ABANDONMENT OF THE SOUDAN--OSMAN DIGNA.
On the 31st of October, 1883, at the suggestion of Cherif Pasha, it was
resolved that the British Army of Occupation, which now numbered 6,700
men, should be reduced to a total force of 3,000 men and six guns, to be
concentrated in Alexandria. Speaking of the change proposed, Ministers
declared, at the Guildhall banquet on Lord Mayor's day, that by the 1st
of January, 1884, the last British soldier would have left Cairo. How
far this prediction was verified will be seen later on.
On the arising of trouble in the Soudan the question was submitted in
Parliament to Mr. Gladstone whether or not Her Majesty's Government
regarded the Soudan as forming part of Egypt, and, if so, whether they
would take steps to restore order in that province. Mr. Gladstone
enigmatically replied that the Soudan "has not been included in the
sphere of our operations, and we are by no means disposed to admit
without qualifications that it is within the sphere of our
responsibility."
On the 19th November Sir Evelyn Baring wrote to Lord Granville that bad
news was expected from Hicks Pasha, and if his force were defeated
Khartoum would probably fall into the hands of the rebels. The Egyptian
Government had no funds to meet the emergency, and it was not improbable
that the Egyptian Government would ask Her Majesty's Government to send
English or Indian troops, or would themselves send part of Sir Evelyn
Wood's army to the front.
On the 20th Sir Evelyn Baring was informed that the British Government
could not lend English or Indian troops, and advised the abandonment of
the Soudan within certain limits. This was at once communicated to
Cherif Pasha.
On the 22nd news reached Cairo of the destruction of Hicks' army. The
political consequences of this disaster will be seen from what follows.
On the 24th Sir Evelyn Baring telegraphed that the recent success of the
Mahdi was a source of danger to Egypt proper, and that the danger would
be greatly increased if Khartoum fell, which seemed not improbable. On
the 25th Lord Granville replied that under existing circumstances the
British force in Egypt should be maintained at its then present
strength, and, in view of the alarming condition of the Soudan, informed
Sir Evelyn Baring that the Egyptian Government must take the sole
responsibility of operations in that country.
On the 3rd December Sir Evelyn Baring expressed a hope that Her
Majesty's Government would adhere steadfastly to the policy of
non-interference in the affairs of the Soudan. As a natural outcome of
this policy, it appeared to him that neither English nor Indian troops
should be employed in the Soudan, and that Sir E. Wood's army, which was
officered by English officers on the active list, should, as was
originally intended by Lord Dufferin, be employed only in Egypt proper.
On the 13th Lord Granville again telegraphed that Her Majesty's
Government had no intention of employing British or Indian troops in
the Soudan. They recommended the Khedive's Ministers to come to an early
decision to abandon the territory south of Assouan, or at least of Wady
Halfa.
On the 14th Sir Evelyn Baring reported as to the immediate steps
necessary if the policy of abandonment were carried out. As it was
impossible to say beforehand what the effect on the population of Egypt
proper would be, he recommended that Her Majesty's Government should be
prepared at a short notice to send a couple of battalions from the
Mediterranean garrison, and that immediate steps should be taken to
bring the force of the Army of Occupation up to its full strength.
On the 16th Sir Evelyn Baring informed Cherif Pasha that Her Majesty's
Government had no idea of sending English or Indian troops to the
Soudan, that Her Majesty's Government would not object to the employment
of Turkish troops exclusively in the Soudan, with a base at Souakim, if
they were paid by the Sultan. He added that Her Majesty's Government
recommended the abandonment of all the territory south of Assouan, or at
least of Wady Halfa, and that they were prepared to assist in
maintaining order in Egypt proper, and in defending it and the ports of
the Red Sea.
On the 20th Sir Evelyn Baring was authorized to inform Cherif Pasha that
Her Majesty's Government adhered entirely to the policy which they had
laid down with regard to Egyptian affairs, which had been interrupted
owing to the destruction of Hicks' army, and they were of opinion that
ineffectual efforts on the part of the Egyptian Government to secure
their position in the Soudan would only endanger its success. Her
Majesty's Government adhered to the advice given on the 13th inst. with
regard to the course which should be pursued by Egypt in view of the
disaster which had occurred in the Soudan.
The advice given to yield up the Soudan was most unpalatable to the
Egyptian Government, and Cherif Pasha communicated to Sir Evelyn Baring
his objections in a _note verbale_ dated 21st December. In forwarding
the note Sir Evelyn added he felt sure that under no amount of
persuasion or argument would the present Ministers consent to the
adoption of the policy of abandonment. The only way in which it could be
carried out would be for him to inform the Khedive that Her Majesty's
Government insisted on the adoption of this course, and that if his
present Ministers would not carry out the policy, others must be named
who would consent to do so.
