BAKER'S DEFEAT AT EL-TEB.
The morning of the 4th February, 1884, was dull with heavy showers. The
troops were paraded before daybreak. At 6.30 the force marched in the
direction of Tokar. The formation was as follows:--Three infantry
battalions in echelon, and marching in columns of companies; artillery
and cavalry on the front and flanks, and cavalry vedettes extending all
round at points a mile distant from the main body. The baggage,
transported by 300 camels, was in the rear, guarded by 200 blacks.
The country was open, but scattered here and there were patches of scrub
and thorny mimosa bushes. The scrub grew thicker as the force advanced;
but the ground was still sufficiently open for the operations of
cavalry.
After the force had marched about six miles, shots were heard from the
vedettes on the left front, and small numbers of the enemy were sighted
in the distance right ahead. A halt was at once called. The scouts
reported that the enemy was concealed in some bushes in advance of the
left front. Twice a Krupp gun was brought up and some shells fired
amongst them, causing them to fall back. The march was then resumed.
Bands of Arabs were next seen on the ridges, both in front and towards
the right, and in the latter direction a small body of horsemen,
apparently scouts, appeared in sight about a mile off. Major Giles was
ordered to charge them with the cavalry. This he at once did; but after
dispersing them, and wheeling towards the front, he suddenly came upon a
large number of spearmen, who sprang up from out of the brushwood. Major
Giles would have charged them, but his men, after their long gallop,
were in too loose order; there was no time to form, and nothing remained
but to fall back upon the main body. As the cavalry retired, the mounted
skirmishers joined them, and the Arabs followed close upon their heels.
In the meanwhile, the enemy opened a musketry fire simultaneously on the
front and both flanks. The force was taken by surprise, though warnings
of what was coming might have been detected previously, as the vedettes
on the left had for some time been drawing nearer to the main body.
This, however, seems to have been overlooked. The scouts were now seen
hastily retreating, and a large body of the enemy came swarming over the
hills. The intention seemed to be to rush upon the army on all sides.
To repel the impending attack, Sartorius Pasha, who was in advance with
Baker, was sent to form the infantry into a single large square, with
the camels and baggage in the centre. Two companies of the Alexandria
battalion at first refused to obey orders, and stood like a
panic-stricken flock of sheep; but at length the infantry formed in
front, on the left flank, and also on part of the right flank. On the
remaining part, however, and also along the whole of what would have
been the rear of the square, the companies were a noisy, confused
rabble, the soldiers being mixed up with the camels and baggage in wild
disorder.
This was the state of things when the enemy, numbers of whom had been
concealed in the brushwood, rushed on with loud yells, delivering their
chief attack upon the left side of the force, and upon the left portion
of the front line.
The frantic efforts of the Egyptians to get into proper formation, the
confused din of orders, and the chaos in the rear, where 300 camels with
the whole of the transport were struggling to force their way into the
interior, defy description. The square was formed eventually, but the
rear side was but an irregular outbulging mass of horses, mules, camels,
and men, tightly wedged together, and extending towards the centre. The
confusion was increased by the cavalry skirmishers, who, when the rush
came, charged panic-stricken right into the square, many of them being
shot by their comrades, who by this time were firing wildly in all
directions.
The enemy were now rapidly encircling the entire force, which was
delivering a tremendous fire mostly into the air. Under cover of the
smoke the rush was made. The Egyptian infantry on being attacked broke
almost at once, falling back into the centre of the square, and forcing
the transport animals upon the rear of the Soudanese black troops. These
last stood well for some time, but after a while became demoralized by
the rush of fellow-soldiers and camels from behind.
The right of the square was not at first assailed, and here the men for
some time kept up a continuous fire towards the front, with the result
of killing many of their own cavalry.[94] Into the gaps made in the
square the enemy now poured in hundreds, and all became panic and
confusion. Sartorius, who, with his staff, was inside the square, tried
to rally his men. The task was a hopeless one.
At the time the charge was made on the left flank of the column, Baker
with Colonel Hay and the rest of his staff were out with the cavalry in
front. Upon riding back they found that the enemy had already got
between them and the square. They succeeded in cutting their way
through, though the General and Hay had narrow escapes from the spears
thrown at them. On nearing the square they had to run the gauntlet of
the fire of the Egyptians in front, who, regardless of what was going on
around, were blazing away before them. When Baker reached the square the
enemy had already broken it up, and it was clear that all was lost. In
eight minutes from the time of the rush the whole force was in hopeless
flight.
The scene on all sides baffles description; of those inside the square
very few escaped, they got jammed in amongst the mass of baggage-camels
and had but a poor chance of firing or defending themselves.
The Egyptian cavalry were the first to run. They fired off their
carbines into the air without taking aim at anything, and then bolted at
full speed. Sartorius and his staff, who with difficulty succeeded in
extricating themselves from the square, were sent off by Baker to
endeavour to get the flying cavalry to halt and make a charge. After
shooting two of his men, Sartorius succeeded in effecting a momentary
halt; but the instant his back was turned they were off again in full
flight.
