[1] The word "interference" as formed, on the false analogy of such
words as "difference," from "to interfere," which originally was
applied to a horse striking (Lat. _ferire_) one foot or leg against
the other.
INTERIM, originally a Latin word for "in the meantime." The word was
hence applied to certain edicts and decrees passed by the emperor and
the diets during the reformation in Germany with the object of
_temporarily_ settling a controversy. These "interims" regulated points
of religious and ecclesiastical difference until they could be decided
by a general council. The best example of such a _modus vivendi_ is the
Augsburg Interim of 1548, drawn up by Michael Helding, Julius von Pflug
and John Agricola (a medievalist, an Erasmian, and a conservative
Lutheran) at the bidding of Charles V., and accepted by the diet. It was
an ambiguous document, teaching from the Roman Catholic side
transubstantiation, the seven sacraments, adoration of the Virgin and
saints, and papal headship, and from the Protestant, justification by
faith, marriage of priests, the use of the cup by the laity. Maurice of
Saxony was permitted to vary the interim for his dominions, and his
edition was called the Leipzig Interim. An earlier interim was that of
Regensburg, 1541.
INTERLACED ARCHES, the term for a scheme of decoration employed in
Romanesque and Gothic architecture, where arches are thrown from
alternate piers, interlacing or intersecting one another. In the former
case, the first arch mould is carried alternately over and under the
second, in the latter the mouldings actually intersect and stop one
another. An example of the former exists in St Peter's in the East,
Oxford, and of the latter in St Joseph's chapel, Glastonbury, and in the
cathedral of Bristol.
INTERLAKEN, a Swiss town (1864 ft.) in the canton of Berne, situated on
the flat plain (_Bodeli_) between the lakes of Brienz (E.) and of Thun
(W.), and connected by steamer, as well as by railway (17(1/2) m.) with
the town of Thun. It is built on the left bank of the Aar, and grew up
around the religious house of Austin Canons, founded about 1130 and
suppressed in 1528. In the surviving buildings of the convent religious
services (Anglican, Scottish Presbyterian and French Protestant) are now
held, while the more modern castle is occupied by offices of the
Cantonal Government. The fine and well-shaded avenue called the
_Hoheweg_ runs through the main portion of the town, and is lined on the
north side by a succession of huge hotels and the large Kursaal.
Interlaken is much frequented in summer, partly because of the glorious
view of the Jungfrau (13,669 ft.) which it commands to the south, and
partly because it is the best starting-point for many excursions, as to
Schynige Platte, Lauterbrunnen and Grindelwald. The lines serving these
places all start from the eastern railway station (that from Thun
reaches the western or main railway station), whence steamers depart for
the Giessbach Falls, Brienz and Meiringen, on the way to Lucerne or to
the Grimsel Pass. In 1900 the population of Interlaken was 2962 (mainly
Protestant and German-speaking). Opposite Interlaken, and on the right
bank of the Aar is Unterseen (in 1900, 2607 inhabitants), which was
built in 1280 by Berthold von Eschenbach.
See _Fontes rerum Bernensium_ (original documents up to 1366) (8
vols., Berne, 1883-1903); _Die Regesten des Klosters zu Interlaken_
(Coire, 1849); E. Tatarinoff, _Die Entwickelung der Probstei
Interlaken im XIII. Jahrhundert_ (Schaffhausen, 1892).
(W. A. B. C.)
INTERLOPER, one who interferes in affairs in which he has no concern.
This word, with the verbal form "to interlope," first appears at the end
of the 16th and beginning of the 17th century in connexion with the
interference of unauthorized persons in the trading monopoly of the
Russia Company and later of the East India Company. The _New English
Dictionary_ quotes from H. Lane (1590), _Hakluyt's Voyages_, "From those
parts the Muscovites were furnished out of Dutchland by enterlopers with
all arts and artificers and had few or none by us," and also from the
_Minutes of the Court of the East India Company_, 22nd of February 1615,
"to examine all suspected personnes that intend interlopinge into the
East Indies or Muscovy." Edward Phillips (_New World of Words_, 1658)
defines interlopers at common law as those "that without legal authority
intercept the trade of a company, as it were Interleapers." The word
appears to be of English origin, for the Dutch _enterlooper_, smuggler,
often given as the source, was taken from English, as was the French
_interlope_. The word is a compound of _inter_, between, and _lope_, a
dialectal variant of "leap." A common word for a vagrant, or
"straggler," as it is defined, was till 1580 "landloper," and the
combination of "straggler" and "interloper" is found in _Horsey's
Travels_ (Hakluyt Soc.), 1603-1627, "all interlopers and straglyng
Englishmene lyving in that country."
