CHAPTER XXII.

SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO.

DECEMBER, 1884, AND JANUARY, 1885.

The city of Savannah was an old place, and usually accounted a

handsome one. Its houses were of brick or frame, with large yards,

ornamented with shrubbery and flowers; its streets perfectly

regular, crossing each other at right angles; and at many of the

intersections were small inclosures in the nature of parks. These

streets and parks were lined with the handsomest shade-trees of

which I have knowledge, viz., the Willow-leaf live-oak, evergreens

of exquisite beauty; and these certainly entitled Savannah to its

reputation as a handsome town more than the houses, which, though

comfortable, would hardly make a display on Fifth Avenue or the

Boulevard Haussmann of Paris. The city was built on a plateau of

sand about forty feet above the level of the sea, abutting against

the river, leaving room along its margin for a street of stores and

warehouses. The customhouse, court-house, post-office, etc., were

on the plateau above. In rear of Savannah was a large park, with a

fountain, and between it and the court-house was a handsome

monument, erected to the memory of Count Pulaski, who fell in 1779

in the assault made on the city at the time it was held by the

English during the Revolutionary War. Outside of Savannah there

was very little to interest a stranger, except the cemetery of

Bonaventura, and the ride along the Wilmington Channel by way of

Thunderbolt, where might be seen some groves of the majestic

live-oak trees, covered with gray and funereal moss, which were

truly sublime in grandeur, but gloomy after a few days' camping

under them:

Within an hour of taking up my quarters in Mr. Green's house, Mr.

A. G. Browne, of Salem, Massachusetts, United States Treasury agent

for the Department of the South, made his appearance to claim

possession, in the name of the Treasury Department, of all captured

cotton, rice, buildings, etc. Having use for these articles

ourselves, and having fairly earned them, I did not feel inclined

to surrender possession, and explained to him that the

quartermaster and commissary could manage them more to my liking

than he; but I agreed, after the proper inventories had been

prepared, if there remained any thing for which we had no special

use, I would turn it over to him. It was then known that in the

warehouses were stored at least twenty-five thousand bales of

cotton, and in the forts one hundred and fifty large, heavy

sea-coast guns: although afterward, on a more careful count, there

proved to be more than two hundred and fifty sea-coast or siege

guns, and thirty-one thousand bales of cotton. At that interview

Mr. Browne, who was a shrewd, clever Yankee, told me that a vessel

was on the point of starting for Old Point Comfort, and, if she had

good weather off Cape Hatteras, would reach Fortress Monroe by

Christmas-day, and he suggested that I might make it the occasion

of sending a welcome Christmas gift to the President, Mr. Lincoln,

who peculiarly enjoyed such pleasantry. I accordingly sat down and

wrote on a slip of paper, to be left at the telegraph-office at

Fortress Monroe for transmission, the following:

SAVANNAH GEORGIA, December 22, 1884.

To His Excellency President Lincoln, Washington, D. C.:

I beg to present you as a Christmas-gift the city of Savannah, with

one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, also

about twenty five thousand bales of cotton.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

This message actually reached him on Christmas-eve, was extensively

published in the newspapers, and made many a household unusually

happy on that festive day; and it was in the answer to this

dispatch that Mr. Lincoln wrote me the letter of December 28th,

already given, beginning with the words, "many, many thanks," etc.,

which he sent at the hands of General John A. Logan, who happened

to be in Washington, and was coming to Savannah, to rejoin his

command.

On the 23d of December were made the following general orders for

the disposition of the troops in and about Savannah:

[Special Field Order No. 139.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 23, 1864.

Savannah, being now in our possession, the river partially cleared

out, and measures having been taken to remove all obstructions,

will at once be made a grand depot for future operations:

1. The chief-quartermaster, General Euston, will, after giving the

necessary orders touching the transports in Ogeechee River and

Oasabaw Sound, come in person to Savannah, and take possession of

all public buildings, vacant storerooms, warehouses, etc., that may

be now or hereafter needed for any department of the army. No

rents will be paid by the Government of the United States during

the war, and all buildings must be distributed according to the

accustomed rates of the Quartermaster's Department, as though they

were public property.

2. The chief commissary of subsistence, Colonel A. Beckwith, will

transfer the grand depot of the army to the city of Savannah,

secure possession of the needful buildings and offices, and give

the necessary orders, to the end that the army may be supplied

abundantly and well.

3. The chief-engineer, Captain Poe, will at once direct which of

the enemy's forts are to be retained for our use, and which

dismantled and destroyed. The chief ordnance-officer, Captain

Baylor, will in like manner take possession of all property

pertaining to his department captured from the enemy, and cause the

same to be collected and conveyed to points of security; all the

heavy coast-guns will be dismounted and carried to Fort Pulaski.

4. The troops, for the present, will be grouped about the city of

Savannah, looking to convenience of camps; General Slocum taking

from the Savannah River around to the seven-mile post on the Canal,

and General Howard thence to the sea; General Kilpatrick will hold

King's Bridge until Fort McAllister is dismantled, and the troops

withdrawn from the south side of the Ogeechee, when he will take

post about Anderson's plantation, on the plank-road, and picket all

the roads leading from the north and west.

5. General Howard will keep a small guard at Forts Rosedale,

Beaulieu, Wimberley, Thunderbolt, and Bonaventura, and he will

cause that shore and Skidaway Island to be examined very closely,

with a view to finding many and convenient points for the

embarkation of troops and wagons on seagoing vessels.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.

[Special Field Order No. 143.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 26, 1864.

The city of Savannah and surrounding country will be held as a

military post, and adapted to future military uses, but, as it

contains a population of some twenty thousand people, who must be

provided for, and as other citizens may come, it is proper to lay

down certain general principles, that all within its military

jurisdiction may understand their relative duties and obligations.

1. During war, the military is superior to civil authority, and,

where interests clash, the civil must give way; yet, where there is

no conflict, every encouragement should be given to well-disposed

and peaceful inhabitants to resume their usual pursuits. Families

should be disturbed as little as possible in their residences, and

tradesmen allowed the free use of their shops, tools, etc.;

churches, schools, and all places of amusement and recreation,

should be encouraged, and streets and roads made perfectly safe to

persons in their pursuits. Passes should not be exacted within the

line of outer pickets, but if any person shall abuse these

privileges by communicating with the enemy, or doing any act of

hostility to the Government of the United States, he or she will be

punished with the utmost rigor of the law. Commerce with the outer

world will be resumed to an extent commensurate with the wants of

the citizens, governed by the restrictions and rules of the

Treasury Department.

2. The chief quartermaster and commissary of the army may give

suitable employment to the people, white and black, or transport

them to such points as they may choose where employment can be had;

and may extend temporary relief in the way of provisions and vacant

houses to the worthy and needy, until such time as they can help

themselves. They will select first the buildings for the necessary

uses of the army; next, a sufficient number of stores, to be turned

over to the Treasury agent for trade-stores. All vacant

store-houses or dwellings, and all buildings belonging to absent

rebels, will be construed and used as belonging to the United States,

until such time as their titles can be settled by the courts of the

United States.

8. The Mayor and City Council of Savannah will continue to

exercise their functions, and will, in concert with the commanding

officer of the post and the chief-quartermaster, see that the

fire-companies are kept in organization, the streets cleaned and

lighted, and keep up a good understanding between the citizens and

soldiers. They will ascertain and report to the chief commissary

of subsistence, as soon as possible, the names and number of worthy

families that need assistance and support. The mayor will forth

with give public notice that the time has come when all must choose

their course, viz., remain within our lines, and conduct themselves

as good citizens, or depart in peace. He will ascertain the names

of all who choose to leave Savannah, and report their names and

residence to the chief-quartermaster, that measures may be taken to

transport them beyond our lines.

4. Not more than two newspapers will be published in Savannah;

their editors and proprietors will be held to the strictest

accountability, and will be punished severely, in person and

property, for any libelous publication, mischievous matter,

premature news, exaggerated statements, or any comments whatever

upon the acts of the constituted authorities; they will be held

accountable for such articles, even though copied from other

papers.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.

It was estimated that there were about twenty thousand inhabitants

in Savannah, all of whom had participated more or less in the war,

and had no special claims to our favor, but I regarded the war as

rapidly drawing to a close, and it was becoming a political

question as to what was to be done with the people of the South,

both white and black, when the war was actually over. I concluded

to give them the option to remain or to join their friends in

Charleston or Augusta, and so announced in general orders. The

mayor, Dr. Arnold, was completely "subjugated," and, after

consulting with him, I authorized him to assemble his City Council

to take charge generally of the interests of the people; but warned

all who remained that they must be strictly subordinate to the

military law, and to the interests of the General Government.

About two hundred persona, mostly the families of men in the

Confederate army, prepared to follow the fortunes of their husbands

and fathers, and these were sent in a steamboat under a flag of

truce, in charge of my aide Captain Audenried, to Charleston

harbor, and there delivered to an officer of the Confederate army.

