THE BATTLE OF OMDURMAN.
The force under the Sirdar's command on the 2nd September, was thus
composed:--
_British Troops_: 21st Lancers; 32nd Field Battery Royal Artillery; 37th
Howitzer Battery Royal Artillery; two forty-pounders Royal Artillery.
_Infantry Division, 1st Brigade_ (_Wauchope's_): 1st Battalion
Warwickshire Regiment; 1st Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment; 1st
Battalion Seaforth Highlanders; 1st Battalion Cameron Highlanders; six
Maxims; detachment Royal Engineers.
_2nd Brigade_ (_Lyttelton's_): 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards; 1st
Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers; 2nd Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers;
2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade; four Maxims; detachment Royal Engineers.
_Egyptian Troops_: Nine squadrons cavalry; one battery Horse Artillery;
four field batteries; ten Maxims; eight companies Camel Corps.
_1st Brigade_ (_Macdonald's_): 2nd Egyptian Battalion; 9th, 10th, and
11th Soudanese Battalions.
_2nd Brigade_ (_Maxwell's_): 8th Egyptian Battalion; 12th, 13th, and
14th Soudanese Battalions.
_3rd Brigade_ (_Lewis's_): 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 15th Egyptian Battalions.
_4th Brigade_ (_Collinson's_): 1st, 5th, 17th, and 18th Egyptian
Battalions.
The gunboat flotilla, under Commander Keppel, consisted of the twin
screw steamers _Sultan_, _Sheikh_, and _Melik_, each carrying two
twelve-pounder quick-firing guns, one four-inch howitzer, and four
Maxims; the large stern-wheelers _Fatteh_ and _Nazir_, each armed with
one twelve-pounder quick-firer, two six-pounder quick-firers, and three
Maxims; and the small stern-wheelers _Tamaai_, _Hafir_ (formerly _El
Teb_), _Abu Klea_, and _Metammeh_, armed with one nine-centimetre Krupp
and two Maxims.
Each vessel was commanded by a British officer, with a non-commissioned
officer of the Royal Marine Artillery as gunnery instructor.
The total force, naval and military, may be put down as a little over
22,000 men.[170]
The position occupied by the Sirdar's force was a favourable one for
defensive purposes. It stood on slightly elevated ground with a clear
open space of desert dotted with scrub directly in front, and extending
for five miles to the base of a group of hills to the westward. In a
northerly and southerly direction was a series of hills of moderate
elevation, culminating on the north at a distance of about two miles in
the Kerreri Hill, and on the south at a distance of 1,200 yards in that
of Jebel Surgham. Behind the position was the broad expanse of the Nile.
The camp formed a sort of angular crescent or horse-shoe, with the ends,
practically the flanks of the position, resting on the river, and
protected by the gunboats. In the centre were a few mud huts, and within
the position, but a little to the north, stood the small village of
Egeiga.
The troops were disposed as follows:--On the left was the 2nd British
Brigade, composed of the Rifles, the Lancashires, the Northumberlands,
and the Guards, with the Maxim battery worked by the Irish Fusiliers.
Then came the 1st British Brigade, consisting of the Warwicks, the
Camerons, Seaforths, and Lincolns, with a battery of Maxims manned by a
detachment of the Royal Artillery. The Soudanese and Egyptian Brigades,
under Maxwell, Macdonald, and Lewis, continued the fighting line round
to the right, Collinson's Egyptian brigade being kept in reserve in the
rear of Lewis's and Macdonald's. Maxims were placed between Lewis's and
Macdonald's brigades. The 37th Howitzer Battery of the Royal Artillery
had been detached and placed on the opposite bank of the Nile, as stated
in the last chapter. The 32nd Field Battery of the Royal Artillery,
under Major Williams, was posted, with two Egyptian batteries and
Maxims, on the extreme left of the position close to the river. The two
remaining Egyptian batteries were put on the north or right side of the
position. The 21st Lancers were picketed at the south end of the camp,
and the Egyptian cavalry and Camel Corps occupied a position away to the
north in the direction of the Kerreri Hill. Along the front of the
British line a breastwork of bushes was placed, whilst the Egyptian line
was defended by a shallow trench.[171]
Of the gunboats, two remained to support the howitzer battery opposite
Omdurman, three others guarded the camp, and the rest were stationed at
various points between Egeiga and Omdurman.
