CHAPTER XX.

_Accession of Chosroes I. (Anushirwari). Conspiracy to dethrone him

crushed. General Severity of his Government. He concludes Peace with

Rome, A.D. 533. Terms of the Peace. Causes Which led to its Rupture.

First Roman War of Chosroes, A.D. 540-544. Second Roman War, A.D.

549-557. Eastern Wars. Conquest of Arabia Felix. Supposed Campaign in

India. War with the Turks. Revolt of Persarmenia. Third Roman War, A.D.

572-579. Death of Chosroes._

The accession of Chosroes was not altogether undisputed, Kaoses, the

eldest of the sons of Kobad, regarding himself as entitled to the crown

by right of birth, assumed the insignia of royalty on the death of his

father, and claimed to be acknowledged as monarch. But Mebodes, the

Grand Vizier, interposed with the assertion of a constitutional axiom,

that no one had the right of taking the Persian crown until it was

assigned to him by the assembly of the nobles. Kaoses, who thought he

might count on the goodwill of the nobles, acquiesced; and the assembly

being convened, his claims were submitted to it. Hereupon Mebodes

brought forward the formal testament of Kobad, which he had hitherto

concealed, and, submitting it to the nobles, exhorted them to accept as

king the brave prince designated by a brave and successful father. His

eloquence and authority prevailed; the claims of Kaoses and of at least

one other son of Kobad were set aside; and, in accordance with his

father’s will, Chosroes was proclaimed lawful monarch of Persia.

But a party among the nobles were dissatisfied with the decision to

which the majority had come. They dreaded the restlessness, and probably

feared the cruelty, of Chosroes. It might have been expected that they

would have espoused the cause of the disappointed Kaoses, which had

a solid basis of legality to rest upon; but, apparently, the personal

character of Kaoses was unsatisfactory, or at any rate, there was

another prince whose qualities conciliated more regard and aroused more

enthusiasm. Zanies, the second son of Kobad, had distinguished himself

repeatedly in the field, and was the idol of a considerable section

of the nation, who had long desired that he should govern them.

Unfortunately, however, he possessed a disqualification fatal in the

eyes of Orientals; he had, by disease or mischance, lost one of his

eyes, and this physical blemish made it impossible that he should occupy

the Persian throne. Under these circumstances an ingenious plan was hit

upon. In order to combine respect for law and usage with the practical

advantage of being governed by the man of their choice, the discontented

nobles conceived the idea of conferring the crown on a son of Zames,

a boy named after his grandfather Kobad, on whose behalf Zames would

naturally be regent. Zames readily came into the plot; several of his

brothers, and, what is most strange, Chosroes’ maternal uncle, the

Aspebed, supported him; the conspiracy seemed nearly sure of success,

when by some accident it was discovered, and the occupant of the throne

took prompt and effectual measures to crush it. Zames, Kaoses, and all

the other sons of Kobad were seized by order of Chosroes, and, together

with their entire male offspring, were condemned to death. The Aspebed,

and the other nobles found to have been accessory to the conspiracy,

were, at the same time, executed. One prince alone, the intended

puppet-king, Kobad, escaped, through the compassion of the Persian who

had charge of him, and, after passing many years in concealment, became

a refugee at the Court of Constantinople, where he was kindly treated by

Justinian.

When Chosroes had by these means secured himself against the claims

of pretenders, he proceeded to employ equal severity in repressing the

disorders, punishing the crimes, and compelling the abject submission

of his subjects. The heresiarch Mazdak, who had escaped the persecution

instituted in his later years by Kobad, and the sect of the Mazdakites,

which, despite that persecution, was still strong and vigorous, were

the first to experience the oppressive weight of his resentment; and the

corpses of a hundred thousand martyrs blackening upon gibbets proved

the determination of the new monarch to make his will law, whatever

the consequences. In a similar spirit the hesitation of Mebodes to obey

instantaneously an order sent him by the king was punished capitally,

and with circumstances of peculiar harshness, by the stern prince, who

did not allow gratitude for old benefits to affect the judgments which

he passed on recent offences. Nor did signal services in the field avail

to save Chanaranges, the nobleman who preserved the young Kobad, from

his master’s vengeance. The conqueror of twelve nations, betrayed by an

unworthy son, was treacherously entrapped and put to death on account of

a single humane act which had in no way harmed or endangered the jealous

monarch.

The fame of Chosroes rests especially on his military exploits and

successes. On first ascending the throne he seems, however, to have

distrusted his capacity for war; and it was with much readiness that he

accepted the overtures for peace made by Justinian, who was anxious

to bring the Eastern war to a close, in order that he might employ the

talents of Belisarius in the reduction of Africa and Italy. A truce

was made between Persia and Rome early in A.D. 532; and the truce was

followed after a short interval by a treaty--known as “the endless

peace”--whereby Rome and Persia made up their differences and arranged

to be friends on the following conditions: (1) Rome was to pay over

to Persia the sum of eleven thousand pounds of gold, or about half a

million of our money, as her contribution towards the maintenance of the

Caucasian defences, the actual defence being undertaken by Persia; (2)

Daras was to remain a fortified post, but was not to be made the Roman

head-quarters in Mesopotamia, which were to be fixed at Constantia;

(3) the district of Pharangium and the castle of Bolon, which Rome had

recently taken from Persia, were to be restored, and Persia on her part

was to surrender the forts which she had captured in Lazica; (4) Rome

and Persia were to be eternal friends and allies, and were to aid

each other whenever required with supplies of men and money. Thus was

terminated the thirty years’ war, which, commencing in A.D. 502 by the

attack of Kobad on Annastasius, was brought to a close in A.D. 532, and

ratified by Justinian in the year following.

When Chosroes consented to substitute close relations of amity with Rome

for the hereditary enmity which had been the normal policy of his house,

he probably expected that no very striking or remarkable results would

follow. He supposed that the barbarian neighbors of the empire on the

north and on the west would give her arms sufficient employment, and

that the balance of power in Eastern Europe and Western Asia would

remain much as before. But in these expectations he was disappointed.

Justinian no sooner found his eastern frontier secure than he directed

the whole force of the empire upon his enemies in the regions of the

west, and in the course of half a dozen years (A.D. 533-539), by the

aid of his great general, Belisarius, he destroyed the kingdom of the

Vandals in the region about Carthage and Tunis, subdued the Moors,

and brought to its last gasp the power of the Ostrogoths in Italy. The

territorial extent of his kingdom was nearly doubled by these victories;

his resources were vastly increased; the prestige of his arms was

enormously raised; veteran armies had been formed which despised danger,

and only desired to be led against fresh enemies; and officers had been

trained capable of conducting operations of every kind, and confident,

under all circumstances, of success. It must have been with feelings

of dissatisfaction and alarm not easily to be dissembled that the Great

King heard of his brother’s long series of victories and conquests, each

step in which constituted a fresh danger to Persia by aggrandizing the

power whom she had chiefly to fear. At first his annoyance found a vent

in insolent demands for a share of the Roman spoils, which Justinian

thought it prudent to humor but, as time went on, and the tide of

victory flowed more and more strongly in one direction, he became

less and less able to contain himself, and more and more determined to

renounce his treaty with Rome and renew the old struggle for supremacy.

His own inclination, a sufficiently strong motive in itself, was

seconded and intensified by applications made to him from without on the

part of those who had especial reasons for dreading the advance of Rome,

and for expecting to be among her next victims. Witiges, the Ostrogoth

king of Italy, and Bassaces, an Armenian chief, were the most important

of these applicants. Embassies from these opposite quarters reached

Chosroes in the same year, A.D. 539, and urged him for his own security

to declare war against Justinian before it was too late. “Justinian,”

the ambassadors said, “aimed at universal empire. His aspirations had

for a while been kept in check by Persia, and by Persia alone, the sole

power in the world that he feared. Since the ‘endless peace’ was made,

he had felt himself free to give full vent to his ambitious greed,

had commenced a course of aggression upon all the other conterminous

nations, and had spread war and confusion on all sides. He had destroyed

the kingdom of the Vandals in Africa, conquered the Moors, deceived the

Goths of Italy by professions of friendship, and then fallen upon them

with all his forces, violated the rights of Armenia and driven it to

rebellion, enslaved the Tzani and the Lazi, seized the Greek city

of Bosporus, and the ‘Isle of Palms’ on the shores of the Red Sea,

solicited the alliance of barbarous Huns and Ethiopians, striven to sow

discord between the Persian monarch and his vassals, and in every part

of the world shown himself equally grasping and restless. What would be

the consequence if Persia continued to hold aloof? Simply that all the

other nations would in turn be destroyed, and she would find herself

face to face with their destroyer, and would enjoy the poor satisfaction

of being devoured last. But did she fear to be reproached with breaking

the treaty and forfeiting her pledged word? Rome had already broken it

by her intrigues with the Huns, the Ethiopians, and the Saracens; and

Persia would therefore be free from reproach if she treated the peace

as no longer existing. The treaty-breaker is not he who first draws the

sword, but he who sets the example of seeking the other’s hurt. Or did

Persia fear the result of declaring war? Such fear was unreasonable,

for Rome had neither troops, nor generals to oppose to a sudden Persian

attack. Sittas was dead; Belisarius and the best of the Roman forces

were in Italy. If Justinian recalled Belisarius, it was not certain that

he would obey; and, in the worst case, it would be in favor of Persia

that the Goths of Italy, and the Armenians who for centuries had been

subjects of Rome, were now ready to make common cause with her.” Thus

urged, the Persian king determined on openly declaring war and making an

attack in force on the eastern provinces of the empire.

