THE ADVANCE ON OMDURMAN.
In May, 1898, preparations began for the advance on Omdurman. The
Egyptian head-quarters were moved forward to Fort Atbara, where three
months' provisions for 25,000 men were directed to be accumulated.
Though every article had to be sent up from Lower Egypt, this was
rendered less difficult by the recent completion of the railway
(hitherto carried as far only as Luxor) connecting Cairo with Shellal,
as well as by the prolongation of the military line to Abadieh, twelve
miles north of Berber.
At Abadieh a naval arsenal, with workshops and factories, was
established. Here the new screw gunboats _Sultan_, _Melik_, and
_Sheikh_, which had arrived from England in sections, were put together
and launched.
Meanwhile, pending the advance, Gatacre's brigade, in their summer camp
at Darmali, were being exercised in route marching and manoeuvring, to
keep them in training. The men had by this time got accustomed to the
heat, and suffered but little sickness.
Early in June, there being no immediate fighting in view, the Sirdar
left for Cairo, and later on paid a flying visit to England. Several of
the British officers also went on leave.
On the 22nd, the views of the British Government with regard to the
impending advance were stated in the House of Commons by Sir Michael
Hicks-Beach, in introducing the proposal to remit the loan contracted by
Egypt in 1897 for the expenses of the Dongola Expedition. The Chancellor
of the Exchequer declared that the Government did not contemplate the
undertaking of any further military operations on a large scale, or
involving any considerable expense, for the recovery of the great
provinces to the south of Khartoum. "What we do anticipate," he went on
to say, "is that expeditions may be made by the gunboat flotilla, which
will be at the disposal of the Administration, to free the waterway of
the Nile from any interference with the perfect freedom of commerce with
the interior, so far as it can be carried on by that waterway."
In July the British Government decided to strengthen the Sirdar's force
by additional troops, in the shape of another British brigade, together
with cavalry and artillery. The British force which it was proposed to
put in the field was a division consisting of two brigades, under
General Gatacre. The 1st Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General H. G.
Wauchope, was formed of the battalions which had fought at the Atbara,
viz., the Warwicks, Lincolns, Seaforths, and Camerons; the 2nd Brigade,
commanded by Brigadier-General the Hon. A. G. Lyttelton, consisted of
the 1st Battalion of the Grenadier Guards from Gibraltar, the 1st
Battalion of the Northumberland Fusiliers and the 2nd Battalion of the
Lancashire Fusiliers from Cairo, and the 2nd Battalion of the Rifle
Brigade from Malta. In addition, there were the 21st Lancers from Cairo,
a Maxim battery manned by a detachment of the Royal Irish Fusiliers from
Alexandria, two field batteries (32nd and 37th) of the Royal Artillery,
and details of Royal Engineers, Army Service and Medical Corps, making
a total strength of about 7,500 men.
The Egyptian force which was to co-operate was also increased by another
brigade. The whole was to consist of a division, under the command of
Major-General Hunter, composed of four brigades, viz., the 1st, 2nd, and
3rd, under Macdonald, Maxwell, and Lewis respectively, and a 4th brigade
under Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Collinson, composed of the 1st,
5th, 17th, and 18th Battalions. The cavalry were to be ten squadrons,
besides eight companies of the Camel Corps. The artillery force was to
consist of one horse and four field batteries, and one Maxim battery.
The total Egyptian force represented about 12,500 men.
Fort Atbara was the point upon which, early in August, the British and
Egyptian troops began to concentrate. Lewis's (3rd) brigade had already
gone on ahead to cut firewood for the steamers, and establish depôts of
stores at Nasri Island, ten miles below the Sixth Cataract. From there
Lewis went on to Wad Habeshi, where the rapids commence.
The Egyptian troops were the earliest arrivals at Atbara, which soon
became a scene of bustle and activity. The railway, by this time
extended to within a short distance of the camp, lent important aid in
bringing forward both men and supplies. The gunboats, increased by the
new additions to ten in number, also materially assisted in the work of
transport.
The Nile had risen superbly, and no difficulty was experienced in
passing up the cataracts.
The next point of concentration was fixed at Wad Hamid, a short distance
from Wad Habeshi, already mentioned, and but little time was lost in
sending the troops forward.
