contemplated bad faith on the part of the Confederate government. E.C.
Boudinot, the Cherokee delegate in the Southern Congress, had recently
returned from Richmond, empowered to submit a certain proposal to his
constituents. The text of the proposal does not appear in the records
but its nature,[795] after account be taken of some exaggeration
attributable to the extreme of indignation, can be inferred from the
formal protest[796] against it, which was drawn up at Prairie Springs
in the Cherokee Nation about fifteen miles from Fort Gibson on the
twenty-first of June and signed by Samuel M. Taylor, acting assistant
chief, John Spears of the Executive Council, and Alexander Foreman,
president of the convention. To all intents and purposes the Cherokees
were asked, in return for some paltry offices chiefly military, to
institute a sort of system of military land grants. White people were
to be induced to enlist in their behalf and were then to
[Footnote 793: June 6, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part
ii, 1120.]
[Footnote 794: June 24, 1863, Ibid., 1122-1123.]
[Footnote 795: Steele's letter to Kirby Smith, June 24, 1863
[Ibid., 883-884], gives some hint of its nature also.]
[Footnote 796:--Ibid., 1120-1122.]
be allowed to settle, on equal terms with the Cherokees, within the
Cherokee country. The proposal, as construed by Taylor and his
party, was nothing more or less than a suggestion that the Cherokees
surrender their nationality, their political integrity, the one thing
above everything else that they had sought to preserve when they
entered into an active alliance with the Confederate States. So sordid
was the bargain proposed, so unequal, that the thought obtrudes
itself that a base advantage was about to be taken of the Cherokee
necessities and that the objectors were justified in insinuating that
Boudinot and his political friends were to be the chief beneficiaries.
The Cherokee country was already practically lost to the Confederacy.
Might it not be advisable to distribute the tribal lands, secure
individual holdings, while vested rights might still accrue; for,
should bad come to worse, private parties could with more chance
of success prosecute a claim than could a commonalty, which in its
national or corporate capacity had committed treason and thereby
forfeited its rights. One part of the Cherokee protest merits
quotation here. Its noble indignation ought to have been proof enough
for anybody.
... We were present when the treaty was made, were a party to it,
and rejoiced when it was done. In that treaty our rights to
our country as a Nation were guaranteed to us forever, and the
Confederate States promised to protect us in them. We enlisted
under the banner of those States, and have fought in defense of
our country under that treaty and for the rights of the South for
nearly two years. We have been driven from our homes, and suffered
severe hardships, privations, and losses, and now we are informed,
when brighter prospects are before us, that you think it best for
us to give part of our lands to our white friends; that, to defend
our country and keep troops for our protection, we must raise and
enlist them from
our own territory, and that it is actually necessary that they are
citizens of our country to enable us to keep them with us. To do
this would be the end of our national existence and the ruin of
our people. Two things above all others we hold most dear, our
nationality and the welfare of our people. Had the war been our
own, there would have been justice in the proposition, but it is
that of another nation. We are allies, assisting in establishing
the rights and independence of another nation. We, therefore, in
justice to ourselves and our people, cannot agree to give a part
of our domain as an inducement to citizens of another Government
to fight their own battles and for their own country; besides, it
would open a door to admit as citizens of our Nation the worst
class of citizens of the Confederate States ...
XII. INDIAN TERRITORY IN 1863, JULY TO DECEMBER INCLUSIVE
Independence Day, 1863, witnessed climacteric scenes in the war
dramas, east and west. The Federal victories of Gettysburg and
Vicksburg, all-decisive in the history of the great American conflict,
when considered in its entirety, had each its measure of immediate
and local importance. The loss of all control of the Mississippi
navigation meant for the Confederacy its practical splitting in twain
and the isolation of its western part. For the Arkansas frontier and
for the Missouri border generally, it promised, since western commands
would now recover their men and resume their normal size, increased
Federal aggressiveness or the end of suspended. Initial preparation
for such renewed aggressiveness was contemporary with the fall of
Vicksburg and lay in the failure of the Confederate attack upon
Helena, an attack that had been projected for the making of a
diversion only. The failure compelled Holmes to draw his forces back
to Little Rock.