But the great bulk of the inhabitants chose to remain in Savannah,

generally behaved with propriety, and good social relations at once

arose between them and the army. Shortly after our occupation of

Savannah, a lady was announced at my headquarters by the orderly or

sentinel at the front-door, who was ushered into the parlor, and

proved to be the wife of General G. W. Smith, whom I had known

about 1850, when Smith was on duty at West Point. She was a native

of New London, Connecticut, and very handsome. She began her

interview by presenting me a letter from her husband, who then

commanded a division of the Georgia militia in the rebel army,

which had just quitted Savannah, which letter began, "DEAR SHERMAN:

The fortunes of war, etc-., compel me to leave my wife in Savannah,

and I beg for her your courteous protection," etc., etc. I

inquired where she lived, and if anybody was troubling her. She

said she was boarding with a lady whose husband had, in like manner

with her own, gone off with Hardee's army; that a part of the house

had been taken for the use of Major-General Ward, of Kentucky; that

her landlady was approaching her confinement, and was nervous at

the noise which the younger staff-officers made at night; etc. I

explained to her that I could give but little personal attention to

such matters, and referred her to General Slocum, whose troops

occupied the city. I afterward visited her house, and saw,

personally, that she had no reason to complain. Shortly afterward

Mr. Hardee, a merchant of Savannah, came to me and presented a

letter from his brother, the general, to the same effect, alleging

that his brother was a civilian, had never taken up arms, and asked

of me protection for his family, his cotton, etc. To him I gave

the general assurance that no harm was designed to any of the

people of Savannah who would remain quiet and peaceable, but that I

could give him no guarantee as to his cotton, for over it I had no

absolute control; and yet still later I received a note from the

wife of General A. P. Stewart (who commanded a corps in Hood's

army), asking me to come to see her. This I did, and found her to

be a native of Cincinnati, Ohio, wanting protection, and who was

naturally anxious about the fate of her husband, known to be with

General Hood, in Tennessee, retreating before General Thomas. I

remember that I was able to assure her that he had not been killed

or captured, up to that date, and think that I advised her, instead

of attempting to go in pursuit of her husband, to go to Cincinnati,

to her uncle, Judge Storer, there await the issue of events.

Before I had reached Savannah, and during our stay there, the rebel

officers and newspapers represented the conduct of the men of our

army as simply infamous; that we respected neither age nor sex;

that we burned every thing we came across--barns, stables,

cotton-gins, and even dwelling-houses; that we ravished the women

and killed the men, and perpetrated all manner of outrages on the

inhabitants. Therefore it struck me as strange that Generals

Hardee and Smith should commit their, families to our custody, and

even bespeak our personal care and attention. These officers knew

well that these reports were exaggerated in the extreme, and yet

tacitly assented to these publications, to arouse the drooping

energies of the people of the South.

As the division of Major-General John W. Geary, of the Twentieth

Corps, was the first to enter Savannah, that officer was appointed

to command the place, or to act as a sort of governor. He very

soon established a good police, maintained admirable order, and I

doubt if Savannah, either before or since, has had a better

government than during our stay. The guard-mountings and parades,

as well as the greater reviews, became the daily resorts of the

ladies, to hear the music of our excellent bands; schools were

opened, and the churches every Sunday were well filled with most

devout and respectful congregations; stores were reopened, and

markets for provisions, meat, wood, etc., were established, so that

each family, regardless of race, color, or opinion, could procure

all the necessaries and even luxuries of life, provided they had

money. Of course, many families were actually destitute of this,

and to these were issued stores from our own stock of supplies. I

remember to have given to Dr. Arnold, the mayor, an order for the

contents of a large warehouse of rice, which he confided to a

committee of gentlemen, who went North (to Boston), and soon

returned with one or more cargoes of flour, hams, sugar, coffee,

etc., for gratuitous distribution, which relieved the most pressing

wants until the revival of trade and business enabled the people to

provide for themselves.

A lady, whom I had known in former years as Miss Josephine Goodwin,

told me that, with a barrel of flour and some sugar which she had

received gratuitously from the commissary, she had baked cakes and

pies, in the sale of which she realized a profit of fifty-six

dollars.

Meantime Colonel Poe had reconnoitred and laid off new lines of

parapet, which would enable a comparatively small garrison to hold

the place, and a heavy detail of soldiers was put to work thereon;

Generals Easton and Beckwith had organized a complete depot of

supplies; and, though vessels arrived almost daily with mails and

provisions, we were hardly ready to initiate a new and hazardous

campaign. I had not yet received from General Grant or General

Halleck any modification of the orders of December 6, 1864, to

embark my command for Virginia by sea; but on the 2d of January,

1865, General J. G. Barnard, United States Engineers, arrived

direct from General Grant's headquarters, bearing the following

letter, in the general's own handwriting, which, with my answer, is

here given:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 27, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the

Mississippi.

GENERAL: Before writing you definite instructions for the next

campaign, I wanted to receive your answer to my letter written from

Washington. Your confidence in being able to march up and join

this army pleases me, and I believe it can be done. The effect of

such a campaign will be to disorganize the South, and prevent the

organization of new armies from their broken fragments. Hood is

now retreating, with his army broken and demoralized. His loss in

men has probably not been far from twenty thousand, besides

deserters. If time is given, the fragments may be collected

together and many of the deserters reassembled. If we can, we

should act to prevent this. Your spare army, as it were, moving as

proposed, will do it.

In addition to holding Savannah, it looks to me that an intrenched

camp ought to be held on the railroad between Savannah and

Charleston. Your movement toward Branchville will probably enable

Foster to reach this with his own force. This will give us a

position in the South from which we can threaten the interior

without marching over long, narrow causeways, easily defended, as

we have heretofore been compelled to do. Could not such a camp be

established about Pocotaligo or Coosawhatchie?

I have thought that, Hood being so completely wiped out for present

harm, I might bring A. J. Smith here, with fourteen to fifteen

thousand men. With this increase I could hold my lines, and move

out with a greater force than Lee has. It would compel Lee to

retain all his present force in the defenses of Richmond or abandon

them entirely. This latter contingency is probably the only danger

to the easy success of your expedition. In the event you should

meet Lee's army, you would be compelled to beat it or find the

sea-coast. Of course, I shall not let Lee's army escape if I can

help it, and will not let it go without following to the best of my

ability.

Without waiting further directions, than, you may make your

preparations to start on your northern expedition without delay.

Break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join the

armies operating against Richmond as soon as you can. I will leave

out all suggestions about the route you should take, knowing that

your information, gained daily in the course of events, will be

better than any that can be obtained now.

It may not be possible for you to march to the rear of Petersburg;

but, failing in this, you could strike either of the sea-coast

ports in North Carolina held by us. From there you could take

shipping. It would be decidedly preferable, however, if you could

march the whole distance.

From the best information I have, you will find no difficulty in

supplying your army until you cross the Roanoke. From there here

is but a few days' march, and supplies could be collected south of

the river to bring you through. I shall establish communication

with you there, by steamboat and gunboat. By this means your wants

can be partially supplied. I shall hope to hear from you soon, and

to hear your plan, and about the time of starting.

Please instruct Foster to hold on to all the property in Savannah,

and especially the cotton. Do not turn it over to citizens or

Treasury agents, without orders of the War Department.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 2, 1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point.

GENERAL: I have received, by the hands of General Barnard, your

note of 26th and letter of 27th December.

I herewith inclose to you a copy of a projet which I have this

morning, in strict confidence, discussed with my immediate

commanders.

I shall need, however, larger supplies of stores, especially grain.

I will inclose to you, with this, letters from General Easton,

quartermaster, and Colonel Beckwith, commissary of subsistence,

setting forth what will be required, and trust you will forward

them to Washington with your sanction, so that the necessary steps

may be taken at once to enable me to carry out this plan on time.

I wrote you very fully on the 24th, and have nothing to add. Every

thing here is quiet, and if I can get the necessary supplies in our

wagons, shall be ready to start at the time indicated in my projet

(January 15th). But, until those supplies are in hand, I can do

nothing; after they are, I shall be ready to move with great

rapidity.

I have heard of the affair at Cape Fear. It has turned out as you

will remember I expected.

I have furnished General Easton a copy of the dispatch from the

Secretary of War. He will retain possession of all cotton here,

and ship it as fast as vessels can be had to New York.

I shall immediately send the Seventeenth Corps over to Port Royal,

by boats, to be furnished by Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster

(without interfering with General Easton's vessels), to make a

lodgment on the railroad at Pocotaligo.

General Barnard will remain with me a few days, and I send this by

a staff-officer, who can return on one of the vessels of the

supply-fleet. I suppose that, now that General Butler has got

through with them, you can spare them to us.

My report of recent operations is nearly ready, and will be sent

you in a day or two, as soon as some farther subordinate reports

come in.

I am, with great respect, very truly, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

[Entirely confidential]

PROJET FOR JANUARY.

1. Right wing to move men and artillery by transports to head of

Broad River and Beaufort; reestablish Port Royal Ferry, and mass

the wing at or in the neighborhood of Pocotaligo.