On one day, viz., the 3rd August, no less than six Soudanese battalions
left Atbara. The cavalry and transport animals went forward along the
western bank of the Nile. As the black soldiers left, the white ones
began to arrive. Even before the last of the steamers conveying the six
Egyptian battalions had started, the first half of the Rifle Brigade
appeared, the remainder turning up on the following day. The regiment
had left Cairo on the 27th and 28th July, proceeding by rail to Shellal,
above the First Cataract, thence by steamer to Wady Halfa, and then by
rail _viâ_ Abu Hamid to Atbara. General Wauchope and his staff came up
on the 5th, closely followed by the artillery, the Grenadier Guards, the
Northumberland Fusiliers, the 21st Lancers, and the rest of the 2nd
British brigade.
It is worthy of observation that, notwithstanding the railway connection
established between Cairo and Assouan, recourse had once more to be had
to the steamers of Messrs. Thomas Cook & Son for the transport of the
horses belonging to the British brigade from Khizan, on the river just
below Luxor, to Assouan.[167]
On the 13th steamers with the 1st (British) Brigade (Gatacre's) from
Darmali passed Atbara, going direct to Wad Hamid. The same day, whilst
many of the troops were still waiting for the means of transport, the
Sirdar took his departure for the front. After he left, and up to the
21st, more Egyptian troops continued to arrive. Some of them had marched
all the way from Souakim, and others had toiled up against the stream
from Merawi.
All were hurried forward from Atbara as fast as the means of transport
would allow. No sooner did a steamer return from the front than she was
refilled and sent off again packed to overflowing with a fresh batch of
men.
By the 23rd August all but the last boat-load of soldiers had arrived at
Wad Hamid. The Camel Corps, following the route taken by the Desert
Column under Stewart in 1885, had marched across the Bayuda desert to
Metammeh, and thence to the front. Abu Klea was found still white with
Dervish bones. Metammeh, the scene of the slaughter of the Jaalins in
1897, presented an aspect of utter desolation. When first visited by
Englishmen after the Jaalin massacre, human remains lay about the town
in heaps, but the tribe had since removed and buried these. One ghastly
souvenir still existed in the shape of a gallows, with portions of eight
men suspended thereon.
Meanwhile from Wad Hamid reconnaissances had been pushed on as far as
Shabluka, at the southern end of the Sixth Cataract, which place, as
well as the gorge leading to it, was found to be evacuated. The entrance
to the Shabluka gorge, where the river is only 300 yards wide, was
defended by four forts with embrasures, and might have formed a strong
position against any force approaching by the river. It had, however,
the disadvantage of being liable to be easily turned by troops operating
on land, and probably for this reason the Khalifa, instead of making a
stand at Shabluka, as had been expected, had left the place to take care
of itself.
The reconnaissance was continued to the island of Jebel Royan, about
thirty-four miles from Khartoum, whence, from an elevated position, a
distant view of Omdurman and the white tomb of the Mahdi was obtained.
The first person to set eyes on the spot which formed the object of the
expedition was Major Staveley Gordon, the nephew of Gordon Pasha.
An advance post was established at Jebel Royan, and thither the stores
which had been accumulated at Nasri Island were now transferred.
On the 23rd, preparatory to the further advance, the Sirdar held a
review of the assembled forces, British and Egyptian, and the next day
the troops began moving off in successive divisions. The cavalry and
Camel Corps were the first to start, closely followed by General Hunter
and the whole of the Egyptian division. On the 25th the British division
marched out, and Wad Hamid was evacuated. The heat that day is described
as most oppressive, and the march over the loose sand told severely on
the men, and especially on those of the newly-arrived 2nd Brigade, who
fell out in numbers. The steamers, most of them towing long trains of
lighters, accompanied the force, whilst others scouted ahead. There
being plenty of water in the cataract, the flotilla passed up without
trouble.
After halting by the way the whole force, on the 27th, was assembled at
El Hajir, opposite Jebel Royan. Whilst there news arrived of a disaster
which had occurred to the gunboat _Hafir_. The vessel, when near Shendy,
sprang a leak, and suddenly sank within a few yards of the shore.
Fortunately no lives or stores had been lost.
The troops rested at El Hajir till 5 p.m. on the 28th, and then marched
to Wady Abid, where a zeriba was made. The whole of the next day was
spent at Wady Abid, where, on the night of the 29th, a terrific storm
broke over the camp, deluging everything, and causing considerable
discomfort. At 3 a.m. on the 30th the reveille was sounded, and soon
after the men, drenched to the skin, set out for Sayal. On the 31st
Sayal was evacuated, and the troops moved on to Suruab. The same day the
gunboats shelled the Dervish advance camp at Kerreri.
