ebb-strong; so I asked. Captain Williamson to tow us up as near
Fort McAllister as he would venture for the torpedoes, of which the
navy-officers had a wholesome dread. The Dandelion steamed up some
three or four miles, till the lights of Fort McAllister could be
seen, when she anchored, and we pulled to the fort in our own boat.
General Howard and I then walked up to the McAllister House, where
we found General Hazen and his officers asleep on the floor of one
of the rooms. Lying down on the floor, I was soon fast asleep, but
shortly became conscious that some one in the room was inquiring
for me among the sleepers. Calling out, I was told that an officer
of General Fosters staff had just arrived from a steamboat anchored
below McAllister; that the general was extremely anxious to see me
on important business, but that he was lame from an old Mexican-War
wound, and could not possibly come to me. I was extremely weary
from the incessant labor of the day and night before, but got up,
and again walked down the sandy road to McAllister, where I found a
boat awaiting us, which carried us some three miles down the river,
to the steamer W. W. Coit (I think), on board of which we found
General Foster. He had just come from Port Royal, expecting to
find Admiral Dahlgren in Ossabaw Sound, and, hearing of the capture
of Fort McAllister, he had come up to see me. He described fully
the condition of affairs with his own command in South Carolina.
He had made several serious efforts to effect a lodgment on the
railroad which connects Savannah with Charleston near Pocotaligo,
but had not succeeded in reaching the railroad itself, though he
had a full division of troops, strongly intrenched, near Broad
River, within cannon-range of the railroad. He explained,
moreover, that there were at Port Royal abundant supplies of bread
and provisions, as well as of clothing, designed for our use. We
still had in our wagons and in camp abundance of meat, but we
needed bread, sugar, and coffee, and it was all-important that a
route of supply should at once be opened, for which purpose the
assistance of the navy were indispensable. We accordingly
steamed down the Ogeechee River to Ossabaw Sound, in hopes to meet
Admiral Dahlgren, but he was not there, and we continued on by the
inland channel to Warsaw Sound, where we found the Harvest Moon,
and Admiral Dahlgren. I was not personally acquainted with him at
the time, but he was so extremely kind and courteous that I was at
once attracted to him. There was nothing in his power, he said,
which he would not do to assist us, to make our campaign absolutely
successful. He undertook at once to find vessels of light draught
to carry our supplies from Port Royal to Cheeves's Mill, or to
Grog's Bridge above, whence they could be hauled by wagons to our
several camps; he offered to return with me to Fort McAllister, to
superintend the removal of the torpedoes, and to relieve me of all
the details of this most difficult work. General Foster then
concluded to go on to Port Royal, to send back to us six hundred
thousand rations, and all the rifled guns of heavy calibre, and
ammunition on hand, with which I thought we could reach the city of
Savannah, from the positions already secured. Admiral Dahlgren
then returned with me in the Harvest Moon to Fort McAllister. This
consumed all of the 14th of December; and by the 15th I had again
reached Cheeves's Mill, where my horse awaited me, and rode on to
General Howard's headquarters at Anderson's plantation, on the
plank-road, about eight miles back of Savannah. I reached this
place about noon, and immediately sent orders to my own
head-quarters, on the Louisville road, to have them brought over to
the plank-road, as a place more central and convenient; gave written
notice to Generals Slocum and Howard of all the steps taken, and
ordered them to get ready to receive the siege-guns, to put them in
position to bombard Savannah, and to prepare for the general assault.
The country back of Savannah is very low, and intersected with
innumerable saltwater creeks, swamps, and rice-fields. Fortunately
the weather was good and the roads were passable, but, should the
winter rains set in, I knew that we would be much embarrassed.
Therefore, heavy details of men were at once put to work to prepare a
wharf and depot at Grog's Bridge, and the roads leading thereto were
corduroyed in advance. The Ogeechee Canal was also cleared out for
use; and boats, such as were common on the river plantations, were
collected, in which to float stores from our proposed base on the
Ogeechee to the points most convenient to the several camps.
Slocum's wing extended from the Savannah River to the canal, and
Howard's wing from the canal to the extreme right, along down the
Little Ogeechee. The enemy occupied not only the city itself, with
its long line of outer works, but the many forts which had been
built to guard the approaches from the sea-such as at Beaulieu,
Rosedew, White Bluff, Bonaventura, Thunderbolt, Cansten's Bluff,
Forts Tatnall, Boggs, etc., etc. I knew that General Hardee could
not have a garrison strong enough for all these purposes, and I was
therefore anxious to break his lines before he could receive
reenforcements from Virginia or Augusta. General Slocum had
already captured a couple of steamboats trying to pass down the
Savannah River from Augusta, and had established some of his men on
Argyle and Hutchinson Islands above the city, and wanted to
transfer a whole corps to the South Carolina bank; but, as the
enemy had iron-clad gunboats in the river, I did not deem it
prudent, because the same result could be better accomplished from
General Fosters position at Broad River.
Fort McAllister was captured as described, late in the evening of
December 13th, and by the 16th many steamboats had passed up as
high as King's Bridge; among them one which General Grant had
dispatched with the mails for the army, which had accumulated since
our departure from Atlanta, under charge of Colonel A. H. Markland.
These mails were most welcome to all the officers and soldiers of
the army, which had been cut off from friends and the world for two
months, and this prompt receipt of letters from home had an
excellent effect, making us feel that home was near. By this
vessel also came Lieutenant Dune, aide-de-camp, with the following
letter of December 3d, from General Grant, and on the next day
Colonel Babcock, United States Engineers, arrived with the letter
of December 6th, both of which are in General Grant's own
handwriting, and are given entire:
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 3, 1864.
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Armies near Savannah,
Georgia.
GENERAL: The little information gleaned from the Southern press
indicating no great obstacle to your progress, I have directed your
mails (which had been previously collected in Baltimore by Colonel
Markland, special-agent of the Post-Office Department) to be sent
as far as the blockading squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to
you as soon as heard from on the coast.
Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain from
congratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has
been struck. I have never had a fear, however, for the result.
Since you left Atlanta no very great progress has been made here.
The enemy has been closely watched, though, and prevented from
detaching against you. I think not one man has gone from here,
except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. Bragg
has gone from Wilmington. I am trying to take advantage of his
absence to get possession of that place. Owing to some
preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are making to blow
up Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I do not believe
a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition off. I
hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg will
not have started back by that time.
In this letter I do not intend to give you any thing like
directions for future action, but will state a general idea I have,
and will get your views after you have established yourself on the
sea-coast. With your veteran army I hope to get control of the only
two through routes from east to west possessed by the enemy before
the fall of Atlanta. The condition will be filled by holding
Savannah and Augusta, or by holding any other port to the east of
Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmington falls, a force from there
can cooperate with you.
