THE ANTECEDENTS OF TRAFALGAR.
SEPTEMBER 15--OCTOBER 19, 1805. AGE, 47.
The crowds that had assembled to greet Nelson's arrival at Portsmouth,
four weeks before, now clustered again around his footsteps to bid him
a loving farewell. Although, to avoid such demonstrations, he had
chosen for his embarkation another than the usual landing-place, the
multitude collected and followed him to the boat. "They pressed
forward to obtain sight of his face," says Southey; "Many were in
tears, and many knelt down before him, and blessed him as he passed.
England has had many heroes, but never one," he justly adds, "who so
entirely possessed the love of his fellow countrymen as Nelson." There
attached to him not only the memory of many brilliant deeds, nor yet
only the knowledge that more than any other he stood between them and
harm,--his very name a tower of strength over against their enemies.
The deep human sympathy which won its way to the affections of those
under his command, in immediate contact with his person, seamen as
well as officers, had spread from them with quick contagion throughout
all ranks of men; and heart answered to heart in profound trust, among
those who never had seen his face. "I had their huzzas before," he
said to Captain Hardy, who sat beside him in the boat. "Now I have
their hearts."
He was accompanied to the ship by Mr. Canning and Mr. Rose, intimate
associates of Mr. Pitt, and they remained on board to dine. Nelson
noted that just twenty-five days had been passed ashore, "from dinner
to dinner." The next morning, Sunday, September 15th, at 8 A.M., the
"Victory" got under way and left St. Helen's, where she had been lying
at single anchor, waiting to start. Three other line-of-battle ships
belonging to his fleet, and which followed him in time for Trafalgar,
were then at Spithead, but not yet ready. The "Victory" therefore
sailed without them, accompanied only by Blackwood's frigate, the
"Euryalus." The wind outside, being west-southwest, was dead foul, and
it was not till the 17th that the ship was off Plymouth. There it fell
nearly calm, and she was joined by two seventy-fours from the harbor.
The little squadron continued its course, the wind still ahead, until
the 20th of the month, when it had not yet gained a hundred miles
southwest from Scilly. Here Nelson met his former long-tried second in
the Mediterranean, Sir Richard Bickerton, going home ill; having
endured the protracted drudgery off Toulon only to lose, by a hair's
breadth, his share in the approaching triumph.
On the 25th the "Victory" was off Lisbon. "We have had only one day's
real fair wind," wrote Nelson to Lady Hamilton, "but by perseverance
we have done much." The admiral sent in letters to the British consul
and naval officers, urging them to secure as many men as possible for
the fleet, but enjoining profound secrecy about his coming, conscious
that his presence would be a deterrent to the enemy and might prevent
the attempt to leave Cadiz, upon which he based his hopes of a speedy
issue, and a speedy return home for needed repose. His departure from
England, indeed, could not remain long unknown in Paris; but
communications by land were slow in those times, and a few days'
ignorance of his arrival, and of the reinforcement he brought, might
induce Villeneuve to dare the hazard which he otherwise might fear.
"Day by day," he wrote to Davison, "I am expecting the allied fleet to
put to sea--every day, hour, and moment." "I am convinced," he tells
Blackwood, who took charge of the inshore lookout, "that you estimate,
as I do, the importance of not letting these rogues escape us without
a fair fight, which I pant for by day, and dream of by night." For the
same reasons of secrecy he sent a frigate ahead to Collingwood, with
orders that, when the "Victory" appeared, not only should no salutes
be fired, but no colors should be shown, if in sight of the port. The
like precautions were continued when any new ship joined. Every care
was taken to lull the enemy into confidence, and to lure him out of
port.
At 6 P.M. of Saturday, September 28th, the "Victory" reached the
fleet, then numbering twenty-nine of the line; the main body being
fifteen to twenty miles west of Cadiz, with six ships close in with
the port. The next day was Nelson's birthday--forty-seven years old.
The junior admirals and the captains visited the commander-in chief,
as customary, but with demonstrations of gladness and confidence that
few leaders have elicited in equal measure from their followers. "The
reception I met with on joining the fleet caused the sweetest
sensation of my life. The officers who came on board to welcome my
return, forgot my rank as commander-in-chief in the enthusiasm with
which they greeted me. As soon as these emotions were past, I laid
before them the plan I had previously arranged for attacking the
enemy; and it was not only my pleasure to find it generally approved,
but clearly perceived and understood." To Lady Hamilton he gave an
account of this scene which differs little from the above, except in
its greater vividness. "I believe my arrival was most welcome, not
only to the Commander of the fleet, but also to every individual in
it; and, when I came to explain to them the '_Nelson touch_,' it was
like an electric shock. Some shed tears, all approved--'It was
new--it was singular--it was simple!' and, from admirals downwards,
it was repeated--'It must succeed, if ever they will allow us to get
at them! You are, my Lord, surrounded by friends whom you inspire with
confidence.' Some may be Judas's: but the majority are certainly much
pleased with my commanding them." No more joyful birthday levee was
ever held than that of this little naval court. Besides the adoration
for Nelson personally, which they shared with their countrymen in
general, there mingled with the delight of the captains the sentiment
of professional appreciation and confidence, and a certain relief,
noticed by Codrington, from the dry, unsympathetic rule of
Collingwood, a man just, conscientious, highly trained, and efficient,
but self-centred, rigid, uncommunicative; one who fostered, if he did
not impose, restrictions upon the intercourse between the ships,
against which he had inveighed bitterly when himself one of St.
