_Second Reign of Kobad. His Change of Attitude towards the Followers of
Mazdak. His Cause of Quarrel with Rome. First Roman War of Kobad. Peace
made A.D. 505. Rome fortifies Daras and Theodosiopolis. Complaint made
by Persia. Negotiations of Kobad with Justin: Proposed Adoption of
Chosroes by the Latter. Internal Troubles in Persia. Second Roman War of
Kobad, A.D. 524-531. Death of Kobad. His Character. His coins._
The second reign of Kobad covered a period of thirty years, extending
from A.D. 501 to A.D. 531. He was contemporary, during this space, with
the Roman emperors Anastasius, Justin, and Justinian, with Theodoric,
king of Italy, with Cassiodorus, Symmachus, Boethius, Procopius, and
Belisarius. The Oriental writers tell us but little of this portion of
his history. Their silence, however, is fortunately compensated by the
unusual copiousness of the Byzantines, who deliver, at considerable
length, the entire series of transactions in which Kobad was engaged
with the Constantinopolitan emperors, and furnish some interesting
notices of other matters which occupied him. Procopius especially, the
eminent rhetorician and secretary of Belisarius, who was born about the
time of Kobad’s restoration to the Persian thrones and became secretary
to the great general four years before Kobad’s death, is ample in his
details of the chief occurrences, and deserves a confidence which the
Byzantines can rarely claim, from being at once a contemporary and a man
of remarkable intelligence. “His facts,” as Gibbon well observes, “are
collected from the personal experience and free conversation of a
soldier, a statesman, and a traveller; his style continually aspires,
and often attains, to the merit of strength and elegance; his,
reflections, more especially in the speeches, which he too frequently
inserts, contain a rich fund of political knowledge; and the historian,
excited by the generous ambition of pleasing and instructing posterity,
appears to disdain the prejudices of the people and the flattery of
courts.”
The first question which Kobad had to decide, when, by the voluntary
cession of his brother, Zamasp, he remounted his throne, was the
attitude which he should assume towards Mazdak and his followers. By
openly favoring the new religion and encouraging the disorders of its
votaries, he had so disgusted the more powerful classes of his subjects
that he had lost his crown and been forced to become a fugitive in a
foreign country. He was not prepared to affront this danger a second
time. Still, his attachment to the new doctrine was not shaken; he held
the views propounded to be true, and was not ashamed to confess himself
an unwavering adherent of the communistic prophet. He contrived,
however, to reconcile his belief with his interests by separating the
individual from the king. As a man, he held the views of Mazdak; but, as
a king, he let it be known that he did not intend to maintain or support
the sectaries in any extreme or violent measures. The result was that
the new doctrine languished; Mazdak escaped persecution and continued to
propagate his views; but, practically, the progress of the new opinions
was checked; they had ceased to command royal advocacy, and had
consequently ceased to endanger the State; they still fermented among
the masses, and might cause trouble in the future; but for the present
they were the harmless speculations of a certain number of enthusiasts
who did not venture any more to carry their theories into practice.
Kobad had not enjoyed the throne for more than a year before his
relations with the great empire on his western frontier became troubled,
and, after some futile negotiations, hostilities once more broke out. It
appears that among the terms of the peace concluded in A.D. 442 between
Isdigerd II. and the younger Theodosius, the Romans had undertaken
to pay annually a certain sum of money as a contribution towards the
expenses of a fortified post which the two powers undertook to maintain
in the pass of Derbend, between the last spurs of the Caucasus and the
Caspian. This fortress, known as Juroi-pach or Biraparach, commanded the
usual passage by which the hordes of the north were accustomed to issue
from their vast arid steppes upon the rich and populous regions of the
south for the purpose of plundering raids, if not of actual conquests.
Their incursions threatened almost equally Roman and Persian territory,
and it was felt that the two nations were alike interested in preventing
them. The original agreement was that both parties should contribute
equally, alike to the building and to the maintaining of the fortress;
but the Romans were so occupied in other wars that the entire burden
actually fell upon the Persians. These latter, as was natural, made from
time to time demands upon the Romans for the payment of their share of
the expenses; but it seems that these efforts were ineffectual, and the
debt accumulated. It was under these circumstances that Kobad. finding
himself in want of money to reward adequately his Ephthalite allies,
sent an embassy to Anastasius, the Roman emperor, with a peremptory
demand for a remittance. The reply of Anastasius was a refusal.
