BREACH BETWEEN THE KING AND THE PARLIAMENT.
With the personal rivalries which the word cabal implies,
there were blended very real and weighty differences, which
touched the nature of authority itself.
Under the very eyes of the King the party which had
compelled him to summon a Parliament, and then wrung
from him the condemnation of Strafford and the right of
Parliament not to be dissolved without its own consent,
had risen to terrible power. When he attacked it, it had
regained control of the majority in the Commons. However
numerous the minority might be, it remained excluded from
all political influence. A member was reprimanded for
uttering the opinion that the majority of the Lords and
the minority of the Commons had as good right to combine
as the majority of the Commons with the minority of the
Lords[300]. Now however the majority of the Lords also
was reduced to impotence: the views of the leaders of the
Commons appeared as the opinion of Parliament. Nothing else
was to be expected but that those great demands for the
abolition of Episcopacy and the co-operation of Parliament
in the appointment of all officers of state, which the
King regarded as an insult to himself, would soon be laid
before him as bills of both Houses. Yet other demands, of
which we have seen the traces at an earlier period, had
now grown to full consciousness. The Lower House had voted
levies for Ireland: the question was raised whether these
could be made without a licence under the great seal,
which had always hitherto been regarded as necessary. The [A.D. 1642.]
House resolved that this was not indispensable, and that
its own order was sufficient[301]. The idea had already
been suggested of not entrusting to the King the nomination
of leaders for the troops destined for Ireland: it was
proposed that the Lower House should name a lord general
for the land forces, and a lord high admiral for the fleet.
In this manner they thought to fill the offices with a
couple of opposition lords, who would have had no chance
in the existing temper of the court. At the same time the
men who stood nearest to the King were attacked by an
impeachment which might cost them their lives. Who after
that could join the King and manage his affairs? Strafford
was ruined because he had tried to gain for the King a
power transcending all earlier precedent: when the King
surrendered him he altered his system. Bristol and Digby
are not to be compared with Strafford in personal worth;
but they belonged to the system which the King was now
determined to uphold: what was left him if he abandoned
them also?
The court was now trying to devise means for checking the
growth of the preponderance of Parliament; and as it was
desirable to keep within the law, none other could be
found than that by which Strafford had perished, and which
had often been talked of since, the impeachment in their
turn of the leading members. There were five in the Lower
House, Pym and Hampden, the two acknowledged leaders,
Hollis and Strode, who had taken a conspicuous part in the
impeachment of Digby and Bristol, and Haslerig, who had
originated the Bill of Attainder and the proposal for the
appointment of generals by Parliament. Of the Lords they
selected Mandeville, now Lord Kimbolton, chiefly because
he had been much concerned in the alliance with the Scots.
The charge which had formerly been brought against the
Viceroy of Ireland, that he had sought to overthrow the
fundamental laws of England, might, they thought, be still
better imputed to those six, for they had endeavoured to
make the King hated by his people, to induce his army to
abandon him, to rob him of his authority: in fact they had [A.D. 1642.]
already levied war on the King, and Parliament was kept
by them in subjection through terror and violence[302]. At
least, they thought, they could support all these charges
with no slighter evidence than had availed to prove the
accusation against Strafford: why should these men not be
convicted of high treason as well as Strafford? Moreover
they would be under arrest during the process, and so for a
long time be rendered harmless. It was determined that the
impeachment should be laid before the Lords immediately in
the King’s name.
It has often been proved to demonstration that this step
cannot be regarded as lawful. The Upper House possessed no
criminal jurisdiction over the Lower: the charges against
the five members ought to have been brought before a
grand jury, or before the Commons themselves. We may add
that there was a misunderstanding of what had happened in
Stafford’s case. The Lord Lieutenant was not condemned at
all in judicial form: his condemnation was a political
act of the legislative authority. The Lower House, from
which it proceeded, had since gone still further in the
same direction, and the Upper House was now paralysed: the
impeachment embraced charges against the majority which now
enjoyed the whole authority of Parliament. It was bringing
the authors of the imputed crime to trial before their
accomplices, for a large part of the Upper House belonged
to the same party. To what result could this lead?
On January 3, 1642, the Attorney-General, by special
command of the King, laid the impeachment before the
Lords, where it was received with astonishment. The arrest
even of the member of their own House was not ordered,
nor even notice of motion given. But just as if all had
been fully completed, royal officers immediately repaired
to the houses of the accused members of the Lower House
to seal up their papers. The Commons were in the act of
taking counsel for the indispensable security of the great
council of the nation, when the news of this measure
arrived. They declared it a breach of their privileges,
especially as there had not even been notice given them [A.D. 1642.]
of the impeachment, and called on the Upper House for
joint resistance: just then appeared the King’s serjeant to
require the surrender of the five members. The Commons had
no intention of giving way to this demand, but could not at
the moment pronounce a definite refusal. The House pledged
itself that the members should at all times be ready to
answer any lawful impeachment which should be brought
against them, but at the same time reserved the power of
representing to the King by a deputation, that this matter
touched the privileges of Parliament, and concerned the
whole Commons of the realm.
The five members were not arrested, and the seals which had
been affixed to their dwellings were removed by an order of
the Lower House, in which the Lords concurred.
In earlier times kings had arrested without difficulty
members who had opposed them. Charles I had surrendered
this power when he accepted the Petition of Right: but we
may remember that the lawyers had then secretly assured
him that it would always remain to him in case of need.
Besides, in cases of treason, privileges counted for
nothing. Always inclined to interfere in person, the King
determined to go himself to the Lower House, and obtain
the surrender of the accused, which had been denied to
his officers. It is asserted that he took counsel on the
question with members of the Privy Council who also had
seats in Parliament, and that his intention was approved by
them[303].
It is clear as day that by so doing the King attacked the
immunities on which Parliament founded its efficiency and
its very existence. It determined under no circumstances
to permit the arrest. An immediate practical importance
now attached to that protest which had been passed after
the discovery of the army plot, and which formed a sort
of English Covenant, and pledged every man to defend by
united effort the privileges of Parliament. In relation to
this the formal resolution was passed that in case any one,
whoever it might be, should attempt to arrest a member of
the House without its assent and order, resistance should [A.D. 1642.]
be made to him. The question was raised whether the refusal
to allow the arrest should be made unconditionally[304]:
and not only was this answered in the affirmative, but
a further step was taken. As the King again refused
the renewed pressure for the appointment of a guard
for Parliament, the Lower House now, without further
hesitation, requested the Lord Mayor to arm the militia,
and send a detachment of them to Westminster to protect
the assembly. It looked as if it might serve also as a
defence against the violent arrest of the members. The King
commanded the Lord Mayor to assemble no troops without his
positive order, and if any riot took place in the city,
to suppress it by force of arms. He himself deferred the
execution of his purpose till the next day (January 4).
His plan was, so to speak, a public secret. In the morning
the Earl of Essex, Lord Chamberlain, informed the five
members confidentially that the King was coming to seize
their persons[305]. This was known at the commencement of
the sitting. The vehemence of the debate was however not
damped by this news, but rather stimulated: especially it
dealt with the act of impeachment, which was attacked at
all points, refuted, denounced, and finally declared to
be a scandalous libel, whose authors must be detected and
punished, in order to secure the Commonwealth against them.
It was as if the Lower House wished to answer the King’s
threat by a counter threat of its own. Hitherto Charles I
had delayed the execution of his design. At the news of
this resolution he felt himself as it were challenged: in
violent agitation he went to the officers assembled in the
antechamber. ‘Soldiers,’ he cried, ‘vassals, let him who is
true to me, follow me[306]!’ They hastened with him down [A.D. 1642.]
the stairs: at the door there was by chance a carriage
which the King entered, the multitude following him on foot.
In St. Stephen’s Chapel the afternoon sitting had just
begun, when Captain Langres, probably sent by the French
ambassador, arrived with the tidings that the King was on
his way from Whitehall[307]. The danger was imminent for
all, inasmuch as they had pledged themselves to resist a
violent capture of the members, who were present. It was
now thought good to adopt the advice which Lord Essex had
given in the morning: and a resolution was passed that the
five members should withdraw, to which Strode, the youngest
of them, offered strenuous opposition, for he wished to
seal his innocence with his blood. Scarcely were they gone
when the King arrived. His armed followers, amounting
to about five hundred men, lined the way for him as he
entered. He bade them stay in the vestibule, forbidding any
of them to enter the chamber on pain of death: the Earl of
Roxburgh kept the door. Charles I had no idea of dispersing
the assembly by force, after the fashion of more decidedly
revolutionary times. Extraordinary as his conduct was, he
believed himself to be acting within his legal rights,
and only wished to make his prerogative effectual. The
prerogative of the crown in the sense of the early kings,
and the privilege of Parliament in the sense of coming
times, were directly contradictory to each other. The King
was attended by the Elector Palatine: uncovered, saluting
on both sides, he walked up to the Speaker’s chair. He said
that he did not wish to interfere with the privilege of the
House, but that it did not apply in cases of treason: as
he had waited in vain yesterday for the surrender of those
accused of this crime, he had now come in person to take
them away. He asked first for Pym--all was silent: then
for Hollis--still no answer. He turned to the Speaker, to [A.D. 1642.]
learn from him where they were: the Speaker fell on his
knee and prayed to be excused if he was silent, he was but
the organ of the House, and had no eyes to see, nor tongue
to speak, anything but what the House bade him. The King
now perceived for himself that those whom he sought were
not present, or, as he himself expressed it, that the birds
were flown. He seized the occasion to assure the House that
he intended no violence, that he would observe all that he
had granted for the good of his subjects, and that he would
proceed in strictly legal fashion against the accused,
but that he expected an answer, else he would know how to
seek and to find them. He departed in the same manner in
which he had entered, but already it might be seen what
lay hidden under this crust of forced moderation. From the
assembly was heard the cry of Privilege! whereupon the
King’s guards laid hand on their swords, and drew out their
loaded pistols.