The scene of contest in the wars between Rome and Persia had been

usually either Mesopotamia or Armenia. On rare occasions only had the

traditional policy been departed from, and attempts made to penetrate

into the richer parts of the Roman East, and to inflict serious injury

on the empire by carrying fire and sword into peaceful and settled

provinces. Kobad, however, had in his later years ventured to introduce

a new system, and had sent troops across the Euphrates into Syria in

the hope of ravaging that fertile region and capturing its wealthy

metropolis, Antioch. This example Chosroes now determined to follow.

Crossing the great stream in the lower portion of its course, he led his

troops up its right bank, past Circesium, Zenobia, and Callinicus, to

Suron, a Roman town on the west side of the river. As this small place

ventured to resist him, Chosroes, bent upon terrifying the other towns

into submission, resolved to take a signal revenge. Though the garrison,

after losing their commandant, made overtures for a surrender, he

insisted on entering forcibly at one of the gates, and then, upon the

strength of this violent entrance, proceeded to treat the city as one

taken by storm, pillaged the houses, massacred a large portion of the

inhabitants, enslaved the others, and in conclusion set the place on

fire and burned it to the ground. It was perhaps in a fit of remorse,

though possibly only under the influence of greed, that shortly

afterwards he allowed the neighboring bishop of Sergiopolis to ransom

these unfortunate captives, twelve thousand, in number, for the modest

sum of two hundred pounds of gold.

From Suron the invading army advanced to Hierapolis, without

encountering the enemy, who did not dare to make any resistance in the

open field, but sought the protection of walls and strongholds. The

defences of Hierapolis were in tolerable order; its garrison was fairly

strong; and the Great King therefore prudently resolved to allow the

citizens to ransom themselves and their city at a moderate price. Two

thousand pounds of silver was the amount fixed upon; and this sum was

paid without any complaint by the Hierapolites. Plunder, not conquest,

was already distinctly set before the invader’s mind as his aim; and

it is said that he even offered at this period to evacuate the Roman

territory altogether upon receiving a thousand pounds of gold. But

the Romans were not yet brought so low as to purchase a peace; it was

thought that Antioch and the other important towns might successfully

defy the Persian arms, and hoped that Justinian would soon send into

the field an army strong enough to cope with that of his adversary. The

terms, therefore, which Chosroes offered by the mouth of Megas, bishop

of Berhcea, were rejected; the Antiochenes were exhorted to remain firm;

Ephraim, the bishop, was denounced to the authorities for counselling

submission; and it was determined to make no pacific arrangement, but to

allow Chosroes to do his worst. The Persian, on his side, was not slack

or remiss. No sooner had he received the ransom of Hierapolis than

he advanced upon Berhoea (now Aleppo), which he reached in four days.

Observing that the defences were weak, he here demanded twice the ransom

that he had accepted from the Hierapolites, and was only induced to

forego the claim by the tears and entreaties of the good bishop, who

convinced him at length that the Berhoeans could not pay so large a sum,

and induced him to accept the half of it. A few more days’ march brought

him from Aleppo to the outskirts of Antioch; and after an interval of

nearly three centuries the “Queen of the East,” the richest and most

magnificent of Oriental cities, was once more invested by Persian troops

and threatened by a Sassanian monarch.

A great calamity had fallen upon Antioch only fourteen years previously.

The entire town had been ruined by a succession of terrible earthquakes,

which commenced in October, A.D. 525, and terminated in August of the

ensuing year. All for a time was havoc and disorder. A landslip had

covered a portion of the city, and in the remainder almost every house

was overthrown. But the liberality of Justinian, the spirit of the

inhabitants, and the efforts of the governor, had effaced these

disasters; and the city, when the Persians appeared before it, was in

most respects grander and more magnificent than ever. The defences were,

however, it would seem, imperfect. The citadel especially, which was

on the high ground south of the city, had been constructed with small

attention to the rules of engineering art, and was dominated by a height

at a little distance, which ought to have been included within the

walls. Nor was this deficiency compensated by any strength in the

garrison, or any weight of authority or talent among those with whom

rested the command. Justinian had originally sent his nephew, Germanus,

to conduct the defence of the Syrian capital, while Buzes, an officer

who had gained some repute in the Armenian war, was entrusted with

the general protection of the East until Belisarius should arrive from

Italy; but Germanus, after a brief stay, withdrew from Antioch into

Cilicia, and Buzes disappeared without any one knowing whither he had

betaken himself. Antioch was left almost without a garrison; and had

not Theoctistus and Molatzes, two officers who commanded in the

Lebanon, come to the rescue and brought with them a body of six thousand

disciplined troops, it is scarcely possible that any resistance should

have been made. As it was, the resistance was brief and ineffectual.

Chosroes at once discerned the weak point in the defences, and, having

given a general order to the less trusty of his troops to make attacks

upon the lower town in various places, himself with the flower of

the army undertook the assault upon the citadel. Here the commanding

position so unaccountably left outside the walls enabled the Persians to

engage the defenders almost on a level, and their superior skill in the

use of missile weapons soon brought the garrison into difficulties. The

assailants, however, might perhaps still have been repulsed, had not

an unlucky accident supervened, which, creating a panic, put it in the

power of the Persians by a bold movement to enter the place. The Romans,

cramped for room upon the walls, had extemporized some wooden stages

between the towers, which they hung outside by means of ropes. It

happened that, in the crush and tumult, one of these stages gave way;

the ropes broke, and the beams fell with a crash to the earth, carrying

with them a number of the defenders. The noise made by the fall was

great, and produced a general impression that the wall itself had been

broken down; the towers and battlements were at once deserted; the

Roman soldiers rushed to the gates and began to quit the town; while the

Persians took advantage of the panic to advance their scaling ladders,

to mount the walls, and to make themselves masters of the citadel. Thus

Antioch was taken. The prudence of Chosroes was shown in his quietly

allowing the armed force to withdraw; his resolve to trample down all

resistance appeared in his slaughter of the Antiochone youth, who with

a noble recklessness continued the conflict after the soldiers had fled;

his wish to inspire terror far and wide made him deliver the entire

city, with few exceptions, to the flames; while his avarice caused him

to plunder the churches, and to claim as his own the works of art, the

marbles, bronzes, tablets, and pictures, with which the Queen of

the Roman East was at this time abundantly provided. But, while thus

gratifying his most powerful passions, he did not lose sight of the

opportunity to conclude an advantageous peace. Justinian’s ambassadors

had long been pressing him to come to terms with their master. He now

consented to declare the conditions on which he was ready to make peace

and withdraw his army. Rome must pay him, as an indemnity for the cost

of the war, the sum of five thousand pounds of gold, and must also

contract to make a further payment of five hundred pounds of gold

annually, not as a tribute, but as a fair contribution towards the

expense of maintaining the Caspian Gates and keeping out the Huns. If

hostages were given him, he would consent to abstain from further acts

of hostility while Justinian was consulted on these proposals, and would

even begin at once to withdraw his army. The ambassadors readily agreed

to these terms, and it was understood that a truce would be observed

until Justinian’s answer should be delivered to Chosroes.

But the Great King, in thus formulating the terms on which he would be

content to make peace, did not intend to tie his own hands, or to allow

the Syrian cities before which he had not yet appeared to be quit of

him without the payment of ransom. After visiting Seleucia, the port of

Antioch at the mouth of the Orontes, bathing in the blue waters of the

Mediterranean, and offering sacrifice to the (setting?) sun upon the

shore, he announced his intention of proceeding to Apameia, a city

on the middle Orontes, which was celebrated for its wealth, and

particularly for its possession of a fragment of the “true cross,”

enshrined in a case which the pious zeal of the faithful had enriched

with gold and jewels of extraordinary value. Received peacefully into

the city by the submissive inhabitants, instead of fixing their ransom

at a definite sum, he demanded and obtained all the valuables of the

sacred treasury, including the precious relic which the Apamaeans

regarded as the most important of their possessions. As, however, it was

the case, and not its contents, that he coveted, while he carried off

the former, he readily restored the latter to the prayers of the bishop

and inhabitants.

From Apameia Chosroes returned to Antioch, and after witnessing the

games of the amphitheatre and securing victory to the green champion

because Justinian preferred the blue, he set out at last on his return

to Persia, taking care to visit, upon his way to the Euphrates, the city

of Chalcis, the only important place in Northern Syria that had hitherto

escaped him. The Chalcidians were required not only to ransom themselves

by a sum of money, but to give up to Chosroes the Roman soldiers who

garrisoned their town. By a perjury that may well be forgiven them,

they avoided the more important concession, but they had to satisfy the

avarice of the conqueror by the payment of two hundred pounds of gold.