Thomas has got back into the defenses of Nashville, with Hood close
upon him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads,
except the main one leading to Chattanooga. Part of this falling
back was undoubtedly necessary, and all of it may have been. It
did not look so, however, to me. In my opinion, Thomas far
outnumbers Hood in infantry. In cavalry Hood has the advantage in
morale and numbers. I hope yet that Hood will be badly crippled,
if not destroyed. The general news you will learn from the papers
better than I can give it.
After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there
is likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I will run
down the coast to see you. If you desire it, I will ask Mrs.
Sherman to go with me.
Yours truly,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES.
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864.
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi
GENERAL: On reflection since sending my letter by the hands of
Lieutenant Dunn, I have concluded that the most important operation
toward closing out the rebellion will be to close out Lee and his
army.
You have now destroyed the roads of the South so that it will
probably take them three months without interruption to reestablish
a through line from east to west. In that time I think the job here
will be effectually completed.
My idea now is that you establish a base on the sea-coast, fortify
and leave in it all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantry
to protect them, and at the same time so threaten the interior that
the militia of the South will have to be kept at home. With the
balance of your command come here by water with all dispatch.
Select yourself the officer to leave in command, but you I want in
person. Unless you see objections to this plan which I cannot see,
use every vessel going to you for purposes of transportation.
Hood has Thomas close in Nashville. I have said all I can to force
him to attack, without giving the positive order until to-day.
To-day, however, I could stand it no longer, and gave the order
without any reserve. I think the battle will take place to-morrow.
The result will probably be known in New York before Colonel
Babcock (the bearer of this) will leave it. Colonel Babcock will
give you full information of all operations now in progress.
Very respectfully your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
The contents of these letters gave me great uneasiness, for I had
set my heart on the capture of Savannah, which I believed to be
practicable, and to be near; for me to embark for Virginia by sea
was so complete a change from what I had supposed would be the
course of events that I was very much concerned. I supposed, as a
matter of course, that a fleet of vessels would soon pour in, ready
to convey the army to Virginia, and as General Grant's orders
contemplated my leaving the cavalry, trains, and artillery, behind,
I judged Fort McAllister to be the best place for the purpose, and
sent my chief-engineer, Colonel Poe, to that fort, to reconnoitre
the ground, and to prepare it so as to make a fortified camp large
enough to accommodate the vast herd of mules and horses that would
thus be left behind. And as some time might be required to collect
the necessary shipping, which I estimated at little less than a
hundred steamers and sailing-vessels, I determined to push
operations, in hopes to secure the city of Savannah before the
necessary fleet could be available. All these ideas are given in
my answer to General Grant's letters (dated December 16, 1864)
herewith, which is a little more full than the one printed in the
report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, because in that
copy I omitted the matter concerning General Thomas, which now need
no longer be withheld:
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 16, 1864.
Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, City Point,
Virginia.
GENERAL: I received, day before yesterday, at the hands of
Lieutenant Dunn, your letter of December 8d, and last night, at the
hands of Colonel Babcock, that of December 6th. I had previously
made you a hasty scrawl from the tugboat Dandelion, in Ogeechee
River, advising you that the army had reached the sea-coast,
destroying all the railroads across the State of Georgia, investing
closely the city of Savannah, and had made connection with the
fleet.
Since writing that note, I have in person met and conferred with
General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, and made all the arrangements
which were deemed essential for reducing the city of Savannah to
our possession. But, since the receipt of yours of the 6th, I have
initiated measures looking principally to coming to you with fifty
or Sixty thousand infantry, and incidentally to capture Savannah,
if time will allow.
At the time we carried Fort McAllister by assault so handsomely,
with its twenty-two guns and entire garrison, I was hardly aware
of its importance; but, since passing down the river with General
Foster and up with Admiral Dahlgren, I realize how admirably
adapted are Ossabaw Sound and Ogeechee River to supply an army
operating against Savannah. Seagoing vessels can easily come to
King's Bridge, a point on Ogeechee River, fourteen and a half miles
due west of Savannah, from which point we have roads leading to all
our camps. The country is low and sandy, and cut up with marshes,
which in wet weather will be very bad, but we have been so favored
with weather that they are all now comparatively good, and heavy
details are constantly employed in double-corduroying the marshes,
so that I have no fears even of bad weather. Fortunately, also, by
liberal and judicious foraging, we reached the sea-coast abundantly
supplied with forage and provisions, needing nothing on arrival
except bread. Of this we started from Atlanta, with from eight to
twenty days' supply per corps and some of the troops only had one
day's issue of bread during the trip of thirty days; yet they did
not want, for sweet-potatoes were very abundant, as well as
corn-meal, and our soldiers took to them naturally. We started
with about five thousand head of cattle, and arrived with over ten
thousand, of course consuming mostly turkeys, chickens, sheep,
hogs, and the cattle of the country. As to our mules and horses,
we left Atlanta with about twenty-five hundred wagons, many of
which were drawn by mules which had not recovered from the
Chattanooga starvation, all of which were replaced, the poor mules
shot, and our transportation is now in superb condition. I have no
doubt the State of Georgia has lost, by our operations, fifteen
thousand first-rate mules. As to horses, Kilpatrick collected all
his remounts, and it looks to me, in riding along our
columns, as though every officer had three or four led horses, and
each regiment seems to be followed by at least fifty negroes and
foot-sore soldiers, riding on horses and mules. The custom was for
each brigade to send out daily a foraging-party of about fifty men,
on foot, who invariably returned mounted, with several wagons
loaded with poultry, potatoes, etc., and as the army is composed of
about forty brigades, you can estimate approximately the number of
horses collected. Great numbers of these were shot by my order,
because of the disorganizing effect on our infantry of having too
many idlers mounted. General Euston is now engaged in collecting
statistics on this subject, but I know the Government will never
receive full accounts of our captures, although the result aimed at
was fully attained, viz., to deprive our enemy of them. All these
animals I will have sent to Port Royal, or collected behind Fort
McAllister, to be used by General Saxton in his farming operations,
or by the Quartermaster's Department, after they are systematically
accounted for. While General Easton is collecting transportation
for my troops to James River, I will throw to Port Royal Island all
our means of transportation I can, and collect the rest near Fort
McAllister, covered by the Ogeeehee River and intrenchments to be
erected, and for which Captain Poe, my chief-engineer, is now
reconnoitring the ground, but in the mean time will act as I have
begun, as though the city of Savannah were my objective: namely,
the troops will continue to invest Savannah closely, making attacks
and feints wherever we have fair ground to stand upon, and I will
place some thirty-pound Parrotts, which I have got from General
Foster, in position, near enough to reach the centre of the city,
and then will demand its surrender. If General Hardee is alarmed,
or fears starvation, he may surrender; otherwise I will bombard the
city, but not risk the lives of our men by assaults across the
narrow causeways, by which alone I can now reach it.
If I had time, Savannah, with all its dependent fortifications,
would surely fall into our possession, for we hold all its avenues
of supply.