Left wing and cavalry to work slowly across the causeway toward

Hardeeville, to open a road by which wagons can reach their corps

about Broad River; also, by a rapid movement of the left, to secure

Sister's Ferry, and Augusta road out to Robertsville.

In the mean time, all guns, shot, shell, cotton, etc., to be moved

to a safe place, easy to guard, and provisions and wagons got ready

for another swath, aiming to have our army in hand about the head

of Broad River, say Pocotaligo, Robertsville, and Coosawhatchie, by

the 15th January.

2. The whole army to move with loaded wagons by the roads leading

in the direction of Columbia, which afford the best chance of

forage and provisions. Howard to be at Pocotaligo by the 15th

January, and Slocum to be at Robertsville, and Kilpatrick at or

near Coosawhatchie about the same date. General Fosters troops to

occupy Savannah, and gunboats to protect the rivers as soon as

Howard gets Pocotaligo.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

Therefore, on the 2d of January, I was authorized to march with my

entire army north by land, and concluded at once to secure a

foothold or starting-point on the South Carolina side, selecting

Pocotaligo and Hardeeville as the points of rendezvous for the two

wings; but I still remained in doubt as to the wishes of the

Administration, whether I should take Charleston en route, or

confine my whole attention to the incidental advantages of breaking

up the railways of South and North Carolina, and the greater object

of uniting my army with that of General Grant before Richmond.

General Barnard remained with me several days, and was regarded

then, as now, one of the first engineers of the age, perfectly

competent to advise me on the strategy and objects of the new

campaign. He expressed himself delighted with the high spirit of

the army, the steps already taken, by which we had captured

Savannah, and he personally inspected some of the forts, such as

Thunderbolt and Causten's Bluff, by which the enemy had so long

held at bay the whole of our navy, and had defeated the previous

attempts made in April, 1862, by the army of General Gillmore,

which had bombarded and captured Fort Pulaski, but had failed to

reach the city of Savannah. I think General Barnard expected me to

invite him to accompany us northward in his official capacity; but

Colonel Poe, of my staff, had done so well, and was so perfectly

competent, that I thought it unjust to supersede him by a senior in

his own corps. I therefore said nothing of this to General

Barnard, and soon after he returned to his post with General Grant,

at City Point, bearing letters and full personal messages of our

situation and wants.

We were very much in want of light-draught steamers for navigating

the shallow waters of the coast, so that it took the Seventeenth

Corps more than a week to transfer from Thunderbolt to Beaufort,

South Carolina. Admiral Dahlgren had supplied the Harvest Moon and

the Pontiac, and General Foster gave us a couple of hired steamers;

I was really amused at the effect this short sea-voyage had on our

men, most of whom had never before looked upon the ocean. Of

course, they were fit subjects for sea-sickness, and afterward they

begged me never again to send them to sea, saying they would rather

march a thousand miles on the worst roads of the South than to

spend a single night on the ocean. By the 10th General Howard had

collected the bulk of the Seventeenth Corps (General Blair) on

Beaufort Island, and began his march for Pocotaligo, twenty-five

miles inland. They crossed the channel between the island and

main-land during Saturday, the 14th of January, by a pontoon-

bridge, and marched out to Garden's Corners, where there was some

light skirmishing; the next day, Sunday, they continued on to

Pocotaligo, finding the strong fort there abandoned, and

accordingly made a lodgment on the railroad, having lost only two

officers and eight men.

About the same time General Slocum crossed two divisions of the

Twentieth Corps over the Savannah River, above the city, occupied

Hardeeville by one division and Purysburg by another. Thus, by the

middle of January, we had effected a lodgment in South Carolina,

and were ready to resume the march northward; but we had not yet

accumulated enough provisions and forage to fill the wagons, and

other causes of delay occurred, of which I will make mention in due

order.

On the last day of December, 1864, Captain Breese, United States

Navy, flag-officer to Admiral Porter, reached Savannah, bringing

the first news of General Butler's failure at Fort Fisher, and that

the general had returned to James River with his land-forces,

leaving Admiral Porter's fleet anchored off Cape Fear, in that

tempestuous season. Captain Breese brought me a letter from the

admiral, dated December 29th, asking me to send him from Savannah

one of my old divisions, with which he said he would make short

work of Fort Fisher; that he had already bombarded and silenced its

guns, and that General Butler had failed because he was afraid to

attack, or even give the order to attack, after (as Porter

insisted) the guns of Fort Fisher had been actually silenced by the

navy.

I answered him promptly on the 31st of December, that I proposed to

march north inland, and that I would prefer to leave the rebel

garrisons on the coast, instead of dislodging and piling them up in

my front as we progressed. From the chances, as I then understood

them, I supposed that Fort Fisher was garrisoned by a comparatively

small force, while the whole division of General Hoke remained

about the city of Wilmington; and that, if Fort Fisher were

captured, it would leave General Hoke free to join the larger force

that would naturally be collected to oppose my progress northward.

I accordingly answered Admiral Porter to this effect, declining to

loan him the use of one of my divisions. It subsequently

transpired, however, that, as soon as General Butler reached City

Point, General Grant was unwilling to rest under a sense of

failure, and accordingly dispatched back the same troops,

reenforced and commanded by General A. H. Terry, who, on the 15th

day of January, successfully assaulted and captured Fort Fisher,

with its entire garrison. After the war was over, about the 20th

of May, when I was giving my testimony before the Congressional

Committee on the Conduct of the War, the chairman of the committee,

Senator B. F. Wade, of Ohio, told me that General Butler had been

summoned before that committee during the previous January, and had

just finished his demonstration to their entire satisfaction that

Fort Fisher could not be carried by assault, when they heard the

newsboy in the hall crying out an "extra" Calling him in, they

inquired the news, and he answered, "Fort Fisher done took!" Of

course, they all laughed, and none more heartily than General

Butler himself.

On the 11th of January there arrived at Savannah a revenue-cutter,

having on board Simeon Draper, Esq., of New York City, the Hon. E.

M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Quartermaster-General Meigs,

Adjutant-General Townsend, and a retinue of civilians, who had come

down from the North to regulate the civil affairs of Savannah....

I was instructed by Mr. Stanton to transfer to Mr. Draper the

custom house, post-office, and such other public buildings as these

civilians needed in the execution of their office, and to cause to

be delivered into their custody the captured cotton. This was

accomplished by--

[Special Field Orders, No. 10.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 12, 1865.

1. Brevet Brigadier-General Euston, chief-quartermaster, will turn

over to Simeon Draper, Esq., agent of the United States Treasury

Department, all cotton now in the city of Savannah, prize of war,

taking his receipt for the same in gross, and returning for it to

the quartermaster-general. He will also afford Mr. Draper all the

facilities in his power in the way of transportation, labor, etc.,

to enable him to handle the cotton with expedition.

2. General Euston will also turn over to Mr. Draper the

custom-house, and such other buildings in the city of Savannah as

he may need in the execution of his office.

By order of General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.

Up to this time all the cotton had been carefully guarded, with

orders to General Euston to ship it by the return-vessels to New

York, for the adjudication of the nearest prize-court, accompanied

with invoices and all evidence of title to ownership. Marks,

numbers, and other figures, were carefully preserved on the bales,

so that the court might know the history of each bale. But Mr.

Stanton, who surely was an able lawyer, changed all this, and

ordered the obliteration of all the marks; so that no man, friend

or foe, could trace his identical cotton. I thought it strange at

the time, and think it more so now; for I am assured that claims,

real and fictitious, have been proved up against this identical

cotton of three times the quantity actually captured, and that

reclamations on the Treasury have been allowed for more than the

actual quantity captured, viz., thirty-one thousand bales.

Mr. Stanton staid in Savannah several days, and seemed very curious

about matters and things in general. I walked with him through the

city, especially the bivouacs of the several regiments that

occupied the vacant squares, and he seemed particularly pleased at

the ingenuity of the men in constructing their temporary huts.

Four of the "dog-tents," or tentes d'abri, buttoned together,

served for a roof, and the sides were made of clapboards, or rough

boards brought from demolished houses or fences. I remember his

marked admiration for the hut of a soldier who had made his door

out of a handsome parlor mirror, the glass gone and its gilt frame

serving for his door.

He talked to me a great deal about the negroes, the former slaves,

and I told him of many interesting incidents, illustrating their

simple character and faith in our arms and progress. He inquired

particularly about General Jeff. C. Davis, who, he said, was a

Democrat, and hostile to the negro. I assured him that General

Davis was an excellent soldier, and I did not believe he had any

hostility to the negro; that in our army we had no negro soldiers,

and, as a rule, we preferred white soldiers, but that we employed a

large force of them as servants, teamsters, and pioneers, who had

rendered admirable service. He then showed me a newspaper account

of General Davis taking up his pontoon-bridge across Ebenezer

Creek, leaving sleeping negro men, women, and children, on the

other side, to be slaughtered by Wheeler's cavalry. I had heard

such a rumor, and advised Mr. Stanton, before becoming prejudiced,

to allow me to send for General Davis, which he did, and General

Davis explained the matter to his entire satisfaction. The truth

was, that, as we approached the seaboard, the freedmen in droves,

old and young, followed the several columns to reach a place of

safety. It so happened that General Davis's route into Savannah

followed what was known as the "River-road," and he had to make

constant use of his pontoon-train--the head of his column reaching

some deep, impassable creek before the rear was fairly over

another. He had occasionally to use the pontoons both day and

night. On the occasion referred to, the bridge was taken up from

Ebenezer Creek while some of the camp-followers remained asleep on

the farther side, and these were picked up by Wheeler's cavalry.

