THE DONGOLA EXPEDITION.
In a previous chapter, the history of events on the Nile frontier was
brought down to the month of August, 1889, when Wad-en-Nejumi's forces,
after the crushing defeat they encountered in the engagement at Toski,
were retreating southwards, and the projected invasion of Egypt was
suspended. The incidents which marked the next few years may be related
in a few words.
The years 1890 and 1891 passed almost undisturbed on the frontier. The
chief military command in the province of Dongola was vested in one of
the Khalifa's emirs, called Mohammed Khalil Zogal, with a force and
detachments at Sunnah, and at Suarda, fifty miles south of Akasheh. From
this last point patrols occasionally went north to Akasheh itself, but
the Nile frontier generally remained quite undisturbed.
From Korosko, Saba Bey, in the autumn of 1890, made a reconnaissance
towards Abu Hamid, with some irregulars, and captured one of the Dervish
outpost forts, which he, a few hours afterwards, was compelled to
relinquish. The matter is only worth mentioning by reason of the fact
that in the fight which accompanied Saba's retreat the notorious
Suleiman Wad Gamr, Colonel Stewart's murderer, was killed.
[Illustration]
In April, 1892, Colonel Kitchener succeeded Sir Francis Grenfell as
Sirdar of the Egyptian army. In the same year there were signs of
increased activity in the Nile Valley, and between Dongola and Suarda
some 5,000 fighting men were kept under arms.
In January, 1893, the Dervishes again became aggressive, and 600 of them
advanced to cut the railway connecting Sarras and Wady Halfa. The raid
failed, owing to the precautions taken by Colonel Wodehouse. The
Dervishes, however, managed to surprise and outnumber 120 of the
Egyptian Camel Corps, who had been sent to follow up the retreat. The
Egyptians fought courageously, but, having lost their two senior
officers, Captain Pyne and Major Fuad Effendi, were defeated, and had to
retire with a loss of no less than thirty-four men killed and fifteen
wounded. The Dervish loss was estimated at more than double that number.
In July of the same year, the Dervishes made a sudden descent on Beris,
the southernmost village of the El Khargeh Oasis, to the north-west of
Assouan.
In November, the enemy made an attack upon the desert outpost of Murad
Wells, but were repulsed.
From this date, with the exception of a raid on a village in the Wady
Halfa district in 1895, the Dervishes in the neighbourhood of the
Egyptian advanced posts observed a strictly defensive attitude.
The year 1896 brought with it great changes in the entire situation. The
reoccupation of the province of Dongola had for some time been in
contemplation by the Egyptian Government and its advisers. It was felt
that a blow must sooner or later be struck at the power of the Khalifa,
which, though it had succeeded in laying waste some of the most fertile
provinces abandoned by Egypt, was known to be waning, if not dying, of
its own unpopularity; but no one thought that the blow would be struck
so soon. In choosing the moment for action, the British Government was
influenced to a very large extent by a desire to assist a friendly Power
in a position of extreme difficulty. Only a short time before (29th
February, 1896) a terrible disaster had happened to the Italian army in
Africa, which had been defeated at Adowa with heavy loss by the
Abyssinians under Menelik. Driven back in the direction of Massowah, the
remains of the Italian forces found it impossible to lend a helping hand
to their comrades garrisoned at Kassala, who were threatened by the
Dervishes, and in a situation of imminent peril. One object of the
British and Egyptian advance which in March, 1896, was determined on,
was, by making a diversion in the region of Dongola, to save Kassala, or
at all events its garrison. It was not from purely disinterested motives
that this step was decided upon. It was obvious that the moment when a
large body of the Khalifa's forces was occupied with the Italians would
be a favourable one for a movement on Dongola, whereas if Kassala was to
fall into the hands of the Dervishes, the latter would be let loose to
overrun the Nile Valley. Everything in fact was ripe for the expedition.
