FINANCE, THE SUEZ CANAL, AND THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION.
In the year 1885, each of the subjects mentioned in the heading of the
present chapter came prominently to the front. In the following pages it
is proposed to deal with the different matters in succession.
_Finance._ In July, 1885, Egypt, thanks to the good offices of Great
Britain, was enabled to arrange a very thorny question which had arisen
with regard to her finance. To explain what occurred, it is necessary to
refer to the events which had previously taken place.
Under the financial decrees of Ismail Pasha, certain revenues were
assigned to the Public Debt Commissioners to provide for the interest
and Sinking Fund of the debt. Although, by the Law of Liquidation
accepted by the Powers in 1880, the rate of interest was reduced, the
provision for the Sinking Fund was left untouched, and the result was
that the debt was gradually reduced by about a million. This, however,
was too good a state of things to last. The expenses caused by the
insurrection in the Soudan, the necessity of providing for the payment
of the Alexandria indemnities, and other pressing claims, not only
rendered it impossible for Egypt to continue the reduction of her
existing debt, but made it indispensable to contract a fresh one in the
shape of a new loan.
In March, 1884, at the invitation of Lord Granville, a conference of the
Great Powers was held in London to discuss the situation. To purchase
the goodwill of France, what became known as "The Anglo-French
Convention" was entered into. By this, subject to the acceptance by the
Powers of the British financial proposals, the British troops in Egypt
were to be withdrawn at a fixed date, unless the Powers, in the
meantime, should agree to their remaining. Lord Granville pointed out
the absurdity of Egypt continuing to pay off her old debts at a moment
when the funds at her disposal were insufficient to meet her current
expenditure. The British proposals, which involved not only a suspension
of the Sinking Fund, but also a further diminution in the rate of
interest, were opposed by the French representative; and Lord Granville,
in a somewhat summary manner, dissolved the conference. Lord Northbrook
was then despatched to Egypt as High Commissioner, and in September,
1884, no means having been discovered of relieving the financial
tension, the Egyptian Government, under his advice, adopted the strong
measure of directing the governors of the provinces, as well as the
heads of the customs and railway administrations, to pay directly to the
Treasury the balance of their receipts for the current half-year (which
closed on the 25th October), instead of to the "Caisse" of the debt. It
is worthy of remark that there was at this time sufficient money in the
"Caisse" to pay the interest on the debt, and the funds intercepted
would simply have gone to swell the Sinking Fund. The step,
nevertheless, was a clear violation of the existing arrangements between
Egypt and her creditors, and naturally raised a storm. Protests rained
in from all quarters; and some of the Powers, notably France, Germany,
and Russia, used strong language. The Commissioners of the debt also
attacked the Khedive's Ministers in the Mixed Tribunals. The Egyptian
Government, realizing that it had got into a "tight place," again by
British advice, meekly bowed its head and directed the payments to the
"Caisse" to be resumed. The Cairo Mixed Tribunal on the 18th December
gave judgment directing the Government to refund the money diverted.
This they were absolutely unable to do, and an appeal was lodged, partly
to gain time and partly because the negotiations with the Powers,
abruptly broken off by Lord Granville, had been in the meantime renewed.
At last, on the 18th March, 1885, "The London Convention" came to the
aid of Nubar Pasha and his Cabinet. The effect of this agreement and the
declarations dated the 17th March annexed to it was that the Powers
acquiesced in the issue of a new loan of £9,000,000. Foreigners were
made liable to certain taxes, and the Law of Liquidation was modified.
Further than this, the Mixed Tribunals were declared incompetent to
proceed with the action against the Government. On 27th July, 1885, a
decree embodying these terms was signed, and a situation full of
embarrassment was happily put an end to.
_The Suez Canal._ It should be mentioned that in the declarations
annexed to "The London Convention" was one which provided that a
commission composed of delegates of the Great Powers should assemble at
an early date to consider the measures to be adopted to secure the free
navigation of the Suez Canal in time of war. What possible connection
there was between this question and that of Egyptian finance it is hard
to say, but, the engagement having been made, it had to be carried out,
and the negotiations were at once taken in hand.
