invigorated Confederate administration north of the Red River, the
only part of the country in undisputed occupancy. Close upon the
assumption of his new duties, came a project[897] for sweeping
reforms, involving army reorganization, camps of instruction for the
Indian soldiery, a more general enlistment, virtually conscription, of
Indians--this upon the theory that "Whosoever is not for us is against
us"--the selection of more competent and reliable staff officers, and
the adoption of such a plan of offensive operations as would mean the
retaking of Forts Smith and Gibson.[898] To Maxey, thoroughly familiar
with the geography of the region, the surrender of those two places
appeared as a gross error in military technique; for the Arkansas
River was a natural line of defence, the Red was not. "If the Indian
Territory gives way," argued he, "the granary of the Trans-Mississippi
Department, the breadstuffs, and beef of this and the Arkansas army
are gone, the left flank of Holmes' army is turned, and with it not
only the meat and bread, but the salt and iron of what is left of the
Trans-Mississippi Department."[899]
[Footnote 897: Maxey to Anderson, January 12, 1864, _Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 856-858.]
[Footnote 898: To this list might be added the proper fitting out of
the troops, which was one of the first things that Maxey called to
Smith's attention [Ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 1112-1113].]
[Footnote 899: This idea met with Smith's full approval [Ibid.,
vol. xxxiv, part ii, 918].]
Army reorganization was an immense proposition and was bound to be a
difficult undertaking under the most favorable of auspices, yet it
stood as fundamental to everything else. Upon what lines ought it to
proceed? One possibility was, the formation of the two brigades, with
Stand Watie and Cooper individually in command, which had already been
suggested to General Smith and favored by him; but which had recently
been found incompatible with his latest recommendation that all the
Indian troops should be commanded, _in toto_, by Cooper.[900] One
feature of great importance in its favor it had in that it did not
ostensibly run counter to the Indian understanding of their treaties
that white troops should be always associated with Indian in the
guaranteed protection of the Indian country, which was all very well
but scarcely enough to balance an insuperable objection, which Cooper,
when consulted, pointed out.[901] The Indians had a strong aversion
to any military consolidation that involved the elimination of their
separate tribal characters. They had allied themselves with the
Confederacy as nations and as nations they wished to fight. Moreover,
due regard ought always to be given, argued Cooper, to their tribal
prejudices, their preferences, call them what one will, and to their
historical neighborhood alliances. Choctaws and Chickasaws might well
stay together and Creeks and Seminoles; but woe betide the contrivance
that should attempt the amalgamation of Choctaws and Cherokees.
[Footnote 900: This is given upon the authority of Maxey [_Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 857]. It seems slightly at variance
with Smith's own official statements. Smith would appear to have
entertained a deep distrust of Cooper, whose promotion he did not
regard as either "wise or necessary" [Ibid., vol. xxii, part
ii, 1102].]
[Footnote 901: Cooper to T.M. Scott, January, 1864 [Ibid., vol.
xxxiv, part ii, 859-862].]
[Illustration: FACSIMILE OF MONTHLY INSPECTION REPORT OF THE FIRST
CREEK REGIMENT OF MOUNTED VOLUNTEERS.]
It seems a little strange that the Indians should so emphasize their
national individualism at this particular time, inasmuch as six of
them, the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, Seminole, and Caddo,
professing to be still in strict alliance with the Southern States,
had formed an Indian confederacy, had collectively re-asserted their
allegiance, pledged their continued support, and made reciprocal
demands. All these things they had done in a joint, or general,
council, which had been held at Armstrong Academy the previous
November. Resolutions of the council, embodying the collective pledges
and demands, were even at this very moment under consideration by
President Davis and were having not a little to do with his attitude
toward the whole Maxey programme.
In the matter of army reorganization, Smith was prepared to concede
to Maxey a large discretion.[902] The brigading that would most
comfortably fit in with the nationalistic feelings of the Indians and,
at the same time, accord, in spirit, with treaty obligations and also
make it possible for Cooper to have a supreme command of the Indian
forces in the field was that which Cooper himself advocated, the same
that Boudinot took occasion, at this juncture, to urge upon President
Davis.[903] It was a plan for three distinct Indian brigades, a
Cherokee, a Creek-Seminole, and a Choctaw-Chickasaw. Maxey thought "it
would be a fine recruiting order,"[904] yet, notwithstanding, he gave
his
[Footnote 902: _Official Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 917.]
