THE EASTERN SOUDAN AGAIN.
In January, 1889, things at Souakim had drifted back pretty much into
the same old groove, and the petty attacks of Osman Digna's followers
were constantly renewed. The enemy's mounted men used, time after time,
to approach the outlying forts, fire a few shots, and then retire.
The military authorities, not feeling themselves equal to the task of
clearing the neighbourhood of the hostile Arabs, hit upon the expedient
of inviting the tribes suspected of being unfriendly to the Mahdist
cause to do so. The invitation, which took the form of a Proclamation
issued by General Grenfell, was not favourably responded to. The
attitude of the tribes was one of expectancy, and all the Sheikhs who
responded stated pretty much the same thing, namely, that they would
come in and help as soon as Osman Digna's power should be broken, and
that they were perfectly willing to assist in cutting off stragglers,
but they declined for the present to compromise themselves further.
On the other hand, Osman Digna was not more successful in inducing the
tribes to flock to his standard. On the 11th February, he burnt his camp
at Handoub, and transported the remainder of his forces to Tokar, which
now became the central point of rebel authority in the Eastern Soudan.
After Osman's departure, matters around Souakim visibly improved. The
tribes brought in cattle frequently, a little trade sprang up, and
things generally wore a more peaceful aspect.
By the month of August, the Haddendowa and Amarar tribes combined
against the Baggara, who were Osman's chief allies, and, obtaining
assistance, in money and food, from the Souakim authorities, advanced
upon Sinkat, intending, if successful there, to attack Osman's position
at Tokar. The united warriors, 700 strong, succeeded only in capturing
some cattle at the former place, after which, meeting with a superior
force, they were compelled to fall back on Tamanieb. No further
assistance being given them, they then broke up and dispersed.
On the 7th October, Osman Digna departed from Tokar to attend a council
held by the Khalifa at Omdurman, in consequence of the defeat and death
of Wad-en-Nejumi, which had meanwhile taken place at the fight at Toski.
In December, Osman left Omdurman, and proceeded by way of Gedaref and
Kassala with the object of gathering followers with whom to renew the
struggle in the Tokar district.
With great difficulty, owing to tribal dissensions, he after some months
got together a force of 10,000, including women and children, which he
conducted to the scene of his former exploits. Owing, however, to the
grain supply from Souakim, on which he had relied for his requirements,
being suddenly stopped, he had a difficulty in feeding his new levies.
The result was that many of them left him and went in search of food and
shelter elsewhere.
In November, 1890, Osman Digna was again at Tokar with a greatly reduced
force, estimated indeed at only 1,000 men, whilst at Handoub but about
150 of his followers remained. From this last point they made occasional
raids in the neighbourhood of Souakim, harassing the friendly tribes,
and generally making things unpleasant so far as the limited numbers of
the aggressors would allow.
The misery and starvation of the well-disposed inhabitants round Souakim
at this time was intense, owing to the gates of the town being closed,
and a cordon being drawn round the forts as a measure of precaution
against the cholera, thus stopping all trade. The Haddendowa, Beni-Amer,
and Amarar tribes implored the Government to assist them in casting off
the Dervish yoke.
This was the position when the moment was deemed favourable for striking
a final blow at Osman Digna, taking Tokar, and pacifying the Eastern
Soudan.
In January, 1891, the situation became all the more favourable for these
operations inasmuch as Osman Digna, towards the end of the month, again
left Tokar, taking with him many of his already reduced garrison.
On 27th January, Colonel Holled-Smith, then in command of the troops at
Souakim, advanced to Handoub with the Egyptian cavalry and the 11th and
12th Battalions of Soudanese Infantry, and, after a short engagement,
captured and occupied the place. Over forty of the Dervishes fell in
the fight, and the remainder dispersed and fled to the hills.
Handoub having fallen, the attack on Tokar was next taken in hand.
For this purpose, on the 8th February, an expeditionary force under
Colonel Holled-Smith was formed. With the addition of some companies of
the 1st Egyptian Battalion, which joined a few days later, it consisted
of nearly 2,000 men, and was composed of 180 cavalry, two large Krupp
guns, two mountain guns, and four battalions of infantry, viz., the 1st
and 4th Egyptian and the 11th and 12th Soudanese. Following the course
pursued in all the former campaigns, the force was sent by sea to
Trinkitat, which was selected as the base of operations. At the same
time a force of 500 friendly natives was raised and sent by land towards
Temerin, to intercept the retreat of the Tokar garrison if opportunity
offered.
By the 15th, the expeditionary troops had reached Trinkitat, and on the
morning of the following day the advance, directed in the first instance
towards the wells of El Teb, commenced. The line of march led over the
site of General Baker's defeat exactly seven years before, and heaps of
white bones still marked the spot. At 3 p.m., the column reached the
wells without encountering any resistance. Here the troops bivouacked,
every precaution being taken to guard against a surprise. On the 18th, a
severe sand-storm prevented the march being resumed, and the troops
remained in camp. In the interval news was received that Osman Digna was
now at a place called Afafit, a village a mile and a half beyond the
ruined town of Tokar, and had with him considerable reinforcements.
