of the page, in bold type, that it is the first duty of the United
States to annex Canada. On the other hand, one hears the opinion that
nothing could be worse for the United States than to receive this
immense, thinly populated territory even as a gift. There are the same
differences of opinion on the other side of the boundary; some say that
the Canadians are glad to be free from the problems which face the
United States, from its municipal politics, its boss rule in political
parties, and from the negro and Philippine questions, and that Canadian
fidelity to the English Crown is not to be doubted for a moment. While
others admit quite openly that to be annexed to the United States is the
only natural thing that can happen to Canada. The immediate future will
probably see some sort of compromise. It is wholly unlikely that the
eastern part of Canada, in view of all its traditions, will prove untrue
to its mother country; whereas the western part of Canada is under
somewhat different economic conditions; it has so different a history,
and is to-day so much more closely related to the United States than to
England that the political separation will hardly continue very long.
The thousands who have gone from the United States across the Canadian
frontier in order to settle the unpeopled Northwest will, in the not
distant future, give rise to some occasion in which economic and
political logic will decree a transfer of the allegiance of Western
Canada, with the exception of a narrow strip of land along the Pacific
Coast. The area of the United States would then include a new region of
about 250 million acres of wheat lands, of which to-day hardly two
millions are in cultivation.
The Canadian problem, of course, arose neither to-day nor yesterday. The
first permanent colony in Canada was a French colony, begun in the year
1604. Frenchmen founded Quebec in the year 1608, and French settlements
developed along the St. Lawrence River. In the year 1759 General Wolfe
conquered Quebec for the English, and in the following year the whole of
Canada fell into their power. English and Scotch immigrants settled more
and more numerously in Upper Canada. The country was divided in 1791 in
two provinces, which were later called Ontario and Quebec; and in 1867,
by an act of the British Parliament, Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and
Nova Scotia were made into one country. A short time thereafter the
government of the new country bought the possessions of the Hudson Bay
Company, and soon afterward the large western region called Manitoba was
organized as a distinct province. In 1871 British Columbia was taken in,
and in the eighties this extensive western land was divided into four
provinces. During this time there were all sorts of interruptions, wars
with the Indians, and disputes over boundaries; but there has never been
open warfare between Canada and the United States. The many
controversies that have arisen have been settled by treaty, and a court
of arbitration met even recently in London to settle a dispute about
boundaries which for many years had occasioned much feeling. It was a
question whether the boundary of the Northwest should lie so as to leave
to Canada a way to the coast without crossing United States territory.
The boundaries were defined by the treaties as lying a certain distance
from the coast; was this coast meant to be mainland, or was it coastline
marked out by the off-lying groups of islands? This was a question of
great economic importance for a part of Canada. The court decided in
favour of the United States, but the decision does not belong on one of
the most honourable pages of American history. It had been agreed that
both England and the United States should appoint distinguished jurists
to the court of arbitration; and this the English did, while the United
States sent prejudiced politicians. This has created some embitterment
in Canada, and the mood is not to-day entirely friendly, although this
will doubtless give way in view of the great economic development which
works toward union with the United States.
Such a union would be hindered very much more by the friendly relations
existing between the United States and England. At the time when the
family quarrel between mother and daughter countries had made an open
breach, it seemed almost certain that America would take the first good
opportunity of robbing England of her Canadian possessions. Even before
the early colonies decided on revolution, they tried to draw the
northern provinces into their train. And when the new Union was formed,
it seemed a most natural thing for all English speaking inhabitants of
the American Continent to participate therein. It was no friendliness
toward England that diverted the expansion of the young country toward
the south rather than toward the north. It was rather the influence of
the Southern States of the Federation which encouraged the expansion
toward the south, because in that way their adjacent territory was
increased, and therewith the number of the slave states represented in
Congress; and the institution of slavery was thereby better protected
from Northern interference. England was the hereditary foe of the
country for an entire century, and every school boy learned from his
history book to hate England and to desire revenge. But this has been
wholly changed in recent years by the sympathy which John Bull showed
during the Spanish war, and by his far-seeing magnanimity shown on a
hundred occasions. There are already preparations making for a special
court of arbitration to sit on all Anglo-American disputes, and the mood
of the American people is certainly inclined to avoid everything that
would unnecessarily offend England. American politicians would thus
hesitate very long before attempting so bold a step as the annexation of
Canada; and thus it is that the Canadian problem gets into the programme
of neither party. Another consideration which perhaps makes a difference
is that no party is quite sure which side would be the gainer; whether
among the millions of people in the Canadian West there would be found
to be more Republicans or Democrats. Therefore, Canada is not now an
issue between the parties. Nevertheless, the problem grows more and more
important in public opinion, and however much Congress may be concerned
to avoid a war with England, and determined never deliberately to bring
about any disloyalty in Canada, we may be certain that once the American
farmers and gold miners in Northwestern Canada have set the pro-American
ball rolling, then the general mood will speedily change and the
friendly resolutions toward England which will be proposed by Senators
will sound very feeble.
