THE EASTERN SOUDAN.
Any history of the military operations in Egypt, during the period
comprised in the accompanying chapters, would be incomplete without a
notice of the events which were in the meantime taking place in the
Eastern Soudan.
In May, 1885, when Graham's force withdrew from Souakim, General Hudson
took over the command. The troops left to protect the town consisted of
930 Europeans, 2,405 Indians, and the Egyptians forming the regular
garrison.
Osman Digna, with the greater part of his followers, was again at
Tamaai, and had also a small force at Hasheen. The fall of Kassala soon
after, by setting free the besieging force, enabled Osman still further
to strengthen his position in the neighbourhood of Souakim.[142] Under
these circumstances, General Hudson was compelled to remain strictly on
the defensive.
It would be both long and wearisome to attempt to describe the various
incidents which occurred during many of the succeeding months.
Day after day the Dervish scouts approached the forts, and cavalry
patrols went out and fired upon them; night after night parties of the
enemy took up positions from which they fired on the town, and remained
until dislodged by the shell fired from the forts and from the
man-of-war stationed in the harbour. Thus Souakim continued to be
besieged, the enemy refraining from any serious attack, and devoting
themselves principally to raiding the friendly tribes in the adjoining
territory.
On 11th May, 1886, the remainder of the British and Indian troops left,
and Major Watson took command as Governor-General of the Eastern Soudan.
The garrison at this time consisted of 2,500 Egyptians.
In June, the prospect began to brighten. The Dervishes withdrew their
patrols round Souakim, and evacuated Hasheen and Handoub. The friendlies
then began to take courage, and made advances upon Tamaai, which they
blockaded, and eventually occupied on 11th September, the Soudanese
garrison retiring with loss into a fort near the village.
On the 7th October the friendlies scored a further success. After being
twice repulsed, they assaulted and took the fort after an hour's
fighting, killing some 200 of the defenders and capturing eighteen guns.
The redoubtable Osman Digna, being wanted at Omdurman, had previously
withdrawn, and no hostile force now remained in the Eastern Soudan.
Two thousand pounds was paid to the friendlies by way of subsidy, and
trade with the interior was opened.
In November, Colonel Kitchener, who had succeeded Major Watson, reported
"the collapse of Osman Digna's power," and a season of greater
tranquillity than Souakim had known for years was experienced.
In January, 1887, affairs at Souakim had even further settled down, and
many of the hostile tribes expressed a desire to come to terms, but, in
June, news arrived that from 2,000 to 3,000 Dervishes, mostly Baggaras,
were advancing from Kassala to relieve Tokar, at that time besieged by
the friendlies. The arrival of the Baggaras at Tokar tended to revive
the fanatical spirit at that place, but had not much influence on the
surrounding tribes, who refused to present themselves there when
summoned by Osman Digna.
In July, Osman was again called to Omdurman, and in his absence nothing
particular was done in the neighbourhood of Souakim. During the autumn,
things looked so peaceful that the garrison was reduced by the
withdrawal of two battalions, and news of this circumstance reaching
Osman, who had then returned to Kassala, he at once collected some 5,000
men and marched to Handoub. By 18th December he was again master of the
whole country up to the walls of Souakim, which once more was in a state
of siege. On 17th December, an attack was made on the Water Forts, and
repulsed. A deserter reported that at Handoub and Tamaai a fighting
force of 5,000 men was preparing to capture Souakim by a rush, and that
the scheme would be carried out at daybreak very shortly.
In January, 1888, frequent night attacks were made; but they were
invariably repulsed by the fire from the men-of-war in the harbour. On
the 17th, a party of friendlies attacked the Dervish camp at daybreak.
Mounted troops from Souakim went in support. The friendlies surprised
and captured the enemy's camp. Then the Dervishes scattered in the
pursuit re-entered the position from the rear, and drove off the
friendlies with considerable loss. The whole Egyptian force then
retreated to Souakim, pursued for four or five miles by the victorious
Dervishes. In this engagement Kitchener and Lieutenant McMurdo were
wounded, and eleven soldiers and friendlies were killed. As a result of
the engagement, Kitchener was warned that in future he should not take
part in similar operations with British officers or Egyptian regulars.