INTERNATIONAL, THE. The International Working Men's Association,
commonly called "The International," was formed at London in 1864. It
was a society of working men of all nations, somewhat like a
cosmopolitan trades union, but bearing a still closer resemblance to an
international social science association for discussing and furthering
the rights of labour. The occasion of its formation was the visit of
some French workmen to the London Exhibition of 1862. In the course of
their visit the labour question was discussed, and a desire for the
further interchange of ideas expressed. Nothing decisive was done till
1864, when a great public meeting of working men of all nations was held
at St Martin's Hall, London, and a provisional committee was appointed
to draft the constitution of the new association.
The first four congresses of the International, held at Geneva
(September 1866), Lausanne (1867), Brussels (1868), and Basel (1869),
marked the rapid development of the association. It gained its first
triumph in the effectual support of the bronze-workers at Paris during
their lock-out in 1867; and it repeatedly aided the English unionists by
preventing the importation of cheap labour from the continent. It soon
spread as far east as Poland and Hungary, and it had affiliated
societies with journals devoted to its cause in every country of western
Europe.
It was supposed to be concerned in all the revolutionary movements and
agitations of Europe, gaining notoriety as the rallying point of social
overthrow and ruin. Its prestige, however, was always based more on the
vast possibilities of the cause it represented than on its actual power.
Its organization was loose, its financial resources insignificant; the
continental unionists joined it more in the hope of borrowing than of
contributing support. At the successive congresses its socialistic
tendencies became more and more pronounced; it declared its opposition
to private property not only in railways but in mines and the soil,
holding that these should revert to the community. Even the principle of
inheritance was saved only by a narrow majority. In 1869 M. Bakunin, the
Russian socialist or nihilist, with his party joined the association,
and at once asserted his character as the "apostle of universal
destruction."
The relation of the association to the communal rising at Paris in the
spring of 1871 has been the subject of much dispute. It is now agreed
that the International as such had no part either in originating or
conducting it; some of its French members joined it, but only on their
individual responsibility. Its complicity after the event is equally
clear. After the fall of the commune the general council of London, Karl
Marx included, issued a long and trenchant manifesto, approving its
action and extolling the "glorious vanquished." From this point the
decline and fall of the association is to be dated. The English
unionists, intent on more practical concerns at home, never took a deep
interest in its proceedings; the German socialists were hindered by law
from corporate action; America was too remote. But it found its worst
enemies amongst its own friends; the views of Marx and his school were
too moderate for the universally subversive principles of M. Bakunin and
the radical Swiss federation of the Jura. It came to a rupture at the
congress of 1872, held at the Hague, when Bakunin, being outvoted and
"excommunicated" by the Marx party, formed a rival International, which
found its chief support in Spain and Italy. Wearied of its European
contentions and desirous to form a basis of operation in America, the
Marx International now transferred the seat of its general council to
New York; but it survived just long enough to hold another congress at
Geneva in 1874, and then quietly expired.
The party of destruction styling themselves "autonomists" had a bloodier
history. The programme of this party was to overturn all existing
institutions, with the view to reconstructing them on some vague
communal basis such as had been tried at Paris in 1871. It endeavoured
to realize this in the great communal risings in southern Spain in 1873,
when its adherents set up their peculiar form of government at
Barcelona, Seville, Cadiz and Cartagena--at the last-mentioned place
also seizing part of the ironclad fleet of Spain. As at Paris, they
failed in leadership and organization, and were suppressed, though not
without difficulty, by the national troops. The "autonomists" lingered
on till 1879. The collapse was complete of an association which once
extended from Hungary to San Francisco, and alarmed the minds of men
with visions of universal ruin.
See Villetard, _Histoire de l'Internationale_ (Paris, 1871); Testut,
_L'Internationale_ (Paris, 1871); Onslow Yorke, _Secret History of the
International_ (London, 1871); J. Rae, _Contemporary Socialism_; also
the articles MARX and SOCIALISM.
INTERNATIONAL LAW, the general term for the law governing the relations
and intercourse of states with one another. The parties in its
application are states (see STATE) and not nations, so that the word
"international" does not accurately limit the scope of the subject. Nor
do authors always confine themselves to its proper limitation. Thus the
rules relating to nationality and naturalization, extradition, patents,
trade marks, &c., which affect states on the one side and foreign
persons on the other, are generally included among the subject-matter of
International Law. There is a special branch of International Law known
as Private International Law (see INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRIVATE) which
deals exclusively with the relations of persons belonging to different
states, in which states as such are not parties.
