To conduct our
Thoughts by Order, beginning with the most Simple and Easie Objects,
And ascending as by Degrees to the Knowlege of the more Compos’d_. I
need not tell you, that Order makes every thing, Easie, Strong and
Beautiful, and that the Superstructure is neither like to Last or
Please unless the Foundation be duly laid, for this is obvious to the
most Superficial Reader. Nor are they likely to solve the Difficult,
who have neglected or slightly pass’d over the Easie Questions. Our
Knowledge is gradual, and by passing Regularly thro Plain things, we
arrive in due time at the more Abstruse.
_Rule_ IV. In this Method we are to practise the Fourth Rule which
is, _Not to leave any part of our Subject unexamin’d_, it being as
necessary to Consider All that can let in Light, as to shut out what’s
Foreign to it. We may stop short of Truth as well as over-run it; and
tho we look never so attentively on our proper Object, if we view but
half of it, we may be as much mistaken, as if we extended our Sight
beyond it. Some Objects agree very well when observ’d on one side,
which upon turning the other shew a great disparity. Thus the Right
Angle of a Triangle may be like to one part of a Square, but compare
the Whole, and you’l find ’em very different Figures. And a Moral
Action may in some Circumstance be not only Fit but Necessary, which in
others, where Time, Place, and the like have made an alteration, wou’d
be most Improper; so that if we venture to Act on the former Judgment,
we may easily do amiss, if we wou’d Act as we ought, we must view its
New Face, and see with what Aspect that looks on us.
To this Rule belongs that of _Dividing the Subject of our Meditations
into as many Parts, as we can, and as shall be requisite to Understand
it perfectly_. This is indeed most necessary in difficult Questions,
which will scarce be unravell’d but in this manner by Pieces: Ever
taking care to make Exact Reviews, and to Sum up our Evidence justly
e’re we pass Sentence and fix our Judgment.
_Rule_ V. To which purpose we must _Always keep our Subject Directly
in our Eye, and Closely pursue it thro all our Progress_; there being
no better Sign of a good Understanding than Thinking Closely and
Pertinently, and Reasoning dependently, so as to make the former part
of our Discourse a support to the Latter, and _This_ an Illustration
of _That_, carrying Light and Evidence in ev’ry step we take. The
neglect of this Rule is the Cause why our Discoveries of Truth are
seldom Exact, that so much is often said to so little purpose; and many
Intelligent and Industrious Readers when they have Read over a Book
are very little wiser than when they began it. And that the two last
Rules may be the better observ’d, ’twill be fit very often to look over
our Process so far as we have gone, that so by rendring our Subject
Familiar, we may the sooner arrive to an Exact Knowlege of it.
_Rule_ VI. All which being done we are in a fair way towards keeping
the last Rule, which is, _To judge no further than we Perceive, and
not to take any thing for Truth which we do not evidently Know to be
so_. Indeed in some Cases we are forc’d to content our selves with
Probability, but ’twere well if we did so only where ’tis plainly
Necessary. That is, when the Subject of our Meditation is such as
we cannot possibly have a Certain Knowlege of, because we are not
furnish’d with Proofs which have a Constant and Immutable Connexion
with the Ideas we apply them to, or because we can’t perceive it,
which is our Case in such Exigencies as oblige us to Act presently,
on a cursory view of the Arguments propos’d to us, when we want time
to trace them to the bottom, and to make use of such means as wou’d
discover Truth.
I cannot think we are often driven to such straits in any considerable
Affair, tho I believe that very many Subjects may be propos’d to us,
concerning which we cannot readily pass our Judgment, either because we
never consider’d them before, or because we are wanting in some Means
that lead to the Knowlege, of ’em. In which Case Reason wills that we
suspend our Judgment till we can be better Inform’d; nor wou’d it have
us remit our Search after Certainty, even in those very Cases in which
we may sometimes be forc’d to Act only on Probable Grounds. For Reason
can’t rest satisfy’d with Probabilities where Evidence is possible, our
Passions and Interest may, but _That_ does not incline us to leave
off Enquiring lest we happen to meet somewhat contrary to our Desires.
No, Reason requires us to continue our Enquiries with all the Industry
we can, till they’ve put us in Possession of Truth, and when we have
found, enjoyns us to follow her, how opposite soever she may cause our
Latter Actions to be to our Former. But by this we may learn (and so
we may by every thing that such weak and fallible Creatures as we are,
perform) to think Candidly of those whose Opinions and Actions differ
from our own. Because we do not know the necessity of their Affairs,
nor in what ill Circumstances they are plac’d in respect of Truth.
And now to Apply what has been said; The State of the Question being
Distinctly known, and certain Ideas fixt to the Terms we make use of,
we shall find sometimes that the Difference which was suppos’d to be
between the Things themselves, is only in words, in the divers ways we
make use of to express the same Idea.
For if upon looking into our selves we discern, that these different
Terms have but one and the same Idea, when we have corrected our
Expressions the Controversie is at an End, and we need enquire no
further. Thus, If we are ask’d _Whether GOD is Infinitely Perfect_?