According to one authority he declined absolutely to make any payment;
according to another, he expressed his willingness to lend his Persian
brother a sum of money on receiving the customary acknowledgment, but
refused an advance on any other terms. Such a response was a simple
repudiation of obligations voluntarily contracted, and could scarcely
fail to rouse the indignation of the Persian monarch. If he learned
further that the real cause of the refusal was a desire to embroil
Persia with the Ephthalites, and to advance the interests of Rome by
leading her enemies to waste each other’s strength in an internecine
conflict, he may have admired the cunning of his rival, but can scarcely
have felt the more amicably disposed towards him.
The natural result followed. Kobad at once declared war. The two empires
had now been uninterruptedly at peace for sixty, and, with the exception
of a single campaign (that of A.D. 441), for eighty years. They had
ceased to feel that respect for each other’s arms and valor which
experience gives, and which is the best preservative against wanton
hostilities. Kobad was confident in his strength, since he was able
to bring into the field, besides the entire force of Persia, a largo
Ephthalite contingent, and also a number of Arabs. Anastasius, perhaps,
scarcely thought that Persia would go to war on account of a pecuniary
claim which she had allowed to be disregarded for above half a century.
The resolve of Kobad evidently took him by surprise; but he had gone too
far to recede. The Roman pride would not allow him to yield to a display
of force what he had refused when demanded peacefully; and he was thus
compelled to maintain by arms the position which he had assumed without
anticipating its consequences.
The war began by a sudden inroad of the host of Persia into Roman
Armenia, where Theodosiopolis was still the chief stronghold and the
main support of the Roman power. Unprepared for resistance, this city
was surrendered after a short siege by its commandant, Constantine,
after which the greater part of Armenia was overrun and ravaged. From
Armenia Kobad conducted his army into Northern Mesopotamia, and formed
the siege of Amida about the commencement of the winter. The great
strength of Amida has been already noticed in this volume. Kobad found
it ungarrisoned, and only protected by a small force, cantoned in its
neighborhood, under the philosopher, Alypius. But the resolution of the
townsmen, and particularly of the monks, was great; and a most strenuous
resistance met all his efforts to take the place. At first his hope was
to effect a breach in the defences by means of the ram; but the besieged
employed the customary means of destroying his engines, and, where these
failed, the strength and thickness of the walls was found to be
such that no serious impression could be made on them by the Persian
battering train. It was necessary to have recourse to some other device;
and Kobad proceeded to erect a mound in the immediate neighborhood of
the wall, with a view of dominating the town, driving the defenders from
the battlements, and then taking the place by escalade. He raised an
immense work; but it was undermined by the enemy, and at last fell in
with a terrible crash, involving hundreds in its ruin. It is said that
after this failure Kobad despaired of success, and determined to draw
off his army; but the taunts and insults of the besieged, or confidence
in the prophecies of the Magi, who saw an omen of victory in the
grossest of all the insults, caused him to change his intention and
still continue the siege. His perseverance was soon afterwards rewarded.
A soldier discovered in the wall the outlet of a drain or sewer
imperfectly blocked up with rubble, and, removing this during the
night, found himself able to pass through the wall into the town. He
communicated his discovery to Kobad, who took his measures accordingly.
Sending, the next night, a few picked men through the drain, to seize
the nearest tower, which happened to be slackly guarded by some sleepy
monks, who the day before had been keeping festival, he brought the bulk
of his troops with scaling ladders to the adjoining portion of the wall,
and by his presence, exhortations, and threats, compelled them to force
their way into the place. The inhabitants resisted strenuously, but were
overpowered by numbers, and the carnage in the streets was great. At
last an aged priest, shocked at the indiscriminate massacre, made bold
to address the monarch himself and tell him that it was no kingly act to
slaughter captives. “Why, then, did you elect to fight?” said the angry
prince. “It was God’s doing,” replied the priest, astutely; “He willed
that thou shouldest owe thy conquest of Amida, not to our weakness, but
to thy own valor.” The flattery pleased Kobad, and induced him to stop
the effusion of blood; but the sack was allowed to continue; the whole
town was pillaged; and the bulk of the inhabitants were carried off as
slaves.