[Footnote 903: Boudinot to Davis, January 4, 1864 [Ibid., vol.
liii, supplement, 920-921]. Boudinot also suggested other things, some
good, some bad. He suggested, for instance, that Indian Territory be
attached to Missouri and Price put in command. Seddon doubted if Price
would care for the place [Ibid., 921].]
[Footnote 904:--Ibid., vol. xxxiv, part ii, 858.]
preference for the two brigade plan.[905] The promotion of Cooper,
implicit in the three brigade plan, was not at all pleasing to General
Smith; for he thought of it as reflecting upon Steele, whom he loyally
described as having "labored conscientiously and faithfully in
the discharge of his duties."[906] With Steele removed from the
scene[907]--and he was soon removed for he had been retained in the
Indian country only that Maxey might have for a brief season the
benefit of his experience[908]--the case was altered and Boudinot
again pressed his point,[909] obtaining, finally, the assurance of
the War Department that so soon as the number of Indian regiments
justified the organization of three brigades they should be
formed.[910]
The formation of brigades was only one of the Indian demands that had
emanated from the general council. Another was, the establishment of
Indian Territory as a military department, an arrangement altogether
inadvisable and for better reasons than the one reason that Davis
offered when he addressed the united nations through their principal
chiefs on the twenty-second of February.[911] Davis's reason was that
[Footnote 905: Maxey to Smith, January 15, 1864, _Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 875.]
[Footnote 906:--Ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 1101-1102.]
[Footnote 907:--Ibid., vol. xxxiv, part ii, 845, 848.]
[Footnote 908: So Smith explained [Ibid., 845], when Steele
objected to staying in the Indian Territory in a subordinate capacity
[Ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 1108]. Steele was transferred to
the District of Texas [Ibid., vol. xxxiv, part ii, 961]. The
withdrawal of Steele left Cooper the ranking officer and the person on
whom such a command, if created, would fall [Ibid., vol. liii,
supplement, 968-969].]
[Footnote 909: Boudinot to Davis, February 11, 1864, Ibid.,
968.]
[Footnote 910: Seddon to Davis, February 22, 1864, Ibid.,
968-969.]
[Footnote 911: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the
Confederacy_, vol. i, 477-479; _Official Records_, vol. xxxiv,
part iii, 824-825. Davis addressed the chiefs and not the delegation
that had brought the resolutions [Ibid., vol. liii, supplement,
1030-1031]. John Jumper, Seminole principal chief, was a member of the
delegation.]
as a separate department Indian Territory could not count upon the
protection of the forces belonging to the Trans-Mississippi Department
that was assured to her while she remained one of its integral parts.
A distinct military district she should certainly be.
When Davis wrote, the ambition of Cooper had, in a measure, been
satisfied; for he had been put in command of all "the Indian troops in
the Trans-Mississippi Department on the borders of Arkansas."[912] It
was by no means all he wanted or all that he felt himself entitled to
and he soon let it be known that such was the state of affairs. He
tried to presume upon the fact that his commission as superintendent
of Indian affairs had issued from the government, although never
actually delivered to him, and, in virtue of it, he was in military
command.[913] The quietus came from General Smith, who informed Cooper
that his new command and he himself were under Maxey.[914]
It was hoped that prospective Indian brigades would be a powerful
incentive to Indian enlistment and so they proved. Moreover, much
was expected in that direction from the reassembling of the general
council at Armstrong Academy, and much had to be; for the times were
critical. Maxey's position was not likely to be a sinecure. As a
friend wrote him,
Northern Texas and the Indian Department have been neglected
so long that they have become the most difficult and the most
responsible commands in the Trans-Mississippi Department. I
tremble for you. A great name is in store for you or you fall into
the rank of failures; the latter may be your
[Footnote 912: _Official Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 848;
Special Orders of the Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, 1864,
_Confederate Records_, no. 7, p. 15.]
[Footnote 913: Cooper to Davis, February 29, 1864, _Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 1007.]