On the 19th, at daylight, the column, after leaving a small garrison at
El Teb, advanced upon Tokar. The cavalry in advance first seized and
occupied the ruined Mamourieh or Government buildings, and then at 10
a.m. the infantry were brought up to the north-eastern side of the
village, which consisted merely of crumbling walls. Scarcely was the
place reached when the enemy were seen advancing through the bush
surrounding the "Mamourieh." There was no time to be lost, and the
infantry moved up at the double and formed a semi-circular line of
defence, the 4th Battalion lining the ruined buildings on the right, the
11th Battalion those on the left, whilst the 12th Battalion held those
in the centre of the position. So rapidly was the attack developed that
some Dervishes had actually taken possession of some of the ruins on the
left flank of the Egyptian position before the 11th Battalion had taken
up the defence assigned to them. The main body of the enemy, now only
fifty yards from the front rank of the troops, proceeded to extend to
the right and left to envelop the entire position. Firing began along
the whole line as the enemy came on. The bulk of their force was
directed against the 12th Battalion, their attack being pushed home with
the usual dash and fearlessness. The troops, however, stood their
ground, and did not yield an inch throughout the whole line. Their
firing settled down to steady volleys, which quickly began to check the
onward rush. As soon as this was perceived, the 11th Battalion, moving
from the left, advanced into the bush and cleared it of the attacking
force, taking, at the point of the bayonet, some ruins occupied in
front. The 11th then halted at a commanding point to the south-east of
the original position. The 4th Battalion remained in position on the
right of the line, and, with the transport escort column, protected the
rear, which at one time was seriously threatened by the enemy's
horsemen.
The Dervishes, after the charge of the 11th Battalion, at once commenced
to retreat, followed closely by the cavalry, which, advancing into the
bush on the right, found some open ground, where they did great
execution.
This completed the rout of the Dervish attacking column, which gradually
disappeared to the south in the direction of Temerin.
The troops then formed up on the high ground occupied by the 11th
Battalion and halted for a rest prior to advancing on the Dervish
head-quarters at the village of Afafit. It was reported that Afafit was
occupied in force, but as the troops advanced the enemy, who had
occupied some intervening sand hills, hurriedly retreated, and at 4 p.m.
the village was entered by the cavalry, the inhabitants coming out in
numbers and welcoming the troops with many expressions of joy.
The strength of the Dervish force was estimated at 4,000, but this
included 2,000 men whom Osman Digna kept in reserve, and who never came
into the fight at all. The enemy's loss was put at as high a figure as
700 men, and it must have been considerable even allowing for bad
shooting, no less than 60,000 cartridges having been fired away by the
Egyptian force. This last lost Captain Barrow, of the South Lancashire
Regiment, and nine men killed, besides forty-eight wounded.
On the morning of the following day it was ascertained by a cavalry
reconnaissance that Osman Digna, deserted by all but 300 followers, had
passed through Temerin, going off in the direction of Kassala.
Communication by land was now established with Souakim, and on the 22nd
Afafit was visited by General Grenfell, who reviewed the troops and
congratulated them on their victory of the 19th.[148]
On the 2nd March the expeditionary force was broken up, and after
leaving garrisons at Afafit, El Teb, and Trinkitat, the rest of the
troops returned in triumph to Souakim.
Disturbances in the Eastern Soudan then for a while ceased; a general
amnesty was proclaimed; the tribes hastened to offer assurances of their
loyalty; trade revived; and steps were taken to resume the cultivation
of the fertile lands in the Tokar district.
The concluding events in the Eastern Soudan, though not chronologically
in their place in the present chapter, are here inserted to avoid
recurring to the subject. They may be briefly stated as follows:--
In 1892 the indefatigable Osman Digna once more appeared in the
neighbourhood of Souakim, with a force varying in number from time to
time. His principal object was to raid the local Arabs. In the summer of
that year he attacked the Egyptian post established at Temerin, but was
driven off by Major Hunter, with a loss of seventy men. This and other
attempts led to the strengthening of the Souakim garrison, and Osman
made no further attempts.
Although in 1893 Osman was reported to have received considerable
reinforcements and to be contemplating a fresh advance, it did not come
off.
After a long interval, in 1895, Osman, from his position in the hills,
made a raid into the now cultivated lands of the Tokar delta.
On the 15th April, 1896, an Egyptian force of 1,000 officers and men,
under Colonel Lloyd, left Souakim to co-operate with a detachment of 250
soldiers, under Major Sidney, from Tokar, in supporting a party of
friendly Arabs, headed by a sheikh called Omar Tita, at Horasab, in the
Erkowit Hills, where Osman Digna and a number of Dervishes had
established themselves.
The column, which marched in square formation, arrived at the Teroi
Wells in the afternoon, having covered a distance of nineteen miles.