Some of them, in their fright, were drowned in trying to swim over,

and others may have been cruelly killed by Wheeler's men, but this

was a mere supposition. At all events, the same thing might have

resulted to General Howard, or to any other of the many most humane

commanders who filled the army. General Jeff. C. Davis was

strictly a soldier, and doubtless hated to have his wagons and

columns encumbered by these poor negroes, for whom we all felt

sympathy, but a sympathy of a different sort from that of Mr.

Stanton, which was not of pure humanity, but of politics. The

negro question was beginning to loom up among the political

eventualities of the day, and many foresaw that not only would the

slaves secure their freedom, but that they would also have votes.

I did not dream of such a result then, but knew that slavery, as

such, was dead forever, and did not suppose that the former slaves

would be suddenly, without preparation, manufactured into voters,

equal to all others, politically and socially. Mr. Stanton seemed

desirous of coming into contact with the negroes to confer with

them, and he asked me to arrange an interview for him. I

accordingly sent out and invited the most intelligent of the

negroes, mostly Baptist and Methodist preachers, to come to my

rooms to meet the Secretary of War. Twenty responded, and were

received in my room up-stairs in Mr. Green's house, where Mr.

Stanton and Adjutant-General Townsend took down the conversation in

the form of questions and answers. Each of the twenty gave his

name and partial history, and then selected Garrison Frazier as

their spokesman:

First Question. State what your understanding is in regard to the

acts of Congress and President Lincoln's proclamation touching the

colored people in the rebel States?

Answer. So far as I understand President Lincoln's proclamation to

the rebel States, it is, that if they will lay down their arms and

submit to the laws of the United States, before the 1st of January,

1863, all should be well; but if they did not, then all the slaves

in the Southern States should be free, henceforth and forever.

That is what I understood.

Second Question. State what you understand by slavery, and the

freedom that was to be given by the President's proclamation?

Answer. Slavery is receiving by irresistible power the work of

another man, and not by his consent. The freedom, as I understand

it, promised by the proclamation, is taking us from under the yoke

of bondage and placing us where we can reap the fruit of our own

labor, and take care of ourselves and assist the Government in

maintaining our freedom.

Fourth Question. State in what manner you would rather live

--whether scattered among the whites, or in colonies by yourselves?

Answer. I would prefer to live by ourselves, for there is a

prejudice against us in the South that will take years to get over;

but I do not know that I can answer for my brethren.

(All but Mr. Lynch, a missionary from the North, agreed with

Frazier, but he thought they ought to live together, along with the

whites.)

Eighth Question. If the rebel leaders were to arm the slaves, what

would be its effect?

Answer. I think they would fight as long as they were before the

"bayonet," and just as soon as they could get away they would

desert, in my opinion.

Tenth Question. Do you understand the mode of enlistment of

colored persons in the rebel States by State agents, under the act

of Congress; if yea, what is your understanding?

Answer. My understanding is, that colored persons enlisted by

State agents are enlisted as substitutes, and give credit to the

State and do not swell the army, because every black man enlisted

by a State agent leaves a white man at home; and also that larger

bounties are given, or promised, by the State agents than are given

by the United States. The great object should be to push through

this rebellion the shortest way; and there seems to be something

wanting in the enlistment by State agents, for it don't strengthen

the army, but takes one away for every colored man enlisted.

Eleventh Question. State what, in your opinion, is the best way to

enlist colored men as soldiers?

Answer. I think, sir, that all compulsory operations should be put

a stop to. The ministers would talk to them, and the young men

would enlist. It is my opinion that it world be far better for the

State agents to stay at home and the enlistments be made for the

United States under the direction of General Sherman.

Up to this time I was present, and, on Mr. Stanton's intimating

that he wanted to ask some questions affecting me, I withdrew, and

then he put the twelfth and last question.

Twelfth Question. State what is the feeling of the colored people

toward General Sherman, and how far do they regard his sentiments

and actions as friendly to their rights and interests, or

otherwise.

Answer. We looked upon General Sherman, prior to his arrival, as a

man, in the providence of God, specially set apart to accomplish

this work, and we unanimously felt inexpressible gratitude to him,

looking upon him as a man who should be honored for the faithful

performance of his duty. Some of us called upon him immediately

upon his arrival, and it is probable he did not meet the secretary

with more courtesy than he did us. His conduct and deportment

toward us characterized him as a friend and gentleman. We have

confidence in General Sherman, and think what concerns us could not

be in better hands. This is our opinion now, from the short

acquaintance and intercourse we have had.

It certainly was a strange fact that the great War Secretary should

have catechized negroes concerning the character of a general who

had commanded a hundred thousand men in battle, had captured cities

conducted sixty-five thousand men successfully across four hundred

miles of hostile territory, and had just brought tens of thousands

of freedmen to a place of security; but because I had not loaded

down my army by other hundreds of thousands of poor negroes, I was

construed by others as hostile to the black race. I had received

from General Halleck, at Washington, a letter warning me that there

were certain influential parties near the President who were

torturing him with suspicions of my fidelity to him and his negro

policy; but I shall always believe that Mr. Lincoln, though a

civilian, knew better, and appreciated my motives and character.

Though this letter of General Halleck has always been treated by me

as confidential, I now insert it here at length:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C., December 30, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I take the liberty of calling your attention, in

this private and friendly way, to a matter which may possibly

hereafter be of more importance to you than either of us may now

anticipate.

While almost every one is praising your great march through

Georgia, and the capture of Savannah, there is a certain class

having now great influence with the President, and very probably

anticipating still more on a change of cabinet, who are decidedly

disposed to make a point against you. I mean in regard to

"inevitable Sambo." They say that you have manifested an almost

criminal dislike to the negro, and that you are not willing to

carry out the wishes of the Government in regard to him, but

repulse him with contempt! They say you might have brought with you

to Savannah more than fifty thousand, thus stripping Georgia of

that number of laborers, and opening a road by which as many more

could have escaped from their masters; but that, instead of this,

you drove them from your ranks, prevented their following you by

cutting the bridges in your rear, and thus caused the massacre of

large numbers by Wheeler's cavalry.

To those who know you as I do, such accusation will pass as the

idle winds, for we presume that you discouraged the negroes from

following you because you had not the means of supporting them, and

feared they might seriously embarrass your march. But there are

others, and among them some in high authority, who think or pretend

to think otherwise, and they are decidedly disposed to make a point

against you.

I do not write this to induce you to conciliate this class of men

by doing any thing which you do not deem right and proper, and for

the interest of the Government and the country; but simply to call

your attention to certain things which are viewed here somewhat

differently than from your stand-point. I will explain as briefly

as possible:

Some here think that, in view of the scarcity of labor in the

South, and the probability that a part, at least, of the

able-bodied slaves will be called into the military service of the

rebels, it is of the greatest importance to open outlets by which

these slaves can escape into our lines, and they say that the route

you have passed over should be made the route of escape, and

Savannah the great place of refuge. These, I know, are the views

of some of the leading men in the Administration, and they now

express dissatisfaction that you did not carry them out in your

great raid.

Now that you are in possession of Savannah, and there can be no

further fears about supplies, would it not be possible for you to

reopen these avenues of escape for the negroes, without interfering

with your military operations? Could not such escaped slaves find

at least a partial supply of food in the rice-fields about

Savannah, and cotton plantations on the coast?

I merely throw out these suggestions. I know that such a course

would be approved by the Government, and I believe that a

manifestation on your part of a desire to bring the slaves within

our lines will do much to silence your opponents. You will

appreciate my motives in writing this private letter.

Yours truly,

H. W. HALLECK.

There is no doubt that Mr. Stanton, when he reached Savannah,

shared these thoughts, but luckily the negroes themselves convinced

him that he was in error, and that they understood their own

interests far better than did the men in Washington, who tried to

make political capital out of this negro question. The idea that

such men should have been permitted to hang around Mr. Lincoln, to

torture his life by suspicions of the officers who were toiling

with the single purpose to bring the war to a successful end, and

thereby to liberate all slaves, is a fair illustration of the

influences that poison a political capital.

My aim then was, to whip the rebels, to humble their pride, to

follow them to their inmost recesses, and make them fear and dread

us. "Fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." I did not want

them to cast in our teeth what General Hood had once done in

Atlanta, that we had to call on their slaves to help us to subdue

them. But, as regards kindness to the race, encouraging them to

patience and forbearance, procuring them food and clothing, and

providing them with land whereon to labor, I assert that no army

ever did more for that race than the one I commanded in Savannah.