The Persian host then continued its march, and reaching the Euphrates at

Obbane, in the neighborhood of Barbalissus, crossed by a bridge of boats

in three days. The object of Chosroes in thus changing his return line

of march was to continue in Roman Mesopotamia the course which he had

adopted in Syria since the conclusion of the truce--i.e. to increase his

spoil by making each important city ransom itself. Edessa, Constantina,

and Daras were successively visited, and purchased their safety by a

contribution. According to Procopius, the proceedings before Daras were

exceptional. Although Chosroes, before he quitted Edossa, had received a

communication from Justinian accepting the terms arranged with the Roman

envoys at Antioch, yet, when he reached Daras, he at once resolved upon

its siege. The city was defended by two walls, an outer one of moderate

strength, and an inner one sixty feet high, with towers at intervals,

whose height was a hundred feet. Chosroes, having invested the place,

endeavored to penetrate within the defences by means of a mine; but, his

design having been betrayed, the Romans met him with a countermine, and

completely foiled his enterprise. Unwilling to spend any more time on

the siege, the Persian monarch upon this desisted from his attempt, and

accepted the contribution of a thousand pounds of silver as a sufficient

redemption for the great fortress.

Such is the account of the matter given to us by Procopius, who is our

only extant authority for the details of this war. But the account is

violently improbable. It represents Chosroes as openly flying in the

face of a treaty the moment that he had concluded it, and as departing

in a single instance from the general tenor of his proceedings in all

other cases. In view of the great improbability of such a course of

action, it is perhaps allowable to suppose that Procopius has been for

once carried away by partisanship, and that the real difference between

the case of Daras and the other towns consisted in this, that Daras

alone refused to pay its ransom, and Chosroes had, in consequence, to

resort to hostilities in order to enforce it.

Still, no doubt, the whole conduct of Chosroes in enforcing ransoms

from the towns after the conclusion of the truce was open to serious

question, and Justinian was quite justified in treating his proceedings

as a violation of his recent engagements. It is not unlikely that, even

without any such excuse, he would shortly have renewed the struggle,

since the return of Belisarius in triumph from the Italian war had

placed at his service for employment in the East a general from whose

abilities much was naturally expected. As it was, Justinian was able, on

receiving intelligence of the fines levied on Apameia, Chalcis, Edessa,

Constantina, and Daras, and of the hostile acts committed against the

last-named place, with great show of reason and justice, to renounce the

recently concluded peace, and to throw on the ill faith of Chosroes the

blame of the rupture.

The Persian prince seems to have paid but little heed to the

denunciation. He passed the winter in building and beautifying a Persian

Antioch in the neighborhood of Ctesiphon, assigning it as a residence

to his Syrian captives, for whose use he constructed public baths and

a spacious hippodrome, where the entertainments familiar to them from

their youth were reproduced by Syrian artists. The new city was

exempt from the jurisdiction of Persian satraps, and was made directly

dependent upon the king, who supplied it with corn gratuitously, and

allowed it to become an inviolable asylum for all such Greek slaves as

should take shelter in it, and be acknowledged as their kinsmen by any

of the inhabitants. A model of Greek civilization was thus brought into

close contact with the Persian court, which could amuse itself with the

contrasts, if it did not learn much from the comparison, of European and

Asiatic manners and modes of thought.

The campaign of A.D. 540 was followed by one of a very different

character in A.D. 541. An unexpected offer suddenly made to the Persian

king drew him from his capital, together with the bulk of his troops, to

one of the remotest portions of the Persian territory, and allowed the

Romans, instead of standing on their defence, to assume an aggressive

in Mesopotamia, and even to retaliate the invasion which the year before

Chosroes had conducted into the heart of their empire. The hostile

operations of A.D. 541 had thus two distinct and far-distant scenes; in

the one set the Persians, in the other the Romans, took the offensive;

the two wars, for such they in reality were, scarcely affected one

another; and it will therefore be convenient to keep the accounts of

them distinct and separate. To commence with.

I. The LAZIO WAR.--Lazica had been a dependency of Rome from the time

when Tzath, upon his conversion to Christianity, professed himself the

vassal of Justin, and received the insignia of royalty from his new

patron (A.D. 522). The terms of the connection had been at the first

honorable to the weaker nation, which paid no tribute, admitted no

Roman garrison, and was troubled by no Roman governor. As time went

on, however, the Romans gradually encroached upon the rights of their

dependants; they seized and fortified a strong post, called Petra, upon

the coast, appointed a commandant who claimed an authority as great

as that of the Lazic king, and established a commercial monopoly which

pressed with great severity upon the poorer classes of the Lazi. Under

these circumstances the nation determined on revolt; and in the winter

of A.D. 540-1 Lazic ambassadors visited the court of Persia, exposed the

grievances of their countrymen, and besought Chosroes to accept their

submission, and extend to them the protection of his government. The

province was distant, and possessed few attractions; whatever the

tales told of its ancient wealth, or glories, or trade, in the time of

Chosroes it was poor and unproductive, dependent on its neighbors for

some of the necessaries and all the conveniences of life, and capable

of exporting nothing but timber, slaves, and skins. It might have been

expected, under such circumstances, that the burden of the protectorate

would have been refused; but there was an advantage, apparent or real,

in the position of the country, discovered by the sagacity of Chosroes

or suggested to him by the interested zeal of the envoys, which made its

possession seem to the Persian king a matter of the highest importance,

and induced him to accept the offer made him without a moment’s delay.

Lazica, the ancient Colchis and the modern Mingrelia and Imeritia,

bordered upon the Black Sea, which the Persian dominions did not as yet

touch. Once in possesion of this tract, Chosroes conceived that he might

launch a fleet upon the Euxine, command its commerce, threaten or ravage

its shores, and even sail against Constantinople and besiege the Roman

emperor in his capital. The Persian king therefore acceded to the

request of the envoys, and, pretending to be called into Iberia by a

threatened invasion of the Huns, led a large army to the Lazic border,

was conducted into the heart of the country by the envoys, received the

submission of Gubazes, the king, and then, pressing on to the coast,

formed the siege of Petra, where the Roman forces were collected. Petra

offered a stout resistance, and repulsed more than one Persian assault;

but it was impossible for the small garrison to cope with the numbers,

the engineering skill, and the ardor of the assailants. After the loss

of their commandant, Johannes, and the fall of one of the principal

towers, the soldiers capitulated; Petra was made over to the Persians,

who restored and strengthened its defences, and Lazica became for the

time a Persian province.

II. The War in Mesopotamia.--Belisarius, on reaching the eastern

frontier, fixed his head-quarters at Daras, and, finding that the

Persians had no intention of invading Syria or Roman Mesopotamia,

resolved to lead his troops into the enemy’s territory. As his forces

were weak in numbers, ill-armed, and ill-supplied, he could scarcely

hope to accomplish any great enterprise; but it was important to recover

the Roman prestige after the occurrences of the preceding year, and to

show that Rome was willing to encounter in the open field any force that

the Persians could bring against her. He therefore crossed the frontier

and advanced in the direction of Nisibis, less with the intention of

attacking the town than of distinctly offering battle to the troops

collected within it. His scheme succeeded; a small force, which he threw

out in advance, drew the enemy from the walls; and their pursuit of

this detachment brought them into contact with the main army of

Belisarius, which repulsed them and sent them flying into the town.

Having thus established his superiority in the field, the Roman general,

though he could not attack Nisibis with any prospect of success, was

able to adopt other offensive measures. He advanced in person a day’s

march beyond Nisibis, and captured the fort of Sisauranon. Eight hundred

Persian cavalry of the first class were made prisoners, and sent by

Belisarius to Byzantium, where they were despatched by Justinian to

Italy, where they served against the Goths. Arethas, the chief of the

Saracens who fought on the side of Rome, was sent still further in

advance. The orders given him were to cross the Tigris into Assyria, and

begin to ravage it, but to return within a short time to the camp, and

bring a report of the strength of the Persians beyond the river. If the

report was favorable, Belisarius intended to quit Mesopotamia, and take

the whole Roman force with him into Assyria. His plans, however,

were frustrated by the selfish Arab, who, wishing to obtain the whole

Assyrian spoil for himself, dismissed his Roman troops, proceeded to

plunder the rich province on his own account, and sent Belisarius no

intelligence of what he was so doing. After waiting at Sisauranon

till the heats of summer had decimated his army, the Roman general

was compelled to retreat by the discontent of the soldiery and the

representations of his principal officers. He withdrew his forces within

the Roman frontier without molestation from the enemy, and was shortly

afterwards summoned to Constantinople to confer on the state of affairs

with, the emperor.