Here the force bivouacked, and the animals were watered.
The cavalry, under Captain Fenwick, was then ordered to reconnoitre and
to endeavour to establish touch with the Tokar force and inform the
commanding officer that the Souakim force would remain where it was for
the night, so as to enable the Tokar contingent to join. It had been
arranged previously with Omar Tita that he should hold the heights and
the pass of Khor Wintri while the two Egyptian forces concentrated.
While the cavalry were proceeding towards the Khor Wintri they were
suddenly attacked by a body of 200 horsemen, supported by a large force
on foot. The men were ordered to trot, but it was soon seen that the
Dervishes were gaining upon them. The reconnoitring party then galloped
towards the open country. Some, becoming entangled in the bush, fell off
their horses and were speared. Fenwick, with thirty-eight officers and
men, retired to the left flank and ascended a hillock, where they kept
the enemy off by firing volleys all night. The Dervishes made four
attempts to storm the hill, but were on each occasion repulsed.
Meanwhile an officer and thirty-two men rode through the scrub and
returned to Teroi Wells. Colonel Lloyd immediately despatched two
volunteers from the mounted police to endeavour to discover the
whereabouts of Captain Fenwick and the Tokar force, but both men were
killed by the Dervishes.
On the morning of the 16th the Dervishes, hearing heavy firing during
the night from the Khor Wintri, drew off, and Captain Fenwick's party
was then able to make its way back to Teroi Wells and rejoin the force
there.
The return of Captain Fenwick's reconnoitring party to the square at
Teroi Wells was a great relief to the members of the column, who had
entertained the gravest fears for their safety.
The cavalry having rested, the column left Teroi Wells and moved towards
the Khor Wintri to join the Tokar force. Owing to the thickness of the
bush and the roughness of the country, the troops were obliged to
proceed on foot. The camels were not required, and the food and reserve
ammunition were sent on towards the hills held by Omar Tita's men. The
two forces joined in the evening at the Khor Wintri, eight miles from
the bivouac at Teroi Wells.
The column, on arriving at the Khor Wintri, found Major Sidney there
holding the wells, the Dervishes with whom he was in touch having
retreated up the pass.
Major Sidney reported that he had arrived at the Khor Wintri on the
previous afternoon and surprised the Dervishes there. On the approach of
his force a party of Dervishes moved up the hill to the right, and
Sidney sent a party up the hill to check them. The remainder then formed
into square and opened fire upon the main body of the Dervishes, who
were advancing and who numbered about 90 horsemen and 500 spearmen. The
latter attempted to turn the right flank and rear by ascending the
mountains, but in each instance they were met by a heavy fire and
finally retreated up the pass, losing about thirty killed and many
wounded. Only three Soudanese soldiers were wounded.
Shortly after the junction of the Souakim and Tokar forces Omar Tita
arrived in camp. He reported that his tribesmen had abandoned the
heights and pass to the enemy.
It was decided that the column should return to Souakim on the following
day, the enemy having retreated bodily towards Horasab. The column
bivouacked again at Teroi Wells on the 17th, and arrived at Souakim on
the 18th, where it was enthusiastically welcomed by the inhabitants.
The effect of this engagement was that demoralization set in at Osman
Digna's camp. It was known that he had lost over 100 killed and about
the same number wounded. Nevertheless, by making a considerable detour
the remainder of his fighting force managed to reach Horasab, whence
they dispersed among the hills. Thus ended the last fight in the
neighbourhood of Souakim.
The story has now arrived at the point at which the reconquest of
Dongola was decided upon. For this undertaking every available Egyptian
soldier was required, and the Souakim troops having to be withdrawn, a
strong Indian contingent was once more despatched to protect Souakim.
The force, which arrived on the 30th May, consisted of 4,000 men, made
up of the 26th Bengal Infantry, the 35th Sikhs, the 1st Bombay Lancers,
the 5th Bombay Mountain Battery, and two Maxim guns, the whole under the
command of Colonel Egerton.
The duty of the Indian Contingent was simply to act as a garrison for
Souakim, where they remained, but saw no fighting.
A question as to whether the expenses of the Indian troops should be
borne by the taxpayers of the United Kingdom or be thrown on the Indian
Budget was raised soon after the Indian Contingent reached Souakim. The
matter was warmly discussed in the House of Commons on the 6th July. Of
the merits of the case there could hardly be a doubt. The force was sent
to Egypt in order to set free the Souakim garrison which was required
for the Dongola expedition, a matter in which India had not the remotest
interest. It could not be pretended that the Khalifa was in any way a
source of danger to the Suez Canal, the great highway to India, or that
he threatened the interests of that dependency in the slightest degree.
Nevertheless on a division, by 252 votes to 106, the House decided that
India was to bear the burden (about £5,000 a month), England paying only
the expenses of the transport of the troops, a conclusion so obviously
unjust that it shocked the national conscience, and for a time seriously
endangered the popularity of Lord Salisbury's Government.