As the five members of the Lower House had fled to the
city, the King next day, holding firmly to his purpose,
repaired to Guildhall to obtain their surrender. The
aldermen and common council were assembled. Charles had
all the less hesitation about trusting himself among
them, because he was assured of the devotion of the city
authorities: only, as we know, the Lord Mayor and Aldermen
were no longer masters of the populace. In presence of the
King was raised the cry, Privilege! Liberty of Parliament!
to this others answered with God bless the King! They were
the battle-cries of the opposing parties: no one could say
which was the stronger among those present[308]. When peace
was restored, the King himself, by asking whether any one
had anything to say, as it were invited a demonstration.
A voice called out that the assembly wished the King to
listen to the opinion of Parliament: another replied that
the speaker expressed his own sentiments only, not those of
the assembly. ‘Who can say,’ interposed the King, ‘that I
do not listen to the advice of my Parliament? but there is [A.D. 1642.]
a difference between Parliament and some turbulent members
of it: the one I do and will listen to, the others I will
deliver over to lawful punishment.’
When the King was gone, his demand raised a hot debate: it
was not directly refused, but at the same time it was not
acceded to.
The King, who wished to show himself in his fashion
gracious and confiding, had invited himself to dine with
one of the aldermen. When he quitted the house the crowd
which had gathered meanwhile received him with the cry,
‘Parliament! Privilege!’ and here it was not as in the
common council, for there was no counter shout. A pamphlet
was thrown into the King’s carriage with the title, ‘To thy
tents, O Israel’--the words with which Israel rose against
Rehoboam. The King however would not even now abandon his
object. The next day appeared a prohibition to receive and
harbour the five fugitive members. His officers and all his
subjects were required to seize them, and commit them to
the Tower, which was now in safe hands: the King at this
moment had some cannon conveyed thither, and strengthened
the garrison. What might not be expected after this[309]?
On one of these days a friend writes to Admiral Pennington:
we have here no fewer storms than you have at sea, and
perhaps even worse and more dangerous. We are here near to
ruin, says another letter: the liberty of the press, the
factious preaching, the licence which unruly people have
assumed of assembling without regard to the laws, all this
has destroyed obedience to the King as with a slow poison.
The Puritan faction, it is observed in a third letter,
together with the schismatics, are so strong in the city
and country, that no one can foresee the result, unless the
King and Parliament are reconciled.
This however was now become impossible. The Commons met the
unsuccessful steps of the King with the most determined and
vigorous opposition. Already on January 5 they had resolved [A.D. 1642.]
to adjourn the sittings at Westminster till the 11th,
as they could not attend to business in safety there, so
long as their violated privileges were not re-established,
and meanwhile to appoint a committee, which should sit at
Guildhall, and before everything else devise means for
the restoration of security[310]. On the 6th we find this
committee already at Guildhall: a deputation of the common
council in their chains and gowns of office welcomed their
appearance. The first decision of the committee was, that
the impeachment of the five members was illegal, and a
breach of the privileges of Parliament. On this was based
the second, in opposition to the King’s new order of
arrest, that whosoever should attempt to obey it should
be treated as an open enemy of the commonwealth. But if
all that had been attempted against the five members was
declared unlawful, there was no ground for depriving them
of their share in the proceedings. On January 7 in Grocer’s
Hall, for the common council could no longer spare the room
at Guildhall, the committee resolved to summon back the
five accused members to its deliberations, without regard
to the King’s decree. Thus the deputation representing
Parliament included in its own body the men whom the King
designated as traitors, and in so doing had the full
support of the capital. In the common council, through
the influence of the newly elected members, even before
they had formally taken their seats, the party opposed
to the King had now the upper hand: the notion was fully
accepted that the city was pledged to defend Parliament and
its privileges. The common council appointed a committee,
which, in concert with that of the Commons, resolved, on
the ground of the attempts that had been made, to form
a guard for defence against them. The city thought it
necessary to take precautions for its safety against such
a commandant of the Tower as John Byron; it was determined
to raise an armed force under an officer in whom Parliament
and the city should have full confidence. Such a leader they
found in Captain Skippon, a man of Puritan opinions and a [A.D. 1642.]
supporter of the Parliament, who had learned war in
Holland, and had raised himself from the lowest rank: he
was placed as major-general at the head of a guard, at
first of eight companies, which was immediately formed in
the city and its neighbourhood. No one was admitted into it
who had not taken the oath of protest. And without scruple
they faced the possibility of thus coming to open war with
the King. In the seventh article of the resolution Skippon
was expressly authorised to attack as well as defend, in
case violence was offered to him: and this service, said
the twelfth article, was to be counted as legal, and as
rendered to the King, the kingdom, and Parliament--for so
long as it was in any way feasible they observed forms.
The sitting of the 10th was the first in which the five
members again took part: we see what an importance its
conclusions had. Nor were they contented with this alliance
between Parliament and the city: they accepted an offer
made by Hampden in the name of some thousands of his
Buckinghamshire constituents, to live and die in defence
of the rights of the Lower House. Thus completely did the
impeachment of the five members, in which Charles I thought
to find deliverance and safety, and his attempt to seize
them, result in his discomfiture.
The King held his conduct to be valid and lawful:
Parliament declared it in the highest degree unlawful, both
the scheme itself and every separate step. We will not
undertake to decide this controversy, but we may remark
that it touched the very core of the pending questions. All
the claims of the Lower House depended on its representing
the commons of the country. As the individuality of the
members would be shown in the discharge of this high duty,
so it was protected by the very idea. The House which
for ages has maintained a certain jurisdiction for the
preservation of internal order, is alone possessed of
the right to judge of the misdeeds of its members within
its precincts, or even of the charges which are brought
against them. Without this an external power would be able
to interfere with the conditions of its internal action,
or directly to disperse it by repeated accusations and
arrests. The assembly forms a moral person, which alone
acts, so long as it is in session: only if it assents [A.D. 1642.]
and surrenders its members, can they be brought to justice.
On this foundation depend its privileges: the members are
thereby raised personally above their natural position as
subjects.
On the other hand the King maintained that the entire
supreme power, and the care for the general interests, were
entrusted to his hands. In cases which implied a danger to
the whole state, he would on no account abandon the right
of arrest in order to prevent such dangers. Every day’s
experience showed that this power was exercised in the
great neighbouring monarchies without any reserve whatever,
and powerfully contributed to their strength and stability.
Now, as before, Charles I regarded members of Parliament
merely as his subjects, and would exercise the inherent
rights of his office against them as well as others. What
he now treated as a crime in them was the attitude of
political hostility which they maintained; he thought to
be able to punish it as treason against the crown. The
Parliament on the contrary saw in every infringement of
their inviolability an attack on the institutions of the
country: to have taken part in them it declared to be
treason[311].
The King succumbed in this contest chiefly because the
capital, carried away by the religious sympathies of the
populace, sided with the Parliament; deeming itself pledged
to protect the privileges of Parliament, whatever sense
might be put on them by Parliament. The armed force which
it might have been expected that the King would raise for
himself, received, under the guidance of the city, an
impulse against him.
He had gone back to Whitehall, as has been said, thinking
the city was favourable to him. When nothing but hostility
and contempt was displayed towards him from thence, he
could not wish to remain longer in the neighbourhood.
Moreover the Queen found her stay unendurable. She one
day called the attention of the Dutch ambassador to
certain persons whose presence in the palace was not to
be avoided, but who, she said, were there merely to spy [A.D. 1642.]
her actions and those of the King. Her oldest friends of
both sexes were in this category: the most detested of all
was the French ambassador, her brother’s representative.
There seemed also to be danger if Parliament, as was
reported, came back to Westminster with the civic guard,
there being no means for repelling an attack on the palace.
The Queen thought that the least she had to fear was being
separated from the King[312]. Under these circumstances
the King and Queen resolved to quit Whitehall: they first
returned to Hampton Court, though no preparation had been
made there for their reception, and soon afterwards, not
feeling safe enough there, repaired to Windsor.
Meanwhile the sittings in the Lower House had been resumed
on the appointed day amid great popular rejoicings. Two
or three thousand mounted yeomen had come in: the sailors
of the Thames occupied the river with numerous barges:
the militia and guards were drawn up in their ranks: the
young men from the stalls and workshops appeared with
flags and pikes, and poles on which printed inscriptions
announced their troth and devotion to the laws, liberty,
and religion. Then the Committee, which hitherto had sat in
the city, with the five members and Lord Kimbolton, entered
a boat at the Three Cranes, which was joined by a great
number of others: amid salutes of artillery and hearty
congratulations they were conducted back towards Whitehall
hard by. The King had fled: the chamber occupied by the
Commons might be regarded as the supreme seat of authority.
A momentary embarrassment may have been caused, through the
nature of the parliamentary forms, by the King’s having
departed. But it was already usual, at least on one side,
to require obedience to decrees issuing from the Lower
House only. In order to obviate the counter effects of the
King’s personal commands, they devised the formula that
only those orders of the King which should be issued with
assent of both Houses, were to be fulfilled. This was [A.D. 1642.]
used, so far as I can discover, for the first time in
the nomination of Skippon: his dismissal could only be
effected by a royal order expressed through the two houses,
that is to say, not by the King’s command but according
to the opinion of the houses. On a similar principle the
commandants of the chief places received instructions to
admit no reinforcement of their garrisons without a royal
order backed by the assent of both houses.
Immediately after the resumption of its sittings,
Parliament renewed its complaints about the bad advisers of
the King, about the favour shown to evil-minded persons,
and the neglect which others experienced: but it now
went further than ever before. A commission appointed
to consider ways and means for the restoration of peace
reported that the greatest of all evils was ‘the influence
which recusants, priests, and other malignants have over
the Queen, the influence which these possess in the State,
the great influence which she has over the King.’ It is
obvious that nothing would content the Parliament but an
administration composed entirely of their partisans, and
the absolute subordination to it of all personal authority.