On the 2nd January, 1884, Cherif wrote to Lord Granville that the former
had already pointed out the necessity imposed on the Government of His
Highness of retaining the Upper Nile, and the pressing need they had of
obtaining the temporary assistance of an armed force of 10,000 men, with
a view to opening up the Souakim-Berber road. The news which reached
them from Baker Pasha confirmed the opinion that the means at their
disposal were inadequate for coping with the insurrection in the Eastern
Soudan. Under these circumstances, and taking into consideration that
they could not get any help from Her Majesty's Government as regarded
the Soudan, the Government of His Highness found themselves compelled to
apply to the Porte without delay for a contingent of 10,000 men to be
sent to Souakim.
The reply was not long in coming. On the 4th January Sir Evelyn Baring
was informed that in important questions, where the administration and
safety of Egypt were at stake, it was indispensable that Her Majesty's
Government should, as long as the provisional occupation of the country
by English troops continued, be assured that the advice which, after
full consideration of the views of the Egyptian Government, they might
feel it their duty to tender to the Khedive, should be followed. It
should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of
Provinces that the responsibility which for the time rested on England
obliged Her Majesty's Government to insist on the adoption of the policy
which they recommended, and that it would be necessary that those
Ministers and Governors who did not follow this course should cease to
hold their offices. The alteration in the tone adopted by Lord Granville
will not fail to strike the reader. Formerly it was advice, now it was
command.
On Lord Granville's despatch of the 4th January being communicated to
Cherif Pasha, he at once resigned.
Some difficulty arose as to how he was to be replaced. Riaz Pasha was
still sulky at not having been allowed when last in power to hang Arabi,
and would not accept office, but eventually Nubar Pasha agreed to
undertake the formation of a native Ministry, and declared that he
accepted the policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the Soudan.
The late Nubar Pasha, the new President of the Council of Ministers,
was one of the most conspicuous characters in modern Egyptian history.
He came to Egypt some fifty years ago, as a _protégé_ of Boghos Bey,
the Minister of Mehemet Ali. After accepting various minor posts under
the Government, Nubar in 1865 became the chief of the Railway
Administration. Nubar, however, possessed talents which were destined to
raise him to a position more exalted than the comparatively obscure one
of head of the Railways, and he speedily became Ismail Pasha's Prime
Minister, and must with him share a fair proportion of praise and blame.
An Armenian by birth and a Christian by religion, Nubar possessed an
intelligence far superior to that of other Egyptian statesmen. That he
should have found himself able, in spite of his independent ideas and
somewhat dictatorial habits, to accept the formation of a Cabinet at
this epoch, is a proof of his far-seeing capacity and sound judgment.
Regarding Nubar's history impartially, it is difficult to deny that
while more in earnest and far-seeing in his projects than Ismail, he was
equally indifferent as to the means by which the money was obtained to
carry them out. At the same time it is certain that the execution of
nearly every good project that nominally emanated from Ismail was due to
Nubar. He was the Minister by whose agency Ismail, after difficult and
intricate negotiations, succeeded in obtaining the title of Khedive, the
change in the order of succession, and practical independence at the
price, nevertheless, of a large increase in the annual tribute paid to
the Porte.
Nubar, however, has a still greater claim to fame, in having brought to
a successful issue the scheme for the International Tribunals, whereby
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Consular Courts in civil cases was
abolished, and natives in dispute with Europeans were made subject to
the new Courts.[93]
During the course of the preceding events troubles were arising in the
Eastern Soudan.
Early in the month of August, 1883, considerable excitement was caused
at Souakim by the news that some emissaries of the Mahdi had arrived
near Sinkat, and were raising the tribes. At the head of the movement
was a man destined to play an important part in the succeeding
operations. This was Osman Digna.
Osman Digna was the grandson of a Turkish merchant and slave-dealer, who
settled in the Eastern Soudan in the early part of this century. Osman
and his brother Ahmed for some time carried on a thriving business in
European cutlery, cottons, ostrich feathers, and slaves, and their
head-quarters were at Souakim. Ahmed managed the business at home, while
Osman, of a more restless and adventurous spirit, was the travelling
partner, and journeyed far and wide, for the Dignas had branches or
agencies at Jeddah, Kassala, Berber, Khartoum, and other places.
His visits to the Soudan enabled him to become acquainted with the
leaders of the anti-Egyptian movement, which, though not culminating in
rebellion until the years 1881-2, was recognizable at least as early as
1869-70. About the last-named period the fortunes of the house of Digna
began to decline. Osman and his brother sustained serious losses in the
capture by a British cruiser of one or two cargoes of slaves on their
way to Jeddah. Then came the Anglo-Egyptian Slave Convention, which
completed the alarm and disgust of the slave-dealers, and the commercial
ruin of his house led Osman to schemes of rebellion.
In 1882 he went to the Red Sea coasts, in the vicinity of Sinkat, thence
inland to Khartoum, and threw in his lot with the new prophet.
Eventually all the tribes in the Eastern Soudan went over to Osman
Digna, who was named Emir to the Mahdi.
On the 16th October, 1883, 160 Egyptian troops, on their way to
reinforce Sinkat, were attacked in a defile by 150 men belonging to the
rebel tribes near Sinkat, and, with the exception of twenty-five, were
all killed.