Vincent's captains. Nelson, on the contrary, at once invited cordial
social relations with the commanding officers. Half of the thirty-odd
were summoned to dine on board the flagship the first day, and half
the second. Not till the third did he permit himself the luxury of a
quiet dinner chat with his old chum, the second in command, whose
sterling merits, under a crusty exterior, he knew and appreciated.
Codrington mentions also an incident, trivial in itself, but
illustrative of that outward graciousness of manner, which, in a man
of Nelson's temperament and position, is rarely the result of careful
cultivation, but bespeaks rather the inner graciousness of the heart
that he abundantly possessed. They had never met before, and the
admiral, greeting him with his usual easy courtesy, handed him a
letter from his wife, saying that being intrusted with it by a lady,
he made a point of delivering it himself, instead of sending it by
another.
The "Nelson touch," or Plan of Attack, expounded to his captains at
the first meeting, was afterwards formulated in an Order, copies of
which were issued to the fleet on the 9th of October. In this
"Memorandum," which was doubtless sufficient for those who had
listened to the vivid oral explanation of its framer, the writer finds
the simplicity, but not the absolute clearness, that they recognized.
It embodies, however, the essential ideas, though not the precise
method of execution, actually followed at Trafalgar, under conditions
considerably different from those which Nelson probably anticipated;
and it is not the least of its merits as a military conception that it
could thus, with few signals and without confusion, adapt itself at a
moment's notice to diverse circumstances. This great order not only
reflects the ripened experience of its author, but contains also the
proof of constant mental activity and development in his thought; for
it differs materially in detail from the one issued a few months
before to the fleet, when in pursuit of Villeneuve to the West Indies.
As the final, and in the main consecutive, illustrations of his
military views, the two are presented here together.
PLAN OF ATTACK.[121]
The business of an English Commander-in-Chief being first to
bring an Enemy's Fleet to Battle, on the most advantageous terms
to himself, (I mean that of laying his Ships close on board the
Enemy, as expeditiously as possible;) and secondly, to continue
them there, without separating, until the business is decided; I
am sensible beyond this object it is not necessary that I should
say a word, being fully assured that the Admirals and Captains
of the Fleet I have the honour to command, will, knowing my
precise object, that of a close and decisive Battle, supply any
deficiency in my not making signals; which may, if extended
beyond these objects, either be misunderstood, or, if waited
for, very probably, from various causes, be impossible for the
Commander-in-Chief to make: therefore, it will only be requisite
for me to state, in as few words as possible, the various modes
in which it may be necessary for me to obtain my object, on
which depends, not only the honour and glory of our Country, but
possibly its safety, and with it that of all Europe, from French
tyranny and oppression.
If the two Fleets are both willing to fight, but little
manoeuvring is necessary; the less the better;--a day is soon
lost in that business: therefore I will only suppose that the
Enemy's Fleet being to leeward, standing close upon a wind on
the starboard tack, and that I am nearly ahead of them, standing
on the larboard tack, of course I should weather them. The
weather must be supposed to be moderate; for if it be a gale of
wind, the manoeuvring of both Fleets is but of little avail, and
probably no decisive Action would take place with the whole
Fleet. Two modes present themselves: one to stand on, just out
of gunshot, until the Van-Ship of my Line would be about the
centre Ship of the Enemy, then make the signal to wear together,
then bear up, engage with all our force the six or five
Van-Ships of the Enemy, passing, certainly, if opportunity
offered, through their Line. This would prevent their bearing
up, and the Action, from the known bravery and conduct of the
Admirals and Captains, would certainly be decisive: the second
or third Rear-Ships of the Enemy would act as they please, and
our Ships would give a good account of them, should they persist
in mixing with our Ships. The other mode would be, to stand
under an easy but commanding sail, directly for their headmost
Ship, so as to prevent the Enemy from knowing whether I should
pass to leeward or windward of him. In that situation, I would
make the signal to engage the Enemy to leeward, and to cut
through their Fleet about the sixth Ship from the Van, passing
very close; they being on a wind, and you going large, could cut
their Line when you please. The Van-Ships of the Enemy would, by
the time our Rear came abreast of the Van-Ship, be severely cut
up, and our Van could not expect to escape damage. I would then
have our _Rear_ Ship, and every Ship in succession, wear,
continue the Action with either the Van-Ship, or second Ship, as
it might appear most eligible from her crippled state; and this
mode pursued, I see nothing to prevent the capture of the five
or six Ships of the Enemy's Van. The two or three Ships of the
Enemy's Rear[122] must either bear up, or wear; and, in either
case, although they would be in a better plight probably than
our two Van-Ships (now in the Rear) yet they would be separated,
and at a distance to leeward, so as to give our Ships time to
refit; and by that time, I believe, the Battle would, from the
judgment of the Admiral and Captains, be over with the rest of
them. Signals from these moments are useless, when every man is
disposed to do his duty. The great object is for us to support
each other, and to keep close to the Enemy, and to leeward of
him.
If the Enemy are running away, then the only signals necessary
will be, to engage the Enemy as arriving up with them; and the
other ships to pass on for the second, third, &c., giving, if
possible, a close fire into the Enemy in passing, taking care to
give our Ships engaged notice of your intention.