Confederate operations in Indian Territory through May and June had
been, as already described, confined to sporadic demonstrations
against Federal herds and Federal supply trains, all having for their
main object the dislodgment of Phillips from Fort Gibson. What proved
to be their culmination and the demonstration most energetically
conducted occurred at Cabin Creek,[797] while far away Vicksburg was
falling and
[Footnote 797: For an official report of the action at Cabin Creek,
see _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 378-382. While, as
things eventuated, it was an endeavor (cont.)]
Gettysburg was being fought. A commissary train from Fort Scott was
expected. It was to come down, escorted by Colonel Williams who was
in command of the negro troops that Blunt had stationed at Baxter
Springs. To meet the train and to reinforce Williams, Phillips
despatched Major Foreman from Fort Gibson. Cooper had learned of the
coming of the train and had made his plans to seize it in a fashion
now customary.[798] The plans were quite elaborate and involved the
coöperation[799] of Cabell's Arkansas brigade,[800] which was to come
from across the line and proceed down the east side of the Grand
River. Thither also, Cooper sent a
[Footnote 797: (cont.) to cut off the supply train, there was
throughout the possibility that it might also result in heading off
Blunt, who was known to be on his way to Fort Gibson [Steele to
Cooper, June 29, 1863; Duval to Cooper, June 29, 1863; Duval to
Cabell, June 29, 1863].]
[Footnote 798: Steele to Cabell, June 25, 1863 [_Confederate
Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, p. 97; _Official Records_, vol.
xxii, part ii, 885].]
[Footnote 799: Steele to Cabell, June 29, 1863 [_Confederate
Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, p. 105; _Official Records_, vol.
xxii, part ii, 893-894].]
[Footnote 800: Of W.L. Cabell, the _Confederate Military
History_, vol. x, has this to say: "Maj. W.L. Cabell, who had been
sent to inspect the accounts of quartermasters in the department,
having well acquitted himself of this duty, was, in March 1863,
commissioned brigadier-general and requested to collect absentees from
the service in northwestern Arkansas. Given Carroll's and Monroe's
regiments, he was directed to perfect such organizations as he could
..." He collected his brigade with great rapidity and it soon numbered
about four thousand men. Even, in April, Steele was placing much
reliance upon it, although he wished to keep its relation to him a
secret. He wrote to Cooper to that effect.
"Who will be in command of the Choctaws when you leave? Will they be
sufficient to picket and scout on the other side of the river far
enough to give notice of any advance of the enemy down the river? I do
not wish it to be generally known that Cabell's forces are under my
command, but prefer the enemy should think them a separate command;
for this reason I do not send these troops west until there is a
necessity for it; in the meantime the other troops can be brought
into position, where if we can get sufficient ammunition all can be
concentrated. I cannot direct positively, not having the intimate
knowledge of the country, but you should be in a position which would
enable you to move either down the Ark. River or on to the road
leading from Boggy Depot to Gibson as circumstances may indicate.
Let me hear from you frequently."--STEELE to Cooper, April 28, 1863,
_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 217-218.]
part of his own brigade and at the same time ordered another part
under Stand Watie to go to Cabin Creek and to take such position on
its south bank as to command the crossing. It was a time when the
rivers were all in flood, a circumstance that greatly affected the
outcome since it prevented the forces on the east side of the Grand
from coming to Stand Watie's support. As Foreman proceeded northward
to effect a junction with Williams, he detached some Cherokees from
the Third Indian, under Lieutenant Luke F. Parsons, to reconnoitre. In
that way he became apprised of Watie's whereabouts and enabled to put
himself on his guard. The commissary train, in due time, reached
Cabin Creek and, after some slight delay caused, not by Stand
Watie's interposition, but by the high waters, crossed. Federals
and Confederates then collided in a somewhat disjointed but lengthy
engagement with the result that Stand Watie retired and the train,
nothing the worse for the hold-up, moved on without further
molestation to Fort Gibson.[801]
The action at Cabin Creek, July 1 to 3, was the last attempt of any
size for the time being to capture Federal supplies en route. The
tables were thenceforth turned and the Confederates compelled to keep
a close
[Footnote 801: In describing what appears to be the action at Cabin
Creek, Steele refers to "bad conduct of the Creeks," and holds it
partly responsible for the failure [_Official Records_, vol.
xxii, part ii, 910]. It is possible that he had in mind, however, a
slightly earlier encounter, the same that he described, adversely
to D.N. McIntosh's abilities as a commander, in his general report
[Ibid., part i, 32]. Steele had little faith in the Indian
brigade and frankly admitted that he expected it in large measure,
to "dissolve," if the Confederates were to be forced to fall back at
Cabin Creek [Steele to Blair, July 1, 1863, _Official Records_,
vol. xxii, part ii, 902]. Nevertheless, he anticipated a victory for
his arms there [Steele to Blair, July 3, 1863, Ibid., 903].