There was no longer a word of any opposition from the House
of Lords. Energetic expressions employed there against the
proposals of the Commons sufficed to give rise to a formal
accusation against them. One day, after an unsatisfactory
conference with the Lords, Pym declared that the Commons
would be very well content to have their help in saving
the country, but if not they were determined to do their
duty alone: but surely it would not come to be recorded
in history that the Lords at a time of so great danger
had taken no part in saving the country. Through various
concurrent circumstances it came to pass that what had been
the minority of the Lords now constituted the majority. The
Upper House, on February 5, assented to the bill by which
the bishops were deprived of their voice in Parliament.
To change the administration and overthrow the bishops
was the purpose which the majority of the Lower House had
pursued since the commencement of the new session. The last
contest had broken out because the King would not give [A.D. 1642.]
way on these points. After this battle had been decided,
and the King defeated, nothing else was to be expected than
that Parliament would proceed without further hesitation
to accomplish its purpose. It had already taken care to
have an armed force at command for the maintenance of the
position it had won.
* * * * *
But to what had the British monarchy of the Stuarts
been reduced! Its aim was to form the three kingdoms
into an union which should consult the interests of all
equally. The prerogative of royalty by the grace of God,
and Episcopacy, were to form the foundations of public
power, and peace abroad serve to maintain tranquillity
at home. Not unsuccessfully the first Stuart supported
this system which originated in his own brain, more by a
clever and versatile management of affairs according to the
circumstances of the moment, which he moulded to his will
with tenacious perseverance, than through great qualities
which might have availed to bind men’s hearts to his cause,
or institutions which might have given it independent
permanence. The system had not strength to bear the test of
a war, in which the second Stuart let himself be entangled,
and Great Britain remained far below the rank which
properly belonged to her. At home the war was a signal
for all contending elements to show themselves. Charles
I was by nature at once lawyer-like and priest-like,
deeply convinced that the doctrines which he believed, the
rights which he claimed, were true and pleasing to God,
and (after the precedent of ‘his wise father’) that both
possessed intrinsic power. His opponents were in his eyes
the enemies of the cause of God, which was also his own,
and which he was born to defend. Of the rights of others
he had little understanding, and but a slight opinion of
their strength, as if they did not much signify so long as
external order lasted. Then it came to pass that through
action and reaction this order was broken through at the
most vulnerable point. The policy in which the King saw
a divine necessity, and the safety and future greatness
of Great Britain, was regarded by the greater portion of [A.D. 1642.]
his subjects as violence and oppression at home, weakness
abroad, and inclination towards a system detested by
them, which was just then threatening the world with
subjection. Then the Scots rose, with the strong effort of
a long-suppressed religious and national impulse: the idea
of independence for their Church spread to the State also.
While the King was preparing to master this opposition with
the strength of England, the latter also rose in analogous
opposition to him. He was obliged to restore Parliament,
with which, during the war, he had been fundamentally at
variance, after having long avoided it: Parliament claimed
its primitive rights in their fullest extent, and would
assent to nothing but an unmistakeably Protestant policy.
In the course of this struggle the native enthusiasm of
the Irish also rose in arms, to cast off the subjection
in which they were held by the superior power of the
Protestant and Teutonic element.
Charles I was not formed by nature to wage such a war
successfully: he was not fully master of his own court
and council, which was full of cabals in which foreign
powers took part, in the very year of this contest. While
he only took counsel with his partisans, he could not
prevent some of them from acting with an eye to their
own particular interests, which made others adopt the
opposite view with embittered pertinacity. He himself was
always occupied with his own intentions; the purposes,
strength, and probable acts of his opponents he had not
the penetration to measure: we see him with the utmost
confidence undertaking what was to the last degree ruinous.
With this was united a false wisdom: for the sake of some
greater end he would assent to things which in-themselves
he disapproved. Then when his ultimate views came again to
light, beside those which for the moment he had admitted,
he appeared in himself untrue and untrustworthy: his
opponents held themselves justified in taking security by
any means against his returning to his old intentions. His
adversaries on the other hand, were consistent, vigilant,
and suspicious: in opposition to the notion of a compact
power, not weak in itself, but merely represented as such,
and always dreaded, they placed the feelings of provincial
and constitutional autonomy, which, when once penetrated
by the feelings and ideas of individual freedom, disclosed [A.D. 1642.]
an invincible strength. Thus it came to pass that one of
the British kingdoms attained to an independence which
robbed the crown of all substantial influence: the second
was striving to conquer by a bloody insurrection, stained
with horrible crimes, the same independence for its
Catholic population which was enjoyed in the first by the
Protestants: while in the third and greatest an authority
was being established which aimed at absorbing the royal
power.
The course of events had virtually decided that the
original system of the Stuarts could not be established:
but what shape the British kingdoms would assume, whether
they would hold together or separate, what forms and
principles of government would ultimately triumph,--all
this lay buried in total darkness.
England had not stopped at the constitutional questions
which presuppose an assured social order. We have more
than once remarked on the significance of the attempt to
overthrow Episcopacy, which formed one of the fundamental
conditions of English society, and of the constitution.
This had been done earlier still in Scotland, though
not without serious danger, in the first stage of the
Reformation movement, in which the truth of doctrines
and the salvation of men’s souls were at stake. It was
otherwise in England, where doctrines in general were
undisputed, and the episcopal order, which was most
intimately connected with the doctrine, had the deepest
root in the nation. That Parliament thought to destroy and
uproot this order is, among all its undertakings, the one
which most distinctly bore the character of revolution--for
where should destruction once begun find an end?--and of
one-sided party violence. To the King it was in a measure
useful, for by opposing it he regained a tenable position
and the possibility of resistance. He could now with
obvious truth retort on his opponents the charge which they
had made against him, of seeking to overthrow the laws of
England. Charles could assert that he would never permit
any alteration in the lawful condition of England. ‘Nolumus
leges Angliae mutari’ was firmer ground for him than the
indefinite and questionable rights of prerogative, which at
an earlier time he had sought to maintain and extend.
No words are needed to show the universal historical [A.D. 1642.]
importance of these contests in Great Britain; both the
purely constitutional ones, and those extending into
the domain of revolution, of whose development we have
undertaken to treat. It was our object to watch the origin
of them on this classic ground of all constitutional
history. It is an event which concerns all, this shaking
of the foundations of the old British state. Whether they
would stand the shock, or, if not, what shape public
affairs would in that case assume, was a question which
must concern the Continent also; the civilised world
is still busy day by day with more or less conspicuous
complications of the spiritual and political struggles
arising from similar opposing principles.
FOOTNOTES:
[300] Mr. Godolphin. Cp. Verney, Notes 3 Dec.
[301] Journals of the House of Commons, 4th November, 1641.
[302] Copy of the articles, in Forster’s Arrest of the Five
Members 114.
[303] Bates, Elenchus motuum 31: ‘Suasu quorundam qui a
sacris erant, etiam ipsius parlamenti senatorum.’
[304] Journals of the Commons ii. 317.
[305] D’Ewes in Sanford 465, ‘(These five gentlemen) were
sent to this day by the Earl of Essex--that the King
intended to come to the House of Commons to seize upon them
there.’ According to Verney they had at the opening of the
morning sitting ‘information that they should be taken away
by force.’
[306] Giustiniani 7/17 Genn. ‘La camera bassa dichiarò
le accuse--per libello infamatorio--a disegno di portare
all’ altra il decreto per approbatione: di questi atti
disobedienti fatto consapevole nello stesso punto, il re
sorti improvisamente della propria stanza e portatosi a
quelle della guardia disse ad alta voce: Vasalli e soldati
miei piu fedeli seguitate mi.’
[307] La Ferté: ‘Comme le parti de ce jour n’étoit pas
bien fait pour le parlement j’en avertis mes amis qui y
pouveurent, un quart heure devant.’ Probably La Ferté is
‘the noble person who wishes well to this nation,’ by whom,
according to D’Ewes, Langres, a Frenchman by origin, was
sent: the ambassador’s friend would then be Fiennes, for
the tidings came to him, and he informed the Speaker. There
is scarcely any room for the treachery often imputed to
Lady Carlisle.
[308] I take this account from the detailed letter of
Robert Slingsby, 6th January, who adds ‘another bold fellow
in the lowest rank stood up against upon a forme and cryed
the priviledges of Parliament: another cryed out the
observe man.’
[309] Instruction to Nicholas, in Forster’s Arrest of the
five members 269. Giustiniano: ‘Il re mostra gran cuore--ma
sproveduto di danaro e forse di savio e fedele consiglio
lascio dubbioso il fine.’
[310] From D’Ewes, in Forster 276, it seems to follow that
the resolution was devised in Coleman Street, whither the
five members had fled, and only accepted by the House.
[311] ‘The violating the privileges of parliament is the
overthrow of parliament.’ Heads of the conference with the
Lords.
[312] Aerssen: ‘LL Majestés me disants, qu’elles étoient
assurées, que mardy ou mercredy ils viendroyent pour
separer la royne du roi.’ Guistiniano: ‘Dubitando per
avventura di quei mostruosi successi, che senza riguardo
tengono di presenti in esercitio le lingue delli piu
appassationati.’
BOOK IX.
THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR. 1642-1646.
In the states of Western Europe constitutional rights from
a very early date had contended for the mastery against the
supreme executive authority: but this strife assumed a new
character, as to the principles involved and the system
on which it was waged, from the date when the spiritual
questions raised by religious controversy came to be mixed
up with those purely political. In this respect creed made
no difference. Starting from the demand for ecclesiastical
uniformity, the French earliest of all sought, under the
impulse of Catholic fanaticism, to confine their government
within the narrowest limits in the sphere of politics also.
