The hybrid form of government proposed in the Home Rule Bills of 1886
and 1893 gave rise to a further difficulty, and one which went far
towards wrecking them both. Should Ireland under Home Rule be
represented at Westminster by its members and representative peers?
Under a system of Gladstonian Home Rule there appear to be only three
possible answers to this question. The Irish representatives may be
excluded altogether, they may be retained altogether, or they may be
retained in diminished numbers and with some limitation on their voting
powers.
The total exclusion clause in the Bill of 1886 was one of the most
unpopular parts of an unpopular Bill. It was immediately urged that this
arrangement was virtually equivalent to separation, and Mr. Gladstone
admitted[44] that the argument had force. Since 1886 public sentiment
has advanced in the direction of a closer Imperial unity, and it is
unlikely that the country will recur in 1912 to a proposal which in 1886
was admitted to be intolerable. Moreover, if the British Parliament is
to retain control of the whole foreign policy of the kingdom, and--what
is likely to be of enormous importance in the future--of its whole
fiscal policy, it would be manifestly unjust to deny to Ireland a voice
and vote in such matters. How would it be possible, for instance, to
discuss the effect upon agriculture of a Tariff Reform Budget in the
absence of competent representatives of the Irish farmers, or to
consider the yearly grant to be made (as it is said) in aid of Irish
finance without the assistance of any representatives of Ireland?
A recognition of the difficulties in the way of total exclusion led Mr.
Gladstone to propose, in 1893, what was known as the "popping-in-and-out
clause," under which Irish members would have sat at Westminster, but
would have voted only on Imperial measures. The best criticism of this
attempt to distinguish between local and Imperial matters was supplied
on another occasion by Mr. Gladstone himself:--
"I have thought much, reasoned much, and inquired much with regard
to that distinction, but I have arrived at the conclusion that it
cannot be drawn. I believe it passes the wit of man."
To distinguish between matters which might and those which could not
affect Ireland was impossible to the ordinary man, and the device of
committing all matters of special difficulty to the decision of Mr.
Speaker had not then its present vogue. Further, it was obvious that
under such a system a British Ministry might have on one day, when
English or Scottish affairs were under discussion, a commanding
majority; but on the next, when a vote possibly affecting the sister
island was in question, might find itself labouring in the trough of the
sea; while on the third day, that vote having been disposed of and the
Irish members having taken their leave, it might rise once more on the
crest of the wave. The proposal was too ludicrous to be long defended.
The sense of humour of the House prevailed over Mr. Gladstone's
earnestness, and he fell back on inclusion for all purposes.
But inclusion for all purposes had its own difficulties. Under the
Gladstonian system the Imperial Parliament would have considered, not
only matters affecting the whole kingdom, but also purely English or
purely Scottish affairs; and to give to the Irish representatives the
control in their own Parliament of purely Irish affairs, and also a
voice at Westminster on matters affecting England or Scotland only, was
obviously unjust. Such a power would have been used, not for the benefit
of England or Scotland, but as an instrument for wresting further
concessions for Ireland.
"I will never be a party," said Mr. Gladstone at one time, "to
allowing the Irish members to manage their own affairs in Dublin,
and at the same time to come over here and manage British affairs.
Such an arrangement would not be a Bill to grant self-government to
Ireland, but one to remove self-government from England; it would
create a subordinate Parliament indeed, but it would be the one at
Westminster, and not that in Dublin."[45]
The problem seems insoluble because, under a hybrid (or Gladstonian)
system of Home Rule, it is insoluble. If a clear line is taken, there
is no difficulty under this head. If full "responsible" or colonial
government is granted, clearly representation in the Imperial Parliament
(I do not now speak of a federal assembly) is an anomaly. On the other
hand, if nothing more is in question than the extension of local
government generally known as Devolution, then adequate representation
in the Imperial Parliament is a matter of course. If a federal
government is established, each member of the Federation must needs be
represented in the federal Parliament; but in that case there must be no
attempt to entrust to the same assembly both the duties of the federal
Parliament and those of a Legislature for one of the federating states.
It was this attempt to treat the Imperial Parliament as the local or
state Legislature for Great Britain, and also as the federal Parliament
for Great Britain and Ireland, which was fatal to Mr. Gladstone's
proposals.