The Soudanese warriors displayed the most reckless bravery. One of them
was seen charging alone a whole company of infantry. The Egyptians
offered no resistance, and the rebels with their two-edged swords and
spears were slaughtering them by hundreds. What had been the square was
now a seething, surging mass of men and camels.
The Turks and the European Police, who, in spite of the rush, had
managed to get together near the guns, alone made a stand, and were
annihilated almost to a man. The European officers, cut off from the
main body by the rush of the enemy, formed a little group apart, and
were bravely defending themselves with their swords and revolvers.
Morice Bey, after he had received a spear-thrust through the side,
killed no less than three of his assailants. When last seen alive, he
was standing in the left front face of the square alongside the camel
conveying the £400, of which he was in charge, and reloading his
revolver, whilst he waved on his men. Near Morice Bey, and close to the
guns,[95] were Surgeon Leslie, Captain Forrestier-Walker, and Lieutenant
Carroll. When last seen Dr. Leslie was sabreing the Arabs who swarmed
over and under the wheels of the Gatlings, and Forrestier-Walker was
shooting his men as they attempted to run from the guns. All four
remained at their posts until speared by the rebels.
All around, the scene was simply one of savage massacre. The Egyptians,
paralyzed by fear, turned their backs, submitting to be killed rather
than attempt to defend their lives; hundreds threw away their rifles,
knelt down, raised their clasped hands, and prayed for mercy.
The Arabs displayed the utmost contempt for their opponents. They seized
them by the neck, or speared them through the back, and then cut their
throats. One was seen to pick up a rifle thrown away by a soldier and
brain him with his own weapon. Another rode in among a crowd of
retreating Egyptians, hacking and hewing about him with his long sword.
An Egyptian officer whom he attacked, instead of defending himself,
raised his shoulders to his ears, and lay down over his horse's neck. In
that position, with his hands grasping the mane, he meekly took the
blows of his assailant until the latter was killed by a shot from an
English officer's revolver. The yells of the savages and the cries of
the victims are described as appalling.
After having made his ineffectual effort to stop the cavalry, Sartorius
ordered Lieutenant Maxwell to gallop after them, already in full flight
to Trinkitat, and try to rally them. Maxwell overtook them. He gave his
instructions to the Egyptian officer in command. The latter would not
even try to get his men together. He refused thrice. Maxwell then shot
him through the head. He succeeded in rallying some forty or fifty men;
but another band of fugitives coming up, swept them off as in a deluge.
The road back to Trinkitat became nothing but a long line of fugitives.
The men not only threw away their arms and accoutrements, but even great
part of their clothing, in order to get away the faster. Officers were
seen to shoot their own men for the sake of obtaining their horses.
A large body of Arabs followed the flying soldiers at a steady pace,
stabbing them through the back as they overtook them. Some few of the
Soudanese troops who had retained their rifles occasionally turned and
fired as they retreated, but most of the fugitives were too overcome by
terror to resist. As the pursuers neared them, they threw themselves
screaming on the ground, and were speared or sabred one after another.
This carnage lasted during a pursuit of upwards of five miles.
The enemy pursued right up to Fort Baker, as the fortification on the
mainland side of the lagoon was called. The garrison left to defend the
work had long since taken flight. Sartorius and the surviving English
officers formed a cordon across the narrow neck of land. Their purpose
was to stop all but the wounded, but the endeavour failed. The fugitives
in hundreds rushed on, many of them in a state of absolute nudity. The
cavalry positively refused to obey the orders of the English, their own
officers having already fled to Trinkitat. They even threw away their
saddles, and turned their horses loose, making the rest of their way to
the beach on foot, in order that they might not be sent out to fight
again.
Fortunately, the enemy did not follow up the pursuit beyond Fort Baker,
otherwise scarcely any of the army would have escaped. Baker was one of
the last to return to the fort. Finding it impossible to rally any of
the men at the fort, Sartorius was sent on to man the lines of
Trinkitat, in order to protect the embarkation. Arrived at Trinkitat, he
succeeded to some extent in manning the lines with the few men in whose
hands rifles remained.
The fugitives ran pell-mell towards the boats, which, had they not
already been aground, would have been sunk by the numbers who crowded
into them. Many of the men waded into the sea in their eagerness to get
off to the transports, and it was only by firing upon them with
revolvers that the officers could induce them to return to the shore,
and wait for their turn to embark. The first troops ordered on board
were those who possessed no arms. Stores and horses were embarked during
the night on board the various steamers waiting. Baker and Sartorius,
and the other English officers, remained on shore to superintend the
embarkation. Although there were indications of the presence of the
enemy no attempt at attack was made.
The total number on the Egyptian side killed in the battle was 2,373,
out of a force numbering altogether 3,746.
The following European officers were killed:--
Morice Bey, Captains Forrestier-Walker and Rucca, Lieutenants Carroll,
Smith, Watkins, Cavalieri, Bertin, Morisi, de Marchi, and Dr. Leslie.