When we reached Savannah, we were beset by ravenous State agents

from Hilton Head, who enticed and carried away our servants, and

the corps of pioneers which we had organized, and which had done

such excellent service. On one occasion, my own aide-de-camp,

Colonel Audenried, found at least a hundred poor negroes shut up in

a house and pen, waiting for the night, to be conveyed stealthily

to Hilton Head. They appealed to him for protection, alleging that

they had been told that they must be soldiers, that "Massa Lincoln"

wanted them, etc. I never denied the slaves a full opportunity for

voluntary enlistment, but I did prohibit force to be used, for I

knew that the State agents were more influenced by the profit they

derived from the large bounties then being paid than by any love of

country or of the colored race. In the language of Mr. Frazier,

the enlistment of every black man "did not strengthen the army, but

took away one white man from the ranks."

During Mr. Stanton's stay in Savannah we discussed this negro

question very fully; he asked me to draft an order on the subject,

in accordance with my own views, that would meet the pressing

necessities of the case, and I did so. We went over this order,

No. 15, of January 16, 1865, very carefully. The secretary made

some verbal modifications, when it was approved by him in all its

details, I published it, and it went into operation at once. It

provided fully for the enlistment of colored troops, and gave the

freedmen certain possessory rights to land, which afterward became

matters of judicial inquiry and decision. Of course, the military

authorities at that day, when war prevailed, had a perfect right to

grant the possession of any vacant land to which they could extend

military protection, but we did not undertake to give a fee-simple

title; and all that was designed by these special field orders was

to make temporary provisions for the freedmen and their families

during the rest of the war, or until Congress should take action in

the premises. All that I now propose to assert is, that Mr.

Stanton, Secretary of War, saw these orders in the rough, and

approved every paragraph thereof, before they were made public:

[Special Field Orders, No. 15.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 16, 1865.

1. The islands from Charleston south, the abandoned rice-fields

along the rivers for thirty miles back from the sea, and the

country bordering the St. John's River, Florida, are reserved and

set apart for the settlement of the negroes now made free by the

acts of war and the proclamation of the President of the United

States.

2. At Beaufort, Hilton Head, Savannah, Fernandina, St. Augustine,

and Jacksonville, the blacks may remain in their chosen or

accustomed vocations; but on the islands, and in the settlements

hereafter to be established, no white person whatever, unless

military officers and soldiers detailed for duty, will be permitted

to reside; and the sole and exclusive management of affairs will be

left to the freed people themselves, subject only to the United

States military authority, and the acts of Congress. By the laws

of war, and orders of the President of the United States, the negro

is free, and must be dealt with as such. He cannot be subjected to

conscription, or forced military service, save by the written

orders of the highest military authority of the department, under

such regulations as the President or Congress may prescribe.

Domestic servants, blacksmiths, carpenters, and other mechanics,

will be free to select their own work and residence, but the young

and able-bodied negroes must be encouraged to enlist as soldiery in

the service of the United States, to contribute their share toward

maintaining their own freedom, and securing their rights as

citizens of the United States.

Negroes so enlisted will be organized into companies, battalions,

and regiments, under the orders of the United States military

authorities, and will be paid, fed, and clothed; according to law.

The bounties paid on enlistment may, with the consent of the

recruit, go to assist his family and settlement in procuring

agricultural implements, seed, tools, boots, clothing, and other

articles necessary for their livelihood.

3. Whenever three respectable negroes, heads of families, shall

desire to settle on land, and shall have selected for that purpose

an island or a locality clearly defined within the limits above

designated, the Inspector of Settlements and Plantations will

himself, or, by such subordinate officer as he may appoint, give

them a license to settle such island or district, and afford them

such assistance as he can to enable them to establish a peaceable

agricultural settlement. The three parties named will subdivide

the land, under the supervision of the inspector, among themselves,

and such others as may choose to settle near them, so that each

family shall have a plot of not more than forty acres of tillable

ground, and, when it borders on some water-channel, with not more

than eight hundred feet water-front, in the possession of which

land the military authorities will afford them protection until

such time as they can protect themselves, or until Congress shall

regulate their title. The quartermaster may, on the requisition of

the Inspector of Settlements and Plantations, place at the disposal

of the inspector one or more of the captured steamers to ply

between the settlements and one or more of the commercial points

heretofore named, in order to afford the settlers the opportunity

to supply their necessary wants, and to sell the products of their

land and labor.

4. Whenever a negro has enlisted in the military service of the

United States, he may locate his family in any one of the

settlements at pleasure, and acquire a homestead, and all other

rights and privileges of a settler, as though present in person.

In like manner, negroes may settle their families and engage on

board the gunboats, or in fishing, or in the navigation of the

inland waters, without losing any claim to land or other advantages

derived from this system. But no one, unless an actual settler as

above defined, or unless absent on Government service, will be

entitled to claim any right to land or property in any settlement

by virtue of these orders.

5. In order to carry out this system of settlement, a general

officer will be detailed as Inspector of Settlements and

Plantations, whose duty it shall be to visit the settlements, to

regulate their police and general arrangement, and who will furnish

personally to each head of a family, subject to the approval of the

President of the United States, a possessory title in writing,

giving as near as possible the description of boundaries; and who

shall adjust all claims or conflicts that may arise under the same,

subject to the like approval, treating such titles altogether as

possessory. The same general officer will also be charged with the

enlistment and organization of the negro recruits, and protecting

their interests while absent from their settlements; and will be

governed by the rules and regulations prescribed by the War

Department for such purposes.

6. Brigadier-General R. Saxton is hereby appointed Inspector of

Settlements and Plantations, and will at once enter on the

performance of his duties. No change is intended or desired in the

settlement now on Beaufort Island, nor will any rights to property

heretofore acquired be affected thereby.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General.

I saw a good deal of the secretary socially, during the time of his

visit to Savannah. He kept his quarters on the revenue-cutter with

Simeon Draper, Esq., which cutter lay at a wharf in the river, but

he came very often to my quarters at Mr. Green's house. Though

appearing robust and strong, he complained a good deal of internal

pains, which he said threatened his life, and would compel him soon

to quit public office. He professed to have come from Washington

purposely for rest and recreation, and he spoke unreservedly of the

bickerings and jealousies at the national capital; of the

interminable quarrels of the State Governors about their quotas,

and more particularly of the financial troubles that threatened the

very existence of the Government itself. He said that the price of

every thing had so risen in comparison with the depreciated money,

that there was danger of national bankruptcy, and he appealed to

me, as a soldier and patriot, to hurry up matters so as to bring

the war to a close.

He left for Port Royal about the 15th of January, and promised to

go North without delay, so as to hurry back to me the supplies I

had called for, as indispensable for the prosecution of the next

stage of the campaign. I was quite impatient to get off myself,

for a city-life had become dull and tame, and we were all anxious

to get into the pine-woods again, free from the importunities of

rebel women asking for protection, and of the civilians from the

North who were coming to Savannah for cotton and all sorts of

profit.

On the 18th of January General Slocum was ordered to turn over the

city of Savannah to General J. G. Foster, commanding the Department

of the South, who proposed to retain his own headquarters at Hilton

Head, and to occupy Savannah by General Grovers division of the

Nineteenth Corps, just arrived from James River; and on the next

day, viz., January 19th, I made the first general orders for the

move.

These were substantially to group the right wing of the army at

Pocotaligo, already held by the Seventeenth Corps, and the left

wing and cavalry at or near Robertsville, in South Carolina. The

army remained substantially the same as during the march from

Atlanta, with the exception of a few changes in the commanders of

brigades and divisions, the addition of some men who had joined

from furlough, and the loss of others from the expiration of their

term of service. My own personal staff remained the same, with the

exception that General W. F. Barry had rejoined us at Savannah,

perfectly recovered from his attack of erysipelas, and continued

with us to the end of the war. Generals Easton and Beckwith

remained at Savannah, in charge of their respective depots, with

orders to follow and meet us by sea with supplies when we should

reach the coast at Wilmington or Newbern, North Carolina.

Of course, I gave out with some ostentation, especially among the

rebels, that we were going to Charleston or Augusta; but I had long

before made up my mind to waste no time on either, further than to

play off on their fears, thus to retain for their protection a

force of the enemy which would otherwise concentrate in our front,

and make the passage of some of the great rivers that crossed our

route more difficult and bloody.

Having accomplished all that seemed necessary, on the 21st of

January, with my entire headquarters, officers, clerks, orderlies,

etc., with wagons and horses, I embarked in a steamer for Beaufort,

South Carolina, touching at Hilton Head, to see General Foster.