The term "international" was first used by Bentham. His explanation of
the new term was as follows:--
"The word _international_, it must be acknowledged, is a new one;
though, it is hoped, sufficiently analogous and intelligible. It is
calculated to express, in a more significant way, the branch of law
which goes commonly under the name of "law of nations," an appellation
so uncharacteristic that, were it not for the force of custom, it
would seem rather to refer to internal jurisprudence. The chancellor
d'Aguesseau has already made, I find, a similar remark; he says that
what is commonly called _droit des gens_ ought rather to be termed
_droit entre les gens_. There remain then the mutual transactions
between sovereigns as such, for the subject of that branch of
jurisprudence which may be properly and exclusively termed
international."[1]
There has been much controversy as to the aptness of the use of the word
"law" in this connexion. "International law," said the 3rd marquess of
Salisbury in a speech on the establishment of a Court of International
Arbitration, "has no existence in the sense in which the term 'law' is
usually understood. It depends generally upon the prejudices of writers
of text-books. It can be enforced by no tribunal, and therefore to apply
to it the phrase 'law' is to some extent misleading."[2] This has been
more or less the view not only of most British statesmen but also of
many practical English jurists. It found one of its most emphatic
exponents in Lord Chief-Justice Coleridge. "Strictly speaking," he
observed in his judgment on the Franconia case,[3] "international law is
an inexact expression, and it is apt to mislead, if its inexactness is
not kept in mind. Law implies a lawgiver and a tribunal capable of
enforcing it and coercing its transgressors, but there is no common
lawgiver to sovereign states, and no tribunal has the power to bind them
by decrees or coerce them if they transgress. The law of nations is that
collection of usages which civilized states have agreed to observe in
their dealings with one another. What these usages are, whether a
particular one has or has not been agreed to, must be matter of
evidence. Treaties and acts of states are but evidence of the agreement
of nations, and do not, in England at least, _per se_ bind the
tribunals. Neither certainly does a consensus of jurists, but it is
evidence of the agreement of nations on international points, and on
such points, when they arise, the English courts give effect as part of
English law to such agreement."
In opposition to this view may be cited the more recent one expressed by
Lord Russell of Killowen, who challenged Lord Coleridge's view as "based
on too narrow a definition of law, a definition which relies too much on
force as the governing idea." "If," he added, "the development of law is
historically considered it will be found to exclude that body of
customary law which in early stages of society precedes law. As
government becomes more frankly democratic, laws bear less and less the
character of commands imposed by a coercive authority, and acquire more
and more the character of customary law founded on consent.... I claim
that the aggregate of the rules to which nations have agreed to conform
in their conduct towards one another are properly to be designated
International Law."[4] This recalls Blackstone's definition: "The law of
nations is a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and
established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the
world, in order to decide all disputes, to regulate all ceremonies and
civilities, and to ensure the observance of justice and good faith in
that intercourse which must frequently occur between two or more
independent states, and the individuals belonging to each."[5] The
current English narrower view owes its origin chiefly to the influence
of John Austin, and the current broader one to that of Sir Henry
Maine.[6] The increasing popularity of references to international
arbitration (see ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL), the adoption of a large
number of special treaties making such references compulsory in certain
cases, the establishment of and increasing recourse to the court for the
decision of difficulties between states created by The Hague "Convention
for the pacific settlement of disputes between States" of 1899 (see
PEACE), the adoption of fixed rules of law in the international
conventions in 1899, 1907 and 1909 dealing with many of the most
controversial questions of international usage, have so transformed the
subject that if, as Lord Coleridge said, law implies a lawgiver and a
tribunal capable of enforcing it, these conditions are now at any rate
partly fulfilled. We shall see below to what extent it may be necessary
to regard power of enforcement against transgressors as requisite to
give international law the character of law properly so-called.
_Sanctions._--The subject of the enforcement of International Law, or
its "sanctions," has given rise to much controversy. The word "sanction"
is derived from the Lat. _sanctio_, which in turn is derived from
_sancire_, to consecrate. In its original sense _sanctio_ means
consecration. From this followed the sense of religious obligation. Thus
_sancire legem_ is used by Roman writers as meaning that observance was
made obligatory, but without reference to the idea of there being a
remedy or penalty for non-observance. With the development of an
organized judicial system the religious or moral obligation was
displaced by the growth of remedial procedure. Cicero observes of some
legal restrictions, _hoc non sancitur lege civili_ (this is not
consecrated by the civil law, i.e. with penalties). A collateral sense
of the word grew up which meant ratification, as where Cicero speaks of
_sancire acta Caesaris_ or of _sancire foedus_.