The intention was to capture Osman Digna, but although seen in the
distance, he succeeded in escaping at the moment when the fortune of war
appeared to be going against him.
Emboldened by this success, the Dervishes began to display increased
activity round Souakim, the neighbourhood of which was infested with
marauding bands. On the 3rd March, a large party established themselves
by night at a disused position called Fort Hudson, and kept up a
continuous fire on the town. On the morning of the 4th, numbers of the
enemy were seen advancing, and H.M.S. _Dolphin_ opened fire at 10 a.m.
The Egyptian forces, to the number of 450 men, advanced to endeavour to
drive the enemy from Fort Hudson, the friendly Amarar tribe assisting.
The position, however, was too strong, and they were repulsed. To make
matters worse, just at the moment when a reinforcement of the enemy
necessitated the retirement a shell from the man-of-war, aimed at the
Dervishes, burst among the friendlies, who, suddenly scared, fell back
in disorder upon the regulars, who had nothing left to do but retreat
with all possible speed. The Dervish force maintained its position
during the remainder of the day under a heavy cross-fire. At nightfall
the Dervishes drew off and made no further attempt to reoccupy the
position. The Egyptian loss in this highly unsuccessful sortie was
Colonel Tapp and eight men killed and seventeen wounded, without
counting the poor friendlies.
After the affair of the 4th March things resumed a comparatively quiet
condition for some months. The enemy's cavalry from time to time came
within range, and a few shots were exchanged, but nothing serious was
attempted on either side. The inaction of the blockading force was
doubtless due in great measure to the dissensions which at this period
broke out amongst the hostile tribes, some of whom were anxious to take
Souakim by assault, whilst others deemed it useless to make the attempt.
The result was a series of quarrels, which nearly led to actual
fighting.
On the night of the 17th September, however, the aspect of things
changed, and without any previous warning a force of some 500 men of the
Jaalin and Baggara tribes intrenched themselves at a distance of 1,000
yards from the Water Forts, with the intention of cutting off the water
supply, and commenced firing on the town. This was kept up continuously
for some time by day and night, and frequent casualties occurred. On the
22nd the enemy placed a gun on the ridge between the Water Forts, and
shelled the town until compelled by the fire from the lines to withdraw.
It was now evident that at any moment a determined attempt might be made
to capture the town, and reinforcements were urgently called for. In
response to the appeal, an additional vessel of war and another
battalion were sent to Souakim.
Meanwhile, the besiegers still continued active in the trenches, which
they pushed forward to within 600 yards of the defensive works. Their
fire began to get exceedingly accurate, though but little harm was done.
Early in November General Grenfell arrived with two divisions of Horse
Artillery and six mortars, which it was hoped would make the enemy's
position in the trenches untenable. After taking a survey of the
situation, Grenfell decided that it was necessary to drive the Arabs
from their trenches as soon as a sufficient force should be assembled to
make the operation practicable.
Two more Egyptian battalions, marching _viá_ Keneh and Kosseir, reached
Souakim in the beginning of December. In addition to this reinforcement,
and in consequence of doubts being entertained at home as to how far the
Egyptian troops could be relied on to face the Soudanese alone and
unsupported, the 2nd Battalion of the Scottish Borderers and 100 of the
British Mounted Infantry were sent from Cairo. This brought the entire
force up to 750 British troops, 2,000 Egyptians, and 2,000 Soudanese.
A reconnaissance made by the cavalry on the 9th December having been
forced to retire before a strong body of the enemy's horsemen, it was
recognized that the cavalry force ought to be strengthened. In
consequence of this, a squadron of the 20th Hussars was sent from Cairo.
Apprehension being still expressed as to the sufficiency of Grenfell's
force, half of the 1st Battalion of the Welsh Regiment was also
despatched.
