recognition of the principle that every legislator represents, first of
all, his local district. It is not expected of a senator that he shall
look at every question from the point of view of the general welfare,
but rather that he shall take first of all the point of view of his
state. It has indeed been urged that the senator is nothing but an
ambassador sent to represent his state before the federal government. If
this is so, it follows at once that no state delegate ought to have any
control over the interests of another state, and so the wishes of any
senator should be final in all matters pertaining to his own state. From
this it is only a small step to the existing order of things, in which
every senator is seconded on his own proposals by his colleagues, if he
will second them on theirs. In this way each delegate has the chance to
place the law-giving machinery at the service of those who will in any
way advance his political popularity among his constituents, and help
him during his next candidacy. And then, too, a good deal is done merely
for appearances; bills are entered, printed, and circulated in the local
papers to tickle the spirits of constituents, while the proposer himself
has not supposed for a moment that his proposition will pass the
committee. Things go in the state legislatures in quite the same way.
Each member is first of all the representative of his own district, and
he claims a certain right of not being interfered with in matters which
concern that district. In this way he is accorded great freedom to grant
all sorts of legislative favours which will bring him sufficient
returns, or to carry through legal intrigues to the injury of his
political opponents. And here in the state legislature, as in the city
council, where the same principles are in use, there is the best
possible chance of selling one’s friendly services at their market
value. If a railroad company sees a bill for public safety proposed
which is technically senseless and exaggerated, which will impede
traffic in the state, and involve ruinous expenditures, it will
naturally be tempted not to sit idle in the hope that a majority of the
committee will set the bill aside; for that course would be hazardous.
It may be that all sorts of prejudices will work together toward
reporting the bill favourably. If the company wants to be secure, it
will rather try such arguments as only capitalists have at their
command. And it has here two ways open: either to “convince” the
committee or else to make arrangements with the man who proposed the
bill, so that he shall recall it. If the possibility of such doings once
exists in politics, there is no means of preventing dishonourable
persons from making money in such ways; not only do they yield to
temptation after they have been elected, but also they seek their
elections solely in order to exploit just such opportunities.
Here we meet that factor which distinguishes the state legislature,
particularly of those states whose traditions are less firmly grounded,
and still more the city councils, so completely from the federal
chambers in Washington. The chance to misuse office is alike in all
three places, but men who have entered the political arena with
honourable motives very seldom yield to criminal temptation. The usual
abuses are committed almost wholly by men who have sought their
political office solely for the sake of criminal opportunities; and this
class of pseudo-politicians can bring itself into the city council very
easily, in the state legislature without much difficulty, but almost
never into Congress. If it were attractive or distinguished or
interesting to be in the state legislature, or on the board of aldermen,
there would be a plenty of worthy applicants for the position, and all
doubtful persons would find the door closed; but the actual case is
quite different.
To be a member of Congress, to sit in the House of Representatives or
perhaps in the Senate, is something which the very best men may well
desire. The position is conspicuous and picturesque, and against the
background of high political life the individual feels himself entrusted
with an important rôle. And although many may hesitate to transfer their
homes to the federal capital, nevertheless the country has never had
difficulty in finding sufficient Representatives who are imbued with the
spirit of the Constitution. On the other hand, to serve as popular
representative in the state legislature means for the better sort of
man, unless he is a professional politician, a considerable sacrifice.
The legislature generally meets in a remote part of the state, at every
session requires many months of busy work on some committee, and most of
this work is nothing but disputing and compromising over the thousand
petty bills, in which no really broad political considerations enter. It
is a dreary, dispiriting work, which can attract only three kinds of
men: firstly, those who are looking forward to a political career in the
service of the party machine and undergo a term in the state legislature
only as preparation for some more important office; secondly, those who
are glad of the small and meagre salary of a representative; and
finally, those whose modest ambition is satisfied if they are delegated
by their fellow-citizens in any sort of representative capacity.
Therefore the general level of personality in the state legislature is
low. Men who have important positions will seldom consent to go, and
when influential persons do enter state politics it is actually with a
certain spirit of renunciation, and not so much to take part in the
business of the legislature as to reform the legislature itself. Since
this is the case, it is not surprising that the most unwholesome
elements flock thither, extortioners and corrupt persons who count on
it, that in regard to dishonourable transactions, the other side will
have the same interest in preserving silence as themselves.