The enemy has made two desperate efforts to get boats from above to
the city, in both of which he has been foiled-General Slocum (whose
left flank rests on the river) capturing and burning the first
boat, and in the second instance driving back two gunboats and
capturing the steamer Resolute, with seven naval officers and a
crew of twenty-five seamen. General Slocum occupies Argyle Island
and the upper end of Hutchinson Inland, and has a brigade on the
South Carolina shore opposite, and is very urgent to pass one of
his corps over to that shore. But, in view of the change of plan
made necessary by your order of the 6th, I will maintain things in
statu quo till I have got all my transportation to the rear and out
of the way, and until I have sea-transportation for the troops you
require at James River, which I will accompany and command in
person. Of course, I will leave Kilpatrick, with his cavalry (say
five thousand three hundred), and, it may be, a division of the
Fifteenth Corps; but, before determining on this, I must see
General Foster, and may arrange to shift his force (now over above
the Charleston Railroad, at the head of Broad River) to the
Ogeeohee, where, in cooperation with Kilpatrick's cavalry, he can
better threaten the State of Georgia than from the direction of
Port Royal. Besides, I would much prefer not to detach from my
regular corps any of its veteran divisions, and would even prefer
that other less valuable troops should be sent to reenforce Foster
from some other quarter. My four corps, full of experience and
full of ardor, coming to you en masse, equal to sixty thousand
fighting men, will be a reenforcement that Lee cannot disregard.
Indeed, with my present command, I had expected, after reducing
Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina; thence to
Raleigh, and thence to report to you. But this would consume, it
may be, six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah; whereas, by
sea, I can probably reach you with my men and arms before the
middle of January.
I myself am somewhat astonished at the attitude of things in
Tennessee. I purposely delayed at Kingston until General Thomas
assured me that he was all ready, and my last dispatch from him of
the 12th of November was full of confidence, in which he promised
me that he would ruin Hood if he dared to advance from Florence,
urging me to go ahead, and give myself no concern about Hood's army
in Tennessee.
Why he did not turn on him at Franklin, after checking and
discomfiting him, surpasses my understanding. Indeed, I do not
approve of his evacuating Decatur, but think he should have assumed
the offensive against Hood from Pulaski, in the direction of
Waynesburg.
I know full well that General Thomas is slow in mind and in action;
but he is judicious and brave and the troops feel great confidence
in him. I still hope he will out-manoeuvre and destroy Hood.
As to matters in the Southeast, I think Hardee, in Savannah, has
good artillerists, some five or six thousand good infantry, and,
it may be, a mongrel mass of eight to ten thousand militia. In all
our marching through Georgia, he has not forced us to use any thing
but a skirmish-line, though at several points he had erected
fortifications and tried to alarm us by bombastic threats. In
Savannah he has taken refuge in a line constructed behind swamps
and overflowed rice-fields, extending from a point on the Savannah
River about three miles above the city, around by a branch of the
Little Ogeechee, which stream is impassable from its salt-marshes
and boggy swamps, crossed only by narrow causeways or common
corduroy-roads.
There must be twenty-five thousand citizens, men, women, and
children, in Savannah, that must also be fed, and how he is to feed
them beyond a few days I cannot imagine. I know that his
requisitions for corn on the interior counties were not filled, and
we are in possession of the rice-fields and mills, which could
alone be of service to him in this neighborhood. He can draw
nothing from South Carolina, save from a small corner down in the
southeast, and that by a disused wagon-road. I could easily get
possession of this, but hardly deem it worth the risk of making a
detachment, which would be in danger by its isolation from the main
army. Our whole army is in fine condition as to health, and the
weather is splendid. For that reason alone I feel a personal
dislike to turning northward. I will keep Lieutenant Dunn here
until I know the result of my demand for the surrender of Savannah,
but, whether successful or not, shall not delay my execution of
your order of the 6th, which will depend alone upon the time it
will require to obtain transportation by sea.
I am, with respect, etc., your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General United States Army.
Having concluded all needful preparations, I rode from my
headquarters, on the plank-road, over to General Slocum's
headquarters, on the Macon road, and thence dispatched (by flag of
truce) into Savannah, by the hands of Colonel Ewing,
inspector-general, a demand for the surrender of the place. The
following letters give the result. General Hardee refused to
surrender, and I then resolved to make the attempt to break his
line of defense at several places, trusting that some one would
succeed.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 17, 1864.
General WILLIAM J. HARDEE, commanding Confederate Forces in
Savannah.
GENERAL: You have doubtless observed, from your station at Rosedew
that sea-going vessels now come through Ossabaw Sound and up the
Ogeechee to the rear of my army, giving me abundant supplies of all
kinds, and more especially heavy ordnance necessary for the
reduction of Savannah. I have already received guns that can cast
heavy and destructive shot as far as the heart of your city; also,
I have for some days held and controlled every avenue by which the
people and garrison of Savannah can be supplied, and I am therefore
justified in demanding the surrender of the city of Savannah, and
its dependent forts, and shall wait a reasonable time for your
answer, before opening with heavy ordnance. Should you entertain
the proposition, I am prepared to grant liberal terms to the
inhabitants and garrison; but should I be forced to resort to
assault, or the slower and surer process of starvation, I shall
then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and
shall make little effort to restrain my army--burning to avenge the
national wrong which they attach to Savannah and other large cities
which have been so prominent in dragging our country into civil
war. I inclose you a copy of General Hood's demand for the
surrender of the town of Resaoa, to be used by you for what it is
worth. I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA AND FLORIDA
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 17, 1864
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Federal Forces near
Savannah, Georgia.
GENERAL: I have to acknowledge the receipt of a communication from
you of this date, in which you demand "the surrender of Savannah
and its dependent forts," on the ground that you "have received
guns that can cast heavy and destructive shot into the heart of the
city," and for the further reason that you "have, for some days,
held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison
can be supplied." You add that, should you be "forced to resort to
assault, or to the slower and surer process of starvation, you will
then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and will
make little effort to restrain your army," etc., etc. The position
of your forces (a half-mile beyond the outer line for the
land-defense of Savannah) is, at the nearest point, at least four
miles from the heart of the city. That and the interior line are
both intact.
Your statement that you have, for some days, held and controlled
every avenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied, is
incorrect. I am in free and constant communication with my
department.
Your demand for the surrender of Savannah and its dependent forts
is refused.
With respect to the threats conveyed in the closing paragraphs of
your letter (of what may be expected in case your demand is not
complied with), I have to say that I have hitherto conducted the
military operations intrusted to my direction in strict accordance
with the rules of civilized warfare, and I should deeply regret the
adoption of any course by you that may force me to deviate from
them in future. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your
obedient servant,
W. J. HARDEE, Lieutenant-General.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 18, 1864 8 p.m.
Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.