MEMORANDUM.
(Secret)
Victory, off CADIZ, 9th October, 1805.
[Sidenote: General Considerations.] Thinking it almost
impossible to bring a Fleet of forty Sail of the Line into a
Line of Battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other
circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that
the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the Enemy to
Battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive, I have
therefore made up my mind to keep the Fleet in that position of
sailing (with the exception of the First and Second in Command)
that the Order of Sailing is to be the Order of Battle, placing
the Fleet in two Lines of sixteen Ships each, with an Advanced
Squadron of eight of the fastest sailing Two-decked Ships, which
will always make, if wanted, a Line of twenty-four Sail, on
whichever Line the Commander-in-Chief may direct.
[Sidenote: Powers of Second in Command.] The Second in Command
will, after my intentions are made known to him, have the entire
direction of his Line to make the attack upon the Enemy, and to
follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.
[Sidenote: The Attack from to Leeward.] If the Enemy's Fleet
should be seen to windward in Line of Battle, and that the two
Lines and the Advanced Squadron can fetch them, they will
probably be so extended that their Van could not succour their
Rear.
I should therefore probably make the Second in Command's signal
to lead through, about their twelfth Ship from their Rear, (or
wherever he could fetch, if not able to get so far advanced); my
Line would lead through about their Centre, and the Advanced
Squadron to cut two or three or four Ships a-head of their
Centre, so as to ensure getting at their Commander-in-Chief, on
whom every effort must be made to capture.
[Sidenote: The General Controlling Idea, under all Conditions.]
The whole impression of the British Fleet must be to overpower
from two or three Ships a-head of their Commander-in-Chief
supposed to be in the Centre, to the Rear of their Fleet. I will
suppose twenty Sail of the Enemy's Line to be untouched, it must
be some time before they could perform a manoeuvre to bring
their force compact to attack any part of the British Fleet
engaged, or to succour their own Ships, which indeed would be
impossible without mixing with the Ships engaged.
Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a Sea Fight
beyond all others. Shot will carry away the masts and yards of
friends as well as foes; but I look with confidence to a Victory
before the Van of the Enemy could succour their Rear, and then
that the British Fleet would most of them be ready to receive
their twenty Sail of the Line, or to pursue them, should they
endeavour to make off.
If the Van of the Enemy tacks, the Captured Ships must run to
leeward of the British Fleet; if the Enemy wears, the British
must place themselves between the Enemy and the Captured, and
disabled British Ships; and should the Enemy close, I have no
fears as to the result.
[Sidenote: Duties of Subordinate.] The Second in Command will in
all possible things direct the movements of his Line, by keeping
them as compact as the nature of the circumstances will admit.
Captains are to look to their particular Line as their rallying
point. But, in case Signals can neither be seen or perfectly
understood, no Captain can do very wrong if he places his Ship
alongside that of an Enemy.
Of the intended attack from to windward, the Enemy in Line of
Battle ready to receive an attack,
[Illustration][123]
[Sidenote: The Attack from to Windward.] The divisions of the
British Fleet will be brought nearly within gun shot of the
Enemy's Centre. The signal will most probably then be made for
the Lee Line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even
steering sails, in order to get as quickly as possible to the
Enemy's Line, and to cut through, beginning from the 12 Ship
from the Enemy's Rear. Some Ships may not get through their
exact place, but they will always be at hand to assist their
friends; and if any are thrown round the Rear of the Enemy, they
will effectually complete the business of twelve Sail of the
Enemy.
Should the Enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still
the twelve Ships composing, in the first position, the Enemy's
Rear, are to be the object of attack of the Lee Line, unless
otherwise directed from the Commander-in-Chief, which is
scarcely to be expected, as the entire management of the Lee
Line, after the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, is
signified, is intended to be left to the judgment of the Admiral
commanding that Line.
[Sidenote: Special Charge of the Commander-in-Chief.] The
remainder of the Enemy's Fleet, 34 Sail, are to be left to the
management of the Commander-in-Chief, who will endeavour to take
care that the movements of the Second in Command are as little
interrupted as is possible.
NELSON AND BRONTE.
It will be borne in mind that the first of these instructions was
issued for the handling of a small body of ships--ten--expecting to
meet fifteen to eighteen enemies; whereas the second contemplated the
wielding of a great mass of vessels, as many as forty British,
directed against a possible combination of forty-six French and
Spanish. In the former case, however, although the aggregate numbers
were smaller, the disproportion of force was much greater, even after
allowance made for the British three-deckers; and we know, from other
contemporary remarks of Nelson, that his object here was not so much a
crushing defeat of the enemy--"only numbers can annihilate"--as the
disorganization and neutralization of a particular detachment, as the
result of which the greater combination of the enemy would fall to
pieces. "After they have beaten our fleet soundly, they will do us no
more harm this summer."[124] Consequently, he relies much upon the
confusion introduced into the enemy's movements by an attack, which,
though of much inferior force, should be sudden in character,
developing only at the last moment, into which the enemy should be
precipitated unawares, while the British should encounter it, or
rather should enter it, with minds fully prepared,--not only for the
immediate manoeuvre, but for all probable consequences.