There were, moreover, political reasons for not delaying it. In the
valley of the Upper Nile, the race between the Powers for possession of
that part of Africa was beginning to attract attention. The French were
extending their influence from the south-west, and the Belgians were
sending out expeditions from the south, and there was a general feeling
that some corresponding action on the part of Great Britain was
desirable, as soon as a favourable opportunity should occur.
Speaking in the House of Commons in March, Mr. Curzon, Under Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, stated that, "in view of the reported forward
movements in various directions by the Dervishes and the threatened
beleaguerment of Kassala, the Government, acting in conjunction with the
Government of Egypt and their advisers, and in order to avoid danger to
Italy, to Egypt, and to England, and in the interests of Europe, had
ordered an advance to Akasheh." He added that the advance might be
extended to Dongola, and that the future action of the Government was to
be "regulated by considerations not merely military and strategical, but
political and financial."
It was decided that the Dongola expedition should consist of about 9,000
Egyptian troops, under the command of the Sirdar. In addition to these,
the 1st Battalion of the North Staffordshire Regiment was to be moved
from Cairo to Wady Halfa to relieve the Egyptian garrison there, and
also to be at hand if required. The route chosen was by rail and river
to Wady Halfa, and thence by a march along the Nile bank to the front.
The decision of the British Government was arrived at so suddenly that
it was not even communicated to the Khedive and his advisers. The news
took Cairo by surprise. Without any previous intimation it became known
at midnight on the 12th March that Colonel Hunter, who commanded the
frontier force at Wady Halfa, had been ordered to advance and occupy
Akasheh, that all available troops were to be pushed up the Nile with a
view to an advance on Dongola, and that the 1st Battalion of the North
Staffordshire Regiment (64th), then quartered in Cairo, was to leave
immediately for Wady Halfa.[153]
Although the news took Cairo by surprise, it was the kind of surprise
with which one hears that something long expected and long delayed has
at last really come true. For years past the Egyptian army had been
steadily trained and prepared for the event which the disaster to the
Italian arms in Abyssinia only precipitated.
A few words may here be said concerning the state of the army at this
period. Its formation, begun by Sir Evelyn Wood soon after Tel-el-Kebir,
had progressed slowly but surely. The men had been gradually disciplined
under British officers and accustomed by degrees to meeting the
Dervishes in the numerous frontier skirmishes of the past ten years. In
1884-5, Egyptian troops were employed upon the lines of communication of
Wolseley's Nile expedition, and some of the Camel Corps were under fire
at Kirbekan. Backed by British troops, they fought well at Ginnis, and
they crushed Wad-en-Nejumi single-handed at Argin and Toski. At the
beginning of 1896 the army numbered 18,000 men. It consisted of sixteen
battalions of infantry, each battalion having six companies of from 100
to 120 men each, and about eight squadrons of cavalry, with camel corps,
artillery, &c. Of the infantry, ten battalions were composed of
fellaheen, taken by conscription, and six of Soudanese blacks
(volunteers enlisted for life). The fellaheen battalions numbered from 1
to 4 had British colonels and majors; those numbered from 5 to 8 were
officered only by natives. The Soudanese Battalions numbered from 9 to
14 (this last only in course of formation) had British officers, whilst
the 15th and 16th Battalions, made up of reservists called out for the
campaign, were also partly officered by Englishmen. There were in all
about eighty British officers, a number increased to 120 by others sent
out on special service in the course of the campaign.
A glance must now be taken at the means of transport at the disposal of
the Sirdar, and it will be seen that, as in Wolseley's expedition, the
provisioning of the above force at a distance of nearly 1,000 miles from
its base in Cairo formed one of the chief difficulties to be dealt with.