GENERAL: I wrote you at length (by Colonel Babcock) on the 16th
instant. As I therein explained my purpose, yesterday I made a
demand on General Hardee for the surrender of the city of Savannah,
and to-day received his answer--refusing; copies of both letters
are herewith inclosed. You will notice that I claim that my lines
are within easy cannon-range of the heart of Savannah; but General
Hardee asserts that we are four and a half miles distant. But I
myself have been to the intersection of the Charleston and Georgia
Central Railroads, and the three-mile post is but a few yards
beyond, within the line of our pickets. The enemy has no pickets
outside of his fortified line (which is a full quarter of a mile
within the three-mile post), and I have the evidence of Mr. R. R.
Cuyler, President of the Georgia Central Railroad (who was a
prisoner in our hands), that the mile-posts are measured from the
Exchange, which is but two squares back from the river. By
to-morrow morning I will have six thirty-pound Parrotts in
position, and General Hardee will learn whether I am right or not.
From the left of our line, which is on the Savannah River, the
spires can be plainly seen; but the country is so densely wooded
with pine and live-oak, and lies so flat, that we can see nothing
from any other portion of our lines. General Slocum feels
confident that he can make a successful assault at one or two
points in front of General Davis's (Fourteenth) corps. All of
General Howard's troops (the right wing) lie behind the Little
Ogeechee, and I doubt if it can be passed by troops in the face of
an enemy. Still, we can make strong feints, and if I can get a
sufficient number of boats, I shall make a cooperative
demonstration up Vernon River or Wassaw Sound. I should like very
much indeed to take Savannah before coming to you; but, as I wrote
to you before, I will do nothing rash or hasty, and will embark for
the James River as soon as General Easton (who is gone to Port
Royal for that purpose) reports to me that he has an approximate
number of vessels for the transportation of the contemplated force.
I fear even this will cost more delay than you anticipate, for
already the movement of our transports and the gunboats has
required more time than I had expected. We have had dense fogs;
there are more mud-banks in the Ogeechee than were reported, and
there are no pilots whatever. Admiral Dahlgren promised to have
the channel buoyed and staked, but it is not done yet. We find
only six feet of water up to King's Bridge at low tide, about ten
feet up to the rice-mill, and sixteen to Fort McAllister. All
these points may be used by us, and we have a good, strong bridge
across Ogeechee at King's, by which our wagons can go to Fort
McAllister, to which point I am sending all wagons not absolutely
necessary for daily use, the negroes, prisoners of war, sick, etc.,
en route for Port Royal. In relation to Savannah, you will remark
that General Hardee refers to his still being in communication with
his department. This language he thought would deceive me; but I
am confirmed in the belief that the route to which he refers (the
Union Plank-road on the South Carolina shore) is inadequate to feed
his army and the people of Savannah, and General Foster assures me
that he has his force on that very road, near the head of Broad
River, so that cars no longer run between Charleston and Savannah.
We hold this end of the Charleston Railroad, and have destroyed it
from the three-mile post back to the bridge (about twelve miles).
In anticipation of leaving this country, I am continuing the
destruction of their railroads, and at this moment have two
divisions and the cavalry at work breaking up the Gulf Railroad
from the Ogeechee to the Altamaha; so that, even if I do not take
Savannah, I will leave it in a bad way. But I still hope that
events will give me time to take Savannah, even if I have to
assault with some loss. I am satisfied that, unless we take it,
the gunboats never will, for they can make no impression upon the
batteries which guard every approach from the sea. I have a faint
belief that, when Colonel Babcock reaches you, you will delay
operations long enough to enable me to succeed here. With Savannah
in our possession, at some future time if not now, we can punish
South Carolina as she deserves, and as thousands of the people in
Georgia hoped we would do. I do sincerely believe that the whole
United States, North and South, would rejoice to have this army
turned loose on South Carolina, to devastate that State in the
manner we have done in Georgia, and it would have a direst and
immediate bearing on your campaign in Virginia.
I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General United States Army.
As soon as the army had reached Savannah, and had opened
communication with the fleet, I endeavored to ascertain what had
transpired in Tennessee since our departure. We received our
letters and files of newspapers, which contained full accounts of
all the events there up to about the 1st of December. As before
described, General Hood had three full corps of infantry--S. D.
Lee's, A. P. Stewart's, and Cheatham's, at Florence, Alabama--with
Forrest's corps of cavalry, numbering in the aggregate about
forty-five thousand men. General Thomas was in Nashville, Tennessee,
quietly engaged in reorganizing his army out of the somewhat broken
forces at his disposal. He had posted his only two regular corps,
the Fourth and Twenty-third, under the general command of
Major-General J. M. Schofield, at Pulaski, directly in front of
Florence, with the three brigades of cavalry (Hatch, Croxton, and
Capron), commanded by Major-General Wilson, watching closely for
Hood's initiative.
This force aggregated about thirty thousand men, was therefore
inferior to the enemy; and General Schofield was instructed, in
case the enemy made a general advance, to fall back slowly toward
Nashville, fighting, till he should be reenforced by General Thomas
in person. Hood's movement was probably hurried by reason of my
advance into Georgia; for on the 17th his infantry columns marched
from Florence in the direction of Waynesboro', turning, Schofield's
position at Pulaski. The latter at once sent his trains to the
rear, and on the 21st fell back to Columbia, Tennessee. General
Hood followed up this movement, skirmished lightly with Schofield
at Columbia, began the passage of Duck River, below the town, and
Cheatham's corps reached the vicinity of Spring Hill, whither
General Schofield had sent General Stanley, with two of his
divisions, to cover the movement of his trains. During the night
of November 29th General Schofield passed Spring Hill with his
trains and army, and took post at Franklin, on the south aide of
Harpeth River. General Hood now attaches serious blame to General
Cheatham for not attacking General Schofield in flank while in
motion at Spring Hill, for he was bivouacked within eight hundred
yards of the road at the time of the passage of our army. General
Schofield reached Franklin on the morning of November 30th, and
posted his army in front of the town, where some
rifle-intrenchments had been constructed in advance. He had the
two corps of Stanley and Cox (Fourth and Twenty-third), with
Wilson's cavalry on his flanks, and sent his trains behind the
Harpeth.
General Hood closed upon him the same day, and assaulted his
position with vehemence, at one time breaking the line and wounding
General Stanley seriously; but our men were veterans, cool and
determined, and fought magnificently. The rebel officers led their
men in person to the several persistent assaults, continuing the
battle far into the night, when they drew off, beaten and
discomfited.
Their loss was very severe, especially in general officers; among
them Generals Cleburn and Adams, division commanders. Hood's loss
on that day was afterward ascertained to be (Thomas's report):
Buried on the field, seventeen hundred and fifty; left in hospital
at Franklin, thirty-eight hundred; and seven hundred and two
prisoners captured and held: aggregate, six thousand two hundred
and fifty-two. General Schofields lose, reported officially, was
one hundred and eighty-nine killed, one thousand and thirty-three
wounded, and eleven hundred and four prisoners or missing:
aggregate, twenty-three hundred and twenty-six. The next day
General Schofield crossed the Harpeth without trouble, and fell
back to the defenses of Nashville.