We must also not forget that the American principle of strictly local
representation works in another way to keep down the level of the
smaller legislative bodies. If the Representative of a certain locality
must have his residence there, the number of possible candidates is very
much restricted. This is even more true of the city government, where
the principle of local representation requires that every part of the
city, even the poorest and most squalid, shall elect none but men who
reside in it. To be sure, there is a good deal in this that is right;
but it necessarily brings a sort of people together in public committee
with whom it is not exactly a pleasure for most men to work. The
questions which have to be talked over here are still more trivial, and
more than that, the motives which attract corrupt persons are somewhat
more tangible here; since in the rapid growth of the great city the
awarding of monopolies and contracts creates a sort of spoilsman’s
paradise. As the better elements hold aloof from this city government,
by so much more do corrupt persons have freer play.
The relation of the city to both the state and Federation is even more
unfavourable when one comes to consider not the legislative, but the
executive, department. Whereas in Washington, for example, a single man
stands at the head of every department in the administration, and is
entirely responsible for the running of things, there has frequently
been in the city administrations, up to a short time ago, a committee
which is so responsible—this in agreement with the old American idea
that a majority can decide best. Where, however, a single man was
entrusted with administrative powers, he was selected generally by the
mayor and the city council together, and they seldom called a real
expert to such a position. In any case, since the administration depends
wholly on party politics, and the upper staff changes with each new
party victory, there is no such chance for a life career here as would
tempt competent men to offer their services.
In this part of the government, moreover, there is more danger from the
administration by committees than anywhere else. The responsibility of a
majority cannot be fixed anywhere; and where the mayor and aldermen work
together in the selection of officials, neither of the two parties is
quite responsible for the outcome—which is naturally not to be compared
with the closely guarded election of officials under German conditions.
For in Germany the selection of the head of a city department will lie
between a few similarly trained specialists, while the administration of
a New York or a Chicago department, as, say, that of the police or of
street-cleaning, is thought to presuppose no special preparation, and
therefore the number of possible candidates is unlimited. It is not
surprising that such irresponsible committees are not above corruption,
and that many a man who has received a well-paid administrative position
in return for his services to the party, proceeds to make his hay while
the sun shines. It is true that there are many departments where no such
temptation comes in question. It is, for example, universally believed
that the fire departments of all American cities are admirably managed.
The situation is most doubtful in the case of the police departments,
which, of course, are subject to the greatest temptations; and here,
too, there can be the worst abuses in some ways along with the highest
efficiency in others. The service for public protection in a large city
may be admirably organized and crime strenuously followed up, and
nevertheless the police force may be full of corruption. Thieves and
murderers are punctiliously suppressed, while at the same time the
police are extorting a handsome income from bar-rooms which evade the
Sunday laws, from public-houses which exist in violation of city
statutes, and from unlawful places of amusement.
To be sure, we must again and again emphasize two things. In the first
place, it is probable that nine-tenths of the charges are exaggerated
and slanderous. The punishments are so considerable, the means of
investigation so active, and the public watchfulness so keen, both on
account of the party hostility and by virtue of a sensational press,
that it would be hardly comprehensible psychologically, if political
crime in the lowest strata of city or state were to be really anything
but the exception. The many almost fanatically conducted investigations
produce from their mountains of transactions only the smallest mice, and
the state attorney is seldom able to make out a case of actual bribery.
In this matter the Anglo-Americans are pleased to point out that
wherever investigations have ended in making out a case which could
really be punished, the person has been generally an Irishman or some
other European immigrant. In any case, the collection of immigrants from
Europe in the large cities contributes importantly to the unhappy
condition of city politics.
In the second place, we must urge once more that the mere distribution
of well-paid municipal positions to party politicians is not necessarily
in itself an abuse. When, for instance, in a large city, a Republican is
succeeded by a Democratic mayor, he can generally bestow a dozen
well-paid and a hundred or two more modest commissions to men who have
helped in the party victory. But he will be careful not to pick out
those who are wholly unworthy, since that would not only compromise
himself, but would damage his party and prevent its being again
victorious. If he succeeds, on the other hand, in finding men who will
serve the city industriously, intelligently, and ably in proportion to
their pay, it is ridiculous to call the promise of such offices by way
of party reward in any sense a plundering of the city, or to make it
seem that the giving of positions to colleagues of one’s party is
another sort of corruption.