At 3.30 a.m. on the 2nd September the bugles sounded the reveille, and
the troops all stood to their arms, the hour before dawn being the most
usual for a night attack. After waiting an hour, there being no signs of
the expected assault, the Sirdar resolved to take the initiative and
march out against the Dervish forces. At 5.30 the booming of the guns of
the howitzer battery on the east bank and of the gunboats in front
announced that the bombardment of Omdurman, which had begun the previous
day, had recommenced. Before the cannonade had lasted many minutes the
patrols reported the enemy to be advancing to attack. At 6.30 the
Egyptian cavalry on the right were driven in and posted themselves with
the Horse Artillery, Camel Corps, and four Maxims on the Kerreri ridge,
on the right flank of the position. The British infantry were led
forward a few paces, and formed up in double rank in the rear of their
zeriba defences, the Egyptian battalions doing the same behind their
trenches.
At 6.40 the shouts of the advancing Dervishes became audible, and a few
minutes later their flags appeared over the rising ground, which formed
a semicircle round the front and left faces of the position. They came
on in an immense mass, composed apparently of five divisions, with ranks
well kept, and marching with military regularity. As they advanced they
chanted, "La Ilah illa' llah wa Mohammed rasool Allah" ("There is but
one God, and Mohammed is His prophet"). Emirs and sheikhs led the way,
and Baggara horsemen trotted abreast of the men on foot.
[Illustration]
At 6.45 Major Williams's battery of Royal Artillery, on the left of the
position, opened fire at a range of 2,800 yards. The guns made good
practice, the shells bursting in the midst of the Dervish ranks. The
enemy replied with a few rounds from some guns on the Khalifa's left,
but their shells all fell short. The intention appeared to be to cross
the Sirdar's front, but, suddenly swerving to their right, the main body
of the Dervish forces bore down towards the southern face, where the
British division was posted. Simultaneously with this movement another
mass of Dervishes swarmed out from behind Jebel Surgham, to assail the
left flank of the position. Though their riflemen, mounting the hill,
opened a long range fire on the zeriba, this attack, being checked by
the fire of the gunboats, was not pressed home.
Thus far the fire of the artillery, which had been supplemented by that
from the Maxim-Nordenfeldts, though it thinned the enemy's ranks, failed
to stop their advance, and in a short time the troops on the left and
front were hotly engaged.
The Guards, who were the first of the British infantry to engage, opened
with section volleys from their Lee-Metfords at a range of 2,000 yards.
Then, as the range diminished, the fire ran along to the Warwicks, the
Highlanders, the Lincolns, and later on to Maxwell's brigade. From one
end to the other there was a continuous blaze of flame, the men firing
both in volleys and independently. The Lee-Metfords grew so hot that the
men in the firing line had to change them for others held by their
comrades in the rear. The weapons gave out no smoke, so the view was
uninterrupted. The Dervishes were seen falling in heaps, whilst the
ground in front was white with dead men's clothing. Constantly
reinforced from the rear, the assailants made repeated efforts to reach
the lines of infantry, and as whole ranks went down others rushed in to
fill their places. When the front rank got within 800 yards of the
British force, the fire became even more deadly, and the further advance
was practically arrested. Even at this range, here and there, small
bodies of Dervishes continued to make isolated attempts to reach the
lines, but only to perish in the effort. What took place became less a
fight than an execution. One old sheikh, bearing a banner, headed one of
the rushes. In a few seconds he was left with but five comrades, who in
their turn all dropped, and he alone charged to within 200 yards, at
which point he folded his arms across his face and fell dead.