Meantime General Thomas had organized the employees of the
Quartermaster's Department into a corps, commanded by the
chief-quartermaster, General J. Z. Donaldson, and placed them in the
fortifications of Nashville, under the general direction of
Major-General Z. B. Tower, now of the United States Engineers. He
had also received the two veteran divisions of the Sixteenth Corps,
under General A. J. Smith, long absent and long expected; and he
had drawn from Chattanooga and Decatur (Alabama) the divisions of
Steedman and of R. S. Granger. These, with General Schofields army
and about ten thousand good cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson,
constituted a strong army, capable not only of defending Nashville,
but of beating Hood in the open field. Yet Thomas remained inside
of Nashville, seemingly passive, until General Hood had closed upon
him and had entrenched his position.
General Thomas had furthermore held fast to the railroad leading
from Nashville to Chattanooga, leaving strong guards at its
principal points, as at Murfreesboro', Deckerd, Stevenson,
Bridgeport, Whitesides, and Chattanooga. At Murfreesboro' the
division of Rousseau was reenforced and strengthened up to about
eight thousand men.
At that time the weather was cold and sleety, the ground was
covered with ice and snow, and both parties for a time rested on
the defensive. Those matters stood at Nashville, while we were
closing down on Savannah, in the early part of December, 1864; and
the country, as well as General Grant, was alarmed at the seeming
passive conduct of General Thomas; and General Grant at one time
considered the situation so dangerous that he thought of going to
Nashville in person, but General John A. Logan, happening to be at
City Point, was sent out to supersede General Thomas; luckily for
the latter, he acted in time, gained a magnificent victory, and
thus escaped so terrible a fate.
On the 18th of December, at my camp by the side of the plank-road,
eight miles back of Savannah, I received General Hardee's letter
declining to surrender, when nothing remained but to assault. The
ground was difficult, and, as all former assaults had proved so
bloody, I concluded to make one more effort to completely surround
Savannah on all aides, so as further to excite Hardee's fears, and,
in case of success, to capture the whole of his army. We had
already completely invested the place on the north, west, and
south, but there remained to the enemy, on the east, the use of the
old dike or plank-road leading into South Carolina, and I knew that
Hardee would have a pontoon-bridge across the river. On examining
my maps, I thought that the division of John P. Hatch, belonging to
General Fosters command, might be moved from its then position at
Broad River, by water, down to Bluffton, from which it could reach
this plank-road, fortify and hold it--at some risk, of course,
because Hardee could avail himself of his central position to fall
on this detachment with his whole army. I did not want to make a
mistake like "Ball's Bluff" at that period of the war; so, taking
one or two of my personal staff, I rode back to Grog's Bridge,
leaving with Generals Howard and Slocum orders to make all
possible preparations, but not to attack, during my two or three
days' absence; and there I took a boat for Wassaw Sound, whence
Admiral Dahlgren conveyed me in his own boat (the Harvest Moon) to
Hilton Head, where I represented the matter to General Foster, and
he promptly agreed to give his personal attention to it. During
the night of the 20th we started back, the wind blowing strong,
Admiral Dahlgren ordered the pilot of the Harvest Moon to run into
Tybee, and to work his way through to Wassaw Sound and the Ogeechee
River by the Romney Marshes. We were caught by a low tide and
stuck in the mud. After laboring some time, the admiral ordered
out his barge; in it we pulled through this intricate and shallow
channel, and toward evening of December 21st we discovered, coming
toward us, a tug, called the Red Legs, belonging to the
Quarter-master's Department, with a staff-officer on board, bearing
letters from Colonel Dayton to myself and the admiral, reporting that
the city of Savannah had been found evacuated on the morning of
December 21st, and was then in our possession. General Hardee had
crossed the Savannah River by a pontoon-bridge, carrying off his men
and light artillery, blowing up his iron-clads and navy-yard, but
leaving for us all the heavy guns, stores, cotton, railway-cars,
steamboats, and an immense amount of public and private property.
Admiral Dahlgren concluded to go toward a vessel (the Sonoma) of his
blockading fleet, which lay at anchor near Beaulieu, and I
transferred to the Red Legs, and hastened up the Ogeechee River to
Grog's Bridge, whence I rode to my camp that same night. I there
learned that, early on the morning of December 21st, the skirmishers
had detected the absence of the enemy, and had occupied his lines
simultaneously along their whole extent; but the left flank (Slocum),
especially Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps, claimed to have
been the first to reach the heart of the city.
Generals Slocum and Howard moved their headquarters at once into
the city, leaving the bulk of their troops in camps outside. On
the morning of December 22d I followed with my own headquarters,
and rode down Bull Street to the custom-house, from the roof of
which we had an extensive view over the city, the river, and the
vast extent of marsh and rice-fields on the South Carolina side.
The navy-yard, and the wreck of the iron-clad ram Savannah, were
still smouldering, but all else looked quiet enough. Turning back,
we rode to the Pulaski Hotel, which I had known in years long gone,
and found it kept by a Vermont man with a lame leg, who used to be
a clerk in the St. Louis Hotel, New Orleans, and I inquired about
the capacity of his hotel for headquarters. He was very anxious to
have us for boarders, but I soon explained to him that we had a
full mess equipment along, and that we were not in the habit of
paying board; that one wing of the building would suffice for our
use, while I would allow him to keep an hotel for the accommodation
of officers and gentlemen in the remainder. I then dispatched an
officer to look around for a livery-stable that could accommodate
our horses, and, while waiting there, an English gentleman, Mr.
Charles Green, came and said that he had a fine house completely
furnished, for which he had no use, and offered it as headquarters.
He explained, moreover, that General Howard had informed him, the
day before, that I would want his house for headquarters. At first
I felt strongly disinclined to make use of any private dwelling,
lest complaints should arise of damage and lose of furniture, and
so expressed myself to Mr. Green; but, after riding about the city,
and finding his house so spacious, so convenient, with large yard
and stabling, I accepted his offer, and occupied that house during
our stay in Savannah. He only reserved for himself the use of a
couple of rooms above the dining-room, and we had all else, and a
most excellent house it was in all respects.
I was disappointed that Hardee had escaped with his army, but on
the whole we had reason to be content with the substantial fruits
of victory. The Savannah River was found to be badly obstructed by
torpedoes, and by log piers stretched across the channel below the
city, which piers were filled with the cobble stones that formerly
paved the streets. Admiral Dahlgren was extremely active, visited
me repeatedly in the city, while his fleet still watched
Charleston, and all the avenues, for the blockade-runners that
infested the coast, which were notoriously owned and managed by
Englishmen, who used the island of New Providence (Nassau) as a
sort of entrepot. One of these small blockade-runners came into
Savannah after we were in full possession, and the master did not
discover his mistake till he came ashore to visit the custom-house.
Of coarse his vessel fell a prize to the navy. A heavy force was
at once set to work to remove the torpedoes and obstructions in the
main channel of the river, and, from that time forth, Savannah
became the great depot of supply for the troops operating in that
quarter.