The siege of Amida lasted eighty days, and the year A.D. 503 had
commenced before it was over. Anastasius, on learning the danger of his
frontier town, immediately despatched to its aid a considerable force,
which he placed under four commanders--Areobindus, the grandson of the
Gothic officer of the same name who distinguished himself in the Persian
war of Theodosius; Celer, captain of the imperial guard; Patricius, the
Phrygian; and Hypatius, one of his own nephews. The army, collectively,
is said to have been more numerous than any that Rome had ever brought
into the field against the Persians but it was weakened by the divided
command, and it was moreover broken up into detachments which acted
independently of each other. Its advent also was tardy. Not only did
it arrive too late to save Amida, but it in no way interfered with the
after-movements of Kobad, who, leaving a small garrison to maintain his
new conquest, carried off the whole of his rich booty to his city of
Nisibis, and placed the bulk of his troops in a good position upon
his own frontier. When Areobindus, at the head of the first division,
reached Amida and heard that the Persians had fallen back, he declined
the comparatively inglorious work of a siege, and pressed forward,
anxious to carry the war into Persian territory. He seems actually to
have crossed the border and invaded the district of Arzanene, when
news reached him that Kobad was marching upon him with all his troops,
whereupon he instantly fled, and threw himself into Constantia, leaving
his camp and stores to be taken by the enemy. Meanwhile another division
of the Roman army, under Patrilcius and Hypatius, had followed in the
steps of Areobindus, and meeting with the advance-guard of Kobad, which
consisted of eight hundred Ephthalites, had destroyed it almost to a
man.
Ignorant, however, of the near presence of the main Persian army, this
body of troops allowed itself soon afterwards to be surprised on the
banks of a stream, while some of the men were bathing and others were
taking their breakfast, and was completely cut to pieces by Kobad,
scarcely any but the generals escaping.
Thus far success had been wholly on the side of the Persians; and if
circumstances had permitted Kobad to remain at the seat of war and
continue to direct the operations of his troops in person, there is
every to reason to believe that he would have gained still greater
advantages. The Roman generals were incompetent; they were at variance
among themselves; and they were unable to control the troops under their
command. The soldiers were insubordinate, without confidence in their
officers, and inclined to grumble at such an unwonted hardship as a
campaign prolonged into the winter. Thus all the conditions of the war
were in favor of Persia. But unfortunately for Kobad, it happened that,
at the moment when his prospects were the fairest, a danger in another
quarter demanded his presence, and required him to leave the conduct
of the Roman war to others. An Ephthalite invasion called him to the
defence of his north-eastern frontier before the year A.D. 503 was over,
and from this time the operations in Mesopotamia were directed, not by
the king in person, but by his generals. A change is at once apparent.
In A.D. 504 Celer invaded Arzanene, destroyed a number of forts,
and ravaged the whole province with fire and sword. Thence marching
southward, he threated Nisibis, which is said, to have been within a
little of yielding itself. Towards winter Patricius and Hypatius took
heart, and, collecting an army, commenced the siege of Amida, which they
attempted to storm on several occasions, but without success. After a
while they turned the siege into a blockade, entrapped the commander of
the, Persian garrison, Glones, by a stratagem, and reduced the defenders
of the place to such distress that it would have been impossible to hold
put much longer. It seems to have been when matters were at this
point that an ambassador of high rank arrived from Kobad, empowered to
conclude a peace, and instructed to declare his master’s willingness
to surrender all his conquests, including Amida, on the payment of
a considerable sum of money. The Roman generals, regarding Amida as
impregnable, and not aware of the exhaustion of its stores, gladly
consented. They handed over to the Persians a thousand pounds’ weight of
gold, and received in exchange the captured city and territory. A treaty
was signed by which the contracting powers undertook to remain at peace
and respect each other’s dominions for the space of seven years. No
definite arrangement seems to have been made with respect to the yearly
payment on account of the fortress, Birapa-rach, the demand for which
had occasioned the war. This claim remained in abeyance, to be pressed
or neglected, as Persia might consider her interests to require.