Up to this period there had been but few casualties, and the fight had
been for the Sirdar's force about the least dangerous that a soldier
ever took part in. While the original advance was being made, a few only
of the Dervish riflemen paused to fire, and, more for the purpose of
working up their martial ardour than anything else, discharged their
weapons in the air. Even when they took the trouble to aim, the bullets
from their Remingtons all fell short. As soon as the opposing forces got
closer together, things changed, and the enemy's fire began to tell. At
the moment when the Dervish spearmen were being shot down in their mad
rushes, a party of 200 of their riflemen managed to get within about 300
yards of the front, from which point, under cover of a bank, they opened
fire. The riflemen on Jebel Surgham, though shelled by the gunboats,
persisted in their fusillade, and casualties became frequent. Captain
Caldecott, of the Warwicks, was shot through the head, and died an hour
later. One or two other officers, as well as two newspaper
correspondents, were wounded, and twenty-five of the Camerons and over a
dozen of the Seaforths had to be carried to the rear. Eventually the
riflemen in front were dislodged by Major Williams's battery, which,
firing shell among them, caused them to get up and run, only, however,
to be shot down by the Warwicks, Camerons, and Lincolns, not a single
rifleman being left alive.
The attack had hitherto been almost entirely directed on the British
troops, but as the fight proceeded the enemy were gradually driven more
and more to the right, thus leaving the 2nd Brigade (Lyttelton's) out of
action, and giving the 1st Brigade (Wauchope's) and Maxwell's Egyptians
all the work to do. Seeing this, Lyttelton moved up the Lancashires and
the Rifles in support of the 1st Brigade.
After a while the enemy's onrushes began to diminish. It was not so much
that the charging spearmen were driven back, as that they were all
killed. The fire of the troops then slackened. Just before it ceased
altogether a last Dervish effort was made. This time it took the form of
a cavalry attack. A party of Baggara horsemen, about 200 in number,
formed up at a distance of about 1,200 yards and gallantly charged
Maxwell's whole brigade. A more hopeless enterprise could scarcely be
imagined. Nevertheless, though swept down by rifle and Maxim fire, the
remnant courageously dashed on till within 200 yards of the fighting
line, when all that was left of them was a struggling mass of men and
horses lying on the ground.
It was now about 8 a.m., the main attack was finished, and the great
body of the enemy was gradually retiring in a westerly direction toward
some hills three miles distant.
Whilst the Khalifa was delivering his first attack on the front and left
of the Sirdar's position, a large and compact body of Dervishes, under
the Khalifa's son, Sheikh-el-Din, and the Emir Wad Helu, marched round
to attack the right of the position. Here, posted on the Kerreri ridge
of hills, were the Egyptian mounted troops, under Colonel Broadwood,
with whom, at 7 a.m., about 10,000 of the enemy, advancing rapidly, soon
became engaged. On the approach of the Dervish force, the guns of the
Egyptian horse battery at once opened fire at a range of 1,500 yards,
and the cavalry and Camel Corps dismounting, joined in with their
Martini-Henry carbines. The Dervishes, however, continued to advance,
firing as they came on. The force was in far too great a number for
Broadwood to hope to operate against it alone with any prospect of
success, and seeing that the intention was to surround him and cut him
off from the zeriba, he directed the Camel Corps and guns, covered by
the cavalry, to fall back upon the right flank of the position.
There was some delay in getting the camels to move, and afterwards in
taking them and the guns over the rough and broken ground. The Dervishes
pursued closely, firing all the while. The Egyptians from time to time
halted, and fired volleys in return. So hardly was Broadwood's force
pressed at one moment, that two of his guns had to be abandoned. For
some minutes the fighting was most severe, hand-to-hand encounters took
place, and over sixty of his men fell.
The Egyptian force had by this time fallen back to a point not far
distant from the river, and fortunately at the critical moment one of
the gunboats told off to protect the flanks steamed down to afford
assistance. It at once opened with shell fire at close range, and
inflicted heavy loss on the enemy, upwards of 450 bodies being
afterwards counted within a comparatively small area. The intervention
of the steamers effectually checked the onslaught, and enabled the Camel
Corps to get to the zeriba, although the Dervishes for some time
continued the pursuit of the cavalry. After this encounter the Dervishes
made no attempt to push home their attack on the right, but drew off in
good order and retired under cover of the hills. This, with the repulse
of the Dervish attack already recorded on the left flank, terminated the
first stage of the fight.