In March, 1886, the Upper Egypt Railway was open as far as Girgeh, 341
miles above Cairo, but it had been prolonged, for Government purposes
only, to Belianeh, eight miles further on. Thence everything had to be
carried in steamers and native boats to Assouan. Here men and stores had
to be unloaded and conveyed overland by the eight-mile railway to
Shellal, just above the First Cataract, where they were again shipped
and taken on to Wady Halfa. From this last place to Sarras, a distance
of thirty miles, a railway existed when the campaign began, and this
line was continued as quickly as possible in the rear of the army as it
advanced. It may here be observed that the rapid construction of this
railway, under the direction of Nicour Bey and Captain Girouard, of the
Royal Engineers, was not the least notable feature of the campaign. From
the rail-head to the front stores had to be carried by convoys of camels
and mules, aided on the less broken parts of the river by relief boats,
as soon as the rising Nile had allowed them to be dragged up the
cataract by steamers. The navigation of the Nile between Wady Halfa and
Dongola is not easy, the broken water of the Second Cataract extending
from Wady Halfa almost to Sarras, and at Hannek, 100 miles further on,
the Third Cataract again obstructs the navigation.
On the 20th March, Mr. Morley moved a vote of censure of the House of
Commons on the Government in connection with the Dongola expedition, but
on a division the motion was negatived by 288 votes against 143.
There was an incident in connection with the expedition which is of
sufficient importance to deserve notice.
A few days after the expedition was decided on, the Egyptian Government,
on the 19th March, applied to the Commissioners of the Public Debt to
advance towards the expenses the sum of £500,000, to be taken from what
is known as the "Reserve Fund." This fund was created pursuant to the
Khedivial decree of 12th July, 1888, under which the financial
arrangements made by "The London Convention" of 1885, already referred
to in a former chapter, were once more modified. The changes made
comprised the suspension of the Sinking Fund of the Debt, and the
application of the money to form a reserve fund, to meet unforeseen
contingencies. One of these was declared to be "extraordinary expenses
incurred with the previous sanction of the Commission of the Debt."
Four out of the six Commissioners agreed in considering the Dongola
expedition as coming under the above category, and advanced the money.
The French and Russian Commissioners dissented. This led to a lawsuit in
the Mixed Tribunal of Cairo, which later on, viz., on the 9th June,
ordered the Government to refund the money with interest. The judgment
being confirmed on appeal on the 2nd December, 1896, the Khedive's
advisers might have found themselves in a position of some difficulty
had not Lord Cromer vigorously taken the matter in hand, and induced the
British Government to lend the sum which had to be refunded. The amount
due under the judgment, £515,600, was repaid to the "Caisse" on the 8th
December, and the Khedive's Ministers expressed their lively gratitude.
This was still further earned when later on the British Government
released their claim to be repaid the sum advanced.
On 21st March the Sirdar, with Major Wingate and Slatin Pasha, and the
1st Battalion of the North Staffordshire Regiment, 917 strong, left
Cairo for Assouan and Wady Halfa. At the same time the various Egyptian
battalions were hurried up the river with all possible despatch.
As usual the enterprising firm of Messrs. Thomas Cook & Son came in for
the principal part of the river transport work. All their steamers,
except those engaged in the postal service, were requisitioned by the
Egyptian Government, and, deprived of their handsome fittings and
luxurious accommodation, now figured as troopships between Belianeh and
Assouan. Between the 21st and 26th March, these steamers shipped from
the former place no less than 4,500 men, besides 750 animals and an
enormous quantity of stores. A detachment of the Connaught Rangers was
stationed at Belianch in charge of the store depôt established there.
It should be mentioned that the 9th Soudanese Battalion, forming part of
the Souakim garrison, marched from Kosseir, on the Red Sea, to Keneh, on
the Nile, following the route across the desert taken by General Baird
and his army in 1801.
Meanwhile Colonel Hunter with his frontier force moved on to Akasheh,
which for some time past had been the advanced post of the Dervishes,
and occupied it without opposition.
The Egyptian troops now concentrated as rapidly as possible at the
various posts between Wady Halfa and Akasheh, the Staffordshire Regiment
being left to garrison the former place.
The railway was now being pushed forward, and on 24th May it was
completed to a point three miles beyond Ambigol, sixty-three miles south
of Wady Halfa.