The weather was rainy and bad, but we reached Beaufort safely on

the 23d, and found some of General Blair's troops there. The pink

of his corps (Seventeenth) was, however, up on the railroad about

Pocotaligo, near the head of Broad River, to which their supplies

were carried from Hilton Head by steamboats. General Hatch's

division (of General Foster's command) was still at Coosawhatchie

or Tullafinny, where the Charleston & Savannah Railroad crosses the

river of that name. All the country between Beaufort and

Pocotaligo was low alluvial land, cut up by an infinite number of

salt-water sloughs and freshwater creeks, easily susceptible of

defense by a small force; and why the enemy had allowed us to make

a lodgment at Pocotaligo so easily I did not understand, unless it

resulted from fear or ignorance. It seemed to me then that the

terrible energy they had displayed in the earlier stages of the war

was beginning to yield to the slower but more certain industry and

discipline of our Northern men. It was to me manifest that the

soldiers and people of the South entertained an undue fear of our

Western men, and, like children, they had invented such ghostlike

stories of our prowess in Georgia, that they were scared by their

own inventions. Still, this was a power, and I intended to utilize

it. Somehow, our men had got the idea that South Carolina was the

cause of all our troubles; her people were the first to fire on

Fort Sumter, had been in a great hurry to precipitate the country

into civil war; and therefore on them should fall the scourge of

war in its worst form. Taunting messages had also come to us, when

in Georgia, to the effect that, when we should reach South

Carolina, we would find a people less passive, who would fight us

to the bitter end, daring us to come over, etc.; so that I saw and

felt that we would not be able longer to restrain our men as we had

done in Georgia.

Personally I had many friends in Charleston, to whom I would gladly

have extended protection and mercy, but they were beyond my

personal reach, and I would not restrain the army lest its vigor

and energy should be impaired; and I had every reason to expect

bold and strong resistance at the many broad and deep rivers that

lay across our path.

General Foster's Department of the South had been enlarged to

embrace the coast of North Carolina, so that the few troops serving

there, under the command of General Innis N. Palmer, at Newbern,

became subject to my command. General A. H. Terry held Fort

Fisher, and a rumor came that he had taken the city of Wilmington;

but this was premature. He had about eight thousand men. General

Schofield was also known to be en route from Nashville for North

Carolina, with the entire Twenty-third Corps, so that I had every

reason to be satisfied that I would receive additional strength as

we progressed northward, and before I should need it.

General W. J. Hardee commanded the Confederate forces in

Charleston, with the Salkiehatchie River as his line of defense.

It was also known that General Beauregard had come from the

direction of Tennessee, and had assumed the general command of all

the troops designed to resist our progress.

The heavy winter rains had begun early in January, rendered the

roads execrable, and the Savannah River became so swollen that it

filled its many channels, overflowing the vast extent of

rice-fields that lay on the east bank. This flood delayed our

departure two weeks; for it swept away our pontoon-bridge at

Savannah, and came near drowning John E. Smith's division of the

Fifteenth Corps, with several heavy trains of wagons that were en

route from Savannah to Pocotaligo by the old causeway.

General Slocum had already ferried two of his divisions across the

river, when Sister's Ferry, about forty miles above Savannah, was

selected for the passage of the rest of his wing and of

Kilpatrick's cavalry. The troops were in motion for that point

before I quitted Savannah, and Captain S. B. Luce, United States

Navy, had reported to me with a gunboat (the Pontiac) and a couple

of transports, which I requested him to use in protecting Sister's

Ferry during the passage of Slocum's wing, and to facilitate the

passage of the troops all he could. The utmost activity prevailed

at all points, but it was manifest we could not get off much before

the 1st day of February; so I determined to go in person to

Pocotaligo, and there act as though we were bound for Charleston.

On the 24th of January I started from Beaufort with a part of my

staff, leaving the rest to follow at leisure, rode across the

island to a pontoon-bridge that spanned the channel between it and

the main-land, and thence rode by Garden's Corners to a plantation

not far from Pocotaligo, occupied by General Blair. There we found

a house, with a majestic avenue of live-oaks, whose limbs had been

cut away by the troops for firewood, and desolation marked one of

those splendid South Carolina estates where the proprietors

formerly had dispensed a hospitality that distinguished the old

regime of that proud State. I slept on the floor of the house, but

the night was so bitter cold that I got up by the fire several

times, and when it burned low I rekindled it with an old

mantel-clock and the wreck of a bedstead which stood in a corner of

the room--the only act of vandalism that I recall done by myself

personally during the war.

The next morning I rode to Pocotaligo, and thence reconnoitred our

entire line down to Coosawhatchie. Pocotaligo Fort was on low,

alluvial ground, and near it began the sandy pine-land which

connected with the firm ground extending inland, constituting the

chief reason for its capture at the very first stage of the

campaign. Hatch's division was ordered to that point from

Coosawhatchie, and the whole of Howard's right wing was brought

near by, ready to start by the 1st of February. I also

reconnoitred the point of the Salkiehatchie River, where the

Charleston Railroad crossed it, found the bridge protected by a

rebel battery on the farther side, and could see a few men about

it; but the stream itself was absolutely impassable, for the whole

bottom was overflowed by its swollen waters to the breadth of a

full mile. Nevertheless, Force's and Mower's divisions of the

Seventeenth Corps were kept active, seemingly with the intention to

cross over in the direction of Charleston, and thus to keep up the

delusion that that city was our immediate "objective." Meantime, I

had reports from General Slocum of the terrible difficulties he had

encountered about Sister's Ferry, where the Savannah River was

reported nearly three miles wide, and it seemed for a time almost

impossible for him to span it at all with his frail pontoons.

About this time (January 25th), the weather cleared away bright and

cold, and I inferred that the river would soon run down, and enable

Slocum to pass the river before February 1st. One of the divisions

of the Fifteenth Corps (Corse's) had also been cut off by the loss

of the pontoon-bridge at Savannah, so that General Slocum had with

him, not only his own two corps, but Corse's division and

Kilpatrick's cavalry, without which it was not prudent for me to

inaugurate the campaign. We therefore rested quietly about

Pocotaligo, collecting stores and making final preparations, until

the 1st of February, when I learned that the cavalry and two

divisions of the Twentieth Corps were fairly across the river, and

then gave the necessary orders for the march northward.

Before closing this chapter, I will add a few original letters that

bear directly on the subject, and tend to illustrate it:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON, D. C. January 21, 1866.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the

Mississippi.

GENERAL: Your letters brought by General Barnard were received at

City Point, and read with interest. Not having them with me,

however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on

all points of recommendation. As I arrived here at 1 p.m., and

must leave at 6 p.m., having in the mean time spent over three

hours with the secretary and General Halleck, I must be brief.

Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign into the

heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis, Maryland,

with his corps. The advance (six thousand) will reach the seaboard

by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as railroad

transportation can be procured from Cincinnati. The corps numbers

over twenty-one thousand men.

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force, surplus to go to

Selma under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, to

know whether he could go, and, if so, by which of several routes he

would select. No reply is yet received. Canby has been ordered to

set offensively from the seacoast to the interior, toward

Montgomery and Selma. Thomas's forces will move from the north at

an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to Canby. Without

further reenforcement Canby will have a moving column of twenty

thousand men.

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a force

there of eight thousand effective. At Newbern about half the

number. It is rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also has

fallen. I am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we

knew the enemy were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and

that on the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington.

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there. If not, he

will be sent to Newbern. In either event, all the surplus forces

at the two points will move to the interior, toward Goldsboro', in

cooperation with your movements. From either point, railroad

communications can be run out, there being here abundance of

rolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads.

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army

south. Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if

Wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher

having overtaken about two thousand.

All other troops are subject to your orders as you come in

communication with them. They will be so instructed. From about

Richmond I will watch Lee closely, and if he detaches many men, or

attempts to evacuate, will pitch in. In the meantime, should you

be brought to a halt anywhere, I can send two corps of thirty

thousand effective men to your support, from the troops about

Richmond.

To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the

Gulf. A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful.

A force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will cooperate with you

from Newbern or Wilmington, or both. You can call for

reenforcements.

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will

return with any message you may have for me. If there is any thing

I can do for you in the way of having supplies on shipboard, at any

point on the seacoast, ready for you, let me know it.

Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 29, 1885.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

DEAR GENERAL: Captain Hudson has this moment arrived with your

letter of January 21st, which I have read with interest.

The capture of Fort Fisher has a most important bearing on my

campaign, and I rejoice in it for many reasons, because of its

intrinsic importance, and because it gives me another point of

security on the seaboard. I hope General Terry will follow it up

by the capture of Wilmington, although I do not look for it, from

Admiral Porter's dispatch to me. I rejoice that Terry was not a

West-Pointer, that he belonged to your army, and that he had the

same troops with which Butler feared to make the attempt.

Admiral Dahlgren, whose fleet is reenforced by some more ironclads,

wants to make an assault a la Fisher on Fort Moultrie, but I

withhold my consent, for the reason that the capture of all

Sullivan's Island is not conclusive as to Charleston; the capture

of James Island would be, but all pronounce that impossible at this

time. Therefore, I am moving (as hitherto designed) for the

railroad west of Branchville, then will swing across to Orangeburg,

which will interpose my army between Charleston and the interior.