[Footnote 914:--Ibid., 1008.]
fate, and might be the fate of any man, even after an entire and
perfect devotion of all one's time and talent, for want of
the proper means. In military matters these things are never
considered. Success is the only criterion--a good rule, upon the
whole, though in many instances it works great injustice. Good
and deserving men fall, and accidental heroes rise in the scale,
kicking their less fortunate brothers from the platform.[915]
With a view to strengthening the Indian alliance and accomplishing
all that was necessary to make it effective, Commissioner Scott was
ordered by Seddon to attend the meeting of the general council.[916]
Unfortunately, he did not arrive at Armstrong Academy in time, most
unfortunately, in fact, since he was expected to bring funds with
him and funds were sadly needed. Maxey attended and delivered an
address[917] that rallied the Indians in spite of themselves. In
council meeting they had many things to consider, whether or no they
should insist upon confining their operations henceforth to their own
country. Some were for making a raid into Kansas, some for forming an
alliance with the Indians of the Plains,[918] who, during this year
of 1864, were to prove a veritable thorn in the flesh to Kansas and
Colorado.[919] As regarded some of the work of the general council,
Samuel Garland, the principal chief of the Choctaws, proved a huge
stumbling block,
[Footnote 915: S.A. Roberts to Maxey, February 1, 1864, _Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 936-937.]
[Footnote 916: Seddon to Scott, January 6, 1864, Ibid.,
828-829.]
[Footnote 917: Moty Kanard, late principal chief of the Creek
Nation, spoke of it as a _noble_ address and begged for a copy
[Ibid., 960].]
[Footnote 918: Vore to Maxey, January 29, 1864, Ibid., 928;
Maxey to Anderson, February 9, 1864, Ibid., 958; same to same,
February 7, 1864, Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 963-966.]
[Footnote 919: Inasmuch as the alliance with the Indians of the Plains
was never fully consummated and inasmuch as these Indians harassed and
devastated the frontier states for reasons quite foreign to the causes
of the Civil War, the subject of their depredations and outrages is
not considered as within the scope of the present volume.]
and Cooper was forced, so he said, to "put the members of the grand
council to work on" him.[920] It was Cooper's wish, evidently, that
the council would "insist under the Indian compact that all Choctaw
troops shall be put at once in the field as regular Confederate troops
for the redemption and defense of the whole Indian Territory." The
obstinacy of the Choctaw principal chief had to be overcome in order
"to bring out the Third Choctaw Regiment speedily and on the proper
basis." In general, the council reiterated its recommendations of
November previous and so Boudinot informed President Davis,[921] it
being with him the opportunity he coveted of urging, as already noted,
the promotion of Cooper to a major-generalship.
In January and so anterior to most of the foregoing incidents, the
shaking of the political dice in Washington, D.C., had brought again
into existence the old Department of Kansas, Curtis in command.[922]
Its limits were peculiar for they included Indian Territory[923] and
the military post of Fort Smith as well as Kansas and the territories
of Nebraska and Colorado. The status of Fort Smith was a question for
the future to decide; but, in the meantime, it was to be a bone of
contention between Curtis and his colleague, Frederick Steele, in
command of the sister Department of
[Footnote 920: Cooper to Maxey, February, 1864, _Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 959. The report reached Phillips
that the Choctaws wanted a confederacy quite independent of the
southern [Ibid., part i, 107].]
[Footnote 921: Although Davis's address of February 22 could well,
in point of chronology, have been an answer to the applications and
recommendations of the second session of the general council, it
has been dealt with in connection with those of the first session,
notwithstanding that Boudinot made his appeal less than a fortnight
before Davis wrote. In his address, Davis specifically mentioned the
work of the first session and made no reference whatsoever to that of
the second.]
[Footnote 922: _Official Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 10.]
[Footnote 923: Ewing wanted the command of Indian Territory,
Ibid., 89.]
Arkansas; for Steele had control over all Federal forces within the
political and geographical boundaries of the state that gave the name
to his department except the Fort Smith garrison.[924] The termination
of Schofield's career in Missouri[925] was another result of political
dice-throwing, so also was the call for Blunt to repair to the
national capital for a conference.[926]
But politics had nothing whatever to do with an event more notable
still. With the first of February began one of the most remarkable
expeditions that had yet been undertaken in the Indian country. It
was an expedition conducted by Colonel William A. Phillips and it was
remarkable because, while it professed to have for its object the
cleaning out of Indian Territory,[927] its incidents were as much
diplomatic and pacific as military. Its course was only feebly
obstructed and might have been extended into northern Texas had
Moonlight of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry chosen to coöperate.[928]
As it was, the course was southward almost to Fort Washita.