From his general report, it might be thought that Stand Watie
disappointed him at this time, as later; but the Confederate failure
was most certainly mainly attributable to the high waters, which
prevented the union of their expeditionary forces [Steele to Blair,
July 5, 1863, Ibid., 905].]
watch on their own depots and trains. Up to date, since his first
arrival at Fort Gibson, Colonel Phillips had been necessarily on the
defensive because of the fewness of his men. Subsequent to the Cabin
Creek affair came a change, incident to events and conditions farther
east. The eleventh of July brought General Blunt, commander of the
District of the Frontier, to Fort Gibson. His coming was a surprise,
as has already been casually remarked, but it was most timely. There
was no longer any reason whatsoever why offensive action should not
be the main thing on the Federal docket in Indian Territory, as
elsewhere.
To protect its own supplies and to recuperate, the strength of
the Confederate Indian brigade was directed toward Red River,
notwithstanding that Steele had still the hope of dislodging the
Federals north of the Arkansas.[802] His difficulties[803] were no
less legion than before, but he thought it might be possible to
accomplish the end desired by invading Kansas,[804] a plan that seemed
very feasible after S.P. Bankhead assumed command of the Northern
Sub-District of Texas.[805] Steele himself had "neither the artillery
nor the kind of force necessary to take a place" fortified as was
Gibson; but to the westward of the Federal stronghold Bankhead might
move. He might attack Fort Scott, Blunt's headquarters but greatly
weakened now, and possibly also some small posts in southwest
Missouri, replenishing his resources from time to time in the fertile
and well settled Neosho River Valley. Again
[Footnote 802: Steele took umbrage at a published statement of Pike
that seemed to doubt this and to intimate that the line of the
Arkansas had been definitely abandoned [Steele to Pike, July 13, 1863,
_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 925].]
[Footnote 803: For new aspects of his difficulties, see Steele to
Boggs, chief of staff, July 7, 1863, Ibid., 909-911.]
[Footnote 804:--Ibid., p. 910.]
[Footnote 805: Steele to Bankhead, July 11, 1863, Ibid.,
921-922.]
local selfishness rose to the surface[806] and Bankhead, surmising
Steele's weakness and that he would almost inevitably have to fall
back, perhaps vacating Indian Territory altogether, became alarmed for
the safety of Texas.[807]
Steele's recognition and admission of material incapacity for taking
Fort Gibson in no wise deterred him from attempting it. The idea was,
that Cooper should encamp at a point within the Creek Nation, fronting
Fort Gibson, and that Cabell should join him there with a view
to their making a combined attack.[808] As entertained, the idea
neglected to give due weight to the fact that Cabell's men were in no
trim for immediate action,[809] notwithstanding that concerted action
was the only thing likely to induce success. Blunt, with
[Footnote 806: Arkansas betrayed similar selfishness. President
Davis's rejoinder to a protest from Flanagin against a tendency to
ignore the claims of the West struck a singularly high note. Admitting
certain errors of the past, he prayed for the generous coöperation of
the future; for "it is to the future, not to the past, that we must
address ourselves, and I wish to assure you, though I hope it is
unnecessary, that no effort shall be spared to promote the defense of
the Trans-Mississippi Department, and to develop its resources so
as to meet the exigencies of the present struggle" [_Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 932]. Five days afterwards, Governor
Reynolds, in commending Secretary Seddon for a very able ministry,
expressed confidence that his gubernatorial colleagues in Arkansas,
Texas, and Louisiana would, with himself, "act in no sectional or
separatist spirit." It was saying a good deal, considering how strong
the drift of popular opinion had been and was to be in the contrary
direction. However, in August, the four governors appealed
collectively to their constituents and to "the Allied Indian Nations,"
proving, if proof were needed, that they personally were sincere
[Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 892-894; Moore's _Rebellion
Record_, vol. vii, 406-407].]