By the 18th, the additional troops had all arrived, and everything was
prepared for the impending attack.[143] The enemy's trenches were
situated between 800 and 900 yards south-west of the two Water Forts,
Ghemaiza and Shaata, and extended in a long irregular line. The ground
to the west of the northern flank was clear and practicable for cavalry,
while to the north of the northern flank was a depression which would
enable the troops to form up for attack before coming under fire. This
circumstance decided General Grenfell to attack on the north flank,
whilst at the same time making a feint on the south flank.
It was arranged to make the attack a surprise, and with this object a
naval demonstration was prepared at Mersa Kuwai, eight miles to the
north of Souakim, and visible from Osman Digna's camp at Handoub. It was
also decided that, previous to the actual attack, the trenches were to
be vigorously cannonaded by the guns from the lines, and H.M.S. _Racer_.
At 6 a.m. on the 20th, the artillery fire commenced along the whole line
of defence, and the troops marched out to the attack. The 1st Brigade,
under Colonel Kitchener, was composed of the 9th, 10th, and 12th
Soudanese Battalions; the 2nd Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Holled-Smith, consisted of the 4th Egyptian Battalion and the 11th
Soudanese. The Scottish Borderers and the 3rd Egyptian Battalion marched
out independently, and took up a position in the rear of the Water Forts
at 6.30 a.m.
The two brigades now advanced to a position parallel to the extreme
north flank of the enemy's trenches, where they formed front and moved
steadily towards the works. When within 600 yards the troops came under
fire. The advance was continued without replying until within 200 yards,
when the brigades, advancing by quick rushes and opening a heavy
fusillade, reached the trenches and captured them at the point of the
bayonet. Here the greatest slaughter took place, and the survivors,
attempting to rally on their right flank, were dispersed by the 11th
Soudanese, who, in their eagerness to fight, had broken their square and
deployed. During the attack on the trenches, the cavalry remained on the
right of the infantry, guarding their flank. The Horse Artillery Battery
at this period came up and shelled the redoubt on the south flank of
the intrenchments, which had also been exposed to a heavy infantry fire
from the Welsh Regiment and the 3rd Egyptian Battalion, which had
advanced from their position behind the Water Forts. The two Egyptian
brigades now cleared the whole line of intrenchments from north to
south, and, with the Mounted Infantry on the north flank, poured steady
volleys upon the Dervishes, by this time in full retreat upon Handoub.
An attempt made by the enemy's horsemen to work round the right flank of
the attacking line at an earlier stage of the action was defeated by the
20th Hussars, who charged and drove them in disorder in the direction of
Hasheen.
By 8 a.m. the whole thing was over, the position was taken, and the
bugles sounded "Cease firing." The cavalry, however, continued to pursue
the retreating enemy, whilst the rest of the troops intrenched
themselves in zeribas on the captured position.
The defeat of Osman Digna's followers was most complete. Out of a force
of a little over 1,500 men, they had 500 killed either in the fight or
during the pursuit. On the other side the loss was insignificant, being
only six killed and forty-six wounded. It must be admitted that the
Dervish force was vastly inferior in point of numbers to their
opponents,[144] who also possessed the advantages of superior skill and
discipline. Even making every allowance for these circumstances, it is
difficult to account for the trifling loss sustained by the
Anglo-Egyptian troops, except on the hypothesis that they never, in
point of fact, encountered any real resistance. Another circumstance was
that the Dervish force was left to defend their position against greatly
superior numbers without being reinforced. This may perhaps be explained
by the diversion caused by the naval demonstration made at Mersa Kuwai,
and which no doubt caused Osman Digna to imagine that a serious attack
at that point was also contemplated.
The effect of Grenfell's victory on the local tribes must have been very
great, and the idea naturally was that an immediate advance of the
Egyptian troops would be made. This, however, formed no part of the
General's instructions, which were simply to drive the enemy from their
trenches, and on no account to advance against Osman Digna at Handoub.
Before leaving, Grenfell approved plans made for the construction of
additional forts and redoubts, so as to prevent the enemy being able in
future to intrench themselves within range of the town, and his mission
being accomplished, he then returned to Cairo.
The British troops were next withdrawn, and Colonel Kitchener, who was
left in command of the garrison of 2,000 men, maintained a purely
defensive attitude.