The most natural desire, which seems to be wide-spread, is for
reciprocity with Canada. Both countries are aware that they are each
other’s best purchasers, and yet they put difficulties in the way of
importing each other’s products. American industry has already invested
more than $100,000,000 for branch factories in Canada, in order to avoid
duties; and the industry of New England would doubtless be much
benefited if Canadian coal might be delivered duty-free along the
Atlantic coast; nevertheless, the chief disadvantages in the present
arrangements fall to Canada. A treaty was concluded in 1854 which
guaranteed free entrance to the markets of the United States for all
Canadian natural products, and during the twelve years in which the
treaty was in force, Canadian exports increased fourfold. Then the
American protective tariff was restored; and while, for example, the
agricultural products which Canada sold to the United States in 1866
amounted to more than $25,000,000, they had decreased by the beginning
of the twentieth century to $7,367,000; and all Canadian exports to the
United States, with the exception of coin and precious metals, in spite
of the tremendous growth of both countries, had increased at the same
time only 5 per cent. Canada, on the other hand, contented herself with
modest duties, so that the commerce of the United States with Canada has
increased from $28,000,000 in the year 1866 to $117,000,000 in the year
1900. The necessary result of this policy of exclusion on the part of
the United States has necessarily been closer economic relations between
Canada and England. The Canadian exports to Great Britain have increased
steadily, and the bold plans of those who are to-day agitating a tariff
union for all Great Britain would, of course, specially benefit Canadian
commerce.
But the United States knows this, and does not fail to think on the
future. The agitation for new commercial treaties with Canada does not
spring from the supporters of free-trade, but from some most
conservative protectionists, and may be ascribed even to McKinley and
Dingley; and this agitation is steadily growing. On the other hand,
Canada is by no means unanimously enthusiastic for the universal British
reciprocity alliance. The industrial sections of Eastern Canada see
things with different eyes from the agrarians of Western Canada, and
opinions are just as diverse as they are in England. The economic needs
of the East and West are so fundamentally different, and since the West
so greatly needs reciprocity, it is coming more and more to look for a
solution of this problem by seeking, through a union of the West with
the United States, all that which England cannot offer. The government
of Canada, which comprises remarkably effective and intelligent men, is
aiming to nip the incipient disaffection of the West in the bud, by
means of its railroad policy. Railroad lines connect to-day the western
portion of Canada much more closely with the eastern portion than with
the northern parts of the United States.
The economic possibilities of Western Canada are enormous, and would
suffice for a population of a hundred million. The supply of lumber
exceeds that of the United States. Its gold regions are more extensive,
its coal and iron supplies are inexhaustible, its nickel mines the
richest in the world; it has twice the supply of fish of the United
States, and its arable lands could feed the population of the United
States and Europe together. Everything depends on making the most of
these possibilities, and the Canadian of the West looks with natural
envy on the huge progress which the entirely similar regions of the
United States are making, and is moved to reflect how different things
would be with him if only the boundary lines could be altered.
More than anything else, however, the Westerner feels that a spirit of
enterprise, industrial energy, and independent force is needed to
exploit these enormous natural resources, such as the inhabitants of a
dependent colony can never have. Even when a colony like Canada
possesses a certain independence in the administration of its own
affairs, it is still only the appearance and not the fact of
self-government. One sees clearly how colourless and dull the
intellectual life of Canada is, and how in comparison with the very
different life of England on the one hand, and of the United States on
the other, the colonial spirit saps and undermines the spirit of
initiative. The people do not suffer under such a rule; they do not feel
the political lack of fresh air, but they take on a subdued and listless
way of life, trying to adapt themselves to an alien political scheme,
and not having the courage to speak out boldly. This depression is
evinced in all their doings; and this is not the spirit which will
develop the resources of Western Canada. But this infinite, new country
attracts to its pioneer labours fresh energies which are found south of
the Canadian line and across the ocean. The Scotch, Germans, Swedes, and
especially Americans emigrate thither in great numbers. The farmers in
the western United States are to-day very glad to sell their small
holdings, in order to purchase broad tracts of new, fresh ground in
Canada, where there is still no lack of room. They will be the leaders
in this new development of the West. And while they bring with them
their love of work and enterprise, they are of course without sympathy
with Canadian traditions; nor do they feel any patriotism toward the
country: their firmest convictions point toward such political freedom
as the United States offers. Whether the tariff schemes of England will
be able to win back some advantages for Canada, only the future can say.