In accordance with the same general object--confusion--he directs his
assault upon the van, instead of, as at Trafalgar, upon the rear;
according to his saying in the Baltic, recorded by Stewart,[125]
"Close with a Frenchman, but out-manoeuvre a Russian," for which
purpose he would throw his own force, preferably, upon the van of the
latter. The reason is obvious, upon reflection; for in attacking and
cutting off the head--van and centre--of a column of ships, the rear,
coming up under full way, has _immediate_ action forced upon it. There
is no time for deliberation. The van is already engaged, and access to
it more or less impeded, by the hostile dispositions. The decision
must be instant--to the right hand, or to the left, to windward, or to
leeward--and there is at least an even chance that the wrong thing
will be done, as well as a probability, falling little short of
certainty, that all the ships of the rear will _not_ do the same
thing; that is, they will be thrown into confusion with all its dire
train of evils, doubt, hesitancy, faltering, and inconsequent action.
It is hard work to knit again a shattered line under the unremittent
assault of hardened veterans, such as Nelson's Mediterranean ships.
The method employed in the second of these instructions, the
celebrated Memorandum, differs essentially from that of the Plan of
Attack, though both are simply developments of the one idea of
concentration. It is unfortunate for us that Nelson, like most men of
action, reveals his reasoning processes, not in ordered discussion,
but by stray gleams of expression, too often unrecorded, from which we
can infer only the general tenor of his thought. It is in the chance
phrase, transmitted by Stewart, coupled with the change of object, so
definitely announced in the second instance,--the crushing, namely, of
the enemy's great fleet, and not the mere crippling of a detachment
such as went to the West Indies,--that the author thinks to find the
clew to the difference of dispositions, in the first case, from those
prescribed and followed for Trafalgar--the "Nelson touch" that
thrilled the captains. There is again, indeed, in the latter, the
distinct reliance upon confusion, for the line of the foe is to be
broken in two places; but now the confusion introduced is in the part
of the enemy that is assailed, not, as before, in that which is left
out of action. Confusion, in short, is now imposed by external force,
rather than induced by internal perplexity,--a condition surer, and
therefore more liable to result in a crushing victory, for it depends
upon the vigor of the offensive, and not on the weakness of the
defensive, which may prove a deceitful reliance. Moreover, effectual
crushing requires time, even when, as in the final memorandum, a great
concentration of superiority is intended on part of an enemy's order.
Now, when the van and centre are attacked, the rear is pointed fair,
and, if it does not lose its head, comes quickly up to the rescue; but
when, in the contrary case, the centre and rear receive the assault,
the van, being left out of action, not only has to turn round, but
naturally stands away, for an interval dependent upon the initiative
of its immediate commander, as occurred to an extreme degree at
Trafalgar. Thus time, the invaluable five minutes or half hour, is
gained for the offensive to bring its first concentration to a
successful issue, as well as to prepare to repel the van of the
defensive, if it countermarches, as it should. "I look with confidence
to a victory before the van of the enemy could succour their rear, and
then that the British fleet would most of them be ready to receive
their twenty sail of the line, or to pursue them, should they
endeavour to make off."
The organization of a distinct body of eight fast-sailing
ships-of-the-line, to be carried to such part of the field as might
appear necessary to the commander-in-chief in a particular emergency,
resulted inevitably, perhaps, from the considerations presented by
Nelson in the opening sentences of the Memorandum, and from the great
number of ships he then hoped to have. There were precedents for such
a formation, in the practice of the day; but, as far as recalled by
the author, they were the advanced guards, the skirmish line, of the
fleet, not, as in this case, essentially a reserve. In Nelson's
present thought, the employment of this force would be, not antecedent
to, but consequent upon, the particular indications of the day.
Probably they would not be held back as long--for as distinct
indications--as in the case of an army's reserve; but nevertheless,
the chief object of their separate organization was to redress, at the
moment, the unforeseen developments of a battle, whether at the
instant of engagement or during its subsequent progress. The
unfortunate Villeneuve, who commanded the allies, an accomplished
though irresolute seaman, had adopted a similar arrangement, placing
twelve detached ships under his colleague Gravina; but, with sailing
vessels, the effective use of such a force depended largely upon the
windward position, which the allies did not have. If placed to leeward
of a lee line, it was in the power of the assailant to throw them out
of action altogether; if to windward, to attack them separately;
therefore at Trafalgar Villeneuve ordered them back into the line.
Nelson likewise then embodied his reserve in the two columns of
attack, because he had fewer vessels than he expected, and because the
light wind forbade the wasting of time in evolutionary refinements.
The incident of the simultaneous adoption of the same provision by the
two opposing admirals, however, is interesting as indicative of the
progress of naval thought, though still hampered by the uncertainties
of the motive power.
The second of these Orders, that of October 9, is memorable, not only
for the sagacity and comprehensiveness of its general dispositions,
but even more for the magnanimous confidence with which the details of
execution were freely intrusted to those upon whom they had to fall.
It was evidently drawn up in the first instance for Collingwood only;
the word "your" in the original draught having been struck out, and
"second in command" substituted. The comparison already made between
it and its predecessor of May, may not uninstructively be followed by
a study of the difference in details between itself and the execution
it actually received at the Battle of Trafalgar. To aid this purpose
the author has traced, in marginal notes, the succession of the
leading ideas.
