DISSOLUTION OF THE REPUBLIC.
1837-1840.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST CARRERA—SEVERAL DEPARTMENTS OF
GUATEMALA IN REBELLION—JEFE GALVEZ DEPOSED—CARRERA TAKES
GUATEMALA—MURDER OF SALAZAR—CARRERA ACCEPTS MONEY TO LEAVE
THE CITY—DICTATORSHIP OFFERED MORAZAN BY THE ARISTOCRATS
AND REFUSED—CARRERA'S SECOND REBELLION—THE REPUBLIC IN
PERIL—MORAZAN'S EFFORTS TO SAVE IT—NICARAGUA AND HONDURAS
FORCES INVADE SALVADOR—MORAZAN DEFEATS THEM—HIS RETREAT
TO SAN SALVADOR—HE EMBARKS—IS REFUSED HOSPITALITY IN COSTA
RICA—GOES TO SOUTH AMERICA—THE REPUBLIC IS DEAD—SALVADOR AT
THE MERCY OF CARRERA.
Only a week after the success of the insurgents on the field
of Ambelis, a numerous armed force was sent against them by the
government, which achieved victory near Mataquescuintla.[VII-1] The
revolution might have ended here but for the excesses of the government
troops, which roused the Indians, and rendered reconciliation
impossible.[VII-2] Henceforth the war was one of races. Carrera, upheld
as he was by the priests, found no difficulty, in his visits from
village to village, to induce the native population to join the revolt,
which, notwithstanding the triumphant language of the military officers
in their reports—calling the rebels cowards and themselves intrepid
and invincible—was fast spreading. Carefully avoiding encounters with
the regular army, Carrera succeeded in getting together a large force,
which, though raw and undisciplined, often surprised and defeated
detachments of the regulars, seeking a refuge when pursued in the
inaccessible mountain fastnesses.[VII-3]
To make matters worse, the departments of Sacatepequez, Chiquimula,
and Salamá, declared themselves independent of the government, and
the rebels of the first district,[VII-4] concentrating at La Antigua,
threatened to attack the capital. In the latter place a division had
occurred in the liberal party,[VII-5] some of whose members from this
time sided with the serviles; which circumstance made it more difficult
to place the city of Guatemala in a proper state of defence. A mutiny
of the federal troops in the city[VII-6] increased the danger, but it
soon was quelled with the execution of the ringleader. On the 27th
of January, 1838,[VII-7] Galvez despatched the vice-president, José
Gregorio Salazar, and the secretary of relations, Miguel Álvarez,
as commissioners, to confer with General Carrascosa, the commander
of the rebel forces, and bring about an amicable arrangement. The
commissioners signed at Guarda Viejo[VII-8] a convention containing
the following stipulations: 1st, resignation of Galvez; 2d, occupation
of the capital by the forces of Sacatepequez; 3d, the forces in the
capital to go out, and place themselves under the orders of General
Morazan; 4th, the forces of Sacatepequez to guarantee the persons and
property of all; 5th, the commissioners would arrange the manner of
evacuating the city; 6th, upon the ratification of these clauses, they
were to be carried out within twenty-four hours. Nothing was done,
however,[VII-9] and after four hours' waiting, Carrascosa continued
his march toward the gate of Buenavista, where he met the government
commissioners, who assured him, with great mortification, that the
convention had not been ratified.[VII-10]
[Sidenote: ATTACK ON GUATEMALA.]
Sacatepequez' force, 800 strong, entered the capital during the night
of the 29th of January, from the Calvario side, reaching the plazuela
de San Francisco, afterward known as plaza de la Concordia. The roar of
artillery apprised the inhabitants at 1 o'clock in the morning that the
struggle had begun. Generals Prem and Gorris, colonels Yañez, Arias,
Mariscal, Cerda, and Córdoba, and the other officers of the garrison,
made a stout defence. Their troops, though inferior in number, were
for their discipline more efficient than their assailants, who were
mostly raw recruits. It was quite evident that Carrascosa and his
colleague Carballo would waste their efforts unless they were strongly
reënforced. But the opponents of Galvez were resolved to depose
him,[VII-11] even if they had to make use of Carrera to accomplish
their purpose. It was a fatal thought.