The Ephthalite war, which compelled Kobad to make peace with Anastasius,
appears to have occupied him uninterruptedly for ten years. During its
continuance Rome took advantage of her rival’s difficulties to continue
the system (introduced under the younger Theodosius) of augmenting
her own power, and crippling that of Persia, by establishing strongly
fortified posts upon her border in the immediate vicinity of Persian
territory. Not content with restoring Theodosiopolis and greatly
strengthening it defences, Anastasius erected an entirely new fortress
at Daras, on the southern skirts of the Mons Masius, within twelve miles
of Nisibis, at the edge of the great Mesopotamian plain. This place was
not a mere fort, but a city; it contained churches, baths, porticoes,
large granaries, and extensive cisterns. It constituted a standing
menace to Persia; and its erection was in direct violation of the treaty
made by Theodosius with Isdigerd II., which was regarded as still in
force by both nations.
We cannot be surprised that Kobad, when his Ephthalite war was over,
made formal complaint at Constantinople (ab. A.D. 517); of the infraction
of the treaty. Anastasius was unable to deny the charge. He endeavored
at first to meet it by a mixture of bluster with professions of
friendship; but when this method did not appear effectual he had
recourse to an argument whereof the Persians on most occasions
acknowledged the force. By the expenditure of a large sum of money he
either corrupted the ambassadors of Kobad, or made them honestly doubt
whether the sum paid would not satisfy their master.
In A.D. 518 Anastasius died, and the imperial authority was assumed by
the Captain of the Guard, the “Dacian peasant,” Justin. With him Kobad
very shortly entered jinto negotiations. He had not, it is clear,
accepted the pecuniary sacrifice of Anastasius as a complete
satisfaction. He felt that he had many grounds of quarrel with the
Romans, There was the old matter of the annual payment due on account
of the fortress of Biraparach; there was the recent strengthening
of Theodosiopolis, and building of Daras; there was moreover an
interference of Rome at this time in the region about the Caucasus which
was very galling to Persia and was naturally resented by her monarch.
One of the first proceedings of Justin after he ascended the throne
was to send an embassy with rich gifts to the court of a certain Hunnic
chief of these parts, called Ziligdes or Zilgibis, and to conclude a
treaty with him by which the Hun bound himself to assist the Romans
against the Persians. Soon afterwards a Lazic prince, named Tzath, whose
country was a Persian dependency, instead of seeking inauguration
from Kobad, proceeded on the death of his father to the court of
Constantinople, and expressed his wish to become a Christian, and to
hold his crown as one of Rome’s vassal monarchs. Justin gave this person
a warm welcome, had him baptized, married him to a Roman lady of
rank, and sent him back to Lazica adorned with a diadem and robes that
sufficiently indicated his dependent position. The friendly relations
established between Rome and Persia by the treaty of A.D. 505 were,
under these circumstances, greatly disturbed, and on both sides it would
seem that war was expected to break out. But neither Justin nor Kobad
was desirous of a rupture. Both were advanced in years, and both had
domestic troubles to occupy them. Kobad was at this time especially
anxious about the succession. He had four sons, Kaoses, Zames,
Phthasuarsas, and Chosroes, of whom Kaoses was the eldest. This prince,
however, did not please him. His affections were fixed on his fourth
son, Chosroes, and he had no object more at heart than to secure the
crown for this favorite child. The Roman writers tell us that instead
of resenting the proceedings of Justin in the years A.D. 520-522, Kobad
made the strange proposal to him about this time that he should adopt
Chosroes, in order that that prince might have the aid of the Romans
against his countrymen, if his right of succession should be disputed.
It is, no doubt, difficult to believe that such a proposition should
have been made; but the circumstantial manner in which Procopius,
writing not forty years after, relates the matter, renders it almost
impossible for us to reject the story as a pure fabrication. There must
have been some foundation for it. In the negotiations between Justin and
Kobad during the early years of the former, the idea of Rome pledging
herself to acknowledge Chosroes as his father’s successor must have been
brought forward. The proposal, whatever its exact terms, led however to
no result. Rome declined to do as Kobad desired; and thus another ground
of estrangement was added to those which had previously made the renewal
of the Roman war a mere question of time.