In the year 1576 the Estates at Blois asked the assent of
the crown to the resolutions passed by them: they wanted
to exclude from the Privy Council all members hostile to
them. In 1585 the Guises at the head of the Catholic League
proposed assemblies of the Estates, recurring regularly
every three years, which should keep a reckoning between
prince and people. The chief among several grievances which
roused the population of Paris to insurrection against
Henry III was the tolerance accorded to the Huguenots
in contravention of the old laws of the land. In the
assembly of 1588 the Estates formulated the demand that the
King not only should administer the finances with their
co-operation, but also should in future neither declare war
nor conclude peace without them. In the assembly of 1593
they proceeded to dispose of the crown itself: the doctrine
was, that if the King disregarded the fundamental laws of
his kingdom, namely the spiritual laws, his authority
reverted to those by whom it had been conferred, that is to
say, the Estates. It was only the departure of Henry III
from the capital, and the military exploits of Henry IV,
that preserved the personal authority of the French kings.
We may perceive at a glance the manifold analogies between
the English events of which we are now treating, and those
which had taken place in France half a century earlier.
Both began through a desire to make the recognition of the
exclusive dominance of one religion effectively binding
on a government not decidedly inclined to that party: in
both the one-sided tolerance displayed by the princes
formed one of the chief grounds of complaint against
them: the demand was not only for the full execution of
the ecclesiastical laws, but also for the unconditional
validity of the resolutions passed by the assembly of the
Estates wherein these opinions prevailed, for periodic
meetings of the Estates, and the dependence on them of the
highest officials and of the entire administration--with
this difference, that what in the one kingdom was desired
for the benefit of Catholicism, in the other was meant to
aid the Protestant cause. The religious principles were
opposed to one another, the political were to a large
extent identical.
In England however all was more deeply rooted and more
firmly established than in France. The preponderance of
Parliament was far more a matter of historical usage than
the power of the Three Estates in France: it had grown up
in far more intimate union with the feelings and habits
of men. Further, while in France the motives derived from
foreign connexions occupied the whole foreground, and
were as clear as daylight, in England such motives were
weaker and more obscure: the movement assumed a prevailing
national colour. When at last after long disputes every
chance of a peaceful result had vanished, it was obvious
that in England the war must involve far greater danger to
the crown. From the different development of the contending
principles in the two countries arose the divergence in
their later history. At that time the English crown was not
yet without military resources, and the example of France
might serve as an encouragement to challenge the fortunes
of war on the King’s behalf. The English capital had taken
as active a part in favour of the Puritan Parliament as
the French capital for the exclusively Catholic Estates.
Charles I had been obliged to quit Westminster and London
as Henry III had quitted Paris: since the successor of the
latter had within a few years made himself master of Paris,
and had brought about a reaction at least in politics,
might not the same future be possible for Charles I also?
CHAPTER I.
ORIGIN OF THE CIVIL WAR.
There is an important point of connexion between English
and French history in the fact that the Queen of England
was a daughter of Henry IV, and had her father ever in
view as the ideal man and prince. She had grown up under
the influence of those prevailing Catholic sentiments
which her Florentine mother favoured, and in ideas of the
unconditional supremacy of royalty and of the claims of
birth, such as had come into favour under her brother:
almost more than he she showed that the blood of Henry IV
flowed in her veins.
We know how long it was before she could obtain any certain
influence over her husband. He put an end, with a decision
which no one would have expected in him, to the religious
demonstrations of her household, of which she approved: he
allowed no scope to her personal sympathies, which were
directed across the Channel; he supported his ministers
against her. For Charles I was fully conscious of his
royal calling: he would not let his position be interfered
with by foreign influences: only in cases of mercy was
the Queen’s intercession ever attended to. Hostility to
Cardinal Richelieu, who had deeply offended both the Queen
through her mother and the King by his connexion with the
Scots gave the first occasion for an understanding between
Charles and his consort which was of importance in public
affairs; it formed as it were a common interest between
them.
The Queen reconciled herself to the dominion of
Anglicanism, while it supported the prerogative, on which
again toleration of the Catholics was based. Hence also [A.D. 1642.]
attacks on the prerogative, the unconditional validity of
which had been assumed in her marriage treaty, appeared
to her like an assault on her personal rights. She had
that fiery conviction of the truth of her creed which is
frequently characteristic of clever women: they see in
every deviation from it either error, or a wicked design,
or actual crime: the feeling of being in the true faith
fills them with pride and utter contempt for its enemies.
How much more must this have been the case where religious
hostility was in league with political attacks on the
rights of royalty. In the efforts of the Puritan party in
Parliament Henrietta Maria saw so many blows aimed at all
human and divine rights. She had not yet fully converted
her husband to these views, but she impressed him by her
quick, spirited, and lively intelligence: events aroused
in her a far more active spirit of resistance than in him:
she divined the purport of the intentions of her opponents,
and the inevitable results of the steps taken by the King.
The fact that her views and predictions were justified by
the event, gave her a double influence over him, so that he
formed a very high opinion of her talents. Long as they had
been married, she had never lost the traces of passionate
affection: once, though half jestingly, she showed signs
of a nascent jealousy: but the King wished to please her
and go hand in hand with her; as her penetration convinced
him, so too he loved to win her approval. Her judgment
was especially decisive in personal matters: she boasted
once that as soon as she had gained credit with the King,
she had restored to his favour persons whom before he had
hated[313]. Now however the bitterest hatred of Parliament
was directed against all whom she favoured or listened to.
Persons, at least as much as principles, were the great
exciting cause of the movement[314]. The Queen herself was
directly attacked and threatened by this hostility. To arm
against the Parliament was for her a matter at once of
self-defence and of ambition; she aroused for this end all [A.D. 1642.]
the energy which the King possessed. Charles I desired to
defend not merely himself but also his wife and family. In
this community of interests, of opinions, and of dangers,
the Queen obtained, if not absolute dominion, at any rate
the greatest influence over the King.
Her fear lest they should be separated had contributed
mainly, as we have seen, to their joint resolve to quit
London. There was however in this no despondency: the court
merely wished to save itself from being coerced by the
immediate pressure of the mob: the plan of taking up arms
and threatening the city itself was connected with this
removal.
Parliament was greatly disturbed by the news that the
officers and armed men who had been dispersed from
Westminster had reassembled at Windsor. Digby told them
that the King had retired from the city in order to avoid
being trampled on. He himself appeared in the field at the
head of a small body of men with his friend Lunsford, and
was suspected of intending to seize Kingston-on-Thames.
It may safely be assumed that this suspicion was well
founded. Some months later the Queen frankly told a French
agent that the purpose of herself and the King had been to
seize, from Windsor, a strong place in the neighbourhood,
but that this had become impossible when the Parliament
placed troops between that point and the castle[315]. These
were the militia of Surrey and Bucks, who were immediately
despatched, and dispersed the royal troops before they had
fairly assembled. Lunsford was brought back a prisoner: the
subtle Digby escaped.
From Kingston, where there was a considerable magazine, the
King would have been able to communicate with Portsmouth
and Hull, as well as with the Tower. The attention of the
Queen was especially directed towards Hull, where there
was a great store of arms, enough, as was supposed, for an
army of sixteen thousand men: but the project of making an
immediate attempt upon that town was frustrated, as far
as we can see, by the opposition of members of the Privy [A.D. 1642.]
Council, who feared by such a step to provoke the
Parliament to arms, with which they still wished to
maintain a tolerable understanding[316].
The Queen was of an entirely different opinion: she held
that the only way to arrive at an accommodation was first
to come to a distinct breach; that only when the King had
definitely opposed himself to Parliament would he find the
means for resistance.
If however the court had no strong places at its command,
the Queen could not stay in the country. She did not feel
safe in any of the country houses and badly fortified
castles which were at her disposal: she was afraid of
falling some day into the hands of Parliament, a prospect
which seemed to her both disgraceful and dangerous. The
idea of her leaving the country for some time, which had
often been thought of before, was now again mooted: there
was a further reason, as she said, in the fact that her
presence irritated Parliament against the King. Still a
regard for her own safety and for the King’s negotiations
was by no means the only reason for her departure: when the
Queen fled, as undoubtedly she did, before enemies who were
too strong to be faced, she hoped at the same time to be
able to provide the means requisite for their overthrow.
She resolved to conduct her daughter to the house of her
future father-in-law, who would be greatly obliged thereby,
for he had already through his ambassadors expressed a wish
that this should be done, and would afford her support.
She had jewels with her, including some left by Queen
Elizabeth, and intended to sell them, or pawn them as
security for the loan she hoped to raise: and she thought
that with the arms to be purchased with the proceeds, or
with the money in cash, her husband would be in a position
to declare war if necessary. He promised her not to depart
without her knowledge from the resolutions which they
had adopted together, and especially to make no further
concessions to Parliament. Prince Rupert of the Palatinate
had already come to Dover with the purpose of taking arms [A.D. 1642.]
in his uncle’s cause. He was told that the time was not
yet come, and accompanied the Queen to Holland: but at
Dover men spoke without any reserve of the probabilities of
war within a short time[317].
All hope of an accommodation was not yet given up: the
negotiations had not been altogether broken off by the
King’s departure from the capital: on both sides they still
thought it possible to avoid extremities.
On one of the most important questions there had been some
approximation. The King had at last agreed to what the
Lords, after the violent transformation of their house,
had by a majority accepted: he prevailed upon himself to
sanction the exclusion of the bishops from their temporal
offices, and especially from Parliament. He had two motives
for this; first, that otherwise the departure of his Queen
would not have been permitted; secondly, that he saw no
other means of saving the existence of the bishops in their
spiritual character, the episcopal church government, which
the opposition intended to destroy. He regarded Episcopacy
as a divine institution which he durst not overthrow: but
he held it to be allowable to surrender under the pressure
of circumstances, he hoped not for ever, the temporal
authority which had been committed to the bishops.