Phillips carried with him copies of President Lincoln's Amnesty
Proclamation[929] and he distributed them freely. His interpretation
of the proclamation was his own and perhaps not strictly warranted by
the phraseology but justice and generosity debarred his seeing why
magnanimity and forgiveness should not be extended betimes to the poor
deluded red man as much as to the deliberately rebellious white. To
various prominent chiefs
[Footnote 924: _Official Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 167,
187.]
[Footnote 925:--Ibid., 188.]
[Footnote 926: Lane, Wilder, and Dole, requested that Blunt be
summoned to Washington [Ibid., 52].]
[Footnote 927: See Phillips's address to his soldiers, January 30,
1864, Ibid., 190.]
[Footnote 928: Phillips to Curtis, February 16, 1864, Ibid.,
part i, 106-108.]
[Footnote 929: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the
Presidents_, vol. vi, 213-215.]
of secessionist persuasion he sent messages of encouragement and
good-will.[930] More sanguine than circumstances really justified, he
returned to report that, for some of the tribes at least, the war was
virtually over.[931] What his peace mission may have accomplished, the
future would reveal; but there was no doubting what his raid had done.
It had produced consternation among the weaker elements. The Creeks,
the Seminoles, and the Chickasaws had widely dispersed, some into the
fastnesses of the mountains. Only the Choctaws continued obdurate
and defiant. It was strange that Phillips should have arrived at
conclusions so sweeping; for his course[932] had led him within
hearing range of the general council in session at Armstrong Academy
and there the division of sentiment was not so much along tribal lines
as along individual. Strong personalities triumphed; for, as Maxey so
truly divined, the Indian nations were after all aristocracies. The
minority really ruled. At Armstrong Academy, in spite of tendencies
toward an isolation that, in effect, would have been neutrality and,
on the part of a few, toward a definite retracing of steps, the
southern Indians renewed their pledges of loyalty to the Confederacy.
Phillips's olive branch was in their hands and they threw it aside.
Months before they might have been secured for the North but not now.
For them the hour of wavering was past. Maxey's vigor was stimulating.
[Footnote 930: To Governor Colbert of the Chickasaw Nation
[_Official Records_, vol. xxxiv, part i, 109-110], to the Council
of the Choctaw Nation [Ibid., 110], to John Jumper of the
Seminole Nation [Ibid., 111], to McIntosh, possibly D.N.
[Ibid., part ii, 997]. For Maxey's comments upon Phillips and
his letters, see Maxey to Smith, February 26, 1864, Ibid.,
994-997.]
[Footnote 931: Phillips to Curtis, February 24, 1864, Ibid.,
part i, 108-109.]
[Footnote 932: For the itinerary of the course, see Ibid.,
111-112.]
The explanation of Phillips's whole proceeding during the month of
February is to be found in his genuine friendship for the Indian,
which eventually profited him much, it is true, but, from this time
henceforth, was lifelong. He stood in somewhat of a contrast to Blunt,
whom General Steele thought unprincipled[933] and who in Southern
parlance was "an old land speculator,"[934] and to Curtis, who was
soon to show himself, as far as the Indians were concerned, in his
true colors. While Phillips was absent from Fort Gibson, Curtis
arrived there. He was making a reconnoissance of his command and, as
he passed over one reservation after another, he doubtless coveted the
Indian land for white settlement and justified to himself a scheme
of forfeiture as a way of penalizing the red men for their
defection.[935] Phillips was not encouraged to repeat his peace
mission.
Blunt's journey to Washington had results, complimentary and
gratifying to his vanity because publicly vindicatory. On the
twenty-seventh of February he was restored to his old command or, to
be exact, ordered "to resume command of so much of the District of the
Frontier as is included within the boundaries of the Department of
Kansas."[936] His headquarters were at Fort Smith and immediately
began the controversy between him and Thayer, although scornfully
unacknowledged by Thayer, as to the status of Fort Smith. Thayer
refused to admit that there could be any issue[937] between them for
the law in the case was clear. What Blunt and Curtis really wanted was
to get hold of the
[Footnote 933: F. Steele to S. Breck, March 27, 1864, _Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 751.]
[Footnote 934: T.M. Scott to Maxey, April 12, 1864, Ibid., part
iii, 762.]