It is probable that the rupture would have occurred earlier than it did
had not Persia about the year A.D. 523 become once more the scene of
religious discord and conspiracy. The followers of Mazdak had been
hitherto protected by Kobad, and had lived in peace and multiplied
throughout all the provinces of the empire. Content with the toleration
which they enjoyed, they had for above twenty years created no
disturbance, and their name had almost disappeared from the records of
history. But as time went on they began to feel that their position was
insecure. Their happiness, their very safety, depended upon a single
life; and as Kobad advanced in years they grew to dread more and more
the prospect which his death would open. Among his sons there was but
one who had embraced their doctrine; and this prince, Phthasuarsas, had
but little chance of being chosen to be his father’s successor. Kaoses
enjoyed the claim of natural right; Chosroes was his father’s favorite;
Zames had the respect and good wishes of the great mass of the people;
Phthasuarsas was disliked by the Magi, and, if the choice lay with them,
was certain to be passed over. The sectaries therefore determined not
to wait the natural course of events, but to shape them to their own
purposes. They promised Phthasuarsas to obtain by their prayers his
father’s abdication and his own appointment to succeed him, and asked
him to pledge himself to establish their religion as that of the State
when he became king. The prince consented; and the Mazdakites proceeded
to arrange their plans, when, unfortunately for them, Kobad discovered,
or suspected, that a scheme was on foot to deprive him of his crown.
Whether the designs of the sectaries were really treasonable or not is
uncertain; but whatever they were, an Oriental monarch was not likely to
view them with favor. In the East it is an offence even to speculate on
the death of the king; and Kobad saw in the intrigue which had been set
on foot a criminal and dangerous conspiracy. He determined at once to
crush the movement. Inviting the Mazdakites to a solemn assembly, at
which he was to confer the royal dignity on Phthasuarsas, he caused his
army to surround the unarmed multitude and massacre the entire number.
Relieved from this peril, Kobad would at once have declared war against
Justin, and have marched an army into Roman territory, had not troubles
broken out in Iberia, which made it necessary for him to stand on the
defensive. Adopting the intolerant policy so frequently pursued,
and generally with such ill results, by the Persian kings, Kobad had
commanded Gurgenes, the Iberian monarch, to renounce Christianity and
profess the Zoroastrian religion. Especially he had required that the
Iberian custom of burying the dead should be relinquished, and that the
Persian practice of exposing corpses to be devoured by dogs and birds of
prey should supersede the Christian rite of sepulture. Gurgenes was
too deeply attached to his faith to entertain these propositions for a
moment. He at once shook off the Persian yoke, and, declaring himself
a vassal of Rome, obtained a promise from Justin that he would never
desert the Iberian cause. Rome, however, was not prepared to send her
own armies into this distant and inhospitable region; her hope was
to obtain aid from the Tatars of the Crimea, and to play off these
barbarians against the forces wherewith Kobad might be expected shortly
to vindicate his authority. An attempt to engage the Crimeans generally
in this service was made, but it was not successful. A small force was
enrolled and sent to the assistance of Gurgenes. But now the Persians
took the field in strength. A large army was sent into Iberia by Kobad,
under a general named Boes. Gurgenes saw resistance to be impossible.
He therefore fled the country, and threw himself into Lazica, where
the difficult nature of the ground, the favor of the natives, and
the assistance of the Romans enabled him to maintain himself. Iberia,
however, was lost, and passed once more under the Persians, who even
penetrated into Lazic territory and occupied some forts which commanded
the passes between Lazica and Iberia.
Rome, on her part, endeavored to retaliate (A.D. 526) by invading
Persarmenia and Mesopotamia. The campaign is remarkable as that in
which the greatest general of the age, the renowned and unfortunate
Belisarius, first held a command and thus commenced the work of
learning by experience the duties of a military leader. Hitherto a mere
guardsman, and still quite a youth, trammelled moreover by association
with a colleague, he did not on this occasion reap any laurels.
A Persian force under two generals, Narses and Aratius, defended
Persarmenia, and, engaging the Romans under Sittas and Belisarius,
succeeded in defeating them. At the same time, Licelarius, a Thracian in
the Roman service, made an incursion into the tract about Nisibis,
grew alarmed without cause and beat a speedy retreat. Hereupon Justin
recalled him as incompetent, and the further conduct of the war in
Mesopotamia was entrusted to Belisarius, who took up his headquarters at
Daras.