Osman, leaving Sinkat to be besieged by the tribesmen, who, after this
success, were joining his cause day by day, moved down to Tamanieb,
about nineteen miles from Souakim. Osman then commenced operations with
a view to the capture of Tokar, sixteen miles from Trinkitat, on the Red
Sea coast.
On the 3rd November Mahmoud Talma Pasha, who had been appointed to the
command of the troops in the Eastern Soudan, left Souakim with 550 men
in two Egyptian gunboats for Trinkitat. The object of this expedition
was the relief of Tokar, which was also besieged by the rebels. The
force landed on the 4th of November, and set out on the march at eight
a.m., the cavalry in advance, and a mountain-gun in the centre. After an
hour and a half's march the troops rested for twenty minutes, and when
marching recommenced they were attacked by the enemy. The Egyptian
soldiers formed a square and commenced firing. The left side of the
square was broken into by eight or ten men. This created a panic amongst
the troops, many of whom threw away their rifles without firing a shot,
and a general stampede ensued. The Egyptian loss was eleven officers and
148 men. Amongst the killed was Captain Moncrieff, R.N., the British
Consul at Souakim, who had joined the expedition. When last seen
Moncrieff was stabbed in the thigh by an Arab, whom he afterwards shot,
but the captain was at that moment struck fatally in the back by a
spear. The singular part of the affair is that the attacking force only
amounted to 150 or 200 men.
This disaster created a panic at Souakim, where only a thousand troops
remained for the purposes of defence. So little confidence was felt in
them, that arms were served out to the civil population.
On the 17th November Suleiman Pasha, who had been named Governor-General
of the Eastern Soudan, left for Massowah to obtain 400 black soldiers to
be employed for the relief of Tokar and Sinkat.
On the 2nd December the black troops, having arrived, were sent with an
expedition, comprising a total force of 700 men and one mountain-gun, to
Tamanieb, between Souakim and Sinkat, about three hours' march from the
former place. At noon, when passing through a defile, the Egyptian force
was surrounded and cut to pieces. On being attacked the Egyptians formed
a square, but after firing only ten rounds the square was broken. The
black soldiers, fighting back to back, made a desperate resistance, but,
being unsupported by the rest of the force, their efforts were
unavailing. Out of 700 men comprising the expedition only thirty-five
escaped. The rebel force was probably not less than 2,000 to 3,000.
Information was now received that Osman had concentrated a force 7,000
strong on the Tamanieb road, that Sheikh Taka had surrounded Sinkat
with 11,000 men, and that the rebels at Tokar numbered 3,000. Fears
began to be entertained for the garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat, as they
were known to be in want of provisions.
In this threatening state of affairs no alternative remained but to
despatch reinforcements from Cairo and Alexandria. The difficulty,
however, was how to provide them; after much consideration the Egyptian
Government decided to make the attempt.
General Valentine Baker was appointed to command the expedition. Amongst
his officers were Colonel Sartorius, Chief of the Staff and Second in
Command; Lieutenant-Colonel Harrington, Lieutenant-Colonel Hay, Majors
Harvey, Giles, and Holroyd, Morice Bey, and Dr. Leslie.
On the 11th of December Colonel Sartorius arrived at Souakim with 650
gendarmes. In order to protect the place some English vessels of war,
under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir W. Hewett, were stationed off the
town, and from time to time fired a few rounds of shell at the rebels'
position.
On the 16th the first battalion of blacks, organized by Zubehr Pasha,
left Suez to join Baker.
A few days later orders were given to send down the second battalion.
This one was in a worse condition than the other. The officer commanding
protested against going, as he said many of his men did not know how to
put a cartridge in their rifles; but as Baker had written on January 8th
asking for the immediate despatch of troops, drilled or undrilled, no
delay was allowed, and the second battalion left on the 20th.
Further reinforcements were brought up to swell Baker's force from the
Berber and Somali territories, by another battalion of Turks from Cairo,
and some 200 Bashi-Bazouk cavalry.
Baker had by this time collected a force of nearly 4,000 men, with some
Krupp and Gatling guns and rocket tubes. Part of his men were policemen
in uniform, ignorant of the rudiments of military drill, many were
simple fellaheen, whose unfitness as soldiers has been already referred
to, and the rest were the sweepings of the streets of Cairo and
Alexandria. The native officers were as disappointing as the men. With
an army thus composed, it is not surprising if gloomy forebodings
prevailed as to the result of the expedition.
Leaving a force to garrison Souakim, Baker on the 1st February moved the
rest of his army to Trinkitat.
By the 2nd the last of the troops and transports arrived at Trinkitat.
On the same day a fort was constructed about three miles beyond
Trinkitat to protect the guns and transports whilst crossing a morass
lying between the sea and the mainland. This was occupied by Sartorius
with 600 blacks, the remainder returning into camp.
[Illustration]
On the 3rd the whole of the troops, with the guns, marched out to the
fort and bivouacked for the night. The force then consisted of 3,746
men.