Bentham, who worked out the theory of legal sanctions as applied to
modern law, describes them as equivalent to pleasures and pains derived
from four different sources. These are physical, political, moral and
religious. The first three belong to experience in the present life, the
fourth to that in the present life or hereafter.[7]
Austin's analysis of this vague subdivision led him to a more precise
determination of the relationship of sanctions to law, viz. that a law
properly so-called is a command and its sanction is the power to enforce
obedience to it. Stated briefly, any other kind of law according to
Austin is not positive law but merely called so by analogy. Applying
this test to International Law he concludes that the law obtaining
between nations is not positive law; for every positive law is set by a
given sovereign to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its
author. The law obtaining between nations is only law set by general
opinion, with duties which are only enforced by moral sanction; by fear
on the part of nations, or by fear on the part of a sovereign, of
provoking general hostility, and incurring its probable evils, in case
they should violate maxims generally respected.[8]
Sir H. Maine's somewhat indirect answer to Austin may now be taken as
the view held at least by British theoretical writers. "Austin," he
said, "has shown, though not without some straining of language, that
the sanction is found everywhere, in positive law, civil and criminal.
This is, in fact, the great feat which he performed, but some of his
disciples seem to me to draw the inference from his language that men
always obey rules from fear of punishment. As a matter of fact this is
quite untrue, for the largest number of rules which men obey are obeyed
unconsciously, from a mere habit of mind. Men do sometimes obey rules
for fear of the punishment which will be inflicted if they are violated,
but, compared with the mass of men in each community, this class is but
small; probably it is substantially confined to what are called the
criminal classes, and for one man who refrains from stealing or
murdering because he fears the penalty there must be hundreds of
thousands who refrain without a thought on the subject."[9]
The view, however, that a law is not devoid of binding character because
there is no authority to enforce its observance hardly requires
justification at the present day. The fact that any well-established
international usage is observed, and that states invariably endeavour to
answer any reproach of departing from such usage by explanations showing
that the incriminated act is justified by recognized rules of
International Law, is evidence of its binding character. As the late
Professor Rivier, one of the leading authorities on Roman Law, as well
as an international jurist of eminence, has expressed it: "The law of
nations is positive law because states wish it to be so. They recognize
its compulsory character and proclaim it. As they are their own
legislators and make their common laws by express or tacit consent, they
attest explicitly and implicitly their conviction that its principles
are binding upon them, as judicial principles, as law. Innumerable
public acts, affirmations, declarations and conventions are there to
prove it. On the other hand, never in any published official act of the
present age, verbal or written, has a state dared to declare that it did
not consider itself bound by the law of nations and its principles."[10]
States, as Professor Rivier says, have again and again solemnly declared
their determination to abide by the principles of International Law.
Witness the Declaration of Aix-la-Chapelle of November 15, 1818, in
which the representatives of five powers, Austria, France, Great
Britain, Russia and Prussia, solemnly stated that "the sovereigns in
forming this august union have regarded as its fundamental basis their
unchangeable resolution never to depart, either amongst themselves or in
their relations with other states, from the strictest observance of the
principles of the law of nations, principles which, in their application
to a permanent state of peace, can alone effectively guarantee the
independence of each government and the stability of the general
association." In the negotiations for the Treaty of London concerning
the Black Sea (March 13, 1871), at which seven powers were represented,
Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia and
Turkey, a resolution on the sanctity of treaties was annexed to the
first protocol, stating that the plenipotentiaries recognize that it is
an essential principle of the law of nations that "no power can liberate
itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations
thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting powers by means of
an amicable arrangement." Even in 1908, when Austria-Hungary proceeded
to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina without obtaining the prior
assent of the high contracting powers, who under the treaty of Berlin of
1878 had granted her temporary occupation of the annexed provinces, the
protests of the powers concerned were answered by Austria-Hungary
declaring that she had done nothing contrary to the law of nations or
affecting the sanctity of treaties, because the powers had given their
tacit consent to the practical transformation of her temporary into a
permanent occupation.
