determination and direction are therefore inseparable from every
volition, and the cause which really gives it a being, must necessarily
give it character, and particular direction and determination.
Selection is the attribute of the cause, and answers to particular
determination and direction in the effect. As a phenomenon or effect
cannot come to exist without a particular determination, so a cause
cannot give existence to a phenomenon, or effect, without selection.
There must necessarily be one object selected rather than another. Thus,
if fire be thrown among various substances, it selects the combustibles,
and produces phenomena accordingly. It selects and gives particular
determination. We cannot conceive of cause without selection, nor of
effect without a particular determination. But in what lies the
selection? In the nature of the cause in correlation with certain
objects. Fire is in correlation with certain objects, and consequently
exhibits phenomena only with respect to them. In chemistry, under the
title of affinities, we have wonderful exhibitions of selection and
particular determination. Now motive, according to Edwards, lies in the
correlation of the nature of the will, or desire, with certain objects;
and volition is the effect of this correlation. The selection made by
will, arising from its nature, is, on the principle of Edwards, like the
selection made by any other cause; and the particular determination or
direction of the volition, in consequence of this, is like that which
appears in every other effect. In the case of will, whatever effect is
produced, is produced of necessity, by a pre-constitution and
disposition of will and objects, just as in the case of any other cause.
From this it appears sufficiently evident, that on Edwards's principles
there is no such difference between volition and any other effect, as to
shield his reasonings respecting a self-determining will, against the
consequences above deduced from them. The distinction of final and
efficient causes does not lie in his system. The motive is that which
produces the sense of the most agreeable, and produces it necessarily,
and often in opposition to reason and conscience; and this sense of the
most agreeable is choice or volition. It belongs to the opposite system
to make this distinction in all its clearness and force--where the
efficient will is distinguished, both from the persuasions and
allurements of passion and desire, and from the laws of reason and
conscience.
Thus far my argument against Edwards's assumption,--that, to make the
will the cause of its own volitions, is to make it cause its volitions
by an act of volition,--has been indirect. If this indirect argument has
been fairly and legitimately conducted, few probably will be disposed to
deny that the assumption is overthrown by its consequences. In addition
to the above, however, on a subject so important, a direct argument will
not be deemed superfluous.
Self-determining will means simply a will causing its own volitions; and
consequently, particularly determining and directing them. Will, in
relation to volition, is just what any cause is in relation to its
effect. Will causing volitions, causes them just as any cause causes its
effects. There is no intervention of anything between the cause and
effect; between will and volition. A cause producing its phenomena by
phenomena, is a manifest absurdity. In making the will a
self-determiner, we do not imply this absurdity. Edwards assumes that we
do, and he assumes it as if it were unquestionable.
The will, he first remarks, determines all our external actions by
volitions, as the motions of the hands and feet. He next affirms,
generally, that all which the will determines, it determines in this
way; and then concludes, that if it determines its own volitions, they
must come under the general law, and be determined by volitions.
The first position is admitted. The second, involving the last, he does
not prove, and I deny that it is unquestionable.
In the first place, it cannot legitimately be taken as following from
the first. The relation of will to the sequents of its volitions, is not
necessarily the same as its relation to its volitions. The sequents of
volitions are changes or modifications, in external nature, or in parts
of the being external to the will; but the volitions are modifications
of the will itself. Now if the modification of external nature by the
will can be effected only by that modification of itself called
volition, how does it appear that this modification of itself, if
effected by itself, must be effected by a previous modification of
itself? We learn from experience, that volitions have sequents in
external nature, or in parts of our being, external to will; but this
experience teaches us nothing respecting the production of volitions.
The acts of the will are volitions, and all the acts of wills are
volitions; but this means nothing more than that all the acts of the
will are acts of the will, for volition means only this--an act of the
will. But has not the act of the will a cause? Yes, you have assigned
the cause, in the very language just employed. It is the act of the
will--the will is the cause. But how does the will cause its own acts? I
do not know, nor do I know how any cause exerts itself, in the
production of its appropriate phenomena; I know merely the facts. The
connexion between volition and its sequents, is just as wonderful and
inexplicable, as the connexion between will and its volitions. How does
volition raise the arm or move the foot? How does fire burn, or the sun
raise the tides? And how does will cause volitions? I know not; but if I
know that such are the facts, it is enough.
Volitions must have a cause; but, says Edwards, will cannot be the
cause, since this would lead to the absurdity of causing volitions by
volitions. But we cannot perceive that it leads to any such absurdity.