[Footnote 807: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 922.]
[Footnote 808: The plans for such concerted action were made as early
as July 8 [Steele to Cooper, July 8, 1863, _Official Records_,
vol. xxii, part ii, 911-912]. Cabell was instructed to take position
between Webber's Falls and Fort Gibson [Duval to Cabell, July 10,
1863, Ibid., 916-917] and more specifically, two days before
the battle, "within 15 or 20 miles of Gibson and this side of where
Gen. Cooper is now encamped on Elk Creek" [Steele to Cabell, July 15,
1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, p. 145].]
[Footnote 809: Steele knew of the deficiencies in their equipment,
however, and of their exhausted state (cont.)]
scouts out in all directions and with spies in the very camps of his
foes, soon obtained an inkling of the Confederate plan and resolved
to dispose of Cooper before Cabell could arrive from Arkansas.[810]
Cooper's position was on Elk Creek, not far from present
Muskogee,[811] and near Honey Springs on the seventeenth of July the
two armies met, Blunt forcing the engagement, having made a night
march in order to do it. The Indians of both sides[812] were on hand,
in force, the First and Second Home Guards, being dismounted as
infantry and thus fighting for once as they had been mustered in. Of
the Confederate, or Cooper, brigade Stand Watie, the ever reliable,
commanded the First and Second Cherokee, D.N. McIntosh, the First
and Second Creek, and Tandy Walker, the regiment of Choctaws and
Chickasaws. The odds were all against Cooper from the start and, in
ways that Steele had not specified, the material equipment proved
itself inadequate indeed. Much of the ammunition was worthless.[813]
Nevertheless, Cooper stubbornly contested every inch of the ground and
finally gave way only when large numbers of his Indians, knowing their
guns to be absolutely useless to them, became disheartened and then
demoralized. In confusion, they led the van in
[Footnote 809: (cont.) [Duval to W.H. Scott, Commanding Post at
Clarksville, Ark., July 8, 1863, _Confederate Records_, p. 133;
Steele to Blair, July 10, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii,
part ii, 917; same to same, July 13, 1863, Ibid., 925].]
[Footnote 810: See Blunt's official report, dated July 26, 1863
[Ibid., part i, 447-448].]
[Footnote 811: Anderson, _Life of General Stand Watie_, 21.]
[Footnote 812: With respect to the number of white troops engaged on
the Federal side there seems some discrepancy between Blunt's report
[_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 448] and Phisterer's
statistics [_Statistical Record_, 145].]
[Footnote 813: See Cooper's report, dated August 12, 1863 [_Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 457-461]. The following references are
to letters that substantiate, in whole or in part, what Cooper said in
condemnation of the ammunition: Duval to Du Bose, dated Camp Prairie
Springs, C.N., July 27, 1863 [_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no.
268, p. 159]; Steele to Blair, dated Camp Imochiah, August 9, 1863
[Ibid., 185-187; _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii,
961].]
flight across the Canadian; but enough of those more self-contained
went thither in an easterly or southeasterly direction so as to create
the impression among their enemies that they were retiring to meet the
expected reinforcements from Fort Smith.[814]
But the reinforcements were yet far away. Indeed, it was not until
all was over and a day too late that Cabell came up. A tragic sight
confronted him; but his own march had been so dismal, so inauspicious
that everything unfortunate that had happened seemed but a part of
one huge catastrophe. He had come by the "old Pacific mail route,
the bridges of which, in some places, were still standing in the
uninhabited prairies."[815] The forsaken land broke the morale of his
men--they had never been enthusiastic in the cause, some of them were
conscripted unionists, forsooth, and they deserted his ranks by the
score, by whole companies. The remnant pushed on and, in the far
distance, heard the roaring of the cannon. Then, coming nearer, they
caught a first glimpse of Blunt's victorious columns; but those
columns were already retiring, it being their intention to recross to
the Fort Gibson side of the Arkansas. "Moving over the open, rolling
prairies,"[816] Nature's vast meadows, their numbers seemed great
indeed and Cabell made no attempt to pursue or to court further
conflict. The near view of the battle-field dismayed[817] him; for
its gruesome records all too surely told him of another Confederate
defeat.
[Footnote 814: Cooper intended to create such an impression
[_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 460] and he did
[Schofield to McNeil, July 26, 1863, Ibid., part ii, 399-400].]