The International Commission for dealing with the matter held its first
sitting in Paris on the 30th March, 1885, and proceeded to discuss the
various points involved.
As stated in a previous chapter, the attention of the Powers had been
called to the matter by Lord Granville, then Foreign Secretary, as far
back as the 3rd January, 1883, though thus far no progress had been
made.
By the 13th June, 1885, the Commission had agreed on the text of a
convention by which the freedom of navigation of the Canal in war-time
was to be secured, and the Commission then concluded its sittings.
It should be mentioned that the British delegates, in approving the
arrangement, formally declared that they did so under express
reservation against the application of any of the clauses which might be
incompatible with the existing situation in Egypt, or which might fetter
the action of Her Majesty's Government or the movements of Her Majesty's
forces during the British occupation of Egypt. From the date last
mentioned, the question was under discussion by the respective
Governments till more than three years later, when the Convention was
concluded, and finally ratified by the Powers on the 22nd December,
1888.
The principal provisions of the Convention were the following, viz.:--
That the Canal should be open to both merchant vessels and men-of-war
both in time of war and peace; that the Canal should not be subject to
the exercise of the right of blockade; that no act of hostility should
be committed in the Canal, its ports of access, or within a radius of
three miles; that vessels of belligerents should only take in supplies
so far as they were actually necessary, and that their stay in port
should be limited to twenty-four hours; that the like interval should
elapse between the sailing of a belligerent vessel and the departure of
a vessel of a hostile Power; that no belligerent Power should disembark
or embark either troops or munitions of war; that no vessel of war
belonging to the contracting Powers should be stationed in the Canal,
and not more than two at Port Saïd or Suez; that the restrictions
imposed should not apply to measures which the Sultan or the Khedive
might take for the defence of Egypt by their own forces or for the
maintenance of public order; and that no fortifications should be
erected.
Referring to a former chapter dealing with M. de. Lesseps' contention as
to the neutrality of the Canal, it is worthy of note that in no part of
the Convention does the word "neutrality" occur, and it is a fact that
in Lord Salisbury's instructions to the British delegates they were
expressly warned to avoid using that expression and to substitute for it
the term "freedom of navigation."
_The Army of Occupation._ In August, 1885, the continued presence of the
Army of Occupation (then 14,000 in number) had for some time been
producing increased irritation on the part of the Sultan, and also of
the French Government. Sir H. Drummond-Wolff was then sent to the East
with the object of endeavouring to arrive at some understanding with
regard to the withdrawal of the British troops. The British envoy was
also, in combination with the Turkish commissioner Moukhtar Pasha, to
consider the steps to be taken for tranquillizing the Soudan, and to
inquire what changes might be necessary in the civil administration of
Egypt.
The British commissioner was received by the Sultan on 29th August, and
having signed a preliminary convention with the Turkish Minister of
Foreign Affairs at Constantinople, came on to Cairo two months later,
where he was joined by his colleague.
Their joint inquiry lasted till the end of 1886, and resulted in various
suggestions which were not adopted.
In January, 1887, the Sultan, backed by France, was pressing the British
Government to name a day for the evacuation, and, with a view to meeting
his views as far as possible, a definite convention on the subject was
signed by the two commissioners on the 22nd May, 1887.
According to this agreement, the British troops were to withdraw at the
end of three years, unless at the expiration of that period external or
internal danger should render the postponement of the evacuation
necessary, in which case the troops were to be withdrawn as soon as the
danger should have disappeared. Two years after the withdrawal, the
supervision exercised by Great Britain over the Egyptian army was to
cease. Thenceforward Egypt was to enjoy territorial immunity, and, on
the ratification of the Convention, the Powers were to be invited to
recognize and guarantee the inviolability of Egyptian territory.
Nevertheless, the Convention continued, the Turkish Government was to
have the right to occupy the country militarily if there should be
danger from invasion without, or if order and security were threatened
within. On the other hand, the British Government reserved the right to
send, in the above-mentioned cases, troops which would take the measures
necessary to remove those dangers. Lastly, both the Ottoman and British
troops were to withdraw as soon as the causes calling for their
intervention should be removed.