The military operations of the next year (A.D. 542) were comparatively

unimportant. Chosroes collected a large army, and, repeating the

movement of A.D. 540, made his appearance in Commagene early in the

year, intending to press forward through Syria into Palestine, and

hoping to make himself master of the sacred treasures which he knew to

be accumulated in the Holy City of Jerusalem. He found the provincial

commanders, Buzes and Justus, despondent and unenterprising, declined

to meet him in the field, and content to remain shut up within the walls

of Hierapolis. Had these been his only opponents the campaign would

probably have proved a success; but, at the first news of his invasion,

Justinian despatched Belisarius to the East, for the second time,

and this able general, by his arts or by his reputation, succeeded

in arresting the steps of Chosroes and frustrating his expedition.

Belisarius took up his head-quarters at Europus, on the Euphrates, a

little to the south of Zeugma, and, spreading his troops on both

banks of the river, appeared both to protect the Roman province and to

threaten the return of the enemy. Chosroes having sent an emissary to

the Roman camp under the pretence of negotiating, but really to act the

part of a spy, was so impressed (if we may believe Procopius) by the

accounts which he received of the ability of the general and the

warlike qualities of his soldiers, that he gave up the idea of advancing

further, and was content to retire through Roman Mesopotamia into his

own territories. He is said even to have made a convention that he would

commit no hostile act as he passed through the Roman province; but if

so, he did not keep the engagement. The city of Callinicus lay in his

way; its defences were undergoing repairs, and there was actually a gap

in one place where the old wall had been pulled down and the new one had

not yet been built. The Persian king could not resist the temptation

of seizing this easy prey; he entered the undefended town, enslaved all

whom he found in it, and then razed the place to the ground. Such is

the account which the Byzantine historian gives of the third campaign

of Chosroes against the Romans, and of the motive and manner of his

retreat. Without taxing him with falsehood, we may suspect that, for the

glorification of his favorite hero, he has kept back a portion of the

truth. The retreat of Chosroes may be ascribed with much probability to

the advance of another danger, more formidable than Belisarius, which

exactly at this time made its appearance in the country whereto he was

hastening. It was in the summer of A.D. 542 that the plague broke out at

Pelusium, and spread from that centre rapidly into the rest of Egypt and

also into Palestine. Chosroes may well have hesitated to confront this

terrible foe. He did not ultimately escape it; but he might hope to

do so, and it would clearly have been the height of imprudence to have

carried out his intention of invading Palestine when the plague was

known to be raging there.

The fourth year of the Roman war (A.D. 543) opened with a movement of

the Persian troops toward the Armenian frontier, consequent upon the

desertion of the Persian cause by the Roman Armenians in the course of

the winter. Chosroes in person once more led the attack, and proceeded

as far as Azerbijan; but, the pestilence breaking out in his army, he

hastily retreated, after some futile attempts at negotiation with the

Roman officers opposed to him. Belisarius had this year been sent to

Italy, and the Roman army of the East, amounting to thirty thousand

men, was commanded by as many as fifteen generals, almost of equal rank,

among whom there was little concert or agreement. Induced to take

the offensive by the retirement of the Persian king, these incapable

officers invaded Persarmenia with all their troops, and proceeded to

plunder its rich plains and fertile valleys. Encountering suddenly and

unexpectedly the Persian general Nabedes, who, with a small force,

was strongly posted at a village called Anglon, they were compelled to

engage at disadvantage; their troops, entangled in difficult ground,

found themselves attacked in their rear by an ambush; Narses, the

bravest of them, fell; and, a general panic seizing the entire

multitude, they fled in the extremest disorder, casting away their

arms, and pressing their horses till they sank and expired. The Persians

pursued, but with caution, and the carnage was not so great as might

have been expected; but vast numbers of the disarmed fugitives were

overtaken and made prisoners by the enemy; and the arms, animals,

and camp equipment which fell into the hands of the Persians amply

compensated all previous losses, and left Persarmenia the richer for the

inroad.

The ravages of the pestilence having ceased, Chosroes, in the following

year (A.D. 544), again marched westward in person, and laid siege to the

city of Edessa. It would seem that he had now resolved not to be content

with plundering raids, but to attempt at any rate the permanent conquest

of some portion of the Roman territory. Edessa and Daras were the two

towns on which the Roman possession of Western Mesopotamia at this time

mainly depended. As the passing of Nisibis, in A.D. 363, from Roman into

Persian hands, had given to Persia a secure hold on the eastern portion

of the country between the rivers, so the occupation of Edessa and Daras

could it have been effected, would have carried with it dominion over

the more western regions. The Roman frontier would in this way have been

thrown back to the Euphrates. Chosroes must be understood as aiming at

this grand result in the siege which he so pertinaciously pressed, and

which Edessa so gallantly resisted, during the summer of A.D. 544. The

elaborate account which Procopius gives of the siege may be due to a

sense of its importance. Chosroes tried, not force only, but every art

known to the engineering science of the period; he repeated his assaults

day after day; he allowed the defenders no repose; yet he was compelled

at last to own himself baffled by the valor of the small Roman garrison

and the spirit of the native inhabitants, to burn his works, and to

return home. The five hundred pounds of gold which he extorted at last

from Martinus, the commandant of the place, may have been a salve to

his wounded pride; but it was a poor set-off against the loss of men, of

stores, and of prestige, which he had incurred by his enterprise.

It was, perhaps, his repulse from the walls of Edessa that induced

Chosroes, in A.D. 545, seriously to entertain the proposals for an

arrangement which were made to him by the ambassadors of Justinian.

Throughout the war their had been continual negotiations; but hitherto

the Persian king had trifled with his antagonist, and had amused himself

with discussing terms of accommodation without any serious purpose.

Now at last, after five years of incessant hostilities, in which he

had gained much glory but little profit, he seems to have desired a

breathing-space. Justinian’s envoys visited him at Ctesiphon, and

set forth their master’s desire to conclude a regular peace. Chosroes

professed to think that the way for a final arrangement would be best

prepared by the conclusion, in the first instance, of a truce. He

proposed, in lieu of a peace, a cessation of hostilities for five years,

during the course of which the causes of quarrel between the two nations

might be considered, and a good understanding established. It shows the

weakness of the Empire, that Justinian not only accepted this proposal,

but was content to pay for the boon granted him. Chosroes received as

the price of the five years truce the services of a Greek physician and

two thousand pounds of gold.

The five years’ truce seems to have been observed with better faith

by the Persian than by the Roman monarch. Alamundarus indeed, though

a Persian vassal, regarded himself as entitled, despite the truce, to

pursue his quarrel with his natural enemy, Arethas, who acknowledged the

suzerainty of Rome; but Chosroes is not even accused of instigating

his proceedings; and the war between the vassals was carried on without

dragging either of the two lords-paramount into its vortex. Thus far,

then, neither side had any cause of complaint against the other. If we

were bound to accept the Roman story of a project formed by Chosroes

for the surprise and seizure of Daras, we should have to admit that

circumstances rather than his own will saved the Persian monarch from

the guilt of being the first to break the agreement. But the tale told

by Procopius is improbable; and the Roman belief of it can have rested

at best only upon suspicion. Chosroes, it is allowed, committed no

hostile act; and it may well be doubted whether he really entertained

the design ascribed to him. At any rate, the design was not executed,

nor even attempted; and the peace was thus not broken on his part.

It was reserved for Rome in the fourth year of the truce (A.D. 549)

expressly, to break its provisions by accepting the Lazi into alliance

and sending them a body of eight thousand men to help them against the

Persians.

Very soon after their submission to Persia the Lazi had repented of

their rash and hasty action. They found that they had gained nothing,

while in some respects they had lost, by their change of masters.

The general system of the Persian administration was as arbitrary and

oppressive as the Roman. If the commercial monopoly, whereof they so

bitterly complained, had been swept away, commerce itself had gone with

it, and they could neither find a market for their own products, nor

obtain the commodities which they required. The Persian manners and

customs introduced into their country, if not imposed upon themselves,

were detestable to the Lazi, who were zealous and devout Christians,

and possessed by the spirit of intolerance. Chosroes, after holding the

territory for a few years, became convinced that Persia could not

retain it unless the disaffected population were removed and replaced

by faithful subjects. He designed therefore, we are told, to deport

the entire Lazic nation, and to plant the territory with colonies of

Persians and others, on whose fidelity he could place full reliance.

As a preliminary step, he suggested to his lieutenant in Lazica that he

should contrive the assassination of Gubazes, the Lazic king, in whom

he saw an obstacle to his project. Phabrizus, however, failed in his

attempt to execute this commission; and his failure naturally produced

the immediate revolt of the province, which threw itself once more into

the arms of Rome, and, despite the existing treaty with the Persians,

was taken by Justinian under his protection.

The Lazic war, which commenced in consequence of this act of

Justinian’s, continued almost without intermission for nine years--from

A.D. 549 to 557. Its details are related at great length by Procopius

and Agathias, who view the struggle as one which vitally concerned the

interests of their country. According to them, Chosroes was bent upon

holding Lazica in order to construct at the mouth of the Phasis a great

naval station and arsenal, from which his fleets might issue to command

the commerce or ravage the shores of the Black Sea. There is no doubt

that the country was eminently fitted for such a purpose. The soil is

for the most part richly fertile; the hills are everywhere covered with

forests of noble trees; the Rion (Phasis) is deep and broad towards its

mouth; and there are other streams also which are navigable. If Chosroes

entertained the intentions ascribed to him, and had even begun the

collection of timber for ship-building at Petra on the Euxine as early

as A.D. 549, we cannot be surprised at the attitude assumed by Rome, or

at her persistent efforts to recover possession of the Lazic territory.

