(_By our Tame Naval Expert._)
It is really surprising what confusion exists in the public mind upon
the exact significance of such elementary terms as "Command of the Sea,"
and "A Fleet in Being." Only yesterday evening I was asked by a
fellow-traveller on the top of a bus why, if we had command of the sea,
we didn't blow up the Kiel Canal!
It will be as well to begin at the beginning. What is Naval Warfare? It
is an endeavour by sea-going belligerent units, impregnated (for the
time being) with a measure of _animus pugnandi_ and furnished with
offensive weapons, to impose their will upon one another. In rather more
technical language it may be described as fighting in ships.
Now in order to utilize the sea for one's own purposes and at the same
time to deny, proscribe, refuse and restrict it to one's enemy it is
essential to obtain COMMAND. And it must not be overlooked that Command
of the Sea can only be established in one way--by utilizing or
threatening to utilize sea-going belligerent units. But we must
distinguish between Command of the Sea and Sea Supremacy, and again
between Potential Command, Putative Command and Absolute Command.
Finally let there be no confusion between the expressions "Command of
the Sea" and "Control of the Sea," which are entirely different
things--though both rest securely upon the doctrine of the Fleet in
Being, which is at the foundation of all true strategy.
This brings us to the question of what is meant by the phrase "A Fleet
in Being." "To Be or Not to Be" (in Being) is a phrase that has been
woefully misinterpreted, especially by those who insist on a distinction
between Being and Doing. There is no such distinction at sea. For a
fleet to exist as a recognisable instrument is not necessarily for it to
be in Being. Only by exhibiting a desire to dispute Command at all costs
can a fleet be said to come into Being. On the other hand, by being in
Being a fleet does not necessarily obtain command or even partial
control. This is not simply a question of To Be or Not to Be (in Being).
In explaining these academic principles one always runs the risk of
being confronted with concrete instances. I shall be asked, "Is the
German Fleet in Being?" I can only reply that it is in a condition of
strictly Limited Control (I refer to the Kiel Canal), while the Baltic
is in Disputed Command so long as the Russian Fleet is Strategically at
Large.
This brings us to the question of the phrase "Strategically at Large,"
which has been loosely rendered "On the War-path." Let us say rather
that any fleet (in Being) which is ready (even without Putative Control)
to dispute Command is said to be Strategically at Large, so long as it
is imbued with _animus pugnandi_.
_Animus pugnandi_ is the root of the matter. A fleet is in a state of
disintegration without it. And so long as the German Fleet's activities
in the North Sea are confined to peeping out of the Canal to see if the
foe is in the neighbourhood one must conclude that this ingredient has
been overlooked in its composition.