The public opinion of the civilized world, in fact, plays in an
ever-increasing degree the part of a sanctioning authority. With the
growth of international intercourse and international interdependence
the danger of isolation or of discredit or even of "boycotting" becomes
a matter of increasing importance in the conduct of states. The national
press and periodical literature, with exceptions no doubt, are among the
chief factors in the development of this public opinion, but it is by no
means dependent upon them. Personal intercourse among citizens of the
same country, and between statesmen, politicians and citizens of
different countries has a still greater effect in the creation of the
mental attitude of nations towards each other. This exposes any
departure from recognized usage or any disregard for international
obligations to such reprobation throughout the whole world, that, far
from taking advantage of the absence of any coercive method of enforcing
obedience to the principles of international law, states compete with
each other in asserting their strict fidelity to such principles. And
now successive diplomatic conferences have codified many of the chief
branches of international usage, thus diminishing the possible cases in
which states can take advantage of the uncertainty of the law and, by
quibbling over its interpretation, escape from its obligations.
_Sources and Foundations._--It is usual, following Wheaton's
classification,[11] to enumerate the sources of International Law in the
following groups: text-writers of authority as witnesses of usage;
treaties of peace, alliance and commerce; ordinances of particular
states, prescribing rules for the conduct of their commissioned cruisers
and prize tribunals; adjudications of international tribunals; written
opinions of official jurists given confidentially to their own
government; history of wars, negotiations, treaties and other
transactions relating to the public intercourse of nations. It is in
these different classes of opinions and precedents that writers have
been in the habit of searching for those arguments and analogies on
which have been built up the system and principles called International
Law.
Wheaton, it is seen, regarded text-writers as witnesses of the usage of
nations. He explains his meaning as follows: "Without wishing to
exaggerate the importance of these writers, or to substitute in any case
their authority for the principles of reason, it may be affirmed that
they are generally impartial in their judgment. They are witnesses of
the sentiments and usages of civilized nations, and the weight of their
testimony increases every time that their authority is invoked by
statesmen, and every year that passes without the rules laid down in
their works being impugned by the avowal of contrary principles." This
distinguished writer's quasi-explanation of the sources of International
Law is extremely vague. He masses together cause and effect, private and
public opinions, usage and exceptions. Professor Oppenheim has
endeavoured to give a more scientific explanation of the growth and
development of International Law, and objects to calling sources of
International Law what are mere factors influencing its growth:--
"... Custom and treaties," he observes, "are the two exclusive sources
of the Law of Nations. When writers on International Law frequently
enumerate other sources besides custom and treaties they confound the
term 'source' with that of 'cause'[12] by calling sources of
International Law such factors as influence the gradual growth of new
rules of International Law without, however, being the historical
facts out of which these rules receive their legal force. Important
factors of this kind are: Opinions of famous writers on International
Law, decisions of prize courts, arbitral awards, instructions issued
by the different states for the guidance of their diplomatic and other
organs, state papers concerning foreign politics, certain municipal
laws, decisions of municipal courts. All these and other factors may
influence the growth of International Law either by creating usages
which gradually turn into custom, or by inducing the members of the
Family of Nations to conclude such treaties as stipulate legal rules
for future international conduct.
"A factor of the special kind which also influences the growth of
International Law is the so-called comity (_Comitas gentium,
Convenance et courtoisie internationale, Staatengunst_). In their
intercourse with one another states do observe not only legally
binding rules and such rules as have the character of usages, but also
rules of politeness, convenience and goodwill. Such rules of
international conduct are no rules of law, but of comity. The Comity
of Nations is certainly not a source of International Law, as it is
distinctly the contrast to the Law of Nations. But there can be no
doubt that many a rule which formerly was a rule of International
Comity only is nowadays a rule of International Law. And it is
certainly to be expected that this development will go on in future
also, and that thereby many a rule of present International Comity
will in future become one of International Law."[13]
Precedents.
Italian influence.