Meantime, on the 15th and 16th of December, were fought, in front
of Nashville, the great battles in which General Thomas so nobly
fulfilled his promise to ruin Hood, the details of which are fully
given in his own official reports, long-since published. Rumors of
these great victories reached us at Savannah by piecemeal, but his
official report came on the 24th of December, with a letter from
General Grant, giving in general terms the events up to the 18th,
and I wrote at once through my chief of staff, General Webster, to
General Thomas, complimenting him in the highest terms. His
brilliant victory at Nashville was necessary to mine at Savannah to
make a complete whole, and this fact was perfectly comprehended by
Mr. Lincoln, who recognized it fully in his personal letter of
December 26th, hereinbefore quoted at length, and which is also
claimed at the time, in my Special Field Order No. 6, of January 8,
1865, here given:
(Special Field Order No. 6.)
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 8, 1864.
The general commanding announces to the troops composing the
Military Division of the Mississippi that he has received from the
President of the United States, and from Lieutenant-General Grant,
letters conveying their high sense and appreciation of the campaign
just closed, resulting in the capture of Savannah and the defeat of
Hood's army in Tennessee.
In order that all may understand the importance of events, it is
proper to revert to the situation of affairs in September last. We
held Atlanta, a city of little value to us, but so important to the
enemy that Mr. Davis, the head of the rebellious faction in the
South, visited his army near Palmetto, and commanded it to regain
the place and also to ruin and destroy us, by a series of measures
which he thought would be effectual. That army, by a rapid march,
gained our railroad near Big Shanty, and afterward about Dalton.
We pursued it, but it moved so rapidly that we could not overtake
it, and General Hood led his army successfully far over toward
Mississippi, in hope to decoy us out of Georgia. But we were not
thus to be led away by him, and preferred to lead and control
events ourselves. Generals Thomas and Schofield, commanding the
departments to our rear, returned to their posts and prepared to
decoy General Hood into their meshes, while we came on to complete
the original journey. We quietly and deliberately destroyed
Atlanta, and all the railroads which the enemy had used to carry on
war against us, occupied his State capital, and then captured his
commercial capital, which had been so strongly fortified from the
sea as to defy approach from that quarter. Almost at the moment of
our victorious entry into Savannah came the welcome and expected
news that our comrades in Tennessee had also fulfilled nobly and
well their part, had decoyed General Hood to Nashville and then
turned on him, defeating his army thoroughly, capturing all his
artillery, great numbers of prisoners, and were still pursuing the
fragments down in Alabama. So complete success in military
operations, extending over half a continent, is an achievement that
entitles it to a place in the military history of the world. The
armies serving in Georgia and Tennessee, as well as the local
garrisons of Decatur, Bridgeport, Chattanooga, and Murfreesboro',
are alike entitled to the common honors, and each regiment may
inscribe on its colors, at pleasure, the word "Savannah" or
"Nashville." The general commanding embraces, in the same general
success, the operations of the cavalry under Generals Stoneman,
Burbridge, and Gillem, that penetrated into Southwest Virginia, and
paralyzed the efforts of the enemy to disturb the peace and safety
of East Tennessee. Instead of being put on the defensive, we have
at all points assumed the bold offensive, and have completely
thwarted the designs of the enemies of our country.
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,
L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.
Here terminated the "March to the Sea," and I only add a few
letters, selected out of many, to illustrate the general feeling of
rejoicing throughout the country at the time. I only regarded the
march from Atlanta to Savannah as a "shift of base," as the
transfer of a strong army, which had no opponent, and had finished
its then work, from the interior to a point on the sea-coast, from
which it could achieve other important results. I considered this
march as a means to an end, and not as an essential act of war.
Still, then, as now, the march to the sea was generally regarded as
something extraordinary, something anomalous, something out of the
usual order of events; whereas, in fact, I simply moved from
Atlanta to Savannah, as one step in the direction of Richmond, a
movement that had to be met and defeated, or the war was
necessarily at an end.
Were I to express my measure of the relative importance of the
march to the sea, and of that from Savannah northward, I would
place the former at one, and the latter at ten, or the maximum.
I now close this long chapter by giving a tabular statement of the
losses during the march, and the number of prisoners captured. The
property captured consisted of horses and mules by the thousand,
and of quantities of subsistence stores that aggregate very large,
but may be measured with sufficient accuracy by assuming that
sixty-five thousand men obtained abundant food for about forty
days, and thirty-five thousand animals were fed for a like period,
so as to reach Savannah in splendid flesh and condition. I also
add a few of the more important letters that passed between
Generals Grant, Halleck, and myself, which illustrate our opinions
at that stage of the war:
STATEMENT OF CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE ARMY IN THE
FIELD, CAMPAIGN OF GEORGIA.
Killed Wounded Missing Captured
Officers/Men Officers/Men Officers/Men Officers/Men
10 93 24 404 1 277 77 1,261
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, December 16, 1864
Major-General SHERMAN (via Hilton Head).
GENERAL: Lieutenant-General Grant informs me that, in his last
dispatch sent to you, he suggested the transfer of your infantry to
Richmond. He now wishes me to say that you will retain your entire
force, at least for the present, and, with such assistance as may
be given you by General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, operate from
such base as you may establish on the coast. General Foster will
obey such instructions as may be given by you.
Should you have captured Savannah, it is thought that by
transferring the water-batteries to the land side that place may be
made a good depot and base of operations on Augusta, Branchville,
or Charleston. If Savannah should not be captured, or if captured
and not deemed suitable for this purpose, perhaps Beaufort would
serve as a depot. As the rebels have probably removed their most
valuable property from Augusta, perhaps Branchville would be the
most important point at which to strike in order to sever all
connection between Virginia and the Southwestern Railroad.
General Grant's wishes, however, are, that this whole matter of
your future actions should be entirely left to your discretion.
We can send you from here a number of complete batteries of
field-artillery, with or without horses, as you may desire; also, as
soon as General Thomas can spare them, all the fragments,
convalescents, and furloughed men of your army. It is reported that
Thomas defeated Hood yesterday, near Nashville, but we have no
particulars nor official reports, telegraphic communication being
interrupted by a heavy storm.
Our last advises from you was General Howard's note, announcing his
approach to Savannah. Yours truly,
H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, December 18, 1864.
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah (via Hilton Head).
My DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 13th, by Major Anderson, is just
received. I congratulate you on your splendid success, and shall
very soon expect to hear of the crowning work of your campaign--the
capture of Savannah. Your march will stand out prominently as the
great one of this great war. When Savannah falls, then for another
wide swath through the centre of the Confederacy. But I will not
anticipate. General Grant is expected here this morning, and will
probably write you his own views.
I do not learn from your letter, or from Major Anderson, that you
are in want of any thing which we have not provided at Hilton Head.
Thinking it probable that you might want more field-artillery, I
had prepared several batteries, but the great difficulty of
foraging horses on the sea-coast will prevent our sending any
unless you actually need them. The hay-crop this year is short,
and the Quartermaster's Department has great difficulty in
procuring a supply for our animals.