The evils of public life and the possibility of criminal practices are
not confined to legislative and executive bodies. The judiciary also has
its darker side. One must believe fanatically in the people in order not
to see what judicial monstrosities occasionally come out of the emphasis
which is given to the jury system. The law requires that the twelve men
chosen from the people to the jury must come to a unanimous decision;
they are shut in a room together and discuss and discuss until all
twelve finally decide for guilty or not guilty. If they are not
unanimous, no verdict is given, and the whole trial has to begin over
again. A single obstinate juryman, who clings to his particular ideas,
is able, therefore, to outweigh the decision of the other eleven. And it
is to be remembered that every criminal case is tried before a jury. The
case is still worse if all twelve agree, but agree only in their
prejudices. Especially in the South, but also in the West sometimes,
juries return decisions which simply insult the intelligence of the
country. It is true that the unfairness is generally in the direction of
declaring the defendant not guilty.
The law’s delay is also exceedingly regrettable, as well as the extreme
emphasis on technicalities, in consequence of which no one dares, even
in the interests of justice, to ignore the slightest inaccuracy of
form—a fact whose good side too, of course, no one should overlook. It
is most of all regrettable that the choice of judges depends to so large
an extent on politics, and that so many judicial appointments are made
by popular elections and for a limited term. The trouble here is not so
much that a faithful party member is often rewarded with a judicial
position, since for the matter of that there are equally good barristers
to be chosen from either party for vacant positions on the bench; the
real evil is that during his term of office the judge cannot help having
an eye to his reëlection or promotion to some higher position. This
brings politics into his labours truly, and it too often happens that a
ready compliance with party dictates springs up in the lower judicial
positions. Only the federal and the superior state courts are entirely
free from this.
In a similar way, politics sometimes play a part in the doings of the
state attorney. He is subordinate to the state or federal executive,
that is, to a party element which has contracted obligations of various
sorts, and it may so happen that the state attorney will avoid
interfering here and there in matters where a justice higher than party
demands interference. Especially in the quarrels between capital and
labour, one hears repeatedly that the state attorney is too lenient
toward large capitalists. Then there are other evils in judicial matters
arising from the unequal scientific preparation of jurists; the failing
here is in the judicial logic and pregnancy of the decision.
Finally, one source which is a veritable fountain of sin against the
commonwealth is the power of the party machine. We have traced out
minutely how the public life of the United States demands two parties,
how each of these may hope for victory only if it is compactly
organized, and how such organizations need an army of more or less
professional politicians. They may be in the legislature or out of it;
it is their position in the party machine which gives them their
tremendous powers—powers which do not derive from constitutional
principles nor from law, but which are in a way intangible, and
therefore the more liable to abuse.
Richard Croker has never been mayor of New York, and yet he was for a
long time dictator of that city, no matter what Democratic mayor was in
office, and remained dictator even from his country place in England. He
ruled the municipal Democratic party machine, and therefore all the
mayors and officials were merely pawns in his hands. Millions of dollars
floated his way from a thousand invisible sources, all of which were
somehow connected with municipal transactions; and his conscience was as
elastic as his pocket-book. That is what his enemies say, while his
friends allege him to be a man of honour; and nothing has really been
proved against him. But at least one thing is incontestable, that the
system of the party machine and the party boss makes such undemonstrable
corruption possible. Almost every state legislature is in the clutches
of such party mandarins, and even men who are above the suspicion of
venality misuse the tempting power which is centred in their hands in
the service of their personal advantage and reputation, of their
sympathies and antipathies, and transform their Democratic leadership
into autocracy and terrorism. In the higher sense, however, every
victory which they win for their party is like the victory of Pyrrhus,
for their selfish absolutism injures the party more than any advantage
which it wins at the polls benefits it. Their omnipotence is, moreover,
only apparent, for in reality there is a power in the land which is
stronger than they, and stronger than Presidents or legislatures, and
which takes care that all the dangers and evils, sins and abuses that
spring up are finally thrown off without really hindering the steady
course of progress. This power is public opinion.
CHAPTER SEVEN
_Public Opinion_
We have spoken of the President and Congress, of the organization of
court and state, and, above all, of the parties, in order to show the
various forms in which the genius of the American nation has expressed
itself. It may seem almost superfluous to recognize public opinion as a
separate factor in political affairs. It is admitted that public opinion
is potent in æsthetic, literary, moral, and social problems, with all of
which parties and constitutions have nothing to do. But it might be
supposed that when a people has surrounded itself with a network of
electoral machinery, supports hundreds of thousands of representatives
and officials, has perfected parties with their armies of politicians
and legislatures which every year discuss and pass on thousands of
laws—it might be supposed that in regard to political questions public
opinion would have found its complete expression along official
channels, and in a sense would have exhausted itself. Yet this is not
the case. The entire political routine, with its paraphernalia, forms a
closed system, which is distinct in many ways from the actual public
opinion of the country.