The war was opened by an attack upon the great centre of the Persian

power, Petra. This place, which was strongly situated on a craggy rock

projecting into the sea, had been carefully fortified by Justinian

before Lazica passed into the possession of Chosroes, and had since

received important additions to its defences at the hands of the

Persians. It was sufficiently provisioned, and was defended by a body of

fifteen hundred men. Dagisthseus, the Roman commander, besieged it with

his entire force of eight thousand men, and succeeded by his constant

attacks in reducing the garrison to little more than a fourth of its

original number. Baffled in one attempt to effect a breach by means of

a mine, he had contrived to construct another, and might have withdrawn

his props, destroyed the wall, and entered the place, had he not

conceived the idea of bargaining with the emperor for a specific reward

in case he effected the capture. Whilst he waited for his messenger to

bring a reply, the Persian general, Memeroes, forced the passes from

Iberia into Lazica, and descended the valley of the Phasis with an army

of 30,000 men. Dagisthalus in alarm withdrew, and Petra was relieved

and revictualled. The walls were repaired hastily with sandbags, and

the further defence was entrusted to a fresh garrison of 3000 picked

soldiers. Mermeroes then, finding it difficult to obtain supplies for

his large army, retired into Persarmenia, leaving only five thousand

Persians in the country besides the garrison of Petra. This small force

was soon afterwards surprised by the combined Romans and Lazi, who

completely defeated it, destroying or making prisoners almost the entire

number.

In the ensuing year, A.D. 550, the Persians took the field under a fresh

general, Chorianes, who brought with him a considerable army, composed

of Persians and Alans. The allied Romans and Lazi, under Dagisthseus

and Gubazes, gave battle to this new foe on the banks of the Hippis (the

Tschenikal?); and though the Lazi, who had insisted on taking the lead

and fighting separately, were at the first encounter routed by the

Persian horse, yet in the end Roman discipline and stubbornness

triumphed. Their solid line of footmen, bristling with spears, offered

an impervious barrier to the cavalry of the enemy, which did not dare

to charge, but had recourse to volleys of missiles. The Romans responded

with the same; and the battle raged for a while on something like even

terms, the superior rapidity of the Asiatics being counterbalanced by

the better protection which their shields gave to the Europeans, until

at last, by a stroke of fortune, Rome obtained the victory. A chance

arrow killed Chorianes, and his army instantly fled. There was a short

struggle at the Persian camp; but the Romans and Lazi captured it. Most

of the Persians were here put to the sword; the few who escaped quitted

Lazica and returned to their own country.

Soon afterwards Dagisthseus was superseded by Bessas, and the siege of

Petra was recommenced. The strength of the place had been considerably

increased since the former attack upon it. A new wall of great height

and solidity had been built upon a framework of wood in the place which

Dagisthaeus had so nearly breached; the Roman mines had been filled

up with gravel; arms, offensive and defensive, had been collected in

extraordinary abundance; a stock of flour and of salted meat had been

laid in sufficient to support the garrison of 3000 men for five years;

and a store of vinegar, and of the pulse from which it was made, had

likewise been accumulated. The Roman general began by attempting to

repeat the device of his predecessor, attacking the defences in the same

place and by the same means; but, just as his mine was completed, the

new wall with its framework of wood sank quietly into the excavation,

without suffering any disturbance of its parts, while enough of it still

remained above the surface to offer an effectual bar to the assailants.

It seemed hopeless to recommence the mine in this place, and elsewhere

the nature of the ground made mining impossible; some other mode

of attack had therefore to be adopted, or the siege must have been

abandoned. Rome generally took towns by the battering-ram; but the

engines in use were of such heavy construction that they could not be

dragged up an ascent like that upon which Petra stood. Bessas was in

extreme perplexity, when some Hunnic allies, who happened to be in

his camp, suggested a mode of constructing a ram, as effective as the

ordinary one, which should nevertheless be so light that it could be

carried on the shoulders of forty men. Three such machines were quickly

made; and under their blows the wall would soon have given way, had

not the defenders employed against them the terrible agency of fire,

showering upon them from the walls lighted casks of sulphur, bitumen,

and naphtha, which last was known to the Greeks of Colchis as “Medea’s

oil.” Uncertain of succeeding in this attack, the Roman general

gallantly led a scaling party to another portion of the walls, and,

mounting at the head of his men, attempted to make good his footing on

the battlements. Thrown headlong to the ground, but undeterred by his

fall, he was about to repeat his attempt, when he found it needless.

Almost simultaneously his troops had in two other places penetrated into

the town. One band had obtained an entrance by scaling the rocks in

a place supposed to be inaccessible; a second owed its success to a

combination of accidents. First, it had happened that a gap had shown

itself in the piece of the wall which sank into the Roman mine, and a

violent struggle had ensued between the assailants and defenders at this

place.

Then, while this fight was going on, the fire which the Persians were

using against the Roman battering-rams had been by a shift of wind blown

back upon themselves, and the wooden structure from which they fought

had been ignited, and in a short time entirely consumed, together with

its inmates. At sight of the conflagration, the Persians who stood in

the gap had lost heart, and had allowed the Roman troops to force their

way through it into Petra. Thus fell the great Lazic fortress, after a

resistance which is among the most memorable in history. Of the three

thousand defenders, seven hundred had been killed in the siege; one

thousand and seventy were destroyed in the last assault. Only seven

hundred and thirty were made prisoners; and of these no fewer than seven

hundred and twelve were found to be wounded. The remaining five hundred

threw themselves into the citadel, and there resisted to the last

extremity, refusing all terms of capitulation, and maintaining

themselves against an overwhelming force, until at last by sword and

fire they perished to a man.

The siege of Petra was prolonged far into the winter, and the year A.D.

551 had begun ere the resistance ceased. Could the gallant defenders

have maintained themselves for a few more weeks, they might not

improbably have triumphed. Mermeroes, the Persian commander of two years

previously, took the field with the commencement of spring, and, at the

head of a large body of cavalry, supported by eight elephants, began

his march to the coast, hoping to relieve the beleaguered garrison.

Unfortunately he was too late. On his march he heard of the capture of

Petra, and of its complete destruction by Bessas, who feared lest

the Persians should again occupy the dangerous post. Mermeroes had no

difficulty in establishing Persian rule through almost the whole of

Lazica. The Romans did not dare to meet him in the field. Archssopolis,

indeed, repulsed his attack; but no other important place in the entire

country remained subject to the Empire. Qubazes and his followers had to

hide themselves in the recesses of the mountains. Quartering his

troops chiefly on the upper Phasis, about Kutais and its neighborhood,

Mermeroes strengthened his hold on the country by building forts or

receiving their submission, and even extended the Persian dominion

beyond Lazica into Scymnia and Suania. Still Rome, with her usual

tenacity, maintained a hold upon certain tracts; and Gubazes, faithful

to his allies even in the extremity of their depression, maintained a

guerilla war, and hoped that some day fortune would cease to frown on

him.

Meanwhile, at Byzantium, fresh negotiations were in progress, and hopes

were entertained of an arrangement by which all the differences between

the two great powers would be satisfactorily adjusted. Isdigunas

again represented his master at the Byzantine court, and conducted the

diplomatic contest with skill and ability. Taxing Justinian with more

than one infraction of the truce concluded in A.D. 545, he demanded the

payment of a lump sum of two thousand six hundred pounds of gold, and

expressed the willingness of Chosroes to conclude on these terms a fresh

truce for five years, to take effect from the delivery of the money.

With regard to the extent of country whereto the truce should apply, he

agreed to an express limitation of its range--the settled provinces of

both empires should be protected by it, but Lazica and the country of

the Saracens should be excluded from its operation. Justinian consented

to these terms, despite the opposition of many of his subjects, who

thought that Rome degraded herself by her repeated payments of money

to Persia, and accepted a position little better than that of a Persian

tributary.

Thus the peace of A.D. 551 did nothing towards ending the Lazic war,

which, after languishing through the whole of A.D. burst out again with

renewed vigor in the spring of A.D. 553. Mermeroes in that year advanced

from Kutais against Telephis, a strong fort in the possession of Rome,

expelled the commandant, Martinus, by a stratagem, pressed forward

against the combined Roman forces, which fled before him from Ollaria,

and finally drove them to the coast and cooped them up in “the Island,”

a small tract near the mouth of the Phasis between that stream and the

Doconus. On his return he was able to reinforce a garrison which he had

established at Onoguris in the immediate neighborhood of Archseopolis,

as a means of annoying and weakening that important station. He may

naturally have hoped in one or two more campaigns to have driven the

last Roman out of the country and to have attached Lazica permanently

to the empire of the great king.