We prefer to regard International Law as deriving the rules composing it
from practically the same sources as domestic law, and to attribute to
text-writers more or less the same value in its development as in that of
the private law of nations. The same primary rules of conduct are
appealed to between states as between individuals, and precedents play
exactly the same part wherever human actions are concerned. In both cases
what has been done before commends itself when the responsibility of
taking steps pledging the future is concerned. Statesmen on whom great
responsibility impends, on whom the conduct of momentous negotiations has
devolved, and who will have to render an account of their work to the
sovereign or nation they represent, preserve an argument in their own
favour in departing as little as possible from any course taken in
previous similar circumstances. Precedents, moreover, are arguments for
acceptance by their adversaries or counter-negotiators. In fact, in
diplomacy even more than in matters of domestic government precedents
play a dominant part in the growth of usage. These precedents are often
in themselves originally local usages, such as grew up in the intercourse
of the Italian communities. Italy, in fact, served as a laboratory for
early diplomatists and writers. It was in the intercourse of these active
and ambitious states that grew up the very notion of a foreign diplomacy
and the necessity of rules of conduct in this miniature Europe, with its
perpetual antagonisms and jealousies, its balance of power, its idea of a
state distinct from a nation and of a community of states elbowing each
other in their daily contact. It was there that grew up the institution
of passports, the distinction between armed forces and civilians,
international comity, and in fact the very notion that states have an
interest in the observance of law and order among them. In the same way
the active commercial intercourse in the Mediterranean led, in the common
interest, to the development of rules of the sea in time of peace, and
later to others in time of war.
Thirty Years' War.
In the north of Europe, again, out of the active commercial intercourse
among the Baltic and North Sea communities grew rules of the sea in the
same common interest. It was the Thirty Years' War, with its revolting
cruelty, which brought out the contrast between the more humane practice
of war as an art in Italy and the mere bludgeonry which prevailed in the
brutal struggle which disgraced the first half of the 17th century. The
brutality of the struggle turned thinkers' attention to the need of
formulating rules for the protection in time of war of non-combatants
and the innocent subjects of absolute sovereigns, the treatment of the
sick and wounded, the prohibition of wanton pillage and the other
horrors which shocked the awakening conscience of northern Europe. It
was the starting-point of the age of text-books.
Grotius.
Pufendorf.
The first effective work, the one which was the first to influence
sovereigns and statesmen, was Grotius's _De jure belli ac pacis_ (Paris,
1625), which practically exhausted the theoretical arguments in favour
of the new subject. Nobody has in fact since brought to light any new
conception of the foundations of international law. An exhaustive and
masterly treatise having been published, no further subsequent treatise
was necessary to show what all men were beginning to feel. He sublimated
the feelings of his age, and having arrived at the pure substance, the
work of proving the need of his subject was disposed of for all time.
Pufendorf (1632-1697), who, in the sequence of effective text-writers,
succeeded Grotius, endeavoured to base international law on an ethical
basis accepted by all peoples without necessity for a common creed or
standard of morals, but it is doubtful, whatever may have been the
extent to which he stimulated the study of jurisprudence, whether he did
much in advancing the practical development of the law of nations. His
book _De jure naturae et gentium_ (1672), as its name indicates, based
international law on what he called the law of nature, a subject which
has much exercised the minds of jurists searching for an ethical basis
for existing law.
Leibnitz.
The scientific mind of Leibnitz (1646-1716) revolted against this
theoretical and doctrinaire tendency of Pufendorf and other writers, who
were following with feeble tread in the giant footsteps of Grotius. He
saw that the practice of nations was taking a course dictated by the
current moral standards of civilized society, and that the
philosophizing of the text-book writers was leading them away from that
actual practice which they should use as data for their conclusions.
Natural science, moreover, had taught him the risk of theorizing on
imperfect data, and while writing a history of Brunswick it occurred to
him that treaties and diplomatic documents generally were the substances
and tests of the publicist's laboratory. His _codex juris gentium
diplomaticus_ (1693-1700) gave a more precise direction to speculations
on the subject.
Bynkershoek.
The next great writer of authority united all the qualities of a
practical lawyer and jurist. This was Bynkershoek (1673-1743). He was
the first writer on international law who dealt with public maritime law
as a matter demanding special treatment and involving a set of
principles not called into action in territorial warfare. A magistrate
administering the law in a great commercial country, whose interests
were on or across the high seas rather than within the narrow European
limits of Holland, Bynkershoek, like Leibnitz, searched for his data in
the actual practice of nations in their intercourse with one another. He
applied his clear legally trained mind to deriving principles from
practice instead of endeavouring to build up a practice on abstract
principles. It was he who first generalized the different isolated
usages which had grown up at different spots in northern Europe in the
interest of maritime defence, and evolved from practice the principle
that dominion seawards was limited to the extent to which it was
possible to enforce it (cannon-shot range), a principle which not only
created the legal institution of territorial waters, but has since been
imported into other branches of International Law, and has indirectly
influenced the suppression of fictitious blockades and more recently of
fictitious occupations of territory.