José F. Barrundia was authorized by President Morazan to enter into
peaceable negotiations with Carrera, and the clergymen José María de
Castilla, Manuel María Zeceña, and José Vicente Orantes. Barrundia,
together with Manuel Arrivillaga, started for the hacienda of La Vega
to confer with Carrera; but at Ojo de Agua they ascertained that he was
at Mataquescuintla, and declined to hold any conferences, and yet an
arrangement with other opponents had been signed at Santa Rosa. This
document, which was shown by Father Duran to Barrundia, stipulated
the immediate coming of a bishop, the abolition of the code and of
other liberal measures decreed by Barrundia, and that Carrera should
become the commander of the reform forces, or in other words, the
arbiter of the country, which was what the clergy wanted. Barrundia was
indignant, but he had to submit and keep calm, else he might lose his
life. He merely said that the arrangement needed some discussion, which
might lead to the adoption of some amendments. Duran had not worked
to promote Barrundia's nor Molina's ideas, but his own interests. He
coolly replied that the matter had been well considered, and admitted
of no changes.
Barrundia wrote Carrera, asking for an interview to explain Morazan's
views, but Carrera appeared angry at the mention of Morazan's name,
and declined the invitation, saying that the time for negotiations had
passed, and that his march against Guatemala was in order.[VII-12] He
became much mollified on receiving from La Antigua a request for his
coöperation,[VII-13] and was now satisfied that the fate of the country
was in his own hands. Three days after Carrascosa's failure, Carrera
joined him with a numerous force of Indians, and after some fruitless
negotiations, marched into the city on the 1st of February,[VII-14]
at the head of about 10,000 men, women, and children, the troops of
the government having retreated in an opposite direction. The result
of this was that Galvez ceased to be the jefe of the state, and was
succeeded by the vice-jefe, Pedro Valenzuela.[VII-15]
[Sidenote: CARRERA TAKES THE CAPITAL.]
The entry of Carrera's hordes into Guatemala might well create
consternation. Outlaws and robbers were among the leaders; the soldiers
were in rags,[VII-16] and equipped with a variety of arms, from the
rusty musket down to clubs, and knives secured at the end of long
poles, while others carried sticks shaped like muskets, with tin-plate
locks. Conspicuous among the mass of followers were thousands of women
having bags to carry away the booty, and who gazed with amazement
on the fine houses.[VII-17] Shouting 'Viva la religion! Mueran los
extranjeros!' the invaders entered the main plaza. After a few hours
the work of rapine began.[VII-18] No regard was paid by Carrera and his
hordes to the wishes of the vice-jefe Valenzuela, who had asked that
only the force from La Antigua should occupy the plaza.
The leader of the opposition urged Carrera to leave the city; but
he manifested much indignation at such a request, and several of
his chiefs refused compliance. Carrera himself wanted to sack the
city,[VII-19] and it was only with great effort that he was prevented.
In lieu of pillage he was given $11,000,[VII-20] $10,000 for his troops
and $1,000 for himself. He was also flattered with the commission of
lieutenant-colonel and the appointment of comandante of Mita. A number
of those who had defended the city having voluntarily joined the
Sacatepequez force, Carrascosa was now better able to meet emergencies.
He at once, by order of the vice-jefe, made known to Carrera that
the interests of the public service demanded that he should repair to
Mita and take charge of the comandancia there. He made no resistance,
and went away with his horde,[VII-21] the inhabitants again breathing
freely for a time.[VII-22] Thus were the serviles balked once more.
Carrera was sent away from Guatemala, Valenzuela remaining in charge
of the state executive. Morazan was at San Salvador recognized as the
chief magistrate of the republic, and Vijil held the executive office
of that gallant little state.
[Sidenote: MORAZAN VERSUS CARRERA.]
Carrera and his supporters continued, however, their menaces, creating
no little alarm, which was quieted on receipt of the tidings that
Morazan was marching toward Guatemala with 1,500 men. On his arrival
he found not only that the serviles had been deriving advantages from
the disturbed political situation, but that the western departments
of Los Altos, namely, Quezaltenango, Totonicapan, and Sololá, had
declared themselves, on the 2d of February, a separate state under
an independent government.[VII-23] Without interfering with those
arrangements, Morazan endeavored to secure by peaceful means the
submission of Carrera, or rather, the disbanding of his force; failing
in which, he opened, on the 30th of March, the campaign against him.
Three months of military operations ensued, the federal arms being
victorious at every encounter, but without obtaining any definitive
result, for the enemy defeated in one place rallied in another,
continually increasing in numbers, and never crushed.[VII-24] Morazan
returned at last to Guatemala, where in the mean time servile influence
had become predominant.[VII-25] The most strenuous efforts, even to
fulsome sycophancy, were used by the serviles to win him to their side,
and to prevail on him to accept the dictatorship.[VII-26]
The president returned in July to San Salvador to quell a revolt. A few
weeks later, on the 20th of July, 1838, the eleventh and last federal
congress of Central America, presided over by Basilio Porras, closed
its session.[VII-27] Subsequent efforts to bring it again into life
proved unavailing, and from this time the dismemberment of the republic
made rapid progress. Two days after the adjournment of congress, on
the 22d, the state government of Guatemala was also dissolved, and
was temporarily intrusted to the federal authorities,[VII-28] though
the executive office finally was assumed by Mariano Rivera Paz, as
president of the council, which satisfied the people, and peace was
unbroken, it being understood that a constituent assembly would be
summoned at once.