General Thomas has defeated Hood, near Nashville, and it is hoped
that he will completely, crush his army. Breckenridge, at last
accounts, was trying to form a junction near Murfreesboro', but, as
Thomas is between them, Breckenridge must either retreat or be
defeated.
General Rosecrans made very bad work of it in Missouri, allowing
Price with a small force to overrun the State and destroy millions
of property.
Orders have been issued for all officers and detachments having
three months or more to serve, to rejoin your army via Savannah.
Those having less than three months to serve, will be retained by
General Thomas.
Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by some accident the
place may be destroyed, and, if a little salt should be sown upon
its site, it may prevent the growth of future crops of
nullification and secession.
Yours truly,
H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, December 18, 1864.
To Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.
My DEAR GENERAL: I have just received and read, I need not tell you
with how mush gratification, your letter to General Halleck. I
congratulate you and the brave officers and men under your command
on the successful termination of your most brilliant campaign. I
never had a doubt of the result. When apprehensions for your
safety were expressed by the President, I assured him with the army
you had, and you in command of it, there was no danger but you
would strike bottom on salt-water some place; that I would not feel
the same security--in fact, would not have intrusted the expedition
to any other living commander.
It has been very hard work to get Thomas to attack Hood. I gave
him the most peremptory order, and had started to go there myself,
before he got off. He has done magnificently, however, since he
started. Up to last night, five thousand prisoners and forty-nine
pieces of captured artillery, besides many wagons and innumerable
small-arms, had been received in Nashville. This is exclusive of
the enemy's loss at Franklin, which amounted to thirteen general
officers killed, wounded, and captured. The enemy probably lost
five thousand men at Franklin, and ten thousand in the last three
days' operations. Breckenridge is said to be making for
Murfreesboro'.
I think he is in a most excellent place. Stoneman has nearly wiped
out John Morgan's old command, and five days ago entered Bristol.
I did think the best thing to do was to bring the greater part of
your army here, and wipe out Lee. The turn affairs now seem to be
taking has shaken me in that opinion. I doubt whether you may not
accomplish more toward that result where you are than if brought
here, especially as I am informed, since my arrival in the city,
that it would take about two months to get you here with all the
other calls there are for ocean transportation.
I want to get your views about what ought to be done, and what can
be done. If you capture the garrison of Savannah, it certainly
will compel Lee to detach from Richmond, or give us nearly the
whole South. My own opinion is that Lee is averse to going out of
Virginia, and if the cause of the South is lost he wants Richmond
to be the last place surrendered. If he has such views, it may be
well to indulge him until we get every thing else in our hands.
Congratulating you and the army again upon the splendid results of
your campaign, the like of which is not read of in past history, I
subscribe myself, more than ever, if possible, your friend,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 26, 1864.
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah, Georgia.
GENERAL: Your very interesting letter of the 22d inst., brought by
Major Grey of General Foster's staff; is fast at hand. As the
major starts back at once, I can do no more at present than simply
acknowledge its receipt. The capture of Savannah, with all its
immense stores, must tell upon the people of the South. All well
here.
Yours truly,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 24, 1864.
Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.
GENERAL: Your letter of December 18th is just received. I feel
very much gratified at receiving the handsome commendation you pay
my army. I will, in general orders, convey to the officers and men
the substance of your note.
I am also pleased that you have modified your former orders, for I
feared that the transportation by sea would very much disturb the
unity and morale of my army, now so perfect.
The occupation of Savannah, which I have heretofore reported,
completes the first part of our game, and fulfills a great part of
your instructions; and we are now engaged in dismantling the rebel
forts which bear upon the sea-channels, and transferring the heavy
ordnance and ammunition to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, where they
can be more easily guarded than if left in the city.
The rebel inner lines are well adapted to our purpose, and with
slight modifications can be held by a comparatively small force;
and in about ten days I expect to be ready to sally forth again. I
feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. I have thought them
over so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight. I
left Augusta untouched on purpose, because the enemy will be in
doubt as to my objective point, after we cross the Savannah River,
whether it be Augusta or Charleston, and will naturally divide his
forces. I will then move either on Branchville or Colombia, by any
curved line that gives us the best supplies, breaking up in our
course as much railroad as possible; then, ignoring Charleston and
Augusta both, I would occupy Columbia and Camden, pausing there
long enough to observe the effect. I would then strike for the
Charleston & Wilmington Railroad, somewhere between the Santee and
Cape Fear Rivers, and, if possible, communicate with the fleet
under Admiral Dahlgren (whom I find a most agreeable gentleman,
accommodating himself to our wishes and plans). Then I would favor
an attack on Wilmington, in the belief that Porter and Butler will
fail in their present undertaking. Charleston is now a mere
desolated wreck, and is hardly worth the time it would take to
starve it out. Still, I am aware that, historically and
politically, much importance is attached to the place, and it may
be that, apart from its military importance, both you and the
Administration may prefer I should give it more attention; and it
would be well for you to give me some general idea on that subject,
for otherwise I would treat it as I have expressed, as a point of
little importance, after all its railroads leading into the
interior have been destroyed or occupied by us. But, on the
hypothesis of ignoring Charleston and taking Wilmington, I would
then favor a movement direct on Raleigh. The game is then up with
Lee, unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you and fights me; in
which case I should reckon on your being on his heels. Now that
Hood is used up by Thomas, I feel disposed to bring the matter to
an issue as quick as possible. I feel confident that I can break
up the whole railroad system of South Carolina and North Carolina,
and be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the time
spring fairly opens; and, if you feel confident that you can whip
Lee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident that I
can handle him in the open country.
One reason why I would ignore Charleston is this: that I believe
Hardee will reduce the garrison to a small force, with plenty of
provisions; I know that the neck back of Charleston can be made
impregnable to assault, and we will hardly have time for siege
operations.
I will have to leave in Savannah a garrison, and, if Thomas can
spare them, I would like to have all detachments, convalescents,
etc., belonging to these four corps, sent forward at once. I do
not want to cripple Thomas, because I regard his operations as
all-important, and I have ordered him to pursue Hood down into
Alabama, trusting to the country for supplies.
I reviewed one of my corps to-day, and shall continue to review the
whole army. I do not like to boast, but believe this army has a
confidence in itself that makes it almost invincible. I wish you
could run down and see us; it would have a good effect, and show to
both armies that they are acting on a common plan. The weather is
now cool and pleasant, and the general health very good. Your true
friend,
W. T. SHERMAN Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 24, 1864.
Major-General H. W. HALLECK, Chief-of-Staff; Washington, D. C.
GENERAL: I had the pleasure of receiving your two letters of the
16th and 18th instant to-day, and feel more than usually flattered
by the high encomiums you have passed on our recent campaign, which
is now complete by the occupation of Savannah.