Unluckily, however, for Persia, the fatigues which the gallant veteran

had undergone in the campaign of A.D. 553 proved more than his aged

frame could endure, and he had scarcely reached Kutais when he was

seized with a fatal malady, to which he succumbed in the course of the

winter. Chosroes appointed as his successor a certain Nachoragan, who

is said to have been a general of repute, but who proved himself quite

unequal to the position which he was called upon to fill, and in the

course of two years ruined the Persian cause in Lazica. The failure

was the more signal from the fact that exactly at the time of his

appointment circumstances occurred which seriously shook the Roman

influence over the Lazi, and opened a prospect to Persia transcending

aught that she could reasonably have hoped. This was nothing less than

a most serious quarrel between Gubazes, the Lazic king, and some of the

principal Roman commanders--a quarrel which involved consequences fatal

to both parties. Gubazes, disgusted with the negligence or incapacity

of the Roman chiefs, had made complaint of them to Justinian; they had

retaliated by accusing him of meditating desertion, and had obtained

the emperor’s consent to his arrest, and to the use of violence if he

offered resistance. Armed with this mandate, they contrived in a little

time to fasten a quarrel upon him; and, when he declined to do as they

required, they drew their swords upon him and slew him. The Lazic nation

was, naturally enough, alienated by this outrage, and manifested an

inclination to throw itself absolutely into the arms of Persia. The

Romans, dispirited at the attitude of their allies, and at variance

among themselves, could for some months after Gubazes’ death have

offered but little resistance to an enterprising enemy. So demoralized

were they that an army of 50,000 is said to have fled in dismay when

attacked by a force of Persians less than a twelfth of their number,

and to have allowed their camp to be captured and plundered. During

this critical time Nachoragan remained inactive in Iberia, and contented

himself with sending messengers into Lazica to announce his near

approach and to animate and encourage his party. The result was such as

might have been expected. The Lazi, finding that Persia made no effort

to take advantage of their abstention, and that Rome despite of it

maintained possession of the greater portion of their country, came to

the conclusion that it would be unwise to desert their natural allies

on account of a single outrage, however monstrous, and agreed to renew

their close alliance with Rome on condition that the murderers of

Gubazes should be punished, and his brother, Tzathes, appointed king in

his place. Justinian readily gave his consent; and the year A.D. 555 saw

the quarrel ended, and the Lazi once more heartily in accord with, their

Roman protectors.

It was when affairs were in this state, and he had exactly missed his

opportunity, that Nachoragan took the field, and, advancing from Iberia

into the region about Kutai’s with an army amounting to 60,000 men,1

made preparations for carrying on the war with vigor. He was opposed by

Martinus, Justin, and Babas, the two former of whom with the bulk of

the Roman forces occupied the region on the lower Phasis, known as “the

Island,” while Babas held the more central position of Archseopolis.

Nachoragan, after losing about 2,000 of his best troops in the vicinity

of this last-named place, resolved to challenge the Romans to a decisive

encounter by attacking the important post of Phasis at the mouth of the

river. With some skill he succeeded in passing the Roman camp on the

island, and in establishing himself in the plain directly south of

Phasis before the Roman generals guessed his purpose. They, however,

were able by a quick movement to throw themselves into the town, and the

struggle became one between fairly balanced forces, and was conducted

with great obstinacy. The town was defended on the south by an outer

palisade, a broad ditch protected by sharp stakes and full of water, and

an inner bulwark of considerable height but constructed wholly of wood.

The Phasis guarded it on the north; and here a Roman fleet was stationed

which lent its aid to the defenders at the two extremities of their

line. The yards of the ships were manned with soldiers, and boats

were hung from them containing slingers, archers, and even workers of

catapults, who delivered their weapons from an elevation exceeding that

of the towers. But Nachoragan had the advantage of numbers; his men soon

succeeded in filling up part of the ditch; and the wooden bulwark could

scarcely have long resisted his attacks, if the contest had continued

to be wholly one of brute strength. But the Roman commander, Martinus,

finding himself inferior in force, brought finesse and stratagem to his

aid. Pretending to receive intelligence of the sudden arrival of a fresh

Roman army from Byzantium, he contrived that the report should reach

Nachoragan and thereby cause him to divide his troops, and send half of

them to meet the supposed reinforcements. Then, when the Persian general

nevertheless renewed his assault, Martinus sent secretly 5,000 men under

Justin to a short distance from Phasis; and this detachment, appearing

suddenly when the contest was going on at the wall, was naturally taken

for the newly arrived army, and caused a general panic. The Persians,

one and all, took to flight; a general sally was made by the Romans in

Phasis; a rout and a carnage followed, which completely disheartened

the Persian leader, and led him to give up his enterprise. Having lost

nearly one-fourth of his army, Nachoragan drew off to Kutai’s, and

shortly afterwards, leaving the command of the Persians in Lazica to

Vaphrizes, retired to winter quarters in Iberia.

The failure of Nachoragan, following closely upon the decision of the

Lazi to maintain their alliance with Rome in spite of the murder

of Gubazes, seems to have convinced the Persian monarch that, in

endeavoring to annex Lazica, he had engaged in a hopeless enterprise,

and that it would be the most prudent and judicious course to yield

to the inevitable, and gradually withdraw from a position which was

untenable. Having meted out to Nachoragan the punishment usually

assigned to unsuccessful commanders in Persia, he sent an ambassador to

Byzantium in the spring of A.D. 556, and commenced negotiations which

he intended to be serious. Diplomacy seems to have been as averse in the

days of Chosroes as in our own to an undignified rapidity of proceeding.

Hence, though there could be little to debate where both parties were

substantially at one, the negotiations begun in May A.D. 556 were not

concluded till after the commencement of the following year. A complete

suspension of hostilities was then agreed upon, to extend to Lazica no

less than to the other dominions of the two monarchs. In Lazica each

party was to keep what it possessed, territory, cities, and castles. As

this joint occupation was scarcely suitable for a permanent arrangement,

it was provided that the two belligerents should, during the continuance

of the truce, proceed to settle the terms on which a lasting peace might

be established.

An interval of five years elapsed before the happy result, for which

both parties had expressed themselves anxious, was accomplished. It is

uncertain how Chosroes was occupied during this period; but there are

some grounds for believing that he was engaged in the series of Oriental

wars whereof we shall have to speak presently. Success appears to have

crowned his arms wherever he directed them; but he remained undazzled by

his victories, and still retained the spirit of moderation which had

led him in A.D. 557 to conclude the general truce. He was even prepared,

after five years of consideration, to go further in the line of pacific

policy on which he had then entered, and, in order to secure the

continuance of his good relations with Rome, was willing to relinquish

all claim to the sovereignty of Lazica. Under these circumstances,

ambassadors of the highest rank, representing the two powers, met on the

frontier between Daras and Nisibis, proclaimed the power and explained

the motives of their respective sovereigns, and after a lengthy

conference formulated a treaty of peace. The terms, which are given

at length by a writer of the succeeding generation, may be briefly

expressed as follows: (1) the Persians were to withdraw from Lazica, to

give up all claim to it, and to hand over its possession to the Romans;

(2) they were in return to receive from Rome an annual sum of 30,000

pieces of gold, the amount due for the first seven years being paid in

advance; (3) the Christians in Persia were guaranteed the full and free

exercise of their religion, but were forbidden to make converts from

the disciples of Zoroaster; (4) commercial intercourse was to be allowed

between the two empires, but the merchants were restricted to the use of

certain roads and certain emporia; (5) diplomatic intercourse was to be

wholly free, and the goods of ambassadors were to be exempt from duty;

(6) Daras was to continue a fortified town, but no new fortresses were

to be built upon the frontier by either nation, and Daras itself was not

to be made the headquarters of the Prefect of the East, or to be held

by an unnecessarily large garrison; (7) all disputes arising between

the two nations were to be determined by courts of arbitration; (8)

the allies of the two nations were to be included in the treaty, and to

participate in its benefits and obligations; (9) Persia was to undertake

the sole charge of maintaining the Caspian Gates against the Huns and

Alans; (10) the peace was made for a period of fifty years. It has been

held that by this treaty Justinian consented to become a tributary of

the Persian Empire; and undoubtedly it was possible for Oriental vanity

to represent the arrangement made in this light. But the million and a

half, which Rome undertook to pay in the course of the next fifty years,

might well be viewed by the Romans as an outlay for which they received

an ample return in the cession to them of the Persian part of Lazica,

and in the termination of their obligation to contribute towards the

maintenance of the Caspian Gates. If there was any real danger of those

results following from the Persian occupation of Lazica which both

nations anticipated, the sum must be considered to have been one of the

best investments ever made by a State. Even if we believe the dangers

apprehended to have been visionary, yet it cannot be viewed as an

exorbitant price to have paid for a considerable tract of fertile

country, a number of strong fortresses, and the redemption of an

obligation which could not with honor be disowned.