It is not necessary for us to explain how a cause acts. If the will
produce effects in external nature by its acts, it is impossible to
connect with this as a sequence, established either by experience or
logic, that in being received as the cause of its own acts, it becomes
such only by willing its own acts. It is clearly an assumption
unsupported, and incapable of being supported. Besides, in denying will
to be the cause of its own acts, and in supplying another cause, namely,
the motive, Edwards does not escape the very difficulty which he
creates; for I have already shown, that the same difficulty appertains
to motive, and to every possible cause. Every cause produces effects by
exertion or acting; but what is the cause of its acting? To suppose it
the cause of its own acts, involves all the absurdities which Edwards
attributes to self-determination. But, _In the second place_,--let us
look at the connexion of cause and phenomena a little more particularly.
What is cause? It is that which is the ground of the possible, and
actual existence of phenomena. How is cause known? By the phenomena. Is
cause visible? No: whatever is seen is phenomenal. We observe phenomena,
and by the law of our intelligence we assign them to cause. But how do
we conceive of cause as producing phenomena? By a _nisus_, an effort, or
energy. Is this _nisus_ itself a phenomenon? It is when it is observed.
Is it always observed? It is not. The _nisus_ of gravitation we do not
observe; we observe merely the facts of gravitation. The _nisus_ of heat
to consume we do not observe; we observe merely the facts of combustion.
Where then do we observe this _nisus?_ Only in will. Really, volition is
the _nisus_ or effort of that cause which we call will. I do not wish to
anticipate subsequent investigations, but I am constrained here to ask
every one to examine his consciousness in relation to this point. When I
wish to do anything I make an effort--a _nisus_ to do it; I make an
effort to raise my arm, and I raise it. This effort is simply the
volition. I make an effort to lift a weight with my hand,--this effort
is simply the volition to lift it,--and immediately antecedent to this
effort, I recognise only my will, or really only myself. This
effort--this _nisus_--this volition--whatever we call it,--is in the
will itself, and it becomes a phenomenon to us, because we are causes
that know ourselves. Every _nisus_, or effort, or volition, which we may
make, is in our consciousness: causes, which are not self-conscious, of
course do not reveal this _nisus_ to themselves, and they cannot reveal
it to us because it is in the very bosom of the cause itself. What we
observe in relation to all causes--not ourselves, whether they be
self-conscious or not, is not the _nisus_, but the sequents of the
_nisus_. Thus in men we do not observe the volition or _nisus_ in their
wills, but the phenomena which form the sequents of the _nisus_. And in
physical causes, we do not observe the _nisus_ of these causes, but only
the phenomena which form the sequents of this _nisus_. But when each one
comes to himself, it is all different. He penetrates himself--knows
himself. He is himself the cause--he, himself, makes the _nisus_, and is
conscious of it; and this _nisus_ to him becomes an effect--a
phenomenon, the first phenomenon by which he reveals himself, but a
phenomenon by which he reveals himself only to himself. It is by the
sequents of this _nisus_,--the effects produced in the external visible
world, that he reveals himself to others.
Sometimes the _nisus_ or volition expends itself in the will, and gives
no external phenomena. I may make an effort to raise my arm, but my arm
may be bound or paralyzed, and consequently the effort is in vain, and
is not known without. How energetic are the efforts made by the will
during a fit of the night-mare! we struggle to resist some dreadful
force; we strive to run away from danger but all in vain.
It is possible for me to make an effort to remove a mountain: I may
place my hand against its side, and tug, and strive: the _nisus_ or
volition is the most energetic that I can make, but, save the straining
of my muscles, no external expression of the energy of my will is given;
I am resisted by a greater power than myself.
The most original movement of every cause is, then, this _nisus_ in the
bosom of the cause itself, and in man, as a cause, the most original
movement is this _nisus_ likewise, which in him we call volition. To
deny such a _nisus_ would be to deny the activity, efficiency, and
energy of cause. This _nisus_, by its very conception and definition,
admits of no antecedent, phenomenon, or movement: it is in the substance
of the cause; its first going forth to effects. A first movement or
_nisus_ of cause is just as necessary a conception as first cause
itself. There is no conception to oppose to this, but that of every
cause having its first movement determined by some other cause out of
itself--a conception which runs back in endless retrogression without
arriving at a first cause, and is, indeed, the annihilation of all
cause.
The assumption of Edwards, therefore, that if will determine its own
volitions, it must determine them by an act of volition, is unsupported
alike by the facts of consciousness and a sound logic,--while all the
absurdities of an infinite series of causation of acts really fasten
upon his own theory, and destroy it by the very weapons with which it
assails the opposite system.
_In the third place_,--Edwards virtually allows the self-determining
power of will.
Will he defines as the desire, the affections, or the sensibility. There
is no personal activity out of the affections or sensitivity. Volition
is as the most agreeable, and is itself the sense of the most agreeable.