Even on the other great dispute, which was now prominent,
concerning the chief control of the military power, the
King had shown some signs of giving way. When towards the
end of January he was urged to entrust the fortresses, as
well as the command of the militia, only to persons whom
the two Houses of Parliament should have recommended to
him, he answered with much emphasis that the appointment
of military commanders was one of the jewels of the crown
that could not be parted with: but he added that he
wished to know the names of the men in whom Parliament
had confidence, as well as the extent of the power which
they thought to confer, and the length of time for
which it should be held. Such concessions were scarcely [A.D. 1642.]
expected, and awakened in the country a lively hope that
all might even yet be amicably settled[318]. What was the
point at which this hope broke down?
Immediately after the King’s return from Dover to Greenwich
the list of persons recommended, as well as details of the
power intended for them, and its duration, were laid before
him. In the names he found not much to object to: about the
extent of power he raised some legal difficulties, which
however might very well have been removed: but he was only
the more resolute in his resistance to the terms suggested
as to its duration. Parliament claimed exclusively for
itself the right of revoking the appointments, as well as
authority to punish any disobedience to its ordinance[319].
The King however had never intended to go so far. He might
very likely have been persuaded to temporary compliance: as
the scheme stood, it implied his renunciation for ever of
all military authority. To this Charles I would not assent,
declaring in the most emphatic language that he could not
entrust to others the power placed in his hands by God,
through the laws, for the defence of his people, at all
events without being able at any moment to resume it. All
now depended on whether Parliament would be content with
this limitation.
There were not wanting some in the assembly who would
have been satisfied with this, as the control of the army
had always been a right of the crown. But what security
would there have been in appointing military commanders
whose powers might be taken from them by the King at
any moment. The debate filled many with gloom and fear
of misfortune[320]. Whatever they might do, whether
they remained quiet, or regulated the militia under the
authority of the two Houses, matters had come to a crisis,
‘to a desperate pass.’ In the Lower House the determination [A.D. 1642.]
to adhere to their purpose, and consideration of their
own danger prevailed. They first resolved that the King’s
answer must be regarded as a positive refusal, and then
agreed upon a new memorial, in which he was told plainly,
that unless he declared himself ready to satisfy Parliament
on this point, and that at once, through the members who
presented the memorial, they had determined to take control
of the militia under the authority of the two Houses, and
the words were added, ‘for the rescue of the King himself
and of his kingdom.’
Charles I replied that he was astonished at this message:
his answer had contained all that he could grant in reason,
justice, and honour. After a few days Lord Pembroke once
more put the question, whether he would not, at least for
a short time, surrender to Parliament the right of control
over the army. The King answered, not for an hour: things
had been demanded of him which had never before been asked
of a King. He was now against any temporary concession.
Parliament however paid no further attention to him. They
adhered to the fiction that the agreement of the two Houses
implied the royal will, even when the King in person had in
the most decided manner expressed an opposite view. After
receiving his answer the Lower House passed a resolution
that the kingdom should immediately be put into a state
of defence under the authority of Parliament, in the
manner already fixed (March 2). Some few lords of ancient
name, such as Lindsay, Grey, Seymour, Capel, offered some
resistance: but the majority agreed to the conclusions of
the Lower House, and action was taken immediately according
to their tenour.
The King was on his way to the North, when he received a
declaration stating the reasons for these resolutions: he
did not delay a moment the issue of a counter declaration
(Huntingdon, 15 March) in which he repeated the contents of
his last message; at the same time he called attention to
the fundamental laws of the realm, one of which was that no
subject was bound to pay obedience to any act or command to
which the King had not given his consent. He stated that he
required obedience to the existing laws, and simply forbade [A.D. 1642.]
any compliance with orders not ratified by himself;
both generally, and in special relation to the army,
no ordinance was to be carried out in which he had
no part[321]. He did not stop, it will be seen, at
the immediate circumstances of the case, but raised
conspicuously the great constitutional question which
Parliament had decided for itself, or treated as if already
decided.
The Parliament was not misled on either point: this time
the majority of the Upper House took the initiative. On the
evening of the 16th arrived the message from Huntingdon:
on the evening of the 17th first the Lords and then the
Commons adopted the resolutions, first, to adhere to
their earlier declarations in relation to the army[322],
secondly, that the Lords and Commons in Parliament
possessed the full right of declaring what the law of the
land was, and that to dispute or deny this, or to issue
an order that any such declaration was not to be attended
to, was a breach of the privileges of Parliament. Whoever
advised the King, added the Lower House, to send this
message, is an enemy to the peace of the kingdom.
This is the moment, if we would fix it exactly, at which
reconciliation between the King and the Parliament became
impossible. Hitherto the opposing manifestoes had always
assumed the possibility of a reconciliation, although they
obviously risked a different result: but the gulf between
the King’s declaration on the 15th, and the answer of
Parliament on the 17th, could not be bridged over: the two
powers now stood most distinctly opposed to each other,
both in their general claims and in their specific demands.
The latter in fact implied the former: they formed a kind
of summary of the whole dispute.
From this point the dissension, which hitherto had been
confined to the constitutional authorities, spread over a
wider field. King and Parliament together had formed the
authority which every one was bound to obey: what was to
happen when these issued contrary orders? The question [A.D. 1642.]
to which of the two they would render obedience was set
first before the commandants of certain fortresses.
In the first days after the King’s departure, when Digby
and Lunsford were stirring, it was remarked in the city
that arms and ammunition were being brought out of the
Tower, and an unusual quantity of provisions carried in.
Not only was this immediately forbidden, but also, in
order to make it impossible, a levy of militia, under the
command of Skippon, was stationed in the approaches to the
Tower, and information immediately conveyed to the Common
Council. The Lieutenant Constable, John Byron, was greatly
astonished when the Sheriffs of London and Middlesex
informed him of this arrangement. He declared to them
that it ran counter to the privileges of the Tower, which
he had received orders from the King to maintain. They
referred to the commands of the two Houses, in which the
royal will was contained, and threatened him, if he did not
obey, with open force and a formal blockade on the side of
the river. John Byron was the first to give utterance to
those feelings of chivalrous loyalty, without any stain of
factious ambition, which still survived in a large part of
the nobility and gentry. He wrote to the King’s secretary
that he would take care that, in conformity with his
Majesty’s commands, he gave no valid cause for dispute: but
he said that they were seeking occasion against him[323].
If they cut off his supplies, and attacked him with open
force, he certainly could not promise, in the condition he
was in, to hold out long: but they should purchase both the
place and his life as dearly as he could make them[324]. It
was not however to come to such extremities. The Commons
preferred at once to request the removal of Byron: the King
begged to know their complaint against him: they answered
that in times of imminent danger the advice of Parliament
was a sufficient reason. Charles I did not in fact dare to [A.D. 1642.]
resist: for these were the days before the departure of
the Queen, when he sought to avoid a formal breach. Byron
was present at the sitting at which the King’s answer in
the affirmative was announced. He said that only one charge
could be made against him, of having been appointed by
the King and being faithful to him and only begged to be
allowed to resign the place into the King’s own hands. With
the King’s consent the Tower was now finally handed over to
a governor of the Parliamentary party, named Conyers.
Similar sentiments were expressed by Colonel Goring,
commandant of Portsmouth, who this time did not flinch. He
was summoned by Parliament to Westminster to give advice
about arming the country: he delayed to appear for some
time, and when no other pretext was available, declared
plainly that he saw that Parliament was entering on an
illegal course, and refused his obedience. He made his
garrison take an oath of this tenour, and admitted within
the walls of his sea-fortress none but undoubted adherents
of the King.
A direct and typical conflict between the views of
Parliament and of the King in relation to military
authority took place at Hull.
Kingston-upon-Hull, which had grown from a fishing village
to a considerable town, through its favourable situation
for the northern trade, had been carefully fortified
by Henry VIII, who devoted to this purpose some of the
spoils of the monasteries. Strafford had placed a military
magazine there to serve for the war against Scotland: since
the disbanding of his army, the block-houses, castle, and
magazine had remained under the charge of the magistrates
and inhabitants of Hull. The attention of Parliament had
long ago been directed to this place: the mayor had been
requested to disarm all recusants in the city and its
neighbourhood, as danger was apprehended from them. Now
however that an open breach had taken place, the danger
was grown most serious, particularly as the court at once
turned its eyes on Hull. Parliament resolved to secure the
place by a governor who could be fully trusted, Sir John
Hotham. Hotham had taken part in the German war in the
service of the Elector Palatine, and had been promised by [A.D. 1642.]
the King the reversion of Hull, but afterwards had
attached himself decidedly to the dominant party in
Parliament, of which he was a member. He was a rude
soldier, violent and ambitious, and had a very good idea
of how to combine his opinions with his interests: he
immediately sent his son to take possession of the post
to which Parliament had appointed him. Meanwhile Lord
Newcastle had also entered the town, though under another
name, in order to win it for the King, and introduce a
Royalist garrison. The mayor and aldermen of Hull were in
the utmost perplexity; for the moment they admitted neither
force, and prayed Parliament, through the representatives
of the city, to come to an understanding with the King
about the introduction of a garrison: but under the
influence of the elder Hotham, Parliament spurned any such
evasion of the difficulty[325]. In the city itself the
magistrates were mostly for the King, but the greater part
of the citizens inclined to the Parliament. Under these
circumstances Hotham gained his point, and entered Hull
with orders to admit none but Parliamentary troops.
The King had by this time (March 19) come to York: he
had been inclined to return to Scotland, but the country
gentry, as well as the inhabitants of the city, displayed
so much devotion to him that he determined to remain.
Both the interests of the county and his own required the
occupation of Hull. There was no doubt that Hotham would
reject every other measure: but would he have the face to
oppose the King himself? Charles I, who in spite of so
much contrary experience, was always persuaded of the vast
influence of royalty, deemed this impossible, and resolved
to go in person to Hull, and obtain entrance into its
fortifications.