After a statement of General Considerations, and a frank attribution
of full powers to the second in command for carrying out his part,
Nelson lays down the manner of Attack from to Leeward. This condition
not obtaining at Trafalgar, the plan cannot be contrasted with the
performance of that day. Upon this follows a luminous enunciation of
the general idea, namely, Collingwood's engaging the twelve rear
ships, which underlies the method prescribed for each attack--from to
leeward and to windward. Of the latter Nelson fortunately gives an
outline diagram, which illustrates the picture before his own mind,
facilitating our comprehension of his probable expectations, and
allowing a comparison between them and the event as it actually
occurred. It is not to the discredit, but greatly to the credit, of
his conception, that it was susceptible of large modification in
practice while retaining its characteristic idea.
Looking at his diagram,[126] and following his words, it will be seen
that the British lines are not formed perpendicularly to that of the
enemy (as they were at Trafalgar), but parallel to it. Starting from
this disposition, near the enemy and abreast his centre, the lee line
of sixteen ships was to bear up _together_, and advance in line, not
in column (as happened at Trafalgar); their object being the twelve
rear ships of the enemy. This first move stands by itself; the action
of the weather line, and of the reserve squadron still farther to
windward, are held in suspense under the eye of the
commander-in-chief, to take the direction which the latter shall
prescribe as the struggle develops. The mere menace of such a force,
just out of gunshot to windward, would be sufficient to prevent any
extensive manoeuvre of the unengaged enemies. Nelson doubtless had in
mind the dispositions, more than a century old, of Tourville and De
Ruyter, by which a few ships, spaced to windward of an enemy's van,
could check its tacking, because of the raking fire to which they
would subject it. Unquestionably, he would not have kept long in idle
expectancy twenty-four ships, the number he had in mind; but clearly
also he proposed to hold them until he saw how things went with
Collingwood. Thus much time would allow, granting the position he
assumed and a reasonable breeze. His twenty-four to windward held an
absolute check over the supposed thirty-four unengaged, of the enemy.
The attack as planned, therefore, differed from that executed (1) in
that the lee line was not to advance in column, but in line, thereby
dispersing the enemy's fire, and avoiding the terrific concentration
which crushed the leaders at Trafalgar; and (2) in that the weather
squadrons were not to attack simultaneously with the lee, but after it
had engaged, in order to permit the remedying of any mishap that might
arise in delivering the crucial blow. In both these matters of detail
the plan was better than the modification; but the latter was forced
upon Nelson by conditions beyond his control.
It will be observed that, when considering attacking from to leeward,
he orders a simultaneous movement of the three British
divisions,--lee, weather, and reserve; for the obvious reason that if
he held his own divisions in reserve to leeward he could not at all
count upon bringing them into action at will; and, moreover, such an
attack would probably have to be in columns, and, if simultaneous,
would be less liable to disaster than in succession, mutual support
diverting the enemies' fire. In fact, the highest order of offensive
combination was only possible when having the advantage of the
wind--fair, and enough of it.
The plan upon which Trafalgar was to be fought, as above described and
analyzed, was formed some time before leaving England, and it is not
unreasonable to suppose that it was in fact a modification of the
earlier idea, laid down during the chase to the West Indies. On the
10th of September, three days only before quitting Merton, Nelson
called upon his old friend, Lord Sidmouth,[127] who until recently had
been Prime Minister. In the course of the interview he explained his
intentions as regards the attack. "Rodney," he said, "broke the
enemy's line in one place,[128] I will break it in two;" and with his
finger he indicated upon a table the general character of the assault,
to be made in two lines, led by himself and Collingwood. He felt
confident, according to Sidmouth's narration, that he should capture
either their van and centre or their centre and rear. It was of course
out of his power to prevent the enemy inverting their order, by the
simultaneous turning round of every ship, at the time of engagement,
so that the attack intended for the rear should fall upon it become
the van. Against this contingency he provided by the words, "should
the enemy wear together, still the twelve ships composing, _in the
first position_, the enemy's rear, are to be the object of attack of
the lee line." Sidmouth did not commit his recollection of this
incident to writing until many years later, and, not being a seaman,
very likely failed to comprehend some of the details--there seems to
the author to be in the story a confusion of what Nelson planned with
what Nelson did; but a great conception is largely independent of
details, and the essential features of Trafalgar are in Sidmouth's
account. The idea was doubtless imparted also to the family circle at
Merton, where probably the expression, "Nelson touch," originated. It
occurs chiefly, if not wholly, in his letters to Lady Hamilton, to
whom, some days before reaching the fleet, he wrote, "I am anxious to
join, for it would add to my grief if any other man was to give them
the Nelson touch, which WE say is warranted never to fail;" but there
may be a quaint allusion to it in the motto he told Rose he had
adopted: "Touch and Take."
When Nelson left England, he was intrusted by the First Lord with the
delicate and unpleasant mission of communicating to Sir Robert Calder
the dissatisfaction of the Government with his conduct, in the
encounter with the allied fleets the previous July; especially for
failing to keep touch with them and bring them again to action. The
national outcry was too strong to be disregarded, nor is it probable
that the Admiralty took a more lenient view of the matter. At all
events, an inquiry was inevitable, and the authorities seem to have
felt that it was a favor to Calder to permit him to ask for the Court
which in any case must be ordered. "I did not fail," wrote Nelson to
Barham, "immediately on my arrival, to deliver your message to Sir
Robert Calder; and it will give your Lordship pleasure to find, as it
has me, that an inquiry is what the Vice-Admiral wishes, and that he
had written to you by the Nautilus, which I detained, to say so. Sir
Robert thinks that he can clearly prove, that it was not in his power
to bring the combined squadrons again to battle."