The essential point in the agreement was the recognition, by the Sultan,
of England's right to reoccupy Egypt, on emergency, and this at once
gave rise to trouble.
As soon as the terms of the Convention were communicated to the French
Government, the French Ambassador was rampant everywhere, and both he
and his Russian colleague at Constantinople made the most violent
opposition. They lost no opportunity of putting pressure on the Sultan,
who at first was disposed to abide by the arrangement. They went so far
as to declare that, if he ratified the Convention, France and Russia
would thereby have a right to occupy provinces of the Turkish Empire,
and to leave only after a similar convention should be concluded with
them. They also hinted that France might do this in Syria, and Russia in
Armenia. Austria, Germany, and Italy, on the other hand, urged the
ratification of the Convention, but the poor Sultan was too much alarmed
to consent, and, on the 14th July, proposed to England to throw over the
agreement which his Ministers had signed, and to reopen negotiations for
a new convention altogether.
This was a little too much for Lord Salisbury, then Foreign Secretary
and Prime Minister. Needless to say the mission of the British envoy,
upon which £25,046 in money and two years in time had been wasted, came
to an end, and Sir H. Drummond-Wolff, who had already been waiting for a
month to obtain the desired ratification, left Constantinople on the
15th. His colleague, Moukhtar Pasha, whose occupation was now gone,
nevertheless remained in Egypt, where he is to be found at the present
date, drawing a handsome salary, but with no defined duties.
The failure of the negotiations was probably as little regretted by Lord
Salisbury as it was by everybody else having the welfare of Egypt at
heart. Although the time may arrive when that country will be in a
position to walk alone, in 1890 (the period fixed for the withdrawal of
the Army of Occupation) that time had not been reached. The reforms
inaugurated were then only beginning to bear fruit, and, without the
supporting influence afforded by the presence of British troops, ran the
risk of being only imperfectly carried into effect, even if they did not
perish altogether.
It must be conceded that, considered merely as a military force, the
presence of the Army of Occupation has for years ceased to be necessary.
British Ministers have over and over again declared that England's
intervention in Egypt was for the purpose of suppressing anarchy,
supporting the authority of the Khedive, and restoring public order. No
one can deny that all these objects have long since been attained, and
those who attempt to justify the retention of the British troops on the
supposition that their withdrawal might be followed by fresh troubles
adopt an argument similar to that of a person who, having extinguished a
conflagration in his neighbour's house, should persist in occupying it
on the pretence that the fire might break out again.
But regarded as a moral support to England in carrying out her extended
programme of reforming Egyptian institutions, the presence of the Army
of Occupation may be for some time to come a necessity.
Writing on this subject, Sir Alfred Milner, in his admirable work
"England in Egypt," remarks as follows:--
"The British troops have of course no sort of status in the
country. They are not the soldiers of the Khedive, or foreign
soldiers invited by the Khedive; they are not the soldiers of
the protecting Power, because in theory there is no protecting
Power. In theory, their presence is an accident, and their
character that of simple visitors. At the present moment they
are no longer, from the military point of view, of vital
importance, for their numbers have been repeatedly reduced, and
for several years past they have not exceeded, and do not now
(1892) exceed, 3,000 men. It is true that their presence
relieves a certain portion of the Egyptian army from duties it
would otherwise have to perform, and that, if the British troops
were altogether withdrawn, the number of Egyptian soldiers might
have to be somewhat increased. But its value as part of the
defensive forces of the country does not, of course, constitute
the real importance and meaning of the British Army of
Occupation. It is as the outward and visible sign of the
predominance of British influence, of the special interest taken
by Great Britain in the affairs of Egypt, that that army is such
an important element in the present situation. Its moral effect
is out of all proportion to its actual strength. The presence of
a single British regiment lends a weight they would not
otherwise possess to the counsels of the British Consul-General.
Take the troops away, and you must either run the risk of a
decline of British influence, which would imperil the work of
reform, or devise, for a time at least, some new and equivalent
support for that influence, a problem not perhaps impossible,
but certainly difficult of solution."