Towards the end of April the Elector Palatine, and the
King’s younger son, James, arrived one day in Hull for the
purpose, as they said, of inspecting the fortifications of
the place in company with the governor. They were still
busy with this, when the King sent word that he also meant [A.D. 1642.]
to and that accommodation must be provided for him and
his suite: he might have some three hundred men with
him. But Hotham knew that if he admitted only twenty, he
should no longer be master of the place, where there was
still considerable number of Royalists. His resolution was
instantly taken: he raised the drawbridge and informed
the King who was already at the gates, in the humblest
language, but still in direct terms, that he could not
admit him without violating the confidence reposed in him
by the Parliament.
The speech is extant in which Hotham justified his conduct
to the inhabitants of Hull[326]. He declared that it was
his duty to die for King and Parliament, but when there
was hostility between them, he must obey the latter; that
Parliament was entrusted by the King and nation with power
to order everything that concerned the common weal: if
it noticed dangers anywhere, it was bound by its duty to
obviate them, and no one could then refuse obedience to it,
without breaking his troth to the sovereign. He took credit
to himself for what he had done, and said that he did not
think to renounce his loyalty to the King in proving his
obedience to Parliament for an example to others.
Thus was accomplished in a striking manner what had long
been pending: the authority of Parliament as representing
the nation, in military matters as well as all others,
confronted the personal power of the crown, and that with
a claim to superiority. The King was refused admission
into one of his fortresses, in the name of the authority
represented by the two Houses of Parliament, in which his
own title was comprised. Charles I had to retire from Hull
without achieving his object. He declared John Hotham
guilty of treason: but Parliament replied by resolving that
such a sentence on a member of the Lower House, especially [A.D. 1642.]
without any judicial proceedings, was a new breach of the
privileges of Parliament, and an illegal act on the King’s
part.
Thus was one legality opposed to the other, one obedience
to the other, one conception of the supreme power to the
other: and the great question now was, which of the two
would gain the upper hand in England.
There were still numberless persons who would not listen to
the argument propounded by Hotham at Hull, but professed
a doctrine totally opposite. The Lower House, they said,
is elected by subjects, and represents only subjects: no
sort of authority over princes can be conferred on it by
them. Parliament appealed to the fundamental laws of the
realm; but we must first know what is their true meaning:
it seeks to give effect to the protest passed and sworn
to three years ago, but in that the honour of his Majesty
was reserved. The King has conceded all that can fairly
be asked, perhaps too much: Parliament is openly usurping
the whole executive power, and desiring to wield it at its
pleasure: but there cannot be two swords in the kingdom.
Certainly in obeying the King we have no idea of neglecting
the duty we owe to the kingdom.
These opinions prevailed at York[327], whither the King
returned from Hull: and once they were manifested there
unmistakeably. In an assembly of the county gentry Charles
I explained what had happened, adding that he would
rather lose his three crowns than leave such an insult
unpunished[328], and asked them to form a guard for his
protection. What the King said of his own position was
greeted with joyful assent, but what he let fall about the
intentions of Parliament roused expressions of disapproval.
In a second assembly, at Heworth Moor, near York, the
freeholders and tenants also took part. The King appeared
at the head of his newly-formed guard, both horse and
foot: the nobles and gentry constituted the first, the [A.D. 1642.]
militia the second. A proclamation was issued in which the
King professed his adherence to the Protestant religion
and the laws of the land, and claimed the support of the
assembly in maintaining them. The Cavaliers waved their
hats: the people cried ‘God bless the King’: yet even here
there was not complete unanimity. There were still some
Puritans and adherents of the Lower House in York who were
encouraged to express their sentiments by the presence of
some commissioners of Parliament. At the meeting Thomas
Fairfax placed a petition of this nature on the pommel of
the King’s saddle, who refused to receive it, as coming
from a single man: it seemed to him sufficiently rejected
by the joyful acclamations of his partisans. A devoted
mob, of perhaps 20,000 men, attended him back to the city
as if in triumph. The Cavaliers had the upper hand in York
as decidedly as the Roundheads in London. The ancient
nobility, such as the Savilles, who were now again firmly
attached to the King, set the fashion which was followed
by most of the city and county. The York people would
scarcely endure the Londoners who were settled there in
business: they regarded them as accomplices of those who
had transgressed against the King. Three knights brought to
the King as a present a charger splendidly caparisoned in
the ancient style: the velvet which covered it reached to
the ground[329].
Similar exhibitions of chivalrous and popular adherence
were made in Derby, Lancaster, and other northern counties.
The thirteen counties of Wales unanimously rejected the
requests made to them by Parliament, and assured the
King of their entire devotion. The sheriff and gentry of
Nottingham entreated Parliament not to expect them to make
war on the King, to whom they were bound by the oath of
allegiance and supremacy. This address is also remarkable,
because it touches on all the questions which at that
moment the men who had not yet committed themselves to
a party were most anxiously deliberating. The theory of
what might be considered lawful in England was discussed [A.D. 1642.]
at length: the view taken is, that as the King and
Lords can make no law without the assent of the Commons
of England, so this threefold cord may not in any way
be separated: the Commons with the Lords are equally
incompetent to make laws, so that what the Parliament
called laws were merely declarations of opinion, to which
no one was bound to pay obedience.
From this point of view others sought to define more
closely the relations of the three powers. The union of
monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic forms in the
English constitution, contrived by the wisdom of antiquity,
was, they thought, endangered by the demands of Parliament.
The object of the monarchical form was that the country
under one head might be able to repel foreign attacks and
quell internal tumult, and for this it was indispensable
that the head of the state should possess the right of
making peace and war, as well as the nomination to the
military and great civil offices: he must have the power to
enforce the laws. The House of Commons was not intended to
take part in the government, or to nominate those who were
to conduct it, though it possessed the initiative in the
imposition of taxes, and the right of impeaching those who
might misuse the power entrusted to them by the King. The
function of the Upper House was to hold the balance between
these two powers. The absolute power which ruled the
country was composed of the union of the royal prerogative,
the judicial power of the Lords, and the legal privileges
of the Commons[330].
The assumption in this argument is that the laws, by which
the limits of each power within the constitution were
defined, were old and well-known: as in earlier times
the King, so now the Lower House was reproached with
misunderstanding the laws and exceeding its powers.
This accusation could certainly not be controverted from [A.D. 1642.]
the point of view of the existing constitution. The chief
efforts of the dominant party had been hitherto directed
to forcing the King to assent to the bills submitted to
him: he had quitted the capital in order to escape further
pressure: their proceeding, in spite of his refusal, to
give effect to their own views, and this in matters of the
highest importance, was an open violation of the existing
constitution and of the recognised mutual rights of the
parties. They acted as though the King’s consent was no
longer necessary: Henry Martin once propounded the theory
that as the opinion of all the Commons of the realm was
implied in the vote of the Lower House, so the King’s
consent was included in the vote of the Lords[331]; that
the Parliament of the realm was his great council, whose
opinion he must follow; and that the old Norman formula of
refusal ought to be abolished.
The zealous adherents of Parliament did not repel the
charge of transgressing the laws: they accepted it. Their
doctrine was--starting from Oliver St. John’s language on
the Bill of Attainder--that Parliament could not be bound
by written laws, for that the legislative power in the
fullest extent belonged to it, which meant merely equity
applied by common consent to politics: that inferior
tribunals were bound by written laws, but not the highest,
which would cease to be such if bound[332]. This theory
distinguished between fundamental laws and principles,
recognising only the latter as conclusive.
The view which some years later John Milton sought to
uphold, namely, that Parliament was not co-ordinate with
the King, but superior, rested on the same basis. For, he
argued, the King governs through the laws; the Parliament,
even in the absence (as then) of any King’s assent, makes
and repeals them, so that Parliament is above all positive
law. Thus a power, if not literally absolute, yet exalted
above the law, such as the King claimed, was ascribed to
Parliament.
The Parliament still avoided expressing or sanctioning [A.D. 1642.]
on its own part these ideas, which had been generated in
theorising minds by its position and growing strength: it
adhered above all to its practical demands.
These were once more laid before the King in definite form
in the first half of June. They are the so-called nineteen
propositions, a sort of programme of the condition into
which it was sought to bring the nation. Three demands
were therein specially put forward: one religious, for
the change of the existing state of things in relation to
church government and the liturgy, in conformity with a
consultation to be held with learned theologians, and with
the resolutions of Parliament: one political, that all
nominations to high offices should require the approval
of the two Houses, and that even the Privy Council should
consist of only a fixed number of persons, all of whom must
be approved by both Houses: finally one military, that the
proposals in reference to the militia should be accepted,
at least temporarily[333]. The King answered that were he
to assent to these propositions, he should not be able to
fulfil the duty incumbent upon him: they were the sort of
conditions that are made with a prisoner.
While thus definitely refusing, he was already aware that
he had by no means the unanimous opinion of Parliament
opposed to him. We have already more than once mentioned
the discussions within the House on the most important
questions; the first on Strafford’s attainder, the second
about the attack on Episcopacy, and the preparation of the
Remonstrance: but the majority had always persevered in
the course once adopted. Now came the third and greatest
division. In spite of the protests, to which several
lords had resorted, the resolutions about the militia
were passed, and the nineteen propositions laid before
the King as the terms of Parliament. Seeing that thus the
ancient constitution of the country was threatened at once
in spiritual and in political matters, a number of Lords
deemed it their duty, and had the courage, to separate [A.D. 1642.]
from Parliament. At the sitting of May 30 the Upper
House was informed that twelve Lords at once had been
seen on the road to York, and then actually in that city.
They were Monmouth, Northampton, Salisbury, Devonshire,
Dover, Dunsmore, Andover, Capel, Rich, Grey, Lovelace,
and Coventry. Soon followed men like Lord Hertford, who
had taken a great part in the beginning of the movement.
A certain vacillation was exhibited by some before they
took the step, by others after it; but the majority were
fully determined, and held to their purpose. The number
was soon so great that it seemed less wonderful that they
should be gone, than that the rest should stay behind at
Westminster[334]. It was regarded as an event of great
importance when Lord Littleton carried off to the King
the Great Seal, in conformity with a promise made at the
time of receiving it, a feat not accomplished without
some stratagem and danger. A number of the Commons also
repaired to the King, around whom was formed a company that
professed to represent the State, and treated the acts of
the Parliament at Westminster as lawless usurpations.