Nelson felt a profound sympathy for the unfortunate officer, pursued
by the undiscriminating and ignorant fury of popular clamor, the
extent and intensity of which he had had opportunity to realize when
in England. While he probably did not look for so tragic an issue, the
execution of Byng under a similar odium and a similar charge, although
expressly cleared of cowardice and disaffection, was still fresh in
the naval mind. "Sir Robert has an ordeal to pass through," he wrote
Collingwood, "which he little expects." His own opinion upon the case
seems to have undergone some modification, since the generous outburst
with which he at first deprecated the prejudgment of a disappointed
and frightened people; nor could it well fail, as details became known
to him, that he should pass a silent censure upon proceedings, which
contravened alike his inward professional convictions, and his
expressed purposes of action for a similar contingency. "I have had,
as you will believe, a very distressing scene with poor Sir Robert
Calder," he told Lady Hamilton. "He has wrote home to beg an inquiry,
feeling confident that he can fully justify himself. I sincerely hope
he may, but--I have given him the advice as to my dearest friend. He
is in adversity, and if he ever has been my enemy, he now feels the
pang of it, and finds me one of his best friends." "Sir Robert
Calder," he wrote to another correspondent, "has just left us to stand
his trial, which I think of a very serious nature." Nelson was obliged
to detain him until reinforcements arrived from England, because
Calder was unwilling to undergo the apparent humiliation of leaving
his flagship under charges, and she could not yet be spared. It was
not the least of this unlucky man's misfortunes that he left the fleet
just a week before the battle, where his conduct would undoubtedly
have redeemed whatever of errors he may have committed. One of the
last remarks Nelson made before the action began, was, "Hardy, what
would poor Sir Robert Calder give to be with us now!"
Calder's reluctance to quit his flagship, and the keen sensitiveness
with which he expressed his feelings, drew from Nelson a concession he
knew to be wrong, but which is too characteristic, both in the act
itself and in his own account of it, to be omitted. "Sir Robert felt
so much," he wrote to the First Lord, "even at the idea of being
removed from his own ship which he commanded, in the face of the
fleet, that I much fear I shall incur the censure of the Board of
Admiralty, without your Lordship's influence with the members of it. I
may be thought wrong, as an officer, to disobey the orders of the
Admiralty, by not insisting on Sir Robert Calder's quitting the Prince
of Wales for the Dreadnought, and for parting with a 90-gun ship,
before the force arrives which their Lordships have judged necessary;
but I trust that I shall be considered to have done right as a man,
and to a brother officer in affliction--my heart could not stand it,
and so the thing must rest. I shall submit to the wisdom of the Board
to censure me or not, as to them may seem best for the Service; I
shall bow with all due respect to their decision."
From the military point of view this step was indefensible, but it is
in singular keeping with Nelson's kindness of heart, his generosity of
temper, and with a certain recklessness of consequences,--when
supported by inward conviction of right, or swayed by natural
impulses,--which formed no small part of his greatness as a warrior.
"Numbers only can annihilate;" yet to spare the feelings of an unhappy
man, whom he believed to have been his enemy, he parted with one of
the best units from his numbers, although, even with her present, he
was inferior to the allies. He felt keenly, however, the
responsibility he assumed, not only towards the Admiralty, but towards
his own success and reputation. At one time he seems, with unusual
vacillation, even to have returned upon his decision, and to have
notified Calder that the ship could not be spared; for on the 12th of
October the latter wrote him: "The contents of your Lordship's letter
have cut me to the soul. If I am to be turned out of my ship, after
all that has passed, I have only to request I may be allowed to take
my Captain, and such officers as I find necessary for the
justification of my conduct as an officer, and that I may be permitted
to go without a moment's further loss of time. My heart is broken."
This appeal broke down all Nelson's power of resistance. He deprived
himself on the eve of battle of a first-rate ship, taking only the
precaution of sending his entire correspondence with Calder, public
and private, to explain his course, though scarcely to justify it. The
significance of this act is enhanced by the known importance which he
himself attached to the presence or absence of even a third-rate
ship-of-the-line. When the expedition to the Baltic was on the eve of
starting, a seventy-four went aground, in leaving the Downs.
Lieutenant Layman having been conspicuously instrumental in getting
her off, Nelson told him that he had in consequence written in his
favor to the Admiralty; and upon Layman's remarking that what he had
done scarcely deserved so much, the admiral replied, "I think
differently, the loss of one line-of-battle ship might be the loss of
a victory."
