You will not be the first Jury empanelled in this great country
who will have to come to your decision with unreasonable speed.
The proceedings have been so interesting that I cannot hope to do
them justice; but I will merely go over, as far as I can, the main
features of the case, and then my duty will be to leave it to you.
First of all, it should be remembered, because it is indeed included
in what is referred to as the Official Record——
A SPECTATOR: Louder, please.
JUDGE: I am speaking to the Jury. If you think you can hang
that man for us, you are mistaken.—I say it is included even in the
Official Record by an indirect admission that we owe a great deal of
information that we have heard this evening to a man of letters. I
must therefore ask the Gentlemen of the Jury to put themselves for
one moment in the position of such a person. You must forget that you
are solid and good citizens summoned to decide a serious matter, nay,
I must forget that I am an experienced Judge seated on this Bench for
many years; and we must all try to think—both the Jury and myself—try
to think we are authors. Supposing that to be the case, it is all the
easier, of course, to imagine oneself the author of a crime. I will,
therefore, very rapidly divide up the evidence, as I see it, on the
two sides, and then leave the matter to you.
I need not tell you how serious is the issue put before you. If it
were only the solemnity of ending the Mystery of Edwin Drood it would
be almost as solemn as that of ending a human life, but if any doubt
exists in your minds at all as to whether the Mystery of Edwin Drood
has been solved by the prosecution, you must permit the prisoner
in the dock to go forth, even if from a merely personal study of
his countenance you think he is going forth to murder other people.
Unless the prosecution has convinced you that the Mystery is at an
end, you have no right to convict him, and he has the right to the
benefit of the doubt.
The next thing necessary clearly to distinguish is the evidence of
the two principal witnesses. The others were rather entertainers
than witnesses. There were two very genuine witnesses, one of whom
perjured himself or herself—that is to say, would have done so had we
permitted profanity to enter into these proceedings. I want to say
one thing about that. It is a remarkable fact, and in that point the
Jury ought to really fairly balance their minds, because there is a
case for possible perjury in both instances. So horrible a crime as
perjury can only be committed either from a very low or a very high
motive. The character of Mr. Bazzard, as revealed by himself with
picturesque clearness, appears to me an entertaining and attractive
but, shall I say? not a saintly character, and it appears to me to
be arguable that he might possibly tell a lie from general amusement
at the absurd way in which the world is run. On the other hand, it
is admitted, I think, for Miss Landless that though she would not
tell a lie or forswear herself for money, she might conceivably do
it as counting religious observance beneath some affection she had
for her brother. I therefore put it to the Jury as possible that
both are liars. But I should distinguish between their motives if
I were writing a spiritual treatise. It is tenable in both cases.
Undoubtedly if one is telling the truth the other is lying.
About the wearing of a wig, I think the point has been somewhat
unduly pressed on one side. I think it is a strong argument for
Datchery being Helena Landless, but not a very strong one that she
feels the weight of the wig. I suppose there are many of us here
this evening who have been not unconscious of the discomfort of
wearing a wig when you have too much hair already. So I should not
press forward the argument that it must have been a woman’s hair—or
I should not press it too far. Edwin Drood is represented in the
picture as having monstrously long hair—but that does not concern us
here. I think it should be conceded as a point, but not a very great
point, to the prosecution. We come to the second broad distinction
which amounts to this: that very few of the witnesses, and I daresay
very few of the Jurymen, are acquainted with the proper use and
enjoyment of two substances, one of which is opium, and the other
quicklime. Most of us, I conceive, indulge in these things, if at
all, in great moderation, but anyhow, a great deal depends upon
the operation of these two things; and it appears to me on that
point that the whole of this Court, not having called any expert
evidence, either of morphia maniacs, or of persons partially buried
in quicklime, (who are, I imagine a select class)—as the trial has
not called any kind of technical evidence about the effects of these
things, I think it my duty to put it to the Jury that they must
reserve their judgment and allow a wide space for human ignorance
about the effects of these things. I certainly do not know how quick
opium confuses the mind, or how quick quicklime destroys the body,
and if the Jury know it, I, in the best traditions of the Bench and
Bar, command that they dismiss it from their minds.
We have placed in front of us two allegations. On the one side it is
alleged by the prosecution that there is, after all is said and done,
a very strong argument for the death of Drood, in the fact that he
did not return; it is alleged by the defence that you have an even
stronger argument against any theory of the murder of Edwin Drood,
because, again, he did not return, even as a corpse. “If he is dead,”
says the defence, “where is the corpse?” “If he is alive,” says the
prosecution, “where is he?” That, I think, is a fair summary of the
arguments, and it is obvious that if you come to think it out, these
two theories depend on those two suppositions. Is it possible for
opium to make a person half commit a murder? or Is it possible for
quicklime so to destroy all traces, including buttons, and so that
the disappearance of the body is evidence of the murder? That is
the question I shall leave entirely to you—as to whether there is
enough of what I may truly call “quicklime evidence” to warrant you
regarding Jasper as a real murderer, or enough of “opium evidence” to
warrant you saying that it was a visionary or dream murder. Those,
I should say, would be the broad lines on which you have to decide.
For the rest, you have to be answerable to the highest conceivable
Authority as to how you deal with a very fascinating romance.
Gentlemen of the Jury, you will retire and consider your verdict.
[THE VERDICT.]
Immediately his Lordship had concluded, the Foreman of the Jury rose
and said:
MY LORD,—I am happy to be able to announce to your Lordship
that we, following the tradition and practice of British Juries, have
arranged our verdict in the luncheon interval. I should explain,
my Lord, that it undoubtedly presented itself to us as a point of
extraordinary difficulty in this case, that a man should disappear
absolutely and completely, having cut off all communication with his
friends in Cloisterham; but having seen and heard the society and
conversation of Cloisterham here in Court to-day, we no longer feel
the slightest surprise at that. Now, under the influence of that
observation, my Lord, the more extreme characters, if they will allow
me to say so, in this Jury, were at first inclined to find a verdict
of Not Guilty, because there was no evidence of a murder having been
committed; but on the other hand, the calmer and more judicious
spirits among us felt that to allow a man who had committed a
cold-blooded murder of which his own nephew was the victim, to leave
the dock absolutely unpunished, was a proceeding which would probably
lead to our all being murdered in our beds. And so you will be glad
to learn that the spirit of compromise and moderation prevailed, and
we find the prisoner guilty of Manslaughter.
We recommend him most earnestly to your Lordship’s mercy, whilst at
the same time begging your Lordship to remember that the protection
of the lives of the community is in your hands, and begging you not
to allow any sentimental consideration to deter you from applying the
law in its utmost vigour.
MR. WALTERS: I should like to urge that the Jury be
discharged for not having performed their duties in the proper spirit
of the law. We have heard from the Foreman that the verdict was
arranged in advance, and I decline to accept that verdict, and ask
for your Lordship’s ruling.
THE FOREMAN: The Jury, like all British Juries, will be only
too delighted to be discharged at the earliest moment: the sooner the
better.
MR. CHESTERTON: I want to associate myself with my learned
friend.
JUDGE: My decision is that everybody here, except myself, be
committed for Contempt of Court. Off you all go to prison without any
trial whatever!
* * * * *
The Court rose at 11.35, the actual hearing having occupied four
hours and twenty minutes.