To Chosroes the advantage secured by the treaty was similar to that

which Rome had obtained by the peace of A.D. 532. Being no longer

under any necessity of employing his forces against the Romans in the

north-west, he found himself free to act with greatly increased effect

against his enemies in the east and in the south. Already, in the

interval between the conclusion of the general truce and of the fifty

years’ peace, he had, as it seems, invaded the territories of the

Ephthalites, and, with the help of the Great Khan of the Turks,

inflicted upon this people, so long one of Persia’s most formidable

enemies, a severe defeat. According to Tabari, he actually slew the

Ephthalite monarch, ravaged his territory, and pillaged his treasures.

About the same time he had also had a war with the Khazars, had overrun

their country, wasted it with fire and sword, and massacred thousands of

the inhabitants. He now entertained designs against Arabia and perhaps

India, countries on which he could not hope to make an impression

without earnest and concentrated effort. It was doubtless with the view

of extending his influence into these quarters that the Persian monarch

evacuated Lazica, and bound his country to maintain peace with Rome for

the next half-century.

The position of affairs in Arabia was at the time abnormal and

interesting. For the most part that vast but sterile region has been the

home of almost countless tribes, living independently of one another,

each under its own sheikh or chief, in wild and unrestrained freedom.

Native princes have seldom obtained any widely extended dominion over

the scattered population; and foreign powers have still more rarely

exercised authority for any considerable period over the freedom-loving

descendants of Ishmael. But towards the beginning of the sixth century

of our era the Abyssinians of Axum, a Christian people, “raised” far

“above the ordinary level of African barbarism” by their religion and

by their constant intercourse with Rome, succeeded in attaching to their

empire a large portion of the Happy Arabia, and ruled it at first from

their African capital, but afterwards by means of a viceroy, whose

dependence on the Negus of Abyssinia was little more than nominal.

Abraha, an Abyssinian of high rank, being deputed by the Negus to

re-establish the authority of Abyssinia over the Yemen when it was

shaken by a great revolt, made himself master of the country, assumed

the crown, established Abyssinians in all the chief cities, built

numerous churches, especially one of great beauty at Sana, and at

his death left the kingdom to his eldest son, Yaksoum. An important

Christian state was thus established in the Great Peninsula; and it was

natural that Justinian should see with satisfaction, and Chosroes with

some alarm, the growth of a power in this quarter which was sure to side

with Rome and against Persia, if their rivalry should extend into

these parts. Justinian had hailed with pleasure the original Abyssinian

conquest, and had entered into amicable relations with both the Axumites

and their colonists in the Yemen. Chosroes now resolved upon a counter

movement. He would employ the quiet secured to him by the peace of A.D.

562 in a great attack upon the Abyssinian power in Arabia. He would

drive the audacious Africans from the soil of Asia, and would earn the

eternal gratitude of the numerous tribes of the desert. He would extend

Persian influence to the shores of the Arabian Gulf, and so confront the

Romans along the whole line of their eastern boundary. He would destroy

the _point d’appui_ which Rome had acquired in South-western Asia, and

so at once diminish her power and augment the strength and glory of

Persia.

The interference of Chosroes in the affairs of a country so distant as

Western Arabia involved considerable difficulties; but his expedition

was facilitated by an application which he received from a native of the

district in question. Saif, the son of Dsu-Yezm, descended from the race

of the old Homerite kings whom the Abyssinians had conquered, grew up at

the court of Abraha in the belief that that prince, who had married his

mother, was not his step-father, but his father. Undeceived by an insult

which Masrouq, the true son of Abraha and successor of Yaksoum, offered

him, Saif became a refugee at the court of Chosroes, and importuned the

Great King to embrace his quarrel and reinstate him on the throne of

his fathers. He represented the Homerite population of Yemen as groaning

under the yoke of their oppressors and only waiting for an opportunity

to rise in revolt and shake it off. A few thousand Persian troops,

enough to form the nucleus of an army, would suffice; they might be sent

by sea to the port of Aden, near the mouth of the Arabian Gulf, where

the Homerites would join them in large numbers; the combined forces

might then engage in combat with the Abyssinians, and destroy them or

drive them from the land. Chosroes took the advice tendered him, so far

at any rate as to make his expedition by sea. His ships were assembled

in the Persian Gulf; a certain number of Persian troops were embarked on

board them; and the flotilla proceeded, under the conduct of Saif, first

to the mouth of the Gulf, and then along the southern coast of Arabia

to Aden. Encouraged by their presence, the Plomerites rose against their

foreign oppressors; a war followed, of which the particulars have been

disfigured by romance; but the result is undoubted--the Abyssinian

strangers were driven from the soil of Arabia; the native race recovered

its supremacy; and Saif, the descendant of the old Homerite kings, was

established, as the vassal or viceroy of Chosroes, on the throne of his

ancestors. This arrangement, however, was not lasting. Saif, after a

short reign, was murdered by his body-guard; and Chosroes then conferred

the government of Yemen upon a Persian officer, who seems to have borne

the usual title of Marzpan, and to have been in no way distinguished

above other rulers of provinces. Thus the Homerites in the end gained

nothing by their revolt but a change of masters. They may, however, have

regarded the change as one worth making, since it gave them the mild

sway of a tolerant heathen in lieu of the persecuting rule of Christian

bigots.

According to some writers, Chosroes also, in his later years, sent an

expedition by sea against some portion of Hindustan, and received a

cession of territory from an Indian monarch. But the country of the

monarch is too remote for belief, and the ceded provinces seem to have

belonged to Persia previously. It is therefore, perhaps, most probable

that friendly intercourse has been exaggerated into conquest, and the

reception of presents from an Indian potentate metamorphosed into the

gain of territory. Some authorities do not assign to Chosroes any Indian

dominion; and it is at least doubtful whether he made any expedition in

this direction.

A war, however, appears certainly to have occupied Chosroes about

this period on his north-eastern frontier. The Turks had recently been

advancing in strength and drawing nearer to the confines of Persia. They

had extended their dominion over the great Ephthalite kingdom, partly by

force of arms, partly through the treachery of Katulphus, an Ephthalite

chieftain; they had received the submission of the Sogdians, and

probably of other tribes of the Transoxianian region, previously held in

subjection by the Ephthalites; and they aspired to be acknowledged as a

great power, the second, if not the first, in this part of Asia. It was

perhaps rather with the view of picking a quarrel than in the hope

of any valuable pacific result, that, about the close of A.D. 567,

Diza-bul, the Turkish Khan, sent ambassadors to Chosroes with proposals

for the establishment of free commercial intercourse between the Turks

and Persians, and even for the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and

alliance between the two nations. Chosroes suspected the motive for the

overture, but was afraid openly to reject it. He desired to discourage

intercourse between his own nation and the Turks, but could devise

no better mode of effecting his purpose than by burning the Turkish

merchandise offered to him after he had bought it, and by poisoning the

ambassadors and giving out that they had fallen victims to the climate.

His conduct exasperated the Turkish Khan, and created a deep and bitter

hostility between the Turks and Persians. It was at once resolved to

send an embassy to Constantinople and offer to the Greek emperor the

friendship which Chosroes had scorned. The embassy reached the Byzantine

court early in A.D. 568, and was graciously received by Justin, the

nephew of Justinian, who had succeeded his uncle on the imperial throne

between three and four years previously. A treaty of alliance was made

between the two nations; and a Roman embassy, empowered to ratify it,

visited the Turkish court in the Altai mountains during the course

of the next year (A.D. 569), and drew closer the bonds of friendship

between the high contracting powers. But meanwhile Dizabul, confident in

his own strength, had determined on an expedition into Persia. The Roman

ambassador, Zemarchus, accompanied him on a portion of his march, and

witnessed his insulting treatment of a Persian envoy, sent by

Chosroes to meet him and deprecate his attack. Beyond this point exact

information fails us; but we may suspect that this is the expedition

commemorated by Mirk-hond, wherein the Great Khan, having invaded the

Persian territory in force, made himself master of Shash, Ferghana,

Samarkand, Bokhara, Kesh, and Nesf, but, hearing that Hornisdas, son

of Chosroes, was advancing against him at the head of a numerous army,

suddenly fled, evacuating all the country that he had occupied, and

retiring to the most distant portion of Turkestan. At any rate the

expedition cannot have had any great success; for shortly afterwards

(A.D. 571) we find Turkish ambassadors once more visiting the Byzantine

court, and entreating Justin to renounce the fifty years’ peace and

unite with them in a grand attack upon the common enemy, which, if

assaulted simultaneously on either side, might (they argued) be almost

certainly crushed. Justin gave the ambassadors no definite reply, but

renewed the alliance with Dizabul, and took seriously into consideration

the question whether he should not yield to the representations made

to him, and renew the war which Justinian had terminated nine years

previously.