The year A.D. 527 seems to have been one in which nothing of importance
was attempted on either side. At Constantinople the Emperor Justin had
fallen into ill health, and, after associating his nephew Justinian on
the 1st of April, had departed this life on the 1st of August. About the
same time Kobad found his strength insufficient for active warfare, and
put the command of his armies into the hands of his sons. The struggle
continued in Lazica, but with no decisive result. At Daras, Belisarius,
apparently, stood on the defensive. It was not till A.D. 528 had set in
that he resumed operations in the open field, and prepared once more to
measure his strength against that of Persia.
Belisarius was stirred from his repose by an order from court. Desirous
of carrying further the policy of gaining ground by means of fortified
posts, Justinian, who had recently restored and strengthened the
frontier city of Martyropolis, on the Nymphius, sent instructions to
Belisarius, early in A.D. 528, to the effect that he was to build a new
fort at a place called Mindon, on the Persian border a little to the
left of Nisibis. The work was commenced, but the Persians would not
allow it to proceed. An army which numbered 30,000 men, commanded
by Xerxes, son of Kobad, and Perozes, the Mihran, attacked the Roman
workmen; and when Belisarius, reinforced by fresh troops from Syria and
Phoenicia, ventured an engagement, he was completely defeated and forced
to seek safety in flight. The attempted fortification was, upon this,
razed to the ground; and the Mihran returned, with numerous prisoners of
importance, into Persia.
It is creditable to Justinian that he did not allow the ill-success of
his lieutenant to lead to his recall or disgrace. On the contrary, he
chose exactly the time of his greatest depression to give him the title
of “General of the East.” Belisarius upon this assembled at Daras an
imposing force, composed of Romans and allies, the latter being chiefly
Massagetse. The entire number amounted to 25,000 men; and with this
army he would probably have assumed the offensive, had not the Persian
general of the last campaign, Perozes the Mihran, again appeared in
the field, at the head of 40,000 Persians and declared his intention of
besieging and taking Daras. With the insolence of an Oriental he sent a
message to Belisarius, requiring him to have his bath prepared for the
morrow, as after taking the town he would need that kind of refreshment.
Belisarius contented himself, in reply, with drawing out his troops in
front of Daras in a position carefully prepared beforehand, where both
his centre and his flanks would be protected by a deep ditch, outside
of which there would be room to act for his cavalry. Perozes, having
reconnoitred the position, hesitated to attack it without a greater
advantage of numbers, and sent hastily to Nisibis for 10,000 more
soldiers, while he allowed the day to pass without anything more serious
than a demonstration of his calvary against the Roman left, and some
insignificant single combats.
The next morning his reinforcement arrived; and after some exchange of
messages with Belisarius, which led to no result, he commenced active
operations. Placing his infantry in the centre, and his horse upon
either wing, as the Romans had likewise done, and arranging his
infantry so that one half should from time to time relieve the other,
he assaulted the Roman line with a storm of darts and arrows. The Romans
replied with their missile weapons; but the Persians had the advantage
of numbers; they were protected by huge wattled shields; and they were
more accustomed to this style of warfare than their adversaries. Still
the Romans held out; but it was a relief to them when the missile
weapons were exhausted on both sides, and a closer fight began along the
whole line with swords and spears. After a while the Roman left was in
difficulties. Here the Cadiseni (Cadusians?) under Pituazes routed their
opponents, and were pursuing them hastily when the Massagetic horse,
commanded by Sunicas and Aigan, and three hundred Heruli under a chief
called Pharas, charged them on their right flank, and at once threw them
into disorder. Three thousand fell, and the rest were driven back upon
their main body, which, still continued to fight bravely. The Romans did
not push their advantage, but were satisfied to reoccupy the ground from
which they had been driven.
Scarcely was the battle re-established in this quarter when the Romans
found themselves in still greater difficulties upon their right.
Here Perozes had determined to deliver his main attack. The corps of
Immortals, which he had kept in reserve, and such troops as he could
spare from his centre, were secretly massed upon his own left, and
charged the Roman right with such fury that it was broken and began a
hasty retreat. The Persians pursued in a long column, and were carrying
all before them, when once more an impetuous flank charge of the
barbarian cavalry, which now formed an important element in the Roman
armies, changed the face of affairs, and indeed decided the fortune of
the day. The Persian column was actually cut in two by the Massagetic
horse; those who had advanced the furthest were completely separated
from their friends, and were at once surrounded and slain. Among them
was the standard-bearer of Baresmanes, who commanded the Persian left.