Contemporaneous with this, Foster will demonstrate up the Edisto,

and afterward make a lodgment at Bull's Bay, and occupy the common

road which leads from Mount Pleasant toward Georgetown. When I get

to Columbia, I think I shall move straight for Goldsboro', via

Fayetteville. By this circuit I cut all roads, and devastate the

land; and the forces along the coast, commanded by Foster, will

follow my movement, taking any thing the enemy lets go, or so

occupy his attention that he cannot detach all his forces against

me. I feel sure of getting Wilmington, and may be Charleston, and

being at Goldsboro', with its railroads finished back to Morehead

City and Wilmington, I can easily take Raleigh, when it seems that

Lee must come out. If Schofield comes to Beaufort, he should be

pushed out to Kinston, on the Neuse, and may be Goldsboro' (or,

rather, a point on the Wilmington road, south of Goldsboro'). It

is not necessary to storm Goldsboro', because it is in a distant

region, of no importance in itself, and, if its garrison is forced

to draw supplies from its north, it, will be eating up the same

stores on which Lee depends for his command.

I have no doubt Hood will bring his army to Augusta. Canby and

Thomas should penetrate Alabama as far as possible, to keep

employed at least a part of Hood's army; or, what would accomplish

the same thing, Thomas might reoccupy the railroad from Chattanooga

forward to the Etowah, viz., Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona, thereby

threatening Georgia. I know that the Georgia troops are

disaffected. At Savannah I met delegates from several counties of

the southwest, who manifested a decidedly hostile spirit to the

Confederate cause. I nursed the feeling as far as possible, and

instructed Grower to keep it up.

My left wing must now be at Sister's Ferry, crossing the Savannah

River to the east bank. Slocum has orders to be at Robertsville

to-morrow, prepared to move on Barnwell. Howard is here, all ready

to start for the Augusta Railroad at Midway.

We find the enemy on the east aide of the Salkiehatchie, and

cavalry in our front; but all give ground on our approach, and seem

to be merely watching us. If we start on Tuesday, in one week we

shall be near Orangeburg, having broken up the Augusta road from

the Edisto westward twenty or twenty-five miles. I will be sure

that every rail is twisted. Should we encounter too much

opposition near Orangeburg, then I will for a time neglect that

branch, and rapidly move on Columbia, and fill up the triangle

formed by the Congaree and Wateree (tributaries of the Santee),

breaking up that great centre of the Carolina roads. Up to that

point I feel full confidence, but from there may have to manoeuvre

some, and will be guided by the questions of weather and supplies.

You remember we had fine weather last February for our Meridian

trip, and my memory of the weather at Charleston is, that February

is usually a fine month. Before the March storms come we should be

within striking distance of the coast. The months of April and May

will be the best for operations from Goldsboro' to Raleigh and the

Roanoke. You may rest assured that I will keep my troops well in

hand, and, if I get worsted, will aim to make the enemy pay so

dearly that you will have less to do. I know that this trip is

necessary; it must be made sooner or later; I am on time, and in

the right position for it. My army is large enough for the

purpose, and I ask no reinforcement, but simply wish the utmost

activity to be kept up at all other points, so that concentration

against me may not be universal.

I suspect that Jeff. Davis will move heaven and earth to catch me,

for success to this column is fatal to his dream of empire.

Richmond is not more vital to his cause than Columbia and the heart

of South Carolina.

If Thomas will not move on Selma, order him to occupy Rome,

Kingston, and Allatoona, and again threaten Georgia in the

direction of Athena.

I think the "poor white trash" of the South are falling out of

their ranks by sickness, desertion, and every available means; but

there is a large class of vindictive Southerners who will fight to

the last. The squabbles in Richmond, the howls in Charleston, and

the disintegration elsewhere, are all good omens for us; we must

not relax one iota, but, on the contrary, pile up our efforts: I

world, ere this, have been off, but we had terrific rains, which

caught us in motion, and nearly drowned some of the troops in the

rice-fields of the Savannah, swept away our causeway (which had

been carefully corduroyed), and made the swamps hereabout mere

lakes of slimy mud. The weather is now good, and I have the army

on terra firma. Supplies, too, came for a long time by daily

driblets instead of in bulk; this is now all remedied, and I hope

to start on Tuesday.

I will issue instructions to General Foster, based on the

reenforcements of North Carolina; but if Schofield comes, you had

better relieve Foster, who cannot take the field, and needs an

operation on his leg. Let Schofield take command, with his

headquarters at Beaufort, North Carolina, and with orders to secure

Goldsboro' (with its railroad communication back to Beaufort and

Wilmington). If Lee lets us get that position, he is gone up.

I will start with my Atlanta army (sixty thousand), supplied as

before, depending on the country for all food in excess of thirty

days. I will have less cattle on the hoof, but I hear of hogs,

cows, and calves, in Barnwell and the Colombia districts. Even

here we have found some forage. Of course, the enemy will carry

off and destroy some forage, but I will burn the houses where the

people burn their forage, and they will get tired of it.

I must risk Hood, and trust to you to hold Lee or be on his heels

if he comes south. I observe that the enemy has some respect for

my name, for they gave up Pocotaligo without a fight when they

heard that the attacking force belonged to my army. I will try and

keep up that feeling, which is a real power. With respect, your

friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-general commanding.

P. S.--I leave my chief-quartermaster and commissary behind to

follow coastwise.

W. T. S.

[Dispatch No. 6.]

FLAG-STEAMER PHILADELPHIA

SAVANNAH RIVER, January 4, 1865.

HON. GIDEON WELLS, Secretary of the Navy.

SIR: I have already apprised the Department that the army of

General Sherman occupied the city of Savannah on the 21st of

December.

The rebel army, hardly respectable in numbers or condition, escaped

by crossing the river and taking the Union Causeway toward the

railroad.

I have walked about the city several times, and can affirm that its

tranquillity is undisturbed. The Union soldiers who are stationed

within its limits are as orderly as if they were in New York or

Boston.... One effect of the march of General Sherman through

Georgia has been to satisfy the people that their credulity has

been imposed upon by the lying assertions of the rebel Government,

affirming the inability of the United States Government to

withstand the armies of rebeldom. They have seen the old flag of

the United States carried by its victorious legions through their

State, almost unopposed, and placed in their principal city without

a blow.

Since the occupation of the city General Sherman has been occupied

in making arrangements for its security after he leaves it for the

march that he meditates. My attention has been directed to such

measures of cooperation as the number and quality of my force

permit.

On the 2d I arrived here from Charleston, whither, as I stated in

my dispatch of the 29th of December, I had gone in consequence of

information from the senior officer there that the rebels

contemplated issuing from the harbor, and his request for my

presence. Having placed a force there of seven monitors,

sufficient to meet each an emergency, and not perceiving any sign

of the expected raid, I returned to Savannah, to keep in

communication with General Sherman and be ready to render any

assistance that might be desired. General Sherman has fully

informed me of his plans, and, so far as my means permit, they

shall not lack assistance by water.

On the 3d the transfer of the right wing to Beaufort was began, and

the only suitable vessel I had at hand (the Harvest Moon) was sent

to Thunderbolt to receive the first embarkation. This took place

about 3 p.m., and was witnessed by General Sherman and General

Bernard (United States Engineers) and myself. The Pontiac is

ordered around to assist, and the army transports also followed the

first move by the Harvest Moon.

I could not help remarking the unbroken silence that prevailed in

the large array of troops; not a voice was to be heard, as they

gathered in masses on the bluff to look at the vessels. The notes

of a solitary bugle alone came from their midst.

General Barnard made a brief visit to one of the rebel works

(Cansten's Bluff) that dominated this water-course--the best

approach of the kind to Savannah.

I am collecting data that will fully exhibit to the Department the

powerful character of the defenses of the city and its approaches.

General Sherman will not retain the extended limits they embrace.

but will contract the line very much.

General Foster still holds the position near the Tullifinny. With

his concurrence I have detached the fleet brigade, and the men

belonging to it have returned to their vessels. The excellent

service performed by this detachment has fully realized my wishes,

and exemplified the efficiency of the organization--infantry and

light artillery handled as skirmishers. The howitzers were always

landed as quickly as the men, and were brought into action before

the light pieces of the land-service could be got ashore.

I regret very much that the reduced complements of the vessels

prevent me from maintaining the force in constant organization.

With three hundred more marines and five hundred seamen I could

frequently operate to great advantage, at the present time, when

the attention of the rebels is so engrossed by General Sherman.

It is said that they have a force at Hardeeville, the pickets of

which were retained on the Union Causeway until a few days since,

when some of our troops crossed the river and pushed them back.

Concurrently with this, I caused the Sonoma to anchor so as to

sweep the ground in the direction of the causeway.

The transfer of the right-wing (thirty thousand men) to Beaufort

will so imperil the rebel force at Hardeeville that it will be cut

off or dispersed, if not moved in season.

Meanwhile I will send the Dai-Ching to St. Helena, to meet any want

that may arise in that quarter, while the Mingo and Pontiac will be

ready to act from Broad River.

The general route of the army will be northward; but the exact

direction must be decided more or less by circumstances which it

may not be possible to foresee....

My cooperation will be confined to assistance in attacking

Charleston, or in establishing communication at Georgetown, in case

the army pushes on without attacking Charleston, and time alone

will show which of these will eventuate.