But what is the cause of volition? He affirms that it cannot be will,
assuming that to make will the cause of its own volitions, involves the
absurdity of willing volitions or choosing choices; but at the same time
he affirms the cause to be the state of the affections or will, in
correlation with the nature and circumstances of objects. But all
natural causes are in correlation with certain objects,--as, for
example, heat is in correlation with combustibles; that is, these
natural causes act only under the condition of meeting with objects so
constituted as to be susceptible of being acted upon by them. So,
likewise, according to Edwards's representation, we may say that the
cause of volition is the nature and state of the affections or the will,
acting under the condition of objects correlated to it. The sense of the
most agreeable or choice cannot indeed be awakened, unless there be an
object presented which shall appear the most agreeable; but then its
appearing most agreeable, and its awakening the sense of the most
agreeable, depends not only upon "what appears in the object viewed, but
also in the manner of the view, and _the state and circumstances_ of the
mind that views." (p. 22.) Now "the _state_ and _circumstances_ of the
mind that views, and the _manner_ of its view," is simply the mind
acting from its inherent nature and under its proper conditions, and is
a representation which answers to every natural cause with which we are
acquainted: the state of the mind, therefore, implying of course its
inherent nature, may with as much propriety be taken as the cause of
volition, on Edwards's own principles, as the nature and state of heat
may be taken as the cause of combustion: but by "the state, of mind,"
Edwards means, evidently, the state of the will or the affections. It
follows, therefore, that he makes the state of the will or the
affections the cause of volition; but as the state of the will or the
affections means nothing more in reference to will than the state of any
other cause means in reference to that cause,--and as the state of a
cause, implying of course its inherent nature or constitution, means
nothing more than its character and qualities considered as a
cause,--therefore he virtually and really makes will the cause of its
own volitions, as much as any natural cause is the cause of its
invariable sequents.
Edwards, in contemplating and urging the absurdity of determining a
volition by a volition, overlooked that, according to our most common
and necessary conceptions of cause, the first movement or action of
cause must be determined by the cause itself, and that to deny this, is
in fact to deny cause. If cause have not within itself a _nisus_ to
produce phenomena, then wherein is it a cause? He overlooked, too, that
in assigning as the cause or motive of volition, the state of the will,
he really gave the will a self-determining power, and granted the very
point he laboured to overthrow.
The point in dispute, therefore, between us and Edwards, is not, after
all, the self-determining power of the will. If will be a cause, it will
be self-determining; for all cause is self-determining, or, in other
words, is in its inherent nature active, and the ground of phenomena.
But the real point in dispute is this: "_Is the will necessarily
determined, or not?_"
The inherent nature of cause may be so constituted and fixed, that the
_nisus_ by which it determines itself to produce phenomena, shall take
place according to invariable and necessary laws. This we believe to be
true with respect to all physical causes. Heat, electricity, galvanism,
magnetism, gravitation, mechanical forces in general, and the powers at
work in chemical of affinities, produce their phenomena according to
fixed, and, with respect to the powers themselves, necessary laws. We do
not conceive it possible for these powers to produce any other
phenomena, under given circumstances, than those which they actually
produce. When a burning coal is thrown into a mass of dry gunpowder, an
explosion must take place.
Now, is it true likewise that the cause which we call will, must, under
given circumstances, necessarily produce such and such phenomena? Must
its _nisus_, its self-determining energy, or its volition, follow a
uniform and inevitable law? Edwards answers yes. Will is but the
sensitivity, and the inherent nature of the will is fixed, so that its
sense of the most agreeable, which is its most original _nisus_ or its
volition, follows certain necessary laws,--necessary in relation to
itself. If we know the state of any particular will, and its correlation
to every variety of object, we may know, with the utmost certainty, what
its volition will be at a given time, and under given circumstances.
Moral necessity and physical necessity differ only in the terms,--not in
the nature of the connexion between the terms. Volition is as necessary
as any physical phenomenon.
Now, if the will and the affections or sensitivity are one, then, as a
mere psychological fact, we must grant that volition is necessary; for
nothing can be plainer than that the desires and affections necessarily
follow the correlation of the sensitivity and its objects. But if we can
distinguish in the consciousness, the will as a personal activity, from
the sensitivity,--if we can distinguish volition from the strongest
desire or the sense of the most agreeable,--then it will not follow,
because the one is necessary, the other is necessary likewise, unless a
necessary connexion between the two be also an observed fact of
consciousness. This will be inquired into in another part of our
undertaking. What we are now mainly concerned with, is Edwards's
argument against the conception of a will not necessarily determined.
This he calls a contingent determination of will. We adopt the word
contingent; it is important in marking a distinction.
Edwards, in his argument against a contingent determination, mistakes
and begs the question under discussion.