When Nelson joined the fleet, he found it stationed some fifteen to
twenty miles from Cadiz. He soon moved the main body to fifty miles
west of the port. "It is desirable," he admitted, "to be well up in
easterly winds, but I must guard against being caught with a westerly
wind near Cadiz, as a fleet of ships with so many three-deckers would
inevitably be forced into the Straits, and then Cadiz would be
perfectly free for the enemy to come out with a westerly wind, as they
served Lord Keith in the late war." The memory of his weary beat out
of the Mediterranean the previous April, against wind and current,
remained vividly in his mind; and he feared also that the willingness
of the enemy to come out, which was his great object, would be much
cooled by the certainty that his fleet could not be avoided, and by
seeing such additions as it might receive. "I think we are near
enough," he wrote Colling wood, "for the weather if it is fine, the
wind serves, and we are in sight, they will never move." "I rely on
you," he tells Blackwood, "that we can't miss getting hold of them,
and I will give them such a shaking as they never yet experienced; at
least I will lay down my life in the attempt." An advanced squadron of
fast-sailing seventy-fours was thrown out ten or twelve miles east of
the fleet, through which daily signals could be exchanged with
Blackwood's squadron of frigates, that cruised day and night close to
the harbor's mouth. This disposition received a farther development
after the 10th of October, when the combined fleets shifted from the
inner harbor to the Bay of Cadiz, and gave other tokens of a speedy
start. On the 14th of the month he made the following entry in his
diary: "Enemy at the harbour's mouth. Placed Defence and Agamemnon
from seven to ten leagues west of Cadiz, and Mars and Colossus five
leagues east of fleet [that is, under way between the fleet and the
former group], whose station is from fifteen to twenty leagues west of
Cadiz; and by this chain I hope to have constant communication with
the frigates off Cadiz." To the captain of the "Defence" he wrote that
it was possible the enemy might try to drive off the frigate squadron,
in order to facilitate their own evasion; in which case the inner
ships-of-the-line would be at hand to resist the attempt.
Despite these careful dispositions, his mind was still ill at ease
lest the enemy might escape undetected. He never had frigates enough
to make the result as sure as it ought to be, where such vast issues
were at stake. While eight at least were needed to be always with the
fleet before Cadiz, he had but five; and to maintain even so many it
was necessary to cut short other services and essential stations. This
deficiency he urged upon the Government still more than he did the
inadequacy of the line-of-battle force; for his fear of the enemy
eluding him was greater than that of a conflict with superior numbers.
As regards the latter contingency, he wrote to Lord Barham that, if
the enemy came out, he would immediately bring them to battle; "but,
although I should not doubt of spoiling any voyage they might attempt,
yet I hope for the arrival of the ships from England, that as an
enemy's fleet they may be annihilated." On the other hand, "the last
fleet was lost to me for want of frigates." Besides his own direct
representations, he pressed Rose to obtain an intimation to the
Admiralty from the Prime Minister, that the latter was personally
solicitous that more small cruisers should be supplied. Both
Collingwood and Nelson believed the allies bound to the Mediterranean;
but in this they might be mistaken, and as the real object might be
again the West Indies, lookouts should be placed off Cape Blanco on
the coast of Africa, and off the Salvages,[129] both which he knew had
been sighted by Villeneuve, in the outward voyage of the previous
spring.
To his concern about the immediate situation before Cadiz were added
the universal cares of the Mediterranean, with all parts of which he
renewed his correspondence, occupying his active mind with provisions
for forwarding the cause of Great Britain and her allies. Under his
many anxieties, however, he preserved his buoyant, resolute temper,
not worrying over possible happenings against which he was unable to
provide. "The force is at present not so large as might be wished," he
writes to Ball, "but I will do my best with it; they will give me more
when they can, and I am not come forth to find difficulties, but to
remove them." "Your Lordship may depend upon my exertions," he tells
Barham. The possibility that he himself might fall was, as always,
present to his thoughts, and never did life mean more to him than it
now did; yet, as the twilight deepened, and the realization of danger
passed gradually into a presentiment of death, he faced the prospect
without gloom--steadfast still in mind. "Let the battle be when it
may, it will never have been surpassed. My shattered frame, if I
survive that day, will require rest, and that is all I shall ask for.
If I fall on such a glorious occasion, it shall be my pride to take
care that my friends shall not blush for me. These things are in the
hands of a wise and just Providence, and His will be done! I have got
some trifle, thank God, to leave those I hold most dear, and I have
taken care not to neglect it. Do not think I am low-spirited on this
account, or fancy anything is to happen to me; quite the contrary--my
mind is calm, and I have only to think of destroying our inveterate
foe."
Of these days of preoccupation, while in hourly expectation of the
issue, overcharged with official anxieties, and facing, however
fearlessly, a growing impression that he himself would not survive the
conflict for which he longed, an anecdote has been transmitted that
shows again how to the end, and whatever his personal cares, his quick
sympathy went out to men of all classes. Word had been passed through
the fleet that a mail was about to start for England, which would not
improbably be the last opportunity of writing home before the enemy
came forth. The letters had been collected as usual, the bags were all
on board the departing vessel, and she herself, under full sail, had
got already some distance away, when Nelson saw a midshipman come up
and speak to Lieutenant Pasco, the signal officer, who, upon hearing
what was said, stamped his foot in evident vexation, and uttered an
exclamation. The admiral, of whose nearness Pasco was not aware,
called him, and asked what was the matter. "Nothing that need trouble
your Lordship," was the reply. "You are not the man to lose your
temper for nothing," rejoined Nelson. "What was it?" "Well, if you
must know, my Lord, I will tell you. You see that cockswain," pointing
to one of the most active of the petty officers; "we have not a better
man on board the Victory and the message which put me out was this. I
was told that he was so busy receiving and getting off the mail-bags,
that he forgot to drop his own letter to his wife into one of them,
and he has just discovered it in his pocket." "Hoist a signal to bring
her back," was Nelson's instant command; "who knows that he may not
fall in action to-morrow. His letter shall go with the rest,"--and the
despatch vessel was brought back for that alone.[130] In telling the
story, Pasco used to say it was no wonder that the common sailors
idolized Nelson, since he was always thinking about them, and won
their hearts by showing his own.