[Footnote 815: _Confederate Military History_, vol. x, 199.]
[Footnote 816: Ibid., 200.]
[Footnote 817: Cabell might well be dismayed. Steele had done his
best to hurry him up. A letter of July 15 was particularly urgent
[_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 933].]
In the fortunes of the Southern Indians, the Battle of Honey Springs
was a decisive event. Fought and lost in the country of the Creeks, it
was bound to have upon them a psychological effect disastrous to the
steady maintenance of their alliance with the Confederacy, so also
with the other great tribes; but more of that anon. In a military
way, it was no less significant than in a political; for it was the
beginning of a vigorously offensive campaign, conducted by General
Blunt, that never ended until the Federals were in occupation of Fort
Smith and Fort Smith was at the very door of the Choctaw country. No
Indian tribe, at the outset of the war, had more completely gone over
to the South than had the Choctaw. It had influenced the others but
had already come to rue the day that had seen its own first defection.
Furthermore, the date of the Confederate rout at Honey Springs marked
the beginning of a period during which dissatisfaction with General
Steele steadily crystallized.
Within six weeks after the Battle of Honey Springs, the Federals were
in possession of Fort Smith, which was not surprising considering
the happenings of the intervening days. The miscalculations that had
eventuated in the routing of Cooper had brought Steele to the decision
of taking the field in person; for there was just a chance that he
might succeed where his subordinates, with less at stake than he, had
failed. Especially might he take his chances on winning if he could
count upon help from Bankhead to whom he had again made application,
nothing deterred by his previous ill-fortune.
It was not, by any means, Steele's intention to attempt the reduction
of Fort Gibson;[818] for, with such artillery
[Footnote 818: Steele to Blair, July 22, 1863 [_Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 940-941].]
as he had, the mere idea of such an undertaking would be preposterous.
The defensive would have to be, for some time to come, his leading
role; but he did hope to be able to harry his enemy, somewhat,
to entice him away from his fortifications and to make those
fortifications of little worth by cutting off his supplies. Another
commissary train would be coming down from Fort Scott via Baxter
Springs about the first of August.[819] For it, then, Steele would lie
in wait.
When all was in readiness, Fort Smith was vacated, not abandoned;
inasmuch as a regiment under Morgan of Cabell's brigade was left in
charge, but it was relinquished as department headquarters. Steele
then took up his march for Cooper's old battle-ground on Elk Creek.
There he planned to mass his forces and to challenge an attack. He
went by way of Prairie Springs[820] and lingered there a little while,
then moved on to Honey Springs, where was better grazing.[821] He felt
obliged thus to make his stand in the Creek country; for the Creeks
were getting fractious and it was essential for his purposes that they
be mollified and held in check. Furthermore, it was incumbent upon him
not to expose his "depots in the direction of Texas."[822]
As the summer days passed, Cabell and Cooper drew into his vicinity
but no Bankhead, notwithstanding that Magruder had ordered him to
hurry to Steele's
[Footnote 819: Steele to Bankhead, July 22, 1863 [_Official
Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 940]]
[Footnote 820: Duval to A.S. Morgan, July 18, 1863 [Ibid.,
933]; Steele to Blair, July 22, 1863 [Ibid., 940-941].]
[Footnote 821: Steele arrived at Prairie Springs on the twenty-fourth
[Steele to Blair, July 26, 1863, Ibid., 948] and moved to Honey
Springs two days later [same to same, July 29, 1863, Ibid.,
950-951]. On August 7, his camp was at Soda Springs, whither he had
gone "for convenience of water and grass" [same to same, August 7,
1863, Ibid., 956].]
[Footnote 822:--Ibid., 951.]
support.[823] Bankhead had not the slightest idea of doing anything
that would put Texas in jeopardy. In northern Texas sympathy for the
Federal cause, or "rottenness" as the Confederates described it, was
rife.[824] It would be suicidal to take the home force too far away.
Moreover, it was Bankhead's firm conviction that Steele would never be
able to maintain himself so near to Fort Gibson, so he would continue
where he was and decide what to do when time for real action
came.[825] It would be hazarding a good deal to amalgamate his
command,[826] half of which would soon be well disciplined, with
Steele's, which, in some of its parts, was known not to be.