On the night of the 31st another storm of wind and rain was experienced,
which destroyed the field telegraph in places, and interrupted the
telegraph communication for some days.
On the 1st September, the final advance was made to Egeiga, a village
only six miles north of Omdurman. The troops started early, amid heavy
rain. Several deserted villages were passed, and a little after midday a
short halt for refreshments was made, at a place called El Gubeih, not
far from Egeiga, which was reached an hour later.
Patrols of Dervish horsemen had been frequently seen during the march,
falling back before the cavalry, and their outposts were driven in
beyond Egeiga.
Some time before the main body of the army had reached Egeiga, the
cavalry, striking off in a south-westerly direction, reached the slopes
of Jebel Surgham, nearly a mile beyond. From this point, at noon, the
entire Dervish army was seen drawn up in battle array in the desert
outside the city. They were in five divisions, and their numbers were
estimated at 35,000 men.[168]
It soon became evident that this huge force had not come out for the
mere purpose of being looked at. It began steadily to advance, with a
line in front extending over three miles. At one time the enemy halted,
and then again moved forward.
The cavalry then proceeded to fall back on Egeiga, where the main body
of the army, receiving news that the Dervishes were advancing to the
attack, had hurriedly moved out and formed up in position.
After following the retiring troops for some time, the vedettes at 2
p.m. reported that the enemy had halted, and later on it was observed
that they were preparing bivouacs and lighting fires. So rapid was the
Dervish advance that they all but came into action with the rear
squadrons of the reconnoitring force.
Beyond a few shots exchanged between the Lancers and the enemy's scouts
nothing further happened, and the Sirdar's troops, after remaining in
position all the afternoon, retired at nightfall to their camp.
Meanwhile the gunboats, under Commander Keppel, had proceeded at
daylight on the 1st towing the 37th Howitzer Battery Royal Artillery in
barges. Steaming up the east bank, with the aid of a party of
friendlies, they cleared that side of the river. Several villages were
found occupied, but these the friendlies took one after another.
On the steamers approaching Halfiyeh three forts opened on them. The
gunboats returned the fire and soon silenced the works, which were then
occupied by the friendlies. As the steamers, proceeding in line ahead,
rounded Tuti Island, at the confluence of the Blue and White Niles, they
were fired on by the forts, both at Khartoum and at Omdurman. The fire,
though fairly heavy, was ill directed, and did no harm. A suitable spot
having been found on the east bank, the howitzer battery was landed and
at once brought into action.[169] After a few rounds at a range of 3,000
yards, the dome over the Mahdi's tomb was partially destroyed. The
superior weight and accuracy of the steamers' guns ended the naval part
of the fight almost as soon as it was begun, and the flotilla, leaving
the _Tamaai_ and _Nazir_ to guard the battery, returned down stream to
rejoin the army at Egeiga.
The night of the 1st September was an anxious one for everybody in the
Sirdar's camp. Less than five miles separated the opposing armies.
Information had been received that the Khalifa contemplated a night
attack upon the position, and preparations to repel it were made. The
men all lay down fully dressed on the sand with their arms and
accoutrements beside them. Though the moon was at its full only
twenty-four hours before, the night being cloudy, there was not much
light. The gunboats from time to time flashed their electric rays on
Jebel Surgham and the surrounding country with a view to discovering any
signs of a Dervish advance. At the same time, natives from the village
of Egeiga were sent out in the direction of the enemy's camp to obtain
information, so as to give the idea that the Sirdar intended to make a
night attack, and in the expectation that this, coming to the Khalifa's
knowledge, would decide him to remain in his position. As a result the
_ruse_ succeeded perfectly, and, with the exception of two false alarms
which occurred, the night passed away tranquilly enough.
In not making a night attack the Khalifa lost a grand opportunity. Had
he taken advantage of the comparative obscurity to hurl his enormous
force upon the Sirdar's position there is no saying what might have been
the result. The rifle fire of the British and Egyptian troops, which was
the thing the Dervish leader had most to fear, would have been far less
effective than by daylight, and might not have been successful in
stopping at all points the Dervish rushes. Had the enemy once succeeded
in breaking the line of troops and engaging hand to hand with, say, the
Egyptian divisions, the difficulty of coming to their aid in the
darkness and confusion would have been considerable, and though the
ultimate result might have been favourable, it could only have been
attained by an enormous loss of life.