To guard against raids on either flank in the proposed further advance,
the west bank of the Nile was patrolled by native irregulars, and the
important post of Murad Wells had its garrison of Ababdeh "friendlies"
strengthened by some two or three companies from one of the Egyptian
battalions.
The post of Murad Wells, situated about half-way between Korosko and Abu
Hamid, was by far the most important of the desert posts. No Dervish
descent upon the east bank of the river was possible unless these wells
had been first secured; consequently there had been repeated struggles
for their possession. Their guardianship had at the time now referred to
been intrusted to the Ababdeh Arabs in the pay of the Government. The
last attack on the wells was that made by the Dervishes as lately as
November, 1893, but which was repulsed with severe loss. The chief of
the tribe, Saleh Bey, who was in command of the defending force, lost
his life on this occasion, but was succeeded by his elder brother, Ahmed
Bey, an equally capable leader.
On the news of Hunter's advance to Akasheh, a younger brother,
Abd-el-Azim, on the 11th April made a bold reconnaissance to the south.
Crossing the desert with a party of his Ababdehs, he struck the Nile
about forty miles south of Abu Hamid, and then continuing some eighty
miles further along the river, he informed the people of the Egyptian
advance. They received the news everywhere with the greatest delight,
and expressed their joy at the prospect of being delivered from the
Khalifa's reign of terror. Abd-el-Azim was able to obtain some useful
information of the Dervish movements. At Abu Hamid there were only about
400 fighting men, but Berber was held by 6,000 of the Jehadia, Jaalin
and Baggara tribes.
On the 1st of May the first fight of the season came off in the
neighbourhood of Akasheh. About noon 240 of the Egyptian cavalry, under
Major Burn Murdoch, when some four miles from Akasheh, suddenly came
across 300 mounted Baggara, with a further force of about 1,000 men on
foot, drawn up behind them. The odds being too great, the cavalry was
ordered to retire. Seeing this movement, the Dervish horsemen, advancing
amid a cloud of dust, charged down upon the rear troop just at the
moment that the cavalry had entered a narrow defile. Several of the men
were speared and stabbed in the back before the main body had time to
wheel and in their turn charge the assailants. This they quickly did in
dashing style, and then ensued a hand-to-hand fight which lasted about
twenty minutes, at the end of which the Dervishes wheeled about and
galloped off to the rear of the spearmen on foot. The ground not
admitting of another charge, the cavalry then dismounted and opened fire
on the enemy. This was kept up till at 3 p.m., just as the 11th
Soudanese Battalion was arriving in support, the Dervishes retired, to
the great satisfaction of the small Egyptian force, which with jaded
horses, and suffering intensely from want of water, had been fighting
continuously for three hours under a burning sun.
The cavalry had two killed and ten wounded, against eighteen killed and
eighty wounded on the enemy's side.
On the 2nd June the arrival of the 10th Soudanese Battalion at Akasheh
completed the concentration necessary for the further advance.
From information obtained by the Intelligence Department it was
ascertained that the Dervish force, though inferior in number to that of
the Egyptians, was composed of good fighting material, Baggara, Jaalins,
and Jehadias, and was led by the well-known Emir Hamuda. Their total
number was estimated at 3,000.
On the evening of the 6th the Egyptian troops commenced the advance,
quitting Akasheh on the march to Ferket, on the east bank, sixteen miles
distant. The Sirdar, who had shortly before reached the front, was in
command. The force was divided into two parts, which may be called the
River and the Desert Columns.
The River Column, under the command of Colonel Hunter, consisted of
infantry and artillery. The infantry was divided into three brigades of
three battalions each; the artillery was composed of two field batteries
and two Maxims, the latter worked by thirty men of the Connaught
Rangers.
The Desert Column, commanded by Major Burn Murdoch, consisted of seven
squadrons of cavalry, the Camel Corps, one infantry battalion mounted on
camels, one battery of Horse Artillery, and two Maxim guns. The total
force of the two columns was not less than 9,100 men.