In addition to the combined fleets in Cadiz, which numbered thirty-six
of the line, besides frigates, the enemy had a half-dozen of the line
in Cartagena, which showed signs of moving, and whose junction must be
prevented, if possible. Partly for this reason, partly because it was
necessary to renew the water of the ships, Nelson sent a detachment of
six of the line to Gibraltar and Tetuan, immediately after he took
charge. To the junior admiral who commanded it, and who lamented that
they might lose their share in the expected battle, he replied: "I
have no other means of keeping my fleet complete in provisions and
water. The enemy _will_ come out, and we shall fight them; but there
will be time for you to get back first." They did not, however, return
as thus expected, a misadventure which was chiefly due to their having
to guard a convoy past Cartagena,--a potent illustration of the
influence exerted by a powerful squadron, judiciously placed on the
flank of an important trade route, or line of communication; but even
had they rejoined, six others were told off to leave at once in turn.
Nelson did not dare to take the fleet in mass to Tetuan, as he used to
Madalena; for he could never be sure of getting out of the Straits
when he wished, or when the enemy moved. Thus his fleet was reduced,
by both administrative and strategic exigencies, to twenty-three
ships-of-the-line. Fortunately, four more joined before the battle,
raising the numbers actually engaged to twenty-seven. It will be
recognized that Calder's ninety-gun ship was no small loss.
Such were the general dispositions in which the sailing of the enemy
was awaited. A main body of eighteen to twenty, fifty miles west of
Cadiz, a frigate squadron close in to the harbor, and two groups of
ships-of-the-line extended between these extremes. With a westerly
wind, approach to the port would be easy for all; with an easterly,
Nelson wrote to Blackwood, he would habitually beat up for Cadiz,
never going north of the port. His whereabouts in case of thick
weather was thus always known. He notified Collingwood and his other
subordinates, that if the enemy came out, he should stand for Cape
Spartel, the African outpost of the Straits, to bar the entrance of
the allies to the Mediterranean. Signals were arranged, precise, yet
not so elaborate as to tend to confusion, by which the departure and
general direction of the enemy could be continually transmitted, from
the furthest lookouts to the main body, by night as by day.
On the 13th of October his old ship, the "Agamemnon," joined the
fleet. She was commanded by Sir Edward Berry, who had been first
lieutenant in her with Nelson, had accompanied him in boarding the
"San Nicolas" and "San Josef" at St. Vincent, and was afterwards his
flag-captain at the Nile. When her approach was reported to the
admiral, he exclaimed gleefully, "Here comes Berry! Now we shall have
a battle;" for Berry, having been in more fleet actions than any
captain in the British Navy,[131] had a proverbial reputation for such
luck. The event did not belie the prediction. Five days later, on the
18th of the month, Nelson noted in his diary: "Fine weather, wind
easterly; the combined fleets cannot have finer weather to put to
sea;" and the following morning, at half-past nine, the signal,
repeated from masthead to masthead, from the inshore frigates to their
commander-in-chief fifty miles at sea, announced that the
long-expected battle was at hand--for "The Enemy are coming out of
port."
FOOTNOTES:
[121] May, 1805.
[122] The author does not here understand the speaking of "two or three"
rear ships, when the van is supposed to be five or six--making a total of
not over nine or ten enemies. If this order of attack was issued, as
expressly stated by Clarke and M'Arthur, on the chase to the West Indies,
Nelson then was fully aware that he with ten ships was in pursuit of
eighteen. (See _ante_, p. 296) It appears to the author more probable that
it was issued to the fleet when off Toulon, in anticipation of a possible
meeting with the French squadron there, when the disparity of force was
less--say, eight to ten. This impression is confirmed by the "Plan of
Attack" speaking of the junior "Admirals"--in the plural. There was but one
such in the pursuit to the West Indies. It is quite possible, however, that
the same order was re-issued upon the later occasion, re-copied without
change of words. In any event, it confirms other statements and actions of
Nelson's, that an enemy should not be fought ship to ship, but by a
concentration on part of his order.
[123] Inserted by author.
[124] _Ante_, pp. 306, 323.
[125] _Ante_, p. 82.
[126] The author has introduced an arrow to show the direction of the wind
as viewed by Nelson; the arrow flying _with_ the wind.
[127] Formerly Mr. Addington, who was at the head of the Government during
the Copenhagen expedition.
[128] This was a mistake on Nelson's part. Rodney's fleet actually, though
accidentally, broke through De Grasse's order in two (if not three) places.
[129] A desert group of small islands between Madeira and the Canaries.
[130] The author is indebted for this reminiscence to Mr. Stuart J. Reid,
who received it from Pasco's son, also an officer in the Navy.
[131] Besides three of the battles associated with Nelson's name--St.
Vincent, the Nile, and Trafalgar--Berry as a midshipman had been in the
five fleet actions between Suffren and Hughes, in the East Indies, in 1782
and 1783. ("The Nelson Memorial," by John Knox Laughton, pp. 83, 284.)