The fall of this man increased the general confusion. In vain did the
Persian column, checked in its advance, attempt an orderly retreat. The
Romans assaulted it in front and on both flanks, and a terrible carnage
ensued. The crowning disaster was the death of Baresmanes, who was slain
by Sunicas, the Massa-Goth; whereupon the whole Persian army broke and
fled without offering any further resistance. Here fell 5000, including
numbers of the “Immortals.” The slaughter would have been still greater,
had not Belisarius and his lieutenant, Termogenes, with wise caution
restrained the Roman troops and recalled them quickly from the pursuit
of the enemy, content with the success which they had achieved. It was
so long since a Roman army had defeated a Persian one in the open field
that the victory had an extraordinary value, and it would have
been foolish to risk a reverse in the attempt to give it greater
completeness.
While these events took place in Mesopotamia, the Persian arms were also
unsuccessful in the Armenian highlands, whither Kobad had sent a second
army to act offensively against Rome, under the conduct of a certain
Mermeroes. The Roman commanders in this region were Sittas, the former
colleague of Belisarius, and Dorotheas, a general of experience. Their
troops did not amount to more than half the number of the enemy, yet
they contrived to inflict on the Persians two defeats, one in their own
territory, the other in Roman Armenia. The superiority thus exhibited
by the Romans encouraged desertions to their side; and in some instances
the deserters were able to carry over with them to their new friends
small portions of Persian territory.
In the year A.D. 531, after a vain attempt at negotiating terms of
peace with Rome, the Persians made an effort to recover their laurels
by carrying the war into a new quarter and effecting a new combination.
Alamandarus, sheikh of the Saracenic Arabs, had long been a bitter
enemy of the Romans, and from his safe retreat in the desert had been
accustomed for fifty years to ravage, almost at his will, the eastern
provinces of the empire. Two years previously he had carried fire and
sword through the regions of upper Syria, had burned the suburbs of
Chalcis, and threatened the Roman capital of the East, the rich and
luxurious Antioch. He owed, it would seem, some sort of allegiance
to Persia, although practically he was independent, and made his
expeditions when and where he pleased. However, in A.D. 531, he put
himself at the disposal of Persia, proposed a joint expedition, and
suggested a new plan of campaign. “Mesopotamia and Osrhoene,” he said,
“on which the Persians were accustomed to make their attacks, could
better resist them than almost any other part of the Roman territory,
In these provinces were the strongest of the Roman cities, fortified
according to the latest rules of art, and plentifully supplied with
every appliance of defensive warfare. There, too, were the best and
bravest of the Roman troops, and an army more numerous than Rome had
ever employed against Persia before. It would be most perilous to risk
an encounter on this ground. Let Persia, however, invade the country
beyond the Euphrates, and she would find but few obstacles. In that
region there were no strong fortresses, nor was there any army worth
mention. Antioch itself, the richest and most populous city of the Roman
East, was without a garrison, and, if it were suddenly assaulted, could
probably be taken. The incursion might be made, Antioch sacked, and
the booty carried off into Persian territory before the Romans in
Mesopotamia received intelligence of what was happening.” Kobad listened
with approval, and determined to adopt the bold course suggested to him.
He levied a force of 15,000 cavalry, and, placing it under the command
of a general named Azarethes, desired him to take Alamandarus for his
guide and make a joint expedition with him across the Euphrates. It was
understood that the great object of the expedition was the capture of
Antioch.
