These considerations bring us face to face with Federalism, or, to use
the phrase which to so many perplexed Liberals has seemed to point the
way to safety, "Home Rule all round." The expression covers a wide
field, and before any opinion can be pronounced upon the proposal, it is
essential to know what its advocates in fact desire.
To some the phrase means nothing less than Gladstonian Home Rule "all
round," in other words that we should meet the objections to dissolving
the legislative and executive Union with Ireland by dissolving also the
older Union with Scotland, and even (for some do not shrink from the
_reductio ad absurdum_) the yet older unity of England and Wales.
Consider what this means. For more than two hundred years the English
and Scottish races have been united by a constitutional bond
strengthened by mutual respect and good feeling, and Scotsmen, like
Englishmen, have taken their part in the government of these islands. If
in the division of labour and of honours there has been a balance of
advantage, it has not been against the virile Scottish race, from which
have sprung so many of our great soldiers and administrators, so many
leaders of the nation. And such a combination is to be broken up, and
Scotland to become a colony, because Ireland, unwilling to bear her
share in the duties of government, desires to be reduced to that status!
To such a proposal Mr. Gladstone's phrase about Home Rule applies in all
its force:--
"Can any sensible man, can any rational man, suppose that at this
time of day, in this condition of the world, we are going to
disintegrate the great capital institutions of this country for the
purpose of making ourselves ridiculous in the sight of all mankind,
and crippling any power we possess for bestowing benefits through
legislation on the country to which we belong?"
The proposal would be incredibly stupid, if it were not recklessly
mischievous.
But to most advocates of the federal system the word means less than
this; and the conception, usually vaguely expressed, is that the
relations of England, Scotland, and Ireland, should be something like
those of the communities which make up (to quote instances commonly
given) the German Empire, the Swiss Federation, the United States of
America, or the British self-governing dominions of Canada, Australia,
and South Africa. So expressed, the aspiration for a federal union
deserves respectful consideration.
In the first place, it must not be forgotten that no proposal of this
nature has yet been put forward, even in general terms, by any English
or Irish Party. Mr. John Redmond, the leader of the Irish Nationalists,
has indeed said that he and his friends "were only asking what had
already been given in twenty-eight different portions of the
Empire:"[46] and a speaker usually more careful in his language[47]
lately suggested to his audience that they should
"ask the twenty-eight Home Rule Parliaments if the Empire would be
split in pieces if there were a twenty-ninth."
But in order to make up the number of Parliaments and Legislatures
within the Empire to twenty-eight it is necessary to include in one
category the Parliament of the United Kingdom, the colonial Parliaments
of Newfoundland and New Zealand, the federal Parliaments of Canada and
Australia, the provincial or state Legislatures (widely differing from
one another in their constitution and powers) comprised in those
Federations, the Union of South Africa and its constituent provinces,
and the tiny assemblies surviving in the Channel Islands and the Isle of
Man. From a reference so vague and confused no inference as to the real
meaning or desire of either speaker can safely be drawn.[48]
But let us put aside, with the foreign confederacies (which have in most
cases been achieved or maintained by armed conflict), the practically
independent Parliaments within the British Empire, and confine ourselves
to the Federations of Canada and Australia, and to the Union (sometimes
incorrectly called a Federation) of South Africa.
In the first place, it is not immaterial to observe that each of the
Legislatures here referred to resulted, not from the dissolution of an
existing union, but from the voluntary assumption by communities
formerly independent of one another of a closer bond. In other words,
there was in each case a real _Jædus_ or treaty, not imposed by the
Imperial power, but having a local origin and springing from the need of
common action. The operative force was centripetal; and as the force
continues to operate, the tendency of the mass is towards a chemical in
lieu of a mechanical fusion.[49] But in the case of the United Kingdom a
change from organic union to Federation would be the beginning of
dissolution; and the centrifugal force, once set in motion, might lead
further in the same direction.
Again, there can be no true federation without (1) provincial
legislatures and executives, (2) a central Parliament and executive, (3)
a careful definition of the powers of each, and (4) a federal court to
which should be entrusted the duty of determining questions arising
between the federal and provincial governments and legislatures. If,
therefore, provincial or state Governments are created for Ireland and
for Scotland, a like Government should logically be created for England.
Are we prepared to see four (or, if Wales be added, five) legislatures,
and four (or five) executives, in these islands? Have we considered the
possible effect on our whole system of government, on the theory of
Cabinet responsibility to Parliament, on the powers of the House of
Commons over grievance and supply? Must not each unit in a Federation be
put as regards financial matters upon a like footing; and, if so, can
Ireland bear her share? Is federation consistent with the predominance
of one state, England, in wealth and population? These questions are
vital, and none of them have received consideration. By declaring in
general terms for Federalism you go but a little way.
And if we treat the proposal for Federation as indicating a desire to
adopt a constitution under which the relations of the United Kingdom to
each of its constituent parts would be as the relation of some one of
the three self-governing Dominions to the states or provinces of which
it is composed, the question remains, which of those Dominions should be
adopted as a model? For they differ not only in form but in essence.
Under the British North America Act, 1867, and the amending statutes,
there is "one Parliament for Canada" (sect. 17), while each province has
its Legislature. Each provincial Legislature is empowered exclusively to
make laws in relation to certain specified subjects (including property
and civil rights and the administration of justice), and also in
relation to "all matters of a merely local or private nature in the
province"; while the Dominion Parliament may "make laws for the peace,
order, and good government of Canada in relation to all matters not
coming within" the classes of subjects assigned exclusively to the
provincial Legislatures. The division of functions has given rise to
much confusion and litigation; but, speaking generally, the trend of
judicial decision has been towards a wide interpretation of the
provincial powers. The "residuary powers" are in the Dominion
Parliament.
The constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, as defined by the
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, is of a different
character. The Federal Parliament is entrusted with power to make laws
with respect to a number of subjects divided into no less than 39
classes (sect. 51); the State Legislatures have concurrent powers of
legislation, but in case of conflict the law of the Commonwealth is to
prevail over the State law (sect. 109). The "residuary powers" are in
this case left to the States. There is power to alter the Constitution
with the consent of a majority of the electors in a majority of the
States and of a majority of the electors of the Commonwealth (sect.
123)--a power which has been freely used.
The case of South Africa is sometimes cited as a precedent for loosening
the bonds in the United Kingdom. It is a strong precedent for closer
union. The South Africa Act, 1909, created in fact as well as in name,
not a Federation but a true Legislative Union. Under the Act, the South
African colonies were "united in a legislative union under one
government under the name of the Union of South Africa" (sect. 4). The
legislative power is vested in the Parliament of the Union (sect. 19),
which has full power to make laws for the peace, order, and good
government of the Union (sect. 59). In each province (formerly a colony)
there is an administrator appointed by the Governor-General of the Union
in Council (sect. 68), and a Provincial Council (sect. 70); but the
powers of the Provincial Councils are confined within narrow limits
(sect. 85), and their ordinances (they are not called laws) have effect
within the province as long as and so far as they are not repugnant to
any Act of the Union Parliament (sect. 86). The Supreme Courts of the
old colonies become provincial divisions of the Supreme Court of South
Africa (sect. 98), and the colonial property and debts are transferred
to the Union (sects. 121-124). In fact, in South Africa, where, as in
Ireland, the distinction in the past has been racial and not
territorial, Union and not Federation has gained the day. It is safe to
prophesy that the coming proposals of the Government will not follow the
South African plan.