I am also very glad that General Grant has changed his mind about
embarking my troops for James River, leaving me free to make the
broad swath you describe through South and North Carolina; and
still more gratified at the news from Thomas, in Tennessee, because
it fulfills my plans, which contemplated his being able to dispose
of Hood, in case he ventured north of the Tennessee River. So, I
think, on the whole, I can chuckle over Jeff. Davis's
disappointment in not turning my Atlanta campaign into a "Moscow
disaster."
I have just finished a long letter to General Grant, and have
explained to him that we are engaged in shifting our base from the
Ogeeohee to the Savannah River, dismantling all the forts made by
the enemy to bear upon the salt-water channels, transferring the
heavy ordnance, etc., to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, and in
remodeling the enemy's interior lines to suit our future plans and
purposes. I have also laid down the programme for a campaign which
I can make this winter, and which will put me in the spring on the
Roanoke, in direct communication with General Grant on James River.
In general terms, my plan is to turn over to General Foster the
city of Savannah, to sally forth with my army resupplied, cross the
Savannah, feign on Charleston and Augusta, but strike between,
breaking en route the Charleston & Augusta Railroad, also a large
part of that from Branchville and Camden toward North Carolina, and
then rapidly to move for some point of the railroad from Charleston
to Wilmington, between the Santee and Cape Fear Rivers; then,
communicating with the fleet in the neighborhood of Georgetown, I
would turn upon Wilmington or Charleston, according to the
importance of either. I rather prefer Wilmington, as a live place,
over Charleston, which is dead and unimportant when its railroad
communications are broken. I take it for granted that the present
movement on Wilmington will fail. If I should determine to take
Charleston, I would turn across the country (which I have hunted
over many a time) from Santee to Mount Pleasant, throwing one wing
on the peninsula between the Ashley and Cooper. After
accomplishing one or other of these ends, I would make a bee-line
for Raleigh or Weldon, when Lee world be forced to come out of
Richmond, or acknowledge himself beaten. He would, I think, by the
use of the Danville Railroad, throw himself rapidly between me and
Grant, leaving Richmond in the hands of the latter. This would not
alarm me, for I have an army which I think can maneuver, and I
world force him to attack me at a disadvantage, always under the
supposition that Grant would be on his heels; and, if the worst
come to the worst, I can fight my way down to Albermarle Sound, or
Newbern.
I think the time has come now when we should attempt the boldest
moves, and my experience is, that they are easier of execution than
more timid ones, because the enemy is disconcerted by them--as, for
instance, my recent campaign.
I also doubt the wisdom of concentration beyond a certain extent,
for the roads of this country limit the amount of men that can be
brought to bear in any one battle, and I do not believe that any
one general can handle more than sixty thousand men in battle.
I think our campaign of the last month, as well as every step I
take from this point northward, is as much a direct attack upon
Lee's army as though we were operating within the sound of his
artillery.
I am very anxious that Thomas should follow up his success to the
very utmost point. My orders to him before I left Kingston were,
after beating Hood, to follow him as far as Columbus, Mississippi,
or Selma, Alabama, both of which lie in districts of country which
are rich in corn and meat.
I attach more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy's
country, because this war differs from European wars in this
particular: we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile
people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard
hand of war, as well as their organized armies. I know that this
recent movement of mine through Georgia has had a wonderful effect
in this respect. Thousands who had been deceived by their lying
newspapers to believe that we were being whipped all the time now
realize the truth, and have no appetite for a repetition of the
same experience. To be sure, Jeff. Davis has his people under
pretty good discipline, but I think faith in him is much shaken in
Georgia, and before we have done with her South Carolina will not
be quite so tempestuous.
I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and do not think
"salt" will be necessary. When I move, the Fifteenth Corps will be
on the right of the right wing, and their position will naturally
bring them into Charleston first; and, if you have watched the
history of that corps, you will have remarked that they generally
do their work pretty well. The truth is, the whole army is burning
with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina.
I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that
seems in store for her.
Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why we did not go to
South Carolina; and, when I answered that we were enroute for that
State, the invariable reply was, "Well, if you will make those
people feel the utmost severities of war, we will pardon you for
your desolation of Georgia."
I look upon Colombia as quite as bad as Charleston, and I doubt if
we shall spare the public buildings there as we did at
Milledgeville.
I have been so busy lately that I have not yet made my official
report, and I think I had better wait until I get my subordinate
reports before attempting it, as I am anxious to explain clearly
not only the reasons for every step, but the amount of execution
done, and this I cannot do until I get the subordinate reports; for
we marched the whole distance in four or more columns, and, of
course, I could only be present with one, and generally that one
engaged in destroying railroads. This work of destruction was
performed better than usual, because I had an engineer-regiment,
provided with claws to twist the bars after being heated. Such
bars can never be used again, and the only way in which a railroad
line can be reconstructed across Georgia is, to make a new road
from Fairburn Station (twenty-four miles southwest of Atlanta) to
Madison, a distance of one hundred miles; and, before that can be
done, I propose to be on the road from Augusta to Charleston, which
is a continuation of the same. I felt somewhat disappointed at
Hardee's escape, but really am not to blame. I moved as quickly as
possible to close up the "Union Causeway," but intervening
obstacles were such that, before I could get troops on the road,
Hardee had slipped out. Still, I know that the men that were in
Savannah will be lost in a measure to Jeff. Davis, for the Georgia
troops, under G. W. Smith, declared they would not fight in South
Carolina, and they have gone north, en route for Augusta, and I
have reason to believe the North Carolina troops have gone to
Wilmington; in other words, they are scattered. I have reason to
believe that Beauregard was present in Savannah at the time of its
evacuation, and think that he and Hardee are now in Charleston,
making preparations for what they suppose will be my next step.
Please say to the President that I have received his kind message
(through Colonel Markland), and feel thankful for his high favor.
If I disappoint him in the future, it shall not be from want of
zeal or love to the cause.
From you I expect a full and frank criticism of my plans for the
future, which may enable me to correct errors before it is too
late. I do not wish to be rash, but want to give my rebel friends
no chance to accuse us of want of enterprise or courage.
Assuring you of my high personal respect, I remain, as ever, your
friend,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
[General Order No. 3.]
WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON, January 14, 1865.
The following resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives
is published to the army:
[PUBLIC RESOLUTION--No. 4.]
Joint resolution tendering the thanks of the people and of Congress
to Major-General William T. Sherman, and the officers and soldiers
of his command, for their gallant conduct in their late brilliant
movement through Georgia.
Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the thanks of
the people and of the Congress of the United States are due and are
hereby tendered to Major-General William T. Sherman, and through
him to the officers and men under his command, for their gallantry
and good conduct in their late campaign from Chattanooga to
Atlanta, and the triumphal march thence through Georgia to
Savannah, terminating in the capture and occupation of that city;
and that the President cause a copy of this joint resolution to be
engrossed and forwarded to Major-General Sherman.
Approved, January 10, 1865.
By order of the Secretary of War,
W. A. NICHOLS, Assistant Adjutant-General.