The allied army crossed the Euphrates below Circesium, and ascended the
right bank of the river till they neared the latitude of Antioch, when
they struck westward and reached Gabbula (the modern Jabul), on the
north shore of the salt lake now known as the Sabakhah. Here they
learned to their surprise that the movement, which they had intended to
be wholly unknown to the Romans, had come to the ears of Belisarius,
who had at once quitted Daras, and proceeded by forced marches to the
defence of Syria, into which he had thrown himself with an army of
20,000 men, Romans, Isaurians, Lycaonians, and Arabs. His troops were
already interposed between the Persians and their longed-for prey,
Belisarius having fixed his headquarters at Chalcis, half a degree
to the west of Gabbula, and twenty-five miles nearer to Antioch. Thus
balked of their purpose, and despairing of any greater success than they
had already achieved, the allies became anxious to return to Persia with
the plunder of the Syrian towns and villages which they had sacked on
their advance. Belisarius was quite content that they should carry off
their spoil, and would have considered it a sufficient victory to have
frustrated the expedition without striking a blow. But his army was
otherwise minded; they were eager for battle, and hoped doubtless to
strip the flying foe of his rich booty. Belisarius was at last forced,
against his better judgment, to indulge their desires and allow an
engagement, which was fought on the banks of the Euphrates, nearly
opposite Callinicus. Here the conduct of the Roman troops in action
corresponded but ill to the anxiety for a conflict. The infantry indeed
stood firm, notwithstanding that they fought fasting; but the Saracenic
Arabs, of whom a portion were on the Roman side, and the Isaurian and
Lycaonian horse, who had been among the most eager for the fray, offered
scarcely any resistance; and, the right wing of the Romans being left
exposed by their flight, Belisarius was compelled to make his troops
turn their faces to the enemy and their backs to the Euphrates, and in
this position, where defeat would have been ruin, to meet and resist
all the assaults of the foe until the shades of evening fell, and he was
able to transport his troops in boats across the river. The honors of
victory rested with the Persians, but they had gained no substantial
advantage; and when Azarethes returned to his master he was not unjustly
reproached with having sacrificed many lives for no appreciable result.
The raid into Syria had failed of its chief object; and Belisarius,
though defeated, had returned, with the main strength of his army
intact, into Mesopotamia. The battle of Callinicus was fought on Easter
Eve, April 19.
Azarethes probably reached Ctesiphon and made his report to Kobad
towards the end of the month. Dissatisfied with what Azarethes had
achieved, and feeling that the season was not too far advanced for
a second campaign, Kobad despatched an army under three chiefs, into
Mesopotamia, where Sittas was now the principal commander on the Roman
side, as Belisarius had been hastily summoned to Byzantium in order to
be employed against the “Vandals” in Africa. This force found no one to
resist in the open field, and was therefore able to invade Sophene and
lay siege to the Roman fortress of Martyropolis. Martyropolis was ill
provisioned, and its walls were out of repair. The Persians must soon
have taken it, had not Sittas contrived to spread reports of a diversion
which the Huns were about to make as Roman allies. Fear of being caught
between two fires paralyzed the Persian commanders; and before events
undeceived them, news arrived in the camp that Kobad was dead, and
that a new prince sat upon the throne. Under these circumstances,
Chanaranges, the chief of the Persian commanders, yielded to
representations made by Sittas, that peace would now probably be made
between the contending powers, and withdrew his army into Persian
territory.
Kobad had, in fact, been seized with paralysis on the 8th of September,
and after an illness which lasted only five days, had expired. Before
dying, he had communicated to his chief minister, Mebodes, his earnest
desire that Chosroes should succeed him upon the throne, and, acting
under the advice of Mebodes, had formally left the crown to him by a
will duly executed. He is said by a contemporary to have been eighty-two
years old at his death, an age very seldom attained by an Oriental
monarch. His long life was more than usually eventful, and he cannot be
denied the praise of activity, perseverance, fertility of resource, and
general military capacity. But he was cruel and fickle; he disgraced his
ministers and his generals on insufficient grounds; he allowed himself,
from considerations of policy, to smother his religious convictions; and
he risked subjecting Persia to the horrors of a civil war, in order to
gratify a favoritism which, however justified by the event, seems to
have rested on no worthy motive. Chosroes was preferred on account
of his beauty, and because he was the son of Kobad’s best-loved wife,
rather than for any good qualities; and inherited the kingdom, not so
much because he had shown any capacity to govern as because he was his
father’s darling.
The coins of Kobad are, as might be expected from the length of his
reign, very numerous. In their general appearance they resemble those of
Zamasp, but do not exhibit quite so many stars and crescents. The legend
on the obverse is either “Kavdt” or “Kavdt” afzui, i.e. “Kobad,” or
“May Kobad be increased.” The reverse shows the regnal year, which
ranges from eleven to forty-three, together with a mint-mark. The
mint-marks, which are nearly forty in number, comprise almost all those
of Perozes, together with about thirteen others. [PLATE XXII. Fig. 2.]