All attacks on the position having now failed, the 21st Lancers, about
320 in number, under Colonel Martin, were sent out to clear the ground
on the left front, and to head off any retreating Dervishes from the
direction of Omdurman. They moved off about 9 a.m., and after crossing
the eastern slopes of Jebel Surgham perceived what looked like a force
of from 250 to 300 of the enemy concealed in a khor or ravine, from
which a few scattered shots were fired. The Lancers then wheeled into
line and charged. When they got to a distance of only 200 yards from the
position, a body of Dervishes, variously estimated at from 1,500 to
3,000 in number, suddenly rose from the khor and opened fire. The trap
laid was now evident enough, but the Lancers continued the charge, and,
headed by their colonel, dashed on into the khor, fought their way
through the Dervish ranks, and out at the opposite side.
This was not accomplished without the loss of several of their comrades.
There was a three-foot drop into the ravine, and this caused many
disasters. Colonel Martin's horse fell at this point, but, with the
spearmen cutting and slashing all around him, he managed to get his
charger on its legs again, and, with only a stick in his hand, rode
through the fight uninjured.
The Dervishes made a desperate resistance. They reverted to their usual
tactics of first hamstringing the horses and then spearing their riders.
Of the troopers who were unhorsed, hardly a man escaped alive.
Lieutenant Grenfell was killed by a sword-cut received early in the
fight, when charging by the side of his men. As soon as he was missed,
Captain Kenna and Lieutenant de Montmorency rode back to search for him.
Finding Grenfell's body, de Montmorency dismounted and proceeded to put
it on his horse, which unluckily bolted, leaving him alone to face the
Dervishes with his revolver. Happily Captain Kenna, with the aid of
Corporal Swarbrick, succeeded in catching the animal, and De Montmorency
was enabled to join his troop.
Major Wyndham's horse, after carrying him clear of the Dervishes, fell
dead as he was mounting the slope of the khor. Captain Kenna, who was
at the moment on foot searching for Grenfell, put the Major on Kenna's
own horse and mounted behind him, and though the horse kicked them both
off, they got safely out of the _mélée_.
When the Lancers had reached the opposite side they continued their
gallop for a distance of about 400 yards, when they rallied. Then taking
up a position whence they could fire down the khor, they dismounted, and
with their carbines opened fire on the enemy, eventually driving them
off to the westward. As soon as the Dervishes had retired, a party of
troopers advanced and recovered the bodies of Lieutenant Grenfell and
others who had fallen. They were hastily buried on the spot.
The loss of the Lancers in the charge was one officer and twenty men
killed, and four officers and forty-six men wounded. Besides this, there
were 130 horses either killed or injured. The charge itself has been the
subject of much criticism. Most military men appear to consider that for
cavalry to charge unbroken infantry of unknown quantity, over unknown
ground, was, to put it mildly, a mistake. Its result, so far as the
enemy was concerned, was practically nil. By the loss which the cavalry
sustained in horses alone they were put out of action, instead of being
reserved for the moment when they were required for the purpose of
pursuing the fugitives. With the public, however, these considerations
were lost sight of in the gallantry displayed by both officers and men,
and the charge has long been one of the most popular episodes of the
fight.[172]
Meanwhile the Sirdar about 8.30 a.m. had given orders to evacuate the
camp and march upon Omdurman. The army advanced _en échelon_ of brigades
from the left, Collinson's brigade in reserve covering the rear of the
transport column, and the Egyptian cavalry and camel corps on the right
and left rear.
At 9.30, the front brigades having reached the sand ridge running from
the west end of Jebel Surgham to the river, a halt was ordered to enable
the rear brigades to get into position.
Information was then received that the Khalifa, with a large force, was
present on the left slopes of Jebel Surgham, from the summit of which a
party of the enemy were now firing.
It appears that the Dervish army had not returned to Omdurman on the
previous night, but had bivouacked, some 40,000 strong, behind Jebel
Surgham. When daylight appeared, and no attack was made on the Khalifa,
he divided his forces into three sections. One of these, as already
related, attacked the front and left of the Sirdar's position, the next
moved towards the Kerreri heights with the object of enveloping his
right, whilst the third, under Abdullah himself, remained concealed
behind Jebel Surgham, ready to fall on the Sirdar's flank in the advance
upon Omdurman.
The Sirdar realized the situation at once, and a change of front half
right of the three leading brigades was ordered, whilst two companies of
Maxwell's brigade stormed and occupied Jebel Surgham.
When the change of front was being effected, the sound of heavy firing
on the right was heard, where Macdonald's brigade was by this time hotly
engaged.