There were many circumstances which urged him towards a rupture. The

payments to be made under the fifty years’ peace had in his eyes the

appearance of a tribute rendered by Rome to Persia, which was, he

thought, an intolerable disgrace. A subsidy, not very dissimilar, which

Justinian had allowed the Saracenic Arabs under Persian rule, he had

already discontinued; and hostilities had, in consequence, already

commenced between the Persian and the Roman Saracens. The successes

of Chosroes in Western Arabia had at once provoked his jealousy,

and secured to Rome, in that quarter, an important ally in the great

Christian kingdom of Abyssinia. The Turks of Central Asia had sought his

friendship and offered to combine their attacks with his, if he would

consent to go to war. Moreover, there was once more discontent and

even rebellion in Armenia, where the proselytizing zeal of the Persian

governors had again driven the natives to take up arms and raise the

standard of independence. Above all, the Great King, who had warred with

such success for twenty years against his uncle, was now in advanced

age, and seemed to have given signs of feebleness, inasmuch as in his

recent expeditions he had individually taken no part, but had entrusted

the command of his troops to others. Under these circumstances, Justin,

in the year A.D. 572, determined to renounce the peace made ten

years earlier with the Persians, and to recommence the old struggle.

Accordingly he at once dismissed the Persian envoy, Sebocthes, with

contempt, refused wholly to make the stipulated payment, proclaimed his

intention of receiving the Armenian insurgents under his protection,

and bade Chosroes lay a finger on them at his peril. He then appointed

Marcian to the prefecture of the East, and gave him the conduct of the

war which was now inevitable.

No sooner did the Persian monarch find his kingdom seriously menaced

than, despite his advanced age, he immediately took the field in person.

Giving the command of a flying column of 6000 men to Adarman, a skilful

general, he marched himself against the Romans, who under Marcian had

defeated a Persian force, and were besieging Nisibis, forced them to

raise the siege, and, pressing forward as they retired, compelled them

to seek shelter within the walls of Daras, which he proceeded to

invest with his main army. Meanwhile Adarman, at the head of the troops

entrusted to him, crossed the Euphrates near Circesium, and, having

entered Syria, carried fire and sword far and wide over that fertile

province. Repulsed from Antioch, where, however, he burnt the suburbs

of the town, he invaded Coelesyria, took and destroyed Apamea, and then,

recrossing the great river, rejoined Chosroes before Daras. The renowned

fortress made a brave defence. For about five months it resisted,

without obtaining any relief, the entire force of Chosroes, who is said

to have besieged it with 40,000 horse and 100,000 foot. At last, on the

approach of winter, it could no longer hold out; enclosed within lines

of circumvallation, and deprived of water by the diversion of its

streams into new channels, it found itself reduced to extremity, and

forced to submit towards the close of A.D. 573. Thus the great Roman

fortress in these parts was lost in the first year of the renewed war;

and Justin, alarmed at his own temerity, and recognizing his weakness,

felt it necessary to retire from the conduct of affairs, and deliver

the reins of empire to stronger hands. He chose as his coadjutor and

successor the Count Tiberius, a Thracian by birth, who had long stood

high in his confidence; and this prince, in conjunction with the Empress

Sophia, now took the direction of the war.

The first need was to obtain a breathing-space. The Persian king having

given an opening for negotiations, advantage was taken of it by the

joint rulers to send an envoy, furnished with an autograph letter from

the empress, and well provided with the best persuasives of peace, who

was to suggest an armistice for a year, during which a satisfactory

arrangement of the whole quarrel might be agreed upon. Tiberius thought

that within this space he might collect an army sufficiently powerful

to re-establish the superiority of the Roman arms in the east; Chosroes

believed himself strong enough to defeat any force that Rome could now

bring into the field. A truce for a year was therefore concluded, at the

cost to Rome of 45,000 aurei; and immense efforts were at once made by

Tiberius to levy troops from his more distant, provinces, or hire them

from the lands beyond his borders. An army of 150,000 men was, it

is said, collected from the banks of the Danube and the Rhine, from

Scythia, Pannonia, Moesia, Illyricum, and Isauria; a general of repute,

Justinian, the son of Germanus, was selected to command them; and the

whole force was concentrated upon the eastern frontier but, after all

these preparations, the Caesar’s heart failed him, and, instead of

offering battle to the enemy, Tiberius sent a second embassy to the

Persian head-quarters, early in A.D. 575, and besought an extension of

the truce. The Romans desired a short term of peace only, but wished for

a general suspension of hostilities between the nations; the Persians

advocated a longer interval, but insisted that the truce should not

extend to Armenia. The dispute continued till the armistice for a year

had run out; and the Persians had resumed hostilities and threatened

Constantina before the Romans would give way. At length it was agreed

that there should be peace for three years, but that Armenia should

be exempt from its operation. Rome was to pay to Persia, during the

continuance of the truce, the sum of 30,000 aurei annually.

No sooner was the peace concluded than Chosroes put himself at the

head of his army, and, entering Armenia Proper, proceeded to crush the

revolt, and to re-establish the Persian authority throughout the entire

region. No resistance was offered to him; and he was able, before the

close of the year, to carry his arms into the Roman territory of Armenia

Minor, and even to threaten Cappadocia. Here Justinian opposed his

progress; and in a partial engagement, Kurs (or Cursus), a leader of

Scythians in the Roman service, obtained an advantage over the Persian

rear-guard, captured the camp and the baggage, but did not succeed in

doing any serious damage. Chosroes soon afterwards revenged himself by

surprising and destroying a Roman camp during the night; he then took

and burnt the city of Melitene (Malatiyeh); after which, as winter was

approaching, he retired across the Euphrates, and returned into his own

country. Hereupon Justinian seems to have invaded Persian Armenia, and

to have enriched his troops with its plunder; according to some writers,

he even penetrated as far as the Caspian Sea, and embarked upon its

waters; he continued on Persian soil during the whole of the winter, and

it was not till the spring came that he re-entered Roman territory (A.D.

576).

The campaign of A.D. 576 is somewhat obscure. The Romans seem to have

gained certain advantages in Northern Armenia and Iberia, while Chosroes

on his part carried the war once more into Armenia Minor, and laid siege

to Theodosiopolis, which, however, he was unable to take. Negotiations

were upon this resumed, and had progressed favorably to a certain,

point, when news arrived of a great disaster to the Roman arms in

Armenia, which changed the face of affairs and caused the Persian

negotiators to break up the conference. Tam-chosro, a Persian general,

had completely defeated the Roman army under Justinian. Armenia had

returned to its allegiance. There seemed every reason to believe that

more was to be gained by arms than by diplomacy, and that, when the

three years peace had run out, the Great King might renew the general

war with a prospect of obtaining important successes.

There are no military events which can be referred to the year A.D.

577. The Romans and Persians amused each other with alternate embassies

during its course, and with negotiations that were not intended to have

any result. The two monarchs made vast preparations; and with the spring

of A.D. 578 hostilities recommenced. Chosroes is accused of having

anticipated the expiration of the truce by a period of forty days; but

it is more probable that he and the Romans estimated the date of

its expiration differently. However this was, it is certain that his

generals, Mebodes and Sapoes, took the field in early spring with 20,000

horse, and entering the Roman Armenia laid waste the country, at the

same time threatening Constantina and Theodosiopolis. Simultaneously

Tamchosro, quitting Persarmenia, marched westward and plundered the

country about Amida (Diarbekr). The Roman commander Maurice, who had

succeeded Justinian, possessed considerable military ability. On this

occasion, instead of following the ordinary plan of simply standing

on the defensive and endeavoring to repulse the invaders, he took the

bolder course of making a counter movement. Entering Persarmenia, which

he found denuded of troops, he carried all before him, destroying the

forts, and plundering the country. Though the summer heats brought

on him an attack of fever, he continued without pause his destructive

march; invaded and occupied Arzanene, with its stronghold, Aphumon,

carried off the population to the number of 10,090, and, pressing

forwards from Arzanene into Eastern Mesopotamia, took Singara, and

carried fire and sword over the entire region as far as the Tigris.

He even ventured to throw a body of skirmishers across the river into

Cordyene (Kurdistan); and these ravagers, who were commanded by Kurs,

the Scythian, spread devastation over a district where no Roman soldier

had set foot since its cession by Jovian. Agathias tells us that

Chosroes was at the time enjoying his summer villeggiatura in the

Kurdish hills, and saw from his residence the smoke of the hamlets which

the Roman troops had fired. He hastily fled from the danger, and shut

himself up within the walls of Ctesiphon, where he was soon afterwards

seized with the illness which brought his life to a close.

Meanwhile Kurs, unconscious probably of the prize that had been so near

his grasp, recrossed the Tigris with his booty and rejoined Maurice, who

on the approach of winter withdrew into Roman territory, evacuating all

his conquests excepting Arzanene. The dull time of winter was, as usual,

spent in negotiations; and it was thought that a peace might have been

concluded had Chosroes lived. Tiberius was anxious to recover Daras,

and was willing to withdraw the Roman forces wholly from Persarmenia and

Iberia, and to surrender Arzanene and Aphumon, if Daras were restored to

him. He would probably have been content even to pay in addition a sum

of money. Chosroes might perhaps have accepted these terms; but while

the envoys empowered to propose them were on their way to his court,

early in the year A.D. 579, the aged monarch died in his palace at

Ctesiphon after a reign of forty-eight years.