The Sirdar's plan for the attack was for the River Column to proceed
along the Nile bank, and the Desert Column to make a detour to the east,
so timed that both columns should reach Ferket at dawn, the former
attacking from the north whilst the latter cut off the Dervish retreat
east and south. On the west of their position was the Nile, the further
bank of which was guarded by Egyptian irregulars, so as to prevent the
possibility of escape on that side. Thus the Dervishes were to be
completely hemmed in on every side.
The River Column bivouacked at 11 p.m. at a place distant only about
four miles from the enemy, every precaution being taken to prevent news
of the advance reaching the Dervish force. There were no bugle calls, no
lights, and no firing.
At 12.15 on the morning of the 7th June the march was resumed, the 1st
Brigade taking the ground nearest the river, the 2nd being on the left,
and the 3rd in the rear.
Meanwhile the Desert Column was skilfully guided in the darkness across
the desert until it reached the point south of Ferket where it had been
arranged that it should take up its position.
The enemy became aware of the approach of the two columns almost
simultaneously, saw that all prospect of retreat was cut off, and
hurriedly prepared for action. Their formation was largely governed by
the position of their camps. Their left wing, or wing next the river,
occupied the huts of the Jaalin camp, and was thrown forward beyond the
centre, which was opposite the Baggara camp; the right wing again was
slightly in the rear of the centre.
The engagement began by the Dervishes opening fire at 5 a.m. from an
outpost on the Jebel Ferkeh, a mountain on the north side of the village
close down by the river under which the River Column had to pass.
The 2nd Brigade brought a heavy fire to bear upon the hill, and quickly
clearing it, the march continued. As the column reached the more open
ground beyond Jebel Ferkeh, the troops opened out, and the brigades on
the right and left got into fighting formation, with two battalions
thrown forward and one in reserve. The 1st Brigade then moved towards
the river to attack the enemy's left wing, whilst the 2nd Brigade
advanced on the right wing near the Jaalin camp; the 3rd Brigade coming
up from the rear to fill the intervening gap.
The entire force then steadily advanced, firing as they went, whilst the
Desert Column shelled the enemy from the south and rear. The Dervishes
fought with the courage of despair, and frequently charged the Egyptian
troops. Small bodies of the enemy continued fighting in the huts forming
the different camps long after any organized resistance had ceased to be
possible, and obstinately refusing quarter. Hut after hut had to be
cleared at the point of the bayonet amid vigorous hand-to-hand fighting,
and in one hut alone eighty Baggara corpses were subsequently found.
Position after position was taken, and an utter rout ensued. Such of the
Dervishes as survived the attack of the River Column fled to the south,
only to find their retreat cut off by the Desert Column, which by this
time had advanced on the flank of the enemy, who were thus effectually
caught as intended. Many of their mounted men, finding themselves headed
off by the cavalry, galloped back to die in front of the lines of
infantry.
The footmen, too, were seen hurrying to and fro seeking a way through
the encircling Egyptian forces. Such of them as succeeded were closely
pursued by the cavalry, and at least 150 were thus slaughtered within a
few miles of Ferket.
The enemy's losses were estimated at 1,000 killed and wounded, and over
500 were taken prisoners. The Egyptian loss, on the other hand, was
limited to twenty men killed and eighty wounded. The Dervish Emir in
command was Osman Azrak, who had lately superseded Hamuda; and the
former and at least forty other emirs were among the slain.
The whole fight was but a short affair, the first shot being fired at 5
a.m., and two hours later the whole thing was over.
Burn Murdoch, with the Desert Column, continued to follow up the pursuit
as far as Suarda, which he occupied the next morning.
The effect of the engagement at Ferket was that fifty miles of the Nile
Valley were cleared of the Dervishes; that the only organized army of
the Khalifa near the frontier was destroyed; and that Suarda, which had
for many years been the starting-place for raids on the Nile villages,
became the advanced post of the Sirdar's army.