The weather of the winter first, and the condition of the ground in

spring, would permit little advantage to be derived from the

presence of the army at Richmond until the middle of May. So that

General Sherman has no reason to move in haste, but can choose such

objects as he prefers, and take as much time as their attainment

may demand. The Department will learn the objects in view of

General Sherman more precisely from a letter addressed by him to

General Halleck, which he read to me a few days since.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. DAHLGREN,

Rear-Admiral, commanding South-Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 29, 1885.

Major-General J. G. FOSTER, commanding Department of the South.

GENERAL: I have just received dispatches from General Grant,

stating that Schofield's corps (the Twenty-third), twenty-one

thousand strong, is ordered east from Tennessee, and will be sent

to Beaufort, North Carolina. That is well; I want that force to

secure a point on the railroad about Goldsboro', and then to build

the railroad out to that point. If Goldsboro' be too strong to

carry by a rapid movement, then a point near the Neuse, south of

Goldsboro', will answer, but the bridge and position about Kinston,

should be held and fortified strong. The movement should be masked

by the troops already at Newbern. Please notify General Palmer

that these troops are coming, and to be prepared to receive them.

Major-General Schofield will command in person, and is admirably

adapted for the work. If it is possible, I want him to secure

Goldsboro', with the railroad back to Morehead City and Wilmington.

As soon as General Schofield reaches Fort Macon, have him to meet

some one of your staff, to explain in full the details of the

situation of affairs with me; and you can give him the chief

command of all troops at Cape Fear and in North Carolina. If he

finds the enemy has all turned south against me, he need not

follow, but turn his attention against Raleigh; if he can secure

Goldsboro' and Wilmington, it will be as much as I expect before I

have passed the Santee. Send him all detachments of men that have

come to join my army. They can be so organized and officered as to

be efficient, for they are nearly all old soldiers who have been

detached or on furlough. Until I pass the Santee, you can better

use these detachments at Bull's Bay, Georgetown, etc.

I will instruct General McCallum, of the Railroad Department, to

take his men up to Beaufort, North Carolina, and employ them on the

road out. I do not know that he can use them on any road here. I

did instruct him, while awaiting information from North Carolina,

to have them build a good trestle-bridge across Port Royal ferry;

but I now suppose the pontoon-bridge will do. If you move the

pontoons, be sure to make a good road out to Garden's Corners, and

mark it with sign-boards--obstructing the old road, so that, should

I send back any detachments, they would not be misled.

I prefer that Hatch's force should not be materially weakened until

I am near Columbia, when you may be governed by the situation of

affairs about Charleston. If you can break the railroad between

this and Charleston, then this force could be reduced.

I am, with respect, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 18, 1865.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

SIR: When you left Savannah a few days ago, you forgot the map

which General Geary had prepared for you, showing the route by

which his division entered the city of Savannah, being the first

troops to occupy that city. I now send it to you.

I avail myself of the opportunity also to inclose you copies of all

my official orders touching trade and intercourse with the people

of Georgia, as well as for the establishment of the negro

settlements.

Delegations of the people of Georgia continue to come in, and I am

satisfied that, by judicious handling and by a little respect shown

to their prejudices, we can create a schism in Jeff. Davis's

dominions. All that I have conversed with realize the truth that

slavery as an institution is defunct, and the only questions that

remain are what disposition shall be made of the negroes

themselves. I confess myself unable to offer a complete solution

for these questions, and prefer to leave it to the slower

operations of time. We have given the initiative, and can afford

to await the working of the experiment.

As to trade-matters, I also think it is to our interest to keep the

Southern people somewhat dependent on the articles of commerce to

which they have hitherto been accustomed. General Grover is now

here, and will, I think, be able to handle this matter judiciously,

and may gradually relax, and invite cotton to come in in large

quantities. But at first we should manifest no undue anxiety on

that score; for the rebels would at once make use of it as a power

against us. We should assume, a tone of perfect contempt for

cotton and every thing else in comparison with the great object of

the war--the restoration of the Union, with all its rights and

power. It the rebels burn cotton as a war measure, they simply

play into our hands by taking away the only product of value they

have to exchange in foreign ports for war-ships and munitions. By

such a course, also, they alienate the feelings of a large class of

small farmers who look to their little parcels of cotton to

exchange for food and clothing for their families. I hope the

Government will not manifest too much anxiety to obtain cotton in

large quantities, and especially that the President will not

indorse the contracts for the purchase of large quantities of

cotton. Several contracts, involving from six to ten thousand

bales, indorsed by Mr. Lincoln, have been shown me, but were not in

such a form as to amount to an order to compel me to facilitate

their execution.

As to Treasury agents, and agents to take charge of confiscated and

abandoned property, whose salaries depend on their fees, I can only

say that, as a general rule, they are mischievous and disturbing

elements to a military government, and it is almost impossible for

us to study the law and regulations so as to understand fully their

powers and duties. I rather think the Quartermaster's Department

of the army could better fulfill all their duties and accomplish

all that is aimed at by the law. Yet on this subject I will leave

Generals Foster and Grover to do the best they can.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 2, 1865.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have just received from Lieutenant-General Grant a copy of

that part of your telegram to him of December 26th relating to

cotton, a copy of which has been immediately furnished to General

Easton, chief-quartermaster, who will be strictly governed by it.

I had already been approached by all the consuls and half the

people of Savannah on this cotton question, and my invariable

answer was that all the cotton in Savannah was prize of war,

belonged to the United States, and nobody should recover a bale of

it with my consent; that, as cotton had been one of the chief

causes of this war, it should help to pay its expenses; that all

cotton became tainted with treason from the hour the first act of

hostility was committed against the United States some time in

December, 1860; and that no bill of sale subsequent to that date

could convey title.

My orders were that an officer of the Quartermaster's Department,

United States Army, might furnish the holder, agent, or attorney, a

mere certificate of the fact of seizure, with description of the

bales' marks, etc., the cotton then to be turned over to the agent

of the Treasury Department, to be shipped to New York for sale.

But, since the receipt of your dispatch, I have ordered General

Easton to make the shipment himself to the quartermaster at New

York, where you can dispose of it at pleasure. I do not think the

Treasury Department ought to bother itself with the prizes or

captures of war.

Mr. Barclay, former consul at New York, representing Mr. Molyneux,

former consul here, but absent a long time, called on me with

reference to cotton claimed by English subjects. He seemed amazed

when I told him I should pay no respect to consular certificates,

that in no event would I treat an English subject with more favor

than one of our own deluded citizens, and that for my part I was

unwilling to fight for cotton for the benefit of Englishmen openly

engaged in smuggling arms and instruments of war to kill us; that,

on the contrary, it would afford me great satisfaction to conduct

my army to Nassau, and wipe out that nest of pirates. I explained

to him, however, that I was not a diplomatic agent of the General

Government of the United States, but that my opinion, so frankly

expressed, was that of a soldier, which it would be well for him to

heed. It appeared, also, that he owned a plantation on the line of

investment of Savannah, which, of course, was pillaged, and for

which he expected me to give some certificate entitling him to

indemnification, which I declined emphatically.

I have adopted in Savannah rules concerning property--severe but

just--founded upon the laws of nations and the practice of

civilized governments, and am clearly of opinion that we should

claim all the belligerent rights over conquered countries, that the

people may realize the truth that war is no child's play.

I embrace in this a copy of a letter, dated December 31, 1864, in

answer to one from Solomon Cohen (a rich lawyer) to General Blair,

his personal friend, as follows:

Major-General F. P. BLAIR, commanding Seventeenth Army Corps.

GENERAL: Your note, inclosing Mr. Cohen's of this date, is

received, and I answer frankly through you his inquiries.

1. No one can practise law as an attorney in the United States

without acknowledging the supremacy of our Government. If I am not

in error, an attorney is as much an officer of the court as the

clerk, and it would be a novel thing in a government to have a

court to administer law which denied the supremacy of the

government itself.

2. No one will be allowed the privileges of a merchant, or,

rather, to trade is a privilege which no one should seek of the

Government without in like manner acknowledging its supremacy.

3. If Mr. Cohen remains in Savannah as a denizen, his property,

real and personal, will not be disturbed unless its temporary use

be necessary for the military authorities of the city. The title

to property will not be disturbed in any event, until adjudicated

by the courts of the United States.

4. If Mr. Cohen leaves Savannah under my Special Order No. 148, it

is a public acknowledgment that he "adheres to the enemies of the

United States," and all his property becomes forfeited to the

United States. But, as a matter of favor, he will be allowed to

carry with him clothing and furniture for the use of himself, his

family, and servants, and will be trans ported within the enemy's

lines, but not by way of Port Royal.

These rules will apply to all parties, and from them no exception

will be made.

I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

This letter was in answer to specific inquiries; it is clear, and

covers all the points, and, should I leave before my orders are

executed, I will endeavor to impress upon my successor, General

Foster, their wisdom and propriety.

I hope the course I have taken in these matters will meet your

approbation, and that the President will not refund to parties

claiming cotton or other property, without the strongest evidence

of loyalty and friendship on the part of the claimant, or unless

some other positive end is to be gained.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

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