1. He mistakes the question. Contingency is treated of throughout as if
identical with chance or no cause. "Any thing is said to be contingent,
or to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of
such words, when its connexion with its causes or antecedents, according
to the established course of things, is not discerned; and so is what we
have no means of foreseeing. And especially is any thing said to be
contingent or accidental, with regard to us, when it comes to pass
without our foreknowledge, and beside our design and scope. But the word
_contingent_ is used abundantly in a very different sense; not for that
whose connexion with the series of things we cannot discern so as to
foresee the event, but for something which has absolutely no previous
ground or reason with which its existence has any fixed and certain
connexion." (p. 31.)
Thus, according to Edwards, not only is _contingent_ used in the same
sense as chance and accident, in the ordinary and familiar acceptation
of these words, but it is also gravely employed to represent certain
phenomena, as without any ground, or reason, or cause of their
existence; and it is under this last point of view that he opposes it as
applied to the determination of the will. In part 2, sec. 3, he
elaborately discusses the question--"whether any event whatsoever, and
volition in particular, can come to pass without a cause of its
existence;" and in sec. 4,--"whether volition can arise without a cause,
through the activity of the nature of the soul."
If, in calling volitions contingent,--if, in representing the
determination of the will as contingent, we intended to represent a
class of phenomena as existing without "any previous ground or reason
with which their existence has a fixed and certain connexion,"--as
existing without any cause whatever, and therefore as existing by
chance, or as really self-existent, and therefore not demanding any
previous ground for their existence,--it seems to me that no elaborate
argument would be required to expose the absurdity of our position. That
"every phenomenon must have a cause," is unquestionably one of those
primitive truths which neither require nor admit of a demonstration,
because they precede all demonstration, and must be assumed as the basis
of all demonstration.
By a contingent will, I do not mean a will which is not a cause. By
contingent volitions, I do not mean volitions which exist without a
cause. By a contingent will, I mean a will which is not a necessitated
will, but what I conceive only and truly to be a _free will_. By
contingent volitions, I mean volitions belonging to a contingent or free
will. I do not oppose contingency to cause, but to necessity. Let it be
supposed that we have a clear idea of necessity, then whatever is not
necessary I call contingent.
Now an argument against contingency of will on the assumption that we
intend, under this title, to represent volitions as existing without a
cause, is irrelevant, since we mean no such thing.
But an argument attempting to prove that contingency is identical with
chance, or no cause, is a fair argument; but then it must be remembered
that such an argument really goes to prove that nothing but necessity is
possible, for we mean by contingency that which is opposed to necessity.
The argument must therefore turn upon these two points: First, is
contingency a possible conception, or is it in itself contradictory and
absurd? This is the main question; for if it be decided that contingency
is a contradictory and absurd conception, then we are shut up to a
universal and an absolute necessity, and no place remains for inquiry
respecting a contingent will. But if it be decided to be a possible and
rational conception, then the _second_ point will be, to determine
whether the will be contingent or necessary.
The first point is the only one which I shall discuss in this place. The
second properly belongs to the psychological investigations which are to
follow. But I proceed to remark, 2. that Edwards, in his argument
against a contingent will, really begs the question in dispute. In the
first place, he represents the will as necessarily determined. This is
brought out in a direct and positive argument contained in the first
part of his treatise. Here necessity is made universal and absolute.
Then, in the second place, when he comes particularly to discuss
contingency, he assumes that it means no cause, and that necessity is
inseparable from the idea of cause. Now this is plainly a begging of the
question, as well as a mistaking of it; for when we are inquiring
whether there be any thing contingent, that is, any thing opposed to
necessity, he _begins_ his argument by affirming all cause to be
necessary, and contingency as implying no cause. If all cause be
necessary, and contingency imply no cause, there is no occasion for
inquiry after contingency; for it is already settled that there can be
no contingency. The very points we are after, as we have seen, are these
two: whether contingency be possible; and whether there be any cause,
for example, will, which is contingent.
If Edwards has both mistaken and begged the question respecting a
contingent will, as I think clearly appears, then of course he has
logically determined nothing in relation to it.
But whether this be so or not, we may proceed now to inquire whether
contingency be a possible and rational conception, or whether it be
contradictory and absurd.
Necessity and contingency are then two ideas opposed to each other. They
at least cannot co-exist in relation to the same subject. That which is
necessary cannot be contingent at the same time, and vice versa. Whether
contingency is a possible conception and has place in relation to any
subject, remains to be determined.
Let us seek a definition of these opposing ideas: we will begin with
necessity, because that this idea is rational and admits of actual
application is not questioned. The only point in question respecting it,
is, whether it be universal, embracing all beings, causes, and events.
What is necessity? Edwards defines necessity under two points of view:--
1. Viewed in relation to will.
2. Viewed irrespective of will.
The first, supposes that opposition of will is possible, but
insufficient;--for example: it is possible for me to place myself in
opposition to a rushing torrent, but my opposition is insufficient, and
the progress of the torrent relatively to me is _necessary_.