The Lords however did not join the King unconditionally.
A mutual engagement was entered into, on the basis of
maintaining the English constitution. The King promised
the Lords to require from them no other obedience than was
grounded on the laws, and to take under his protection
every one who refused to obey the declarations and orders
of the two Houses at Westminster. The Lords undertook
to defend the King, his crown, dignity, and rightful
privileges against every man, and to obey no orders not
warranted by the laws: especially they pledged themselves
to this in respect of military ordinances lacking the
King’s assent. Both parties bound themselves to support
the true Protestant religion, as by law established,--thus
excluding Presbyterianism,--the lawful liberties of the
subjects, and the privileges both of the King and of
Parliament. The King says ‘the just privileges of the
three estates of Parliament[335],’ which included the [A.D. 1642.]
restoration of the bishops to their parliamentary rights:
the Lords say ‘the just privileges of your Majesty and your
two Houses of Parliament.’ Twenty-five Lords signed the
agreement on June 13, 1642.
These promises were given and these declarations exchanged
by way of opposition to the demands contained in the
nineteen propositions[336]. For a moment they flattered
themselves that the weight added to the King’s cause would
incline the Parliament to more peaceful views: but the
contrary happened, the feeling of hostility grew with the
number of enemies.
The Parliament complained of the evil-minded persons about
the King, called Cavaliers, who had no respect for the
laws, and no fear of God or man: that in York nothing
less was intended than the dissolution and overthrow of
the government of the kingdom. In language of earnest
apprehension it warned one and all to aid in averting this
pressing danger according to the promise contained in the
protest. The Lords at Westminster also, under the influence
of a document that reached them, declared it necessary to
provide for the safety of the King and the kingdom[337].
Thereupon, in complete contravention of the royal decrees,
the militia in the city and neighbouring counties were put
under arms, voluntary contributions were collected, and a
loan made.
The associated Lords at York declared in reply that it
appeared from the parliamentary papers which had reached
them, that the sacred person of the King, religion, the
liberty of the subject, Parliament and its rights, were
all in danger[338]: in order to assist the King in their
defence, they proclaimed a levy of cavalry, which all of
them promised to raise, and to maintain in the field for a
fixed time.
On June 17 the assembly at Westminster, on June 22 that
at York, declared the country in danger, each through the
other; and they proceeded to arm against each other.
We see now how it came to such an extremity. It is obvious [A.D. 1642.]
that this idea was eventually entertained through the
Queen’s influence, before her departure: but all still
depended on whether an accommodation was possible in
respect of the military power. The King was willing for
the time to admit the participation of Parliament: but the
latter claimed not only the recommendation of commanders
for that occasion, but also that their removal should
be made to depend exclusively on the vote of the House,
and required the unconditional obedience of the country
to its ordinances. This would have deprived the King for
ever of the sword, and made the Parliament master in his
stead[339]: the King would not go so far, nor would the
majority of the nobility or of the gentry allow it. For
they thought that the sword did not belong to Parliament,
and that absolute executive authority was not its function:
moreover resistance was contrary to the old doctrines
of the established Church. The contest was not between
absolute power and a democratic republic, though these
ideas at times appeared in the background. The one party
in fact desired Parliament not without the King, the other
the King not without Parliament: but the one sought to
maintain the autonomy of the throne and of the Church, and
the estates of the realm as hitherto constituted, the other
would shake the foundation of the Church, and subject the
crown unconditionally to Parliament. On this question a
dispute broke out within the legislative body itself: part
broke loose from the rest, and joined the King.
As now both sides had formally decided to make preparations
for war, the whole country immediately became involved
in the hostility between them. In all the counties the
Parliamentary ordinance and the full powers conferred
by the King on his adherents (commission of array[340])
encountered one another, both couched in the same terms,
both directed to the same end, yet diametrically opposed to
each other in intention.
In the eastern counties the influence of the capital [A.D. 1642.]
gained obedience for the ordinance; in the northern,
through the influence of York, the commission gained
the upper hand; but neither unopposed. In the midland
counties the chiefs who had declared for the opposite
sides contended together: in Lincoln, Willoughby of Parham
and Lord Lindsay; in Leicester, the Earl of Stamford,
who had been deputed by the Parliament, and the sheriff
appointed by the King, Henry Hastings, son of the Earl of
Huntingdon; in Northampton, the Brookes and the Comptons;
in Berkshire, the Earl of Holland and Lord Lovelace; and
others elsewhere. In Oxfordshire the Earl of Berkshire
encountered Hampden, and was arrested by him. As in
Derby the Royalists, so in Wiltshire the adherents of
the Parliament under Lord Pembroke, preponderated. In
Lancashire and Cheshire Lord Stanley mustered in three
separate places bodies of 20,000 men, all armed with
muskets and pikes, and ready for the King’s service: but
this powerful levy, besides awakening jealousy at court,
aroused the opposition of the lesser magnates, led by some
members of Parliament[341]. William Earl of Hertford, to
whom the King had entrusted seven Welsh counties, and
ten others bordering on them, made a great figure; but
he was not undisputed master of them: in Gloucestershire
Parliamentary opinions prevailed, and in Pembroke they were
gaining ground.
The leaders of the Parliamentary majority however derived
their main strength from their alliance with the capital.
Here the Common Council, with the aid of Parliament,
had completely thrown off the authority of the chief
magistrate. He lost the right which he had hitherto
enjoyed, of summoning and dismissing the council, as
well as the initiative in its deliberations. His votes
were swamped by the great number of the rest; the King’s
adherents were ejected: one of the Puritan leaders
succeeded to the Royalist lord mayor. A committee was
appointed to find means of defence, which controlled
the city militia, and in which the Puritans had a [A.D. 1642.]
majority. In the city there were now no preachers except of
this persuasion; all others had been removed or silenced.
From the pulpits not merely religious but also political
opinions were taught: those were counted as the most
faithful who were most eager for war with the King, and
contributed towards it[342]. Under these circumstances the
proposal of the Lords to form a sufficient fund for the
maintenance of the army, obtained full approval[343]: and
their reasoning was also calculated to make an impression.
They observed that the whole kingdom might serve as their
security: if Parliament prevailed, every man’s loan
would certainly be returned with interest: otherwise not
that only, but everything else they possessed would be
endangered. The citizens vied with one another in bringing
in their gold and silver. The preparations of the city were
far in advance of those in the country.
Following the example of the Common Council, Parliament
now appointed a committee of safety, as it was called,
for the defence of Parliament and of the realm, and to
repel all armed opposition. We find among its members Pym,
Hampden, Martin, and Fiennes, as well as some more moderate
men, such as Hollis and Stapleton: of the Lords there
were Essex, Northumberland, Holland, and Say. From this
committee proceeded the proposal, which was adopted by a
resolution of July 12, that an army of 10,000 men should be
raised, and the Earl of Essex placed at the head of it.
Essex and Holland had refused compliance with the King’s
orders to follow him and discharge the duties of their
offices, and committed themselves fully to the Parliament,
which in return took them up very warmly. When now Essex
made up his mind to take command of the armed force that
was being raised against the King, every one saw that
he was thus offending beyond forgiveness, and staking
his whole future on the issue: the Parliament in return
pledged itself to live and die with him. His support
was of indescribable importance to the progress of the [A.D. 1642.]
cause. He was esteemed steadfast in his opposition, and
enjoyed the full confidence of the Presbyterians[344]. The
memory of his father made him popular in the country: he
himself had been at first courted, afterwards neglected
by the government of the Stuarts, and seemed to have some
claim against them. The ease with which the Parliamentary
army was levied was ascribed to his name and zeal: he chose
as his subordinates men conspicuous in the dominant party.
Balfour served as lieutenant-general; among the colonels
of foot we find Brooke, Mandeville, Hollis, Hampden: among
the captains of horse Cromwell, Fiennes, and Haslerig. On
the same principle on which the general chose the colonels
and captains, they made up their regiments and companies,
and clothed them in their colours[345]. The army thoroughly
represented the ruling party, which held general control
of the war, as yet without marked separation between the
Presbyterians and the Independents.
Parliament took charge of the revenues, collected the
customs, contracted loans, controlled the exchequer: it had
already succeeded in getting into its hands the national
fleet.
Algernon Percy, Earl of Northumberland, had at an earlier
time been raised by the special favour of the King to the
dignity of high admiral: he had however long detached
himself from the policy of the court, both on principle
and from dislike to the persons highest in influence
there: in the military question he took the side of the
Parliament. His vice-admiral, Pennington, had drawn on
himself the ill-will of Parliament by aiding the flight
of some of the accused ministers: it desired to displace
him, and designated the Earl of Warwick as his successor.
Northumberland, against the well-known feeling of the
King, lent his aid to this. The King fell into a violent
passion and pronounced the dismissal of Northumberland, who
without a word laid down his office, saying that it would
ill become him to seek to hold, against the King’s will, a [A.D. 1642.]
post which he owed to his extraordinary confidence. The
effect of this obedience was however very disastrous for
the King: the Parliament at once made Warwick admiral, with
all the powers that Northumberland had enjoyed. The King
might say what he pleased: with very slight difficulty the
fleet passed under the supreme command of Warwick. It had
cost the King immense pains to raise this fleet: he had
quarrelled with his people about the means of maintaining
it: and now without resistance it became subservient to the
Presbyterian and Parliamentary interests.
We must not omit to notice that the leading men in this
matter were connected by close ties of relationship.
The great favourite of Queen Elizabeth was the father
of the Earl of Essex: he had two sisters, of whom one
was the mother of Northumberland, the other of Warwick.