[Footnote 935: This matter is very much generalized here for the
reason that it properly belongs in the volume on reconstruction that
is yet to come.]
[Footnote 936: February 23, 1864, _Official Records_, vol. xxxiv,
part ii, 408.]
[Footnote 937: John M. Thayer to Charles A. Dana, March 15, 1864,
Ibid., 617.]
western counties of Arkansas[938] so as to round out the Department of
Kansas. To them it was absurd that Fort Smith should be within their
jurisdiction and its environs within Steele and Thayer's. The upshot
of the quarrel was, the reorganization of the frontier departments on
the seventeenth of April which gave Fort Smith and Indian Territory to
the Department of Arkansas[939] and sent Blunt back to Leavenworth.
His removal from Fort Smith, especially as Curtis had intended, had
no change in department limits been made, to transfer Blunt's
headquarters to Fort Gibson,[940] was an immense relief to Phillips.
Blunt and Phillips had long since ceased to have harmonious views with
respect to Indian Territory. During his short term of power, Blunt had
managed so to deplete Phillips's forces that two of the three Indian
regiments were practically all that now remained to him since one, the
Second Indian Home Guards, had been permanently stationed at Mackey's
Salt Works on the plea that its colonel, John Ritchie, was Phillips's
ranking officer and it was not expedient that he and Phillips "should
operate together."[941] Blunt had detached also a part of the Third
Indian and had placed it at Scullyville as an outpost to Fort Smith.
There were to be no more advances southward for Phillips.[942] Instead
of making them he was to occupy himself with the completion of the
fortifications at Fort Gibson.[943]
[Footnote 938: Thayer to Grant, March 11, 1864, _Official
Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 566.]
[Footnote 939:--Ibid., part iii, 192, 196.]
[Footnote 940:--Ibid., part ii, 651. Blunt would have preferred
Scullyville [Ibid., part iii, 13].]
[Footnote 941: Blunt to Curtis, March 30, 1864, Ibid., part ii,
791.]
[Footnote 942: Blunt to Phillips, April 3, 1864, Ibid., part
iii, 32; Phillips to Curtis, April 5, 1864, Ibid., 52-53.]
[Footnote 943: Curtis had ordered the completion of the fortifications
which might be taken to imply that he too was not favoring a forward
policy.]
Among the southern Indians, Maxey's reconstruction policy was all this
time having its effect. It was revitalizing the Indian alliance with
the Confederacy, but army conditions were yet a long way from being
satisfactory. In March Price relieved Holmes in command of the
District of Arkansas.[944] A vigorous campaign was in prospect and
Price asked for all the help the department commander could afford
him. The District of Indian Territory had forces and of all the
disposable Price asked the loan. Maxey, unlike his predecessors, was
more than willing to coöperate but one difficulty, which he would fain
have ignored himself--for he was not an Albert Pike--he was compelled
to report. The Indians had to be free, absolutely free, to go or to
stay.[945] The choice of coöperating was theirs but theirs also the
power to refuse to coöperate, if they so desired, and no questions
asked. The day had passed when Arkansans or Texans could decide the
matter arbitrarily. Watie was expected to prefer to continue the
irregular warfare that he and Adair, his colonel of scouts, had so
successfully been waging for a goodly time now. Formerly, they
had waged it to Steele's great annoyance;[946] but Maxey felt no
repugnance to the services of Quantrill, so, of course, had nothing to
say in disparagement of the work of Watie. It was the kind of work, he
frankly admitted he thought the Indians best adapted to. The Choctaws
under Tandy Walker were found quite willing to cross the line and
they did excellent service in the Camden campaign, which, both in the
cannonade near Prairie d'Ane on the thirteenth of April and in the
Battle of Poison Spring on the
[Footnote 944: _Official Records_, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 1034,
1036.]
[Footnote 945: Maxey to Smith, April 3, 1864, Ibid., part iii,
728-729.]
[Footnote 946: For Steele's opposition to Adair's predatory movements,
see _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, nos. 267, 268.]
eighteenth of April, offered a thorough test of what Indians could do
when well disciplined, well officered, and well considered. The Indian
reinforcement of Marmaduke was ungrudgingly given and ungrudgingly
commended.[947] The Camden campaign was short and, when about over,
Maxey was released from duty with Price's army. His own district
demanded attention[948] and the Indians recrossed the line.