There needs no Intermediate Idea to compare the Idea of GOD with that
of Infinite Perfection, since we may discern them on the very first
view to be one and the same Idea differently express’d, which to go
about to explain or prove were only to cumber with needless words,
and to make what is Clear, Obscure. For we Injure a Cause instead of
Defending it, by attempting an Explanation or Proof of things so Clear,
that as they do not need, so perhaps they are not Capable of any.
But if it be made a Question _Whether there is a GOD, or a Being
Infinitely Perfect_? We are then to Examin the Agreement between
our Idea of GOD and that of Existence. Now this may be discern’d by
Intuition, for upon a View of our Ideas we find that Existence is a
Perfection, and the Foundation of all other Perfections, since that
which has no Being cannot be suppos’d to have any Perfection. And tho
the Idea of Existence is not Adequate to that of Perfection, yet the
Idea of Perfection Includes that of Existence, and if _That_ Idea were
divided into parts, one part of it wou’d exactly agree with _This_. So
that if we will allow that _Any_ Being is Infinite in All Perfections,
we cannot deny that that Being Exists; Existence it self being one
Perfection, and such an one as all the rest are built upon.
If unreasonable Men will farther demand, _Why is it necessary that All
Perfection shou’d be Centred in One Being, is’t not enough that it
be parcel’d out amongst many? And tho it be true that that Being who
has all Perfection must needs Exist, yet where’s the Necessity of an
All-Perfect Being?_ We must then look about for Proofs and Intermediate
Ideas, and the Objection it self will furnish us with one. For those
_Many_ whose Particular Ideas it wou’d have joyn’d together to make a
Compound one of All-Perfection, are no other than Creatures, as will
appear if we consider our Idea of Particular Being and of Creature,
which are so far from having any thing to distinguish ’em, that in all
Points they resemble each other. Now this Idea naturally suggests to us
that of Creation, or a Power of giving Being to that which before the
exerting of that Power had none, which Idea if we use it as a Medium,
will serve to discover to us the necessity of an All-Perfect Being.
For in the first place, what ever has any Perfection or Excellency
(for that’s all we mean by Perfection here) must either have it of it
self, or derive it from some other Being. Now Creatures cannot have
their Perfections from themselves because they have not their Being,
for to suppose that they Made themselves is an Absurdity too ridiculous
to be seriously refuted, ’tis to suppose them to Be and not to Be at
the same time, and that when they were Nothing, they were able to do
the greatest Matter. Nor can they derive either Being or Perfection
from any other Creature. For tho some Particular Beings may seem to
be the Cause of the Perfections of others, as the Watch-maker may be
said to be the Cause of the Regular Motions of the Watch, yet trace it
a little farther, and you’l find this very Cause shall need another,
and so without End, till you come to the Foundation-head, to that
All-Perfect Being, who is the last resort of our Thoughts, and in
whom they Naturally and Necessarily rest and terminate. If to this it
be Objected that we as good as affirm that this All-Perfect Being is
his own Maker, by saying he is Self-Existent, and so we fall into the
same Absurdity which we imputed to that Opinion which supposes that
Creatures were their own Maker. The reply is easie, That we do not say
he Made himself, we only affirm that his Nature is such, that tho we
can’t sufficiently Explain because we can’t comprehend it, yet thus
much we can discern, that if he did not Exist of himself no other Being
could ever have Existed. So that either All must be swallow’d up in an
Infinite Nothing, if Nothing can properly have that Epithet, and we
must suppose, that neither we our selves, nor any of those Creatures
about us ever had, or ever can have a Being, which is too ridiculous to
imagine, or else we must needs have recourse to a Self-Existing Being,
who is the Maker and Lord of all things. And since Self Existence
must of necessity be plac’d somewhere, is it not much more Natural
and Reasonable to place it in Infinite Perfection, than amongst poor,
frail Creatures, whose Origin we may trace, and whose End we see daily
hastning?
To Sum up all: Since there are Innumerable Beings in the World, which
have each of them their several Excellencies or Perfections; Since
these can no more derive their Perfections than their Being from
themselves or from any other Creature; Since a Self-Existing Being is
the result of our Thoughts; the First and only True Cause, without
whom it is impossible that any thing should ever have Existed; since
Creatures with their Being receive all that depends on it from him
their Maker; Since none can give what he has not, and therefore he who
Communicates an innumerable variety of Perfections to his Creatures,
even all that they enjoy, must needs contain in himself all those
Beauties and Perfections he is pleas’d to Communicate to Inferior
Beings; nothing can be more Plain and Evident than that there is a GOD,
and that the Existence of an All-Perfect Being is Absolutely necessary.
Perhaps these Arguments are not in Form, I do not oblige my Self to
follow servilely the Rules of Art, nor know I what better Judges will
think of ’em, but they seem to me to be Clear, Rational and Concluding,
which is all I aim at. And I hope the Reader will receive from hence
more light into the way of Arguing, than she cou’d have gain’d had I
spent as many Pages in prescribing Rules and giving trifling Examples,
which when they are known, merit only to be forgot again. But if some
are better pleas’d with the usual way of Syllogism, and think an
Argument cannot be rightly managed without one, for their Satisfaction
we will add another Instance.