To enable Macdonald's men to take up position on the right of the
echelon, his brigade had to change places with that of Lewis, and to
move out to the right, so as to allow the latter to come into position
on Macdonald's left front. Whilst carrying out this movement, and at the
moment when he was separated by about a mile from the rest of the army,
Macdonald found himself faced by a strong body of Dervishes, advancing
from the west, from the direction of Jebel Surgham. He at once halted
and deployed into line to the front to meet the attack. It was not long
coming. The Dervishes, estimated at 20,000 in number, commanded by the
Khalifa himself, made a determined onslaught on the brigade. The main
attack was preceded by a charge of between 300 and 400 mounted Baggara,
who, advancing in loose order, made straight for the long line of rifles
which awaited them. The evident intention was to break Macdonald's line
and give the men on foot an opening. The attempt was hopeless from the
first; it was simply riding to certain death. Then the fusillade began,
and horseman after horseman rolled in the dust.
[Illustration]
Undismayed by the fate of their comrades, the Dervish footmen next came
on, only to see their front ranks swept away by Maxim and rifle fire.
Not a man got within 300 yards of the fighting line. The plain became
dotted with white figures and black upturned faces. The Dervishes
planted their banners in the ground and gathered round them, only to
fall lifeless immediately after. At length the men behind, seeing the
slaughter of those in front, stopped at a distance of about 400 yards,
whence they continued firing, though assailed by the rifles of Lewis's
brigade, which by this time was advancing to Macdonald's support.
The Sirdar, learning from General Hunter of Macdonald's position,
despatched Wauchope's (British) brigade to his assistance, and ordered
the remaining brigades to make a further change of front half right.
Before, however, the reinforcements reached Macdonald, he had
practically disposed of the first great attack.
Still, the fight was not nearly over. Whilst Macdonald was yet engaged
with the Khalifa's force, and just at the moment when the order to
advance was about to be given, the Dervishes behind the Kerreri heights
emerged into the plain, and moved rapidly forward to deliver a second
attack.
This new onslaught necessitated a further complete change in the
disposition of Macdonald's brigade. Seeing his front and rear both
threatened, and finding himself also in danger of being outflanked, he
moved some of his battalions to the right, and deployed them into line,
so as to form with the remainder of his brigade a sort of arrow-head,
one side facing north and the other west.
The Dervishes came on in two masses, one commanded by Sheikh-el-Din, and
the other by Wad Helu, and spread themselves out as if to envelop
Macdonald's brigade. Between this and Lewis's there was a gap, into
which the Warwicks, the Seaforths, and the Camerons were now rushing at
the double, whilst the Lincolns hurried off to complete the line on
Macdonald's right. As the Dervishes advanced, Macdonald's Soudanese
received them with a fire so deadly, delivered in the open ground, that
nothing could live in the face of it.
Whilst Macdonald was repelling the new assault on his right, Lewis's
brigade was enfilading the Khalifa's attack on the left.
The Dervish onslaught now began to weaken, and shortly after, as
Wauchope's brigade came up, ceased altogether. The enemy, who had made
their last despairing effort without having been able to push home, now
broke and fled.
[Illustration]
Thus Macdonald, with the aid of Lewis's and Wauchope's brigades, crushed
this second and determined attack. The masterly way in which he handled
his force was the theme of general admiration.
The slaughter which took place is described as something appalling, and
the ground around the scene of the fight was literally strewn with dead
and dying Dervishes.
Meantime Maxwell's and Lyttelton's brigades, accompanied by the 32nd
Field Battery, had been pushed on over the slopes of Jebel Surgham, and
driving before them the Dervish forces under Sheikh-el-Din, they
established themselves in a position which cut off the retreat on
Omdurman of the bulk of the Khalifa's army, who were soon seen streaming
off in a disorganized mass towards the high hills many miles to the
west, closely pursued by the mounted troops, who cleared the right and
front flanks of all hesitating and detached parties of the enemy.
The battle was now practically over, and Lyttelton's and Maxwell's
brigades marched down to Khor Shambat, in the direction of Omdurman,
which spot was reached at 12.30 a.m.; and here the troops rested and
watered. The remainder of Hunter's division and Wauchope's brigade
arrived at the same place an hour and a half later.