It is indeed no easy matter to find under what conditions the will of a
people can most directly express itself in the official machinery of
politics. Many Germans, for instance, entertain the notion that no
government is truly democratic except the cabinet be in all matters
dependent on a majority in parliament; and they are astonished to learn
that in democratic America Congress has no influence on the election of
the highest officials; that the President, in fact, may surround himself
with a cabinet quite antagonistic to the political complexion of
Congress. But no American believes that politics would represent public
opinion any better if this independence of the Executive and his cabinet
were to be modified, say in conformity with the English or French idea.
The reasons for a discrepancy between public opinion and official
politics lie anyhow not in the special forms prescribed by the
Constitution, but in the means by which the forms prescribed by the
Constitution are practically filled by the nation. In the English
Constitution, for instance, there is nothing about a cabinet; and yet
the cabinet is the actual centre of English politics. American politics
might keep to the letter of the Constitution, and still be the truest
reflection of public opinion. That they are not such a reflection is due
to the strong position of the parties. The rivalry of these encourages
keen competition, in which the success of the party has now become an
end in itself quite aside from the principles involved. Personal
advantages to be derived from the party have become prominent in the
minds of its supporters; and even where the motives are unselfish, the
tactics of the party are more important than its ideals. But tactics are
impossible without discipline, and a party which hopes to be victorious
in defending its own interests or in opposing others’ will be no mere
debating club, but a relentlessly strict and practical organization.
Wherewith the control must fall to a very few party leaders, who owe
their positions to professional politicians—that is, to men who for the
most part stand considerably below the level of the best Americans.
The immense number of votes cast in the Presidential elections is apt to
hide the facts. Millions vote for one candidate and millions for the
other, without knowing perhaps that a few months before the national
convention some ten or twelve party leaders, sitting at a quiet little
luncheon, may have had the power to fix on the presidential candidate.
And these wise foreordainings are even less conspicuous in the case of
governors, senators, or representatives. Everywhere the masses believe
that they alone decide, and so they do between the nominees of one party
and of the other, or sometimes between several candidates within the
party; but they are not aware that a more important choice is made
behind the scenes before these candidates make their appearance.
As with the incumbents, so it is with the platform. The party leaders
practically decide what questions shall be made the political issues;
and this is the most important function of all. We have seen that
dissenting groups can hardly hope on ordinary occasions to make a break
in the firm party organization, and though they may vigorously discuss
questions which have not been approved by the party leaders, they will,
nevertheless, arrive at no practical results. It therefore happens very
often that voters are called on to decide issues which seem to them
indifferent, or to choose between two evils, and can expect nothing from
either candidate in the matters which they think most vital. They go to
the polls merely out of consideration for their party. Thus, in reality,
the people do not decide the issues on which they are to vote, nor on
the candidates whom they elect, nor yet on the party leaders who do
decide these things. Nor can the people, if discontented with the party
in power, recall that party during its term of office. In Germany the
government can dissolve parliament if new issues arise; in England the
Cabinet resigns if it fails to carry a measure; but in America the party
with a congressional majority has nothing to fear during its appointed
term. In short, the political life of America is dominated by those
forces which rule the parties, and only in so far as the nation is
filled with the party spirit, is the official political hierarchy an
expression of the nation’s will.
Now it is not in the nature of public opinion to nerve itself up to
clear and definite issues. Unless worked on by party demagogues, it
never formulates itself in a mere yes or no, but surveys the situation
impartially, seeing advantages and disadvantages on both sides, and
passes a conservative judgment. The man who thinks only of parties will
often agree to a compromise which is unjust to both parties and in
general unworthy of them; but the man who takes his stand above the
parties knows that many problems are not fathomed with a yea or nay; he
does not see two opposite sides between which an artificial compromise
is to be found, but he appreciates the given situation in its organic
unity and historical perspective. Historical understanding of the past
and moral seriousness for the future guarantee his right judgment. He
sees the practical opposition of interests, which is always more complex
than the two-horned dilemma that the parties advertise, in a true light,
and testimony of experts instead of politicians suggests to him the
rational solution of the problem. The actual course of action to be
followed may coincide with the plan of one or the other party, or may be
a compromise between them, and yet it will be a distinct policy. In such
decisions there lives ever the spirit of immediate reality; no
artificial dichotomy nor any political tactics are involved, and the
natural moral feeling of a healthy nation is then sufficient for every
issue. Nowhere is this naïve moral sense more potent among the masses
than in America; will then these unpartisan convictions have no weight
in political life? Will they not rather strive to have an independent
effect on the destinies of the nation? The centre and real expression of
these politics for essentials is the system of public opinion.