Among these the Earl of Warwick had undoubtedly the most
resolution and the most active spirit: he was the man who
had sustained Presbyterianism in England in the times
of greatest oppression, and had chiefly promoted the
religious emigration to America. In him the temper which
broke down the ecclesiastical and royalist system of the
Stuarts found its most lively expression: without being
altogether correct in his morals, he stood at the head of
the strict Presbyterians: he was enterprising, determined,
irresistible. As Mandeville had been led by him to join the
party, we may assume that he exercised decisive influence
over his nearer kinsmen, who besides were so inclined
already.
Their position is not without analogy to the political
circumstances of the first Essex. He too desired to
overthrow by popular assistance an administration of
Spanish and anti-Protestant tendencies. Now it had come to
pass that his son and nephew were at the head of the land
and sea forces of England, in direct opposition to the King
and his advisers.
If we consider the extent and the concentration of the
Parliamentary strength, we shall almost wonder that the
Royalists, ill organised, and deprived of the ordinary
resources of the supreme power, should have ventured to
take the field against it.
FOOTNOTES:
[313] She told Grecy: ‘Les personnes qu’il (le roi)
haissoit, lorsqu’elle étoit sans crédit, elle les avoit
retablies depuis qu’elle a pris créance auprès de lui (du
roi).’
[314] Montague: L’état des affaires d’Angleterre en 1642:
‘le prétexte du parlement n’est pas contre la royauté même,
mais contre les personnes.’
[315] So she herself soon after related to Grecy: ‘LL. MM.
s’étoient resolu de se retirer de Londres en une de leurs
maisons pour de là s’emparer d’une place forte, qui n’est
pas beaucoup éloignée.’
[316] Cp. Letters of Queen Henrietta Maria 117.
[317] The Life of Prince Rupert, probably by his secretary,
in Warburton’s Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers
i. 460. ‘It was not found proper at that time to make any
countenance of a war, matters not being as yet come to that
height as to despair of an accommodation.’
[318] This expectation is loudly expressed in the pamphlet,
Joyful Tidings to all True Christians, Jan. 1642. According
to it the King had declared ‘that hereafter he would
altogether join with them.’ (the Parliament).
[319] ‘That the powers granted shall continue until it
shall be otherwise ordered or declared by both houses of
Parliament.’ Ordinance of both houses.
[320] D’Ewes characterises the debate as ‘full of sadness
and evil augury.’ Sanford 482.
[321] Message from Huntingdon. ‘His Majesty being resolved
to observe the laws himself, and to require obedience to
all them from all his subjects.’ Journals 481.
[322] In the Lords with the addition ‘notwithstanding
anything expressed in this message.’
[323] Letters of John Byron in State Paper Office, Jan 22.
‘Though I carry ever so fairly, they are resolved to pick
quarrels with me.’
[324] ‘I cannot promise to keep that place long, in the
condition I am in, yet I will sell both it and my life at
as dear a rate as I can.’ A worthy ancestor of the great
poet!
[325] The younger Hotham had written, ‘Fallback, fall edge,
he would put it to the hazard.’ Sanford 475.
[326] In the pamphlet ‘Five matters of note.’ ‘The
Parliament being called and established by the authority of
the King and consent of the kingdom to effect all things
that are agreeable to law tending to the preservation of
His Majesty’s peace an welfare and the general good of the
subject--if they, foreseeing a danger--endeavour to prevent
it, and the persons by them commanded falsifie their trust,
they are traitors.’
[327] ‘York is a sanctuary to all those that despise the
Parliament.’ Letter sent by a Yorkshire gentleman to a
friend in London, June 3, 1642.
[328] So says Giustiniani: ‘Protesto ad alta voce, eleggere
di perdere le tre corone, che porta sopra il capo, piutosto
che lasciare senza severo castigo aggravio di tanta
consequenza.’
[329] A diurnal out of the north. July, 1642.
[330] England’s absolute monarchie or government of Great
Britain. Thomas Bankes, 1642. He ascribes to the House of
Commons the right ‘of impeaching those who for their own
ends, though countenanced by any surreptitiously gotten
command of the King have violated that law, which he (the
King) is bound ... to protect, and to the protection of
which they were bound to advise him.’
[331] ‘That the King’s vote was included in the Lords’
vote.’
[332] ‘Touching the fundamental laws or politique
constitution of this kingdom.’ Pamphlet of Feb. 24, 1642/3.
‘Whenever circumscribed by written laws, it ceaseth to be
supreme. Its superlative and uncircumscribed power I intend
only as relating to the universe and the affairs thereof,
where it is to work by its fundamental principle, not by
particular precepts or statutes.’
[333] Hallam ii: ‘The nineteen propositions went to
abrogate in spirit the whole existing constitution.’
[334] May’s History of the Long Parliament, ch. iv. 175:
‘In a very short space those lords became the greater
number, and their departure began therefore to seem less
strange than the constant sitting of the rest.’
[335] Parliamentary History xi, 208.
[336] Journals of the House of Lords v. 92.
[337] ‘They do find a disaffection in those persons about
His Majesty, and therefore it concerned us to take care to
provide for the safety of the King and the kingdom.’ June
17. Journals ii. 629.
[338] See their declaration from a pamphlet of the time
in Lady Theresa Lewis’ Lives of Friends of the Chancellor
Clarendon i. 119.
[339] The state of the difference between the King and the
Houses of Parliament, for the direction of conscience.
[340] On the origin of this the History of the Rebellion,
as originally composed, went into more detail than the
later account printed in Clarendon’s Life, vol. vi. p. 335;
ed. 1849.
[341] ‘The meaner sort thought it a fine thing to set up
against the great ones.’ Stanley’s Report.
[342] Butler. Letter from Mercurius, in Somers iv. 580.
[343] New propositions to the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and
Common Council. June 1642. Pamphlet.
[344] Giustiniani: ‘Capo il piu accreditato fra li
malcontenti e che con palese ostinatione ha impugnato
sempre senza rispetto gli interessi reali.’
[345] Nugent’s Memorials of Hampden ii. 200.
CHAPTER II.
THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1642 AND 1643.
Queen Henrietta Maria had a long and stormy passage from
Dover to Helvoetsluys, in which one of her ships was lost:
she never exhibited however any fear for herself when
shipwreck and death seemed to be impending, but spoke only
of God, and of the danger of her husband[346]. At the Hague
she delivered over her daughter, not without ceremony,
to the charge of Prince Frederick Henry of Orange, who
received her with all the respect due to members of royal
houses.
Her first object was, through the Prince’s influence to
induce the States-General to mediate in favour of her
husband; but when his affairs at York took an unexpectedly
favourable turn[347], she devoted all her attention to
procuring him support. The fugitives who had escaped to the
Netherlands, Percy, Jermyn, Windebank, Lord Finch, were in
this very useful to her. Many of her jewels were sold: the
Queen did not deny that they appeared to her more beautiful
than ever, when taken out of their gold settings: she had
to part with them for about half their value. Most of them
served as security for the loan which she raised: luckily
she had brought a full power from her husband for this
purpose: at times even this did not suffice, and the Prince
of Orange guaranteed payment. She actually succeeded in
sending over some money, more than £8000, as she herself [A.D. 1642.]
reckoned in July, which gave very much desired help; for
it was not all the nobility and gentry who provided for
themselves, and moreover the officers of the old army, who
appeared at York as before in London, and were the very
core of the Cavalier party, were urgently in want of pay.
Soon afterwards followed military stores, bought in the
Netherlands, saddles and harness for the cavalry, carbines,
pistols, muskets, matchlocks, even cannon and the necessary
ammunition. There is no doubt that from this source a
military undertaking was first made possible to the King.
There has been much controversy as to which party actually
began the war, the King or Parliament. Unquestionably
Parliament took the lead in preparations--the militia
preceded the array: the King however was the first to
determine to draw the sword.
As Newcastle and the mouth of the Tyne were in the King’s
hands, it would have been an inestimable advantage to his
position in the North, if he could have occupied Hull
also. Towards this he directed his first movement about
the end of July. The troops sought to secure both banks
of the Humber, and threw up entrenchments: guns were
brought up from the ships, with a view to a siege. Hotham
was once more urged not to compel the King to seize by
force on what was his by right[348]; but he, still holding
to his original purpose, replied that he was bound to
obey Parliament, the supreme court of the kingdom[349].
Parliament had already a force in readiness, which came
to the aid of the besieged, under one Meldrum, a Scot, so
that they were able to meet the attacks of the Royalists
by successful sorties. Here the first blood of the war
was shed: the King found himself compelled to abandon the
undertaking, especially as Warwick was bringing relief to
the town by sea.
The leaders at York had hoped to surprise some inland town
also, especially Coventry, which owed special attachment to
the house of Stuart, because the charter constituting it a [A.D. 1642.]
city, had been granted by James I. One of the chief men
at the court, Spenser Compton, Earl of Northampton, who
had once filled a municipal office there, declared that
he could guarantee its fidelity. Accordingly the King
sent word to the magistrates, in the familar style of
old times, which he loved to assume, that he intended
to come on an early day, August 19, and sup with them.
Compton repaired to the city, in order to prepare for him
a good reception. Meanwhile however Puritan opinions,
sustained by zealous preachers like King and the learned
Abbot, had gained the upper hand in Coventry. The ideas of
Parliamentary independence found as much favour there as
in Hull, Gloucester, and most other cities. Compton was
received with hostile demonstrations; and the city refused
admittance, not directly to the King, but to the armed men
whom he brought with him: and when on the next day these
prepared to open the gates by force, the inhabitants did
not hesitate to repel force by force. Parliamentary troops
very soon came up, and made any further attempt impossible.
While the King was thus failing in all his enterprises,
those of the Parliament succeeded. Colonel Goring, who had
raised the King’s standard at Portsmouth, was immediately
cut off from all communications both by land and by sea;
and as he was also ill supplied with provisions, for
Warwick had seized a corn-ship destined for him, he was
without much trouble forced to surrender the place.
Thus the beginnings of the campaign presaged but little
future good for the King.