It is more likely that inasmuch as the Philippine agitation has extended
the influence of the United States into the tropics, the climatic
equilibrium will be restored by another extension into the Canadian
Northwest.
* * * * *
The relations of the United States to Cuba and to the Philippines, to
Panama and to Canada, have been regulated by the immediate needs of the
country without bringing into special prominence any general principles.
Economic interest and general ethics have so far sufficed, and only here
and there has mention been made of the fundamental doctrines contained
in the Declaration of Independence. The case of South America is quite
different; the policy of the United States toward South America is
dictated to-day neither by economic interests nor moral principles; in
fact, it is a mockery of morals and a great prejudice to American
industry. The sole source of this policy is an abstract political
doctrine, which a long time ago was both economically and morally
necessary, but is to-day entirely without value; this is the Monroe
Doctrine. The observance of this famous doctrine is one of the most
interesting instances of the survival of an outlived political
principle, and the blind way in which this prejudice is still favoured
by the masses, so that even the leading politicians would not dare, at
the present time, to defend the real interests of the country by
opposing this doctrine, shows clearly how democracy favours rule of
thumb, and how the American people is in its thought conservative to the
last degree. The Monroe Doctrine has done the United States good
service, and redounded to both its profit and its honour. And so no one
ventures to disturb it, although it has long ceased to bring anything
except disadvantage. Some of the best people know this; but where the
people rule it is as true as where a monarch rules, that the misfortune
of rulers is not to wish to hear the truth.
The blind folly of the Americans in holding tenaciously to the
antiquated Monroe Doctrine is surpassed only by the madness of those
Europeans who wish to take up arms against that doctrine. All the
declarations of the Old World to the effect that the Monroe Doctrine is
an unheard of piece of arrogance, and that the Americans have no right
to assert themselves in such a way, and that it is high time forcibly to
call their right in question, are historically short-sighted as well as
dangerous. They are unhistorical, because there really was a time when
this doctrine was necessary to the existence of the United States, and
when, therefore, the country had a right to assert such doctrine; and
now that it has been silently respected for a hundred years, any protest
against it comes too late. Opposition to the doctrine from the side of
Europe would be foolish, because no European country has any really
vital reason for calling it in question, and there would be a very
lively war indeed if Europe were to try to overstep the Monroe Doctrine
as long as the great mass of the American people still hold it sacred.
The Monroe Doctrine must and will succumb, but it will only be through
the convictions of the Americans, never because some European nation
threatens to batter down the wall. The logic of events is, after all,
stronger than the mere inertia of inherited doctrines. The hour seems
near when the error and folly of the Monroe Doctrine are about to be
felt in wider circles than ever before. The opposite side is already
ably supported in addresses and essays. Soon the opposition will reach
the newspapers, which are to-day, of course, still unanimous on the
popular side; and whenever a wholesome movement commences among the
American people it generally spreads with irresistible speed. We have
seen how rapidly the imperialistic idea took hold on the masses, and the
repudiation of the theory of Monroe will follow quite as rapidly; since
the nation cannot, for the sake of a mere whim, permanently forget its
best interests. It is only a question of overcoming the inertia of long
custom.
The spirit of the Monroe Doctrine was abroad long before the time of
Monroe. It was agreed, from the earliest days of the federal government,
that the new nation should keep itself clear of all political
entanglement with Europe, that it would not mix in with the destinies of
European peoples, and that it would expect of those peoples that they
should not spread the boundaries of their possessions over to the
American continents. When President Washington, in 1796, took his
farewell of the nation, he recommended an extension of commercial
relations with Europe, but entire aloofness from their political
affairs. “The nations of Europe,” he said, “have important problems
which do not concern us as a free people. The causes of their frequent
misunderstandings lie far outside of our province, and the circumstance
that America is geographically remote will facilitate our political
isolation, and the nations who go to war will hardly challenge our young
nation, since it is clear that they will have nothing to gain by it.”
This feeling, that America was to have nothing to do with European
politics, and that the European nations should on no condition be
allowed to extend their sphere of action on to the American continents,
grew steadily. This national conviction rested primarily on two motives:
firstly, America wanted to be sure of its national identity. It felt
instinctively that, if it were to become involved in European conflicts,
the European powers might interfere in the destinies of the smaller and
growing nation, and that the danger of such interference would increase
tremendously if the great nations of Europe were to gain a foothold in
the neighbourhood of the young republic on this side of the ocean. In
the second place, this nation felt that it had a moral mission to
perform. The countries of Europe were groaning under oppression, whereas
this nation had thrown off the English yoke, and proposed to keep the
new continent free from such misrule. In order to make it the theatre
for an experiment of modern democracy, no absolute monarchs were to set
foot in this new world; the self-government of the people was to remain
unquestioned, and every republic was to be free to work out its own
salvation.