Four Krupp guns and two Gatlings were left in the hands of the enemy. As
each man carried 100 rounds of ammunition, and 100 more were in reserve,
at least half a million cartridges, as well as 3,000 Remington rifles
and carbines, were also lost.
The enemy's losses were at first estimated at about 1,000, but it is
obvious that they must have been much under that figure, for there was
little real resistance. A later estimate of 350 would probably be nearly
correct. Indeed, the whole of the rebel force was reckoned by the
English officers as not more than 1,200, and Baker Pasha has put them as
low as 1,000.
It is difficult to avoid seeing that some blame for the disaster
attaches to Baker. He knew, or ought to have known, the composition of
the troops he commanded, and that the short training they had undergone
was insufficient to render them fit to take the field. There was,
indeed, the pressing necessity for relieving the garrisons of Tokar and
Sinkat, and this is about the only thing to be said in his
justification.
The question whether or not Baker was surprised has been much discussed.
One thing is clear. If he were not surprised, his army undoubtedly was.
As already mentioned, the enemy rushed in before there was time to form
the square properly. It has been argued that it could not be a surprise,
because the enemy were sighted more than a mile off, and fired at as
well. The obvious answer is, that if they had been sighted and fired at
twenty miles off, it would have made the matter no better, if after all,
the rush found Baker unprepared. The more abundant the warning, the
heavier the blame upon those who failed to profit by it. There may
possibly have been no surprise, in the sense of the enemy jumping up out
of the bush when nobody dreamt of their existence. But to deny that the
enemy were upon the force before the latter was prepared to receive
them--that, in short, the battle was lost before the men had time to
defend themselves--the most ardent admirer of the General will hardly
attempt.
Further, military critics are of opinion that even with disciplined
troops the formation of 3,000 men into a single square was a hazardous
experiment. The infantry might have been drawn up in three echeloned
squares. Each of these would then have been capable of giving support to
the others. If one square had been broken, the others might have stood
firm. The Turks, as their behaviour showed, might have been trusted to
hold fast in a square of their own. A large proportion of the blacks
would certainly have had more confidence had they been drawn up by
themselves. But the mixture of Turks and blacks with the cowardly
Egyptians was inevitably fatal. Even with good troops, Baker's
arrangements would probably have led to failure. But with an army mainly
composed of impressed slaves and the sweepings of the Cairo and Suez
bazaars, the only result could be destruction.
Disastrous as the result was, it is probable that had the Arab assault
been delivered five miles further on the march toward Trinkitat, the
annihilation of the Egyptian force would have been as complete as that
which befell Hicks Pasha's ill-fated column.
On the night of the 5th February, the transports, with Baker, Sartorius,
and the remainder of the troops, arrived at Souakim, where the news of
the disaster created a panic. In order to provide against an attack by
the rebels, and also to preserve order in the town, Admiral Hewett, on
the 6th, landed a party of bluejackets and Marines with Gatling guns.
With the remnant of Baker's troops, nearly 3,000 men were available for
the defence of the town, but the majority were completely demoralized.
In every part of the town and on the road to the camp were heart-rending
scenes, women and children weeping for husbands and fathers killed in
the late battle. Even for the purpose of holding Souakim, the Egyptian
troops could not be relied upon, whilst the townspeople, infected with
religious mania, threatened to turn on the Europeans.
On the 9th it was decided to declare Souakim in a state of siege, and to
give the British officers full powers, military and civil, over the
town. The Egyptian Government were at the same time notified that in the
event of Souakim being attacked it would be defended by a British force.
On the same day spies from Sinkat brought a letter from Tewfik Bey to
the effect that the garrison having eaten the camels, and even the cats
and dogs, were subsisting on roots and the leaves of trees.
The force at Souakim was now employed working day and night
strengthening the intrenchments and fortifications. A further force of
Marines and bluejackets landed from the fleet, occupying the new
barracks which had been made in the centre of the lines. This post was
surrounded by a trench, and made impregnable. The advanced lines, about
a mile in length, were to be manned by Egyptian troops in case of an
attack. As a means of preventing the latter from running away, the
communication between the lines to be held by them and the rest of the
works was so arranged that it could be immediately cut off, in which
case it was hoped that the Egyptians, having no alternative, might be
induced to stand their ground.
On the 10th the charge of Souakim was handed formally over by Baker to
Admiral Hewett, and the troops, numbering some 3,800 strong, were
paraded. At the same time a proclamation was posted in that town
announcing that the Admiral had taken over the command.
On the 12th the news reached Souakim of the fall of Sinkat. It appears
that the rebels surrounded the place and demanded the submission of the
garrison. Tewfik Bey, with the courage which had marked his conduct
throughout, declined to lay down his arms, replying that he preferred
death to submission. He then sallied forth with 450 half-starved men,
and attacked the rebels, killing a large number. He was finally
overpowered, and the whole of his force annihilated. Tewfik seemed to
have fought bravely himself, and after expending all the cartridges of
his Remington carbine, defended himself with his sword. Only five men
escaped the general massacre, and all the women except thirty were sold
as slaves.