The result of the fight before Omdurman was declared in the Sirdar's
despatch to be "the practical annihilation of the Khalifa's army, the
consequent extinction of Mahdism in the Soudan, and the submission of
nearly the whole country formerly ruled under Egyptian authority."
The Sirdar, for the skilful generalship and judicious disposition of his
forces, which secured him the victory, is entitled to the highest
praise, and no one will grudge him the honours with which his services
were recognized.[173]
As to the fight itself, it was in many ways, no doubt, a walkover. At
the same time it was a lesson in the power of modern arms such as had
never been seen before. It showed that against weapons of precision such
as those carried by the Anglo-Egyptian troops even an overwhelming
superiority of numbers is not in itself of any avail. It demonstrated
once more the pluck and endurance of the British soldier, as well as the
good fighting material of which his Egyptian allies are composed.
Whilst giving the Sirdar every credit for his victory, it is impossible
not to see that the Khalifa, by his repeated blunders, completely played
into his adversary's hands.
The first mistake of the Dervish leader was in not remaining within the
fortifications of Omdurman, from which it would have been impossible to
have dislodged him, except at a great sacrifice, instead of advancing
out into the open and exposing his imperfectly armed legions to the
deadly fire of the Sirdar's rifles. In doing this the Khalifa chose the
one form of attack which gave him the least chance of success. He knew
that his men had on other occasions broken the British and Egyptian
squares, and was desirous of seeing if it could not be done again. In
making this calculation the Dervish leader totally lost sight of the
fact that his enemies possessed both better weapons and superior
organization than in days gone by.
A second and fatal mistake was in not making a night attack on the
Sirdar's position, where, if the Dervishes had attacked in the darkness
with the same impetuous courage which they displayed in daylight, it is
by no means impossible that they might have got within the
Anglo-Egyptian lines.
A third error was in not originally occupying Jebel Surgham, which,
situated on the left front of the Anglo-Egyptian force, possessed for
defensive purposes unquestionable advantages. Had the Khalifa occupied
this commanding position, the Sirdar would have been left with two
alternatives. He might either have accepted the challenge, and have
taken the hill at a heavy loss, or he might have elected to pass it by,
and by making a wide detour in the desert so reach Omdurman. This last
operation, with the Khalifa's forces still unbroken in the
Anglo-Egyptian rear, would have been a hazardous undertaking, and would,
moreover, have left the Khalifa free to continue his resistance.
A further fault was in directing the first attack mainly on the Sirdar's
left, where the British troops were posted, instead of assailing the
Egyptian and Soudanese battalions on the front and right. By adopting
these tactics the Khalifa attacked his enemy at the very strongest
instead of the very weakest point.
In short, the Khalifa, as a general, may be said to have been a complete
failure, leaving undone those things which he ought to have done and
doing those things which he ought not to have done, and there was no
skill in him.
The Dervish loss was immense. No less than 10,800 bodies were counted on
the field of battle in addition to over 300 in the town of Omdurman.
Their wounded, estimated from the number who crawled down to the river
and into the town, was 16,000 more, making a total of 27,000 altogether
out of a fighting force of 52,000 men.[174] Besides these, 4,000 black
troops surrendered and were made prisoners, and three of Gordon's old
steamers were captured.
Bearing in mind the nature of the fight, the Anglo-Egyptian losses were
remarkably slight.
The British killed were but two officers and twenty-five men; of these
no less than twenty-one fell in the mistaken charge of the Lancers. The
British wounded were eleven officers and 136 men. Of the Egyptian force
one officer and twenty rank and file were killed, and thirteen officers
and 222 rank and file were wounded. The total number of casualties in
the Sirdar's entire army was forty-eight killed and 382 wounded.
The Sirdar in his despatch reporting the victory did full justice to the
officers and men under his command, upwards of 300 of whom were
specially mentioned for good service. Indeed, so long was the list that
it excited a good deal of comment when the nature of the contest and the
character of the enemy were taken into account. As a contrast to the
above it may be mentioned that in Wellington's despatches after
Waterloo, a fight in which the loss of the British alone was 1,759
killed and 5,892 wounded, only the names of thirty-two officers are
specially mentioned.