Thus the desire for self-protection and a moral interest in the fight
against absolutism have prescribed a course of holding aloof from
European affairs, and of demanding that Europe should not reach out
toward the American continents. This has become a cardinal principle in
American politics. The opportunity soon came to express this principle
very visibly in international politics. The Holy Alliance between
Austria, Russia, and Prussia was believed by America, ever since 1822,
to have been arranged in order to regain for Spain the Spanish colonies
in South America. England wished to ally itself with the United States;
but they, with excellent tact, steered their course alone. In 1822 the
United States recognized the independence of the Central American
republics; and in 1823, President Monroe, in his message to Congress,
which was probably penned by John Quincy Adams, who was then Secretary
of State, set down this policy in black and white. Monroe had previously
asked ex-President Jefferson for his opinion, and Jefferson had written
that our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to involve
ourselves in European disputes; and our second, never to permit Europe
to meddle in cis-Atlantic affairs, North and South America having their
own interests, which are fundamentally different from those of Europe.
Now the message of President Monroe contained the following
declarations: “That we should consider any attempt on their part [of the
allied powers] to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere
as dangerous to our peace and safety,” and “that we could not view any
interposition for the purpose of oppressing [governments on this side of
the water whose independence we had acknowledged], or controlling in any
manner their destiny by any European power, in any other light than as a
manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.”
Thus the famous Monroe Doctrine was announced to the world, and became
an international factor sufficiently potent even to prevent Napoleon
from realizing his plans regarding Mexico, and in more recent times to
protect Venezuela from the consequences of her misdeeds. And although,
at just that time of the Venezuelan dispute, the old Monroe Doctrine was
in so far modified that the Presidential message conceded to European
powers their right to press their claims by force of arms, so long as
they claimed no permanent right of occupation, nevertheless the
discussions ended with the extreme demand that foreign powers should be
content with the promise of a South American state to pay its debts, and
should receive no security; nor did the United States give security for
the payment, either. After eighty years the doctrine is still asserted
as it has been from the first, although the situation is in all respects
very different. A few brief instances of these changes must suffice us.
In the first place, the two fundamental motives which gave rise to the
doctrine, and in which all important documents are so clearly enunciated
from the time of Washington to that of Monroe, have long since ceased to
exist. The contrast between Europe as the land of tyranny and America as
a democratic free soil, no longer holds; nor can the notion be bolstered
up any longer, even for political ends. In the first place all countries
of Western Europe now enjoy popular representation, while the Latin
republics of South America, with the exception of Chili and the
Argentine Republic, are the most absurd travesties of freedom and
democracy. Conditions in Venezuela and Colombia are now pretty well
known. It has been shown, for instance, that about one-tenth of the
population consists of highly cultivated Spaniards, who take no part in
politics, and suffer under a shameless administrative misrule; that some
eight-tenths more are a harmless and ignorant proletariat of partly
Spanish and partly Indian descent—people who likewise have no political
interest, and who are afraid of the men in power—while the remaining
tenth, which is of mixed Spanish, Indian, and negro blood, holds in its
hands the so-called republican government, and keeps itself in power
with every device of extortion and deception, and from time to time
splits up into parties which throw the whole country into an uproar,
merely for the personal advantages of the party leaders.
Even in America there is no longer a political back-woodsman who
supposes that a republic like what the founders of the United States had
in mind, can ever be made out of such material; and when, in spite of
this, as in the negro question, some one gets up at the decisive moment
of every discussion and tries to conjure with the Declaration of
Independence, even such an appeal now often misses its effect. Since the
Americans have gone into the Philippines they can no longer hold it an
axiom that every government must be justified by the assent of the
governed. People have learned to understand that the right of
self-government must be earned, and is deserved only as the reward of
hard work; that nations which have not yet grown to be orderly and
peaceable need education like children who are not yet of age and do not
know what is good for them. To say that the pitiable citizen of a
corrupt South American republic is freer than the citizen of England,
France, or Germany would be ridiculous; to protect the anarchy of these
countries against the introduction of some European political system is
at the present time not a moral obligation, surely, which the American
Republic need feel itself called on to perform. The democratic idea, as
realized in American life, has become much more influential on the
governments of Europe than on those of South America, notwithstanding
their lofty constitutions, which are filled with the most high-flown
moral and philosophical utterances, but are obeyed by no one.