[Sidenote: SALAZAR DEFEATS CARRERA.]
As soon as Morazan was at some distance from Guatemala on his way to
San Salvador, Carrera, the supposed beaten rebel leader, for whose
capture a liberal reward had been offered,[VII-29] began to show
signs of rallying. He gathered a numerous force, with which, about the
middle of August, he defeated the federal troops, first at Jalapa and
next at Petapa. He then, unresisted, took possession of La Antigua, a
portion of which was pillaged, and forthwith started on his march for
Guatemala.[VII-30] A general clamor for Morazan was aroused; but it
was impossible for him to reach Guatemala in time, and the danger was
imminent that Carrera would not only take the city, but also carry out
his threats of burning every house in it. In this emergency, General
Cárlos Salazar, with the garrison of 900 men, sallied forth, and aided
by a thick fog, surprised Carrera at Villanueva, where the latter was
concentrating his forces, now about 2,400 strong, with the plunder
secured at La Antigua. A battle ensued, the bloodiest that occurred
in 1837 or 1838, and Carrera was routed,[VII-31] with the loss of 350
killed and 24 prisoners, one of whom was the notorious Father Duran,
the representative and agent of the aristocrats near the person of
Carrera;[VII-32] besides giving up a number of federal prisoners and
losing three pieces of artillery, 305 muskets, and a large number of
other arms, besides ammunition. A portion of the defeated forces fled
to La Antigua, and a smaller one joined the rebel Mangandí, who had
500 men. The latter, being ignorant of Carrera's mishap, approached
Guatemala on the 11th, at 10 o'clock in the morning, causing no little
commotion; but on learning of his leader's defeat, he retired to the
mountains. The war might have ended here had the victors followed up
their success; but petty annoyances prevented Salazar from doing so,
and he threw up his command in disgust,[VII-33] though he was afterward
induced to resume it.
The greater part of the clergy friendly to Carrera never forsook him.
It was not so with the aristocrats, Manuel Pavon, Luis Batres, and
Pedro and Juan Jose Aycinena, who feared at times that they could
not control him. After his defeat at Villanueva they called him an
'antropófago sediento de sangre humana.'[VII-34] At that time they
asked the vicar-general, Larrazábal, to fulminate censures against
Carrera, which he did.[VII-35] Friar Bernardo Piñol also railed
against him from the pulpit in the cathedral.[VII-36] However, not long
afterward Carrera was called from that same pulpit 'hijo predilecto del
Altísimo.'
[Sidenote: CARRERA AGAIN DEFEATED.]
The lack of energy on the part of the authorities after the affair
of Villanueva[VII-37] enabled Carrera to reorganize his forces, with
which he made a successful raid, in the latter part of October, against
Ahuachapan and Santa Ana,[VII-38] returning afterward to Guatemala,
when, on the 4th of November, he was attacked in Chiquimulilla by
Colonel Carballo, defeated, and driven back to the mountain recesses
of Mita.[VII-39] Morazan had in the mean time concentrated forces in
Guatemala, and aided Carballo's operations by marching against the
Indian chieftain from a northern direction. But all efforts to crush
the enemy failed, though the federal troops were everywhere victorious;
many of Carrera's followers were taken and shot, but he always managed
to escape.[VII-40] This warfare, or rather chase, was kept up nearly
two months. At last a capitulation was concluded, on the 23d of
December, at Rinconcito. Carrera and his followers were to surrender
their arms[VII-41] and recognize the government, which in turn was
to confirm the former in his office of comandante of the district of
Mita, and respect the lives and property of its inhabitants.[VII-42]
Thus was Carrera a second time given a legal standing. General Guzman,
who treated with him, seemed to place on the treacherous and barbarous
mountaineer the same faith as if he were a civilized man and a
respecter of treaty stipulations.[VII-43] The agreement was not carried
out by Carrera, for he delivered only a small portion of useless arms,
and kept his force under the pretext that the safety of his district
demanded it. The government not only had the weakness to enter into
this arrangement, but also that of not enforcing its fulfilment to
the letter. This rendered the renewal of hostilities but a question of
time.
I have mentioned the congressional decree of May 30, 1838, granting the
states the privilege of acting as best suited their views. This was
tantamount to a dissolution of the union; and when Morazan's second
presidential term expired, on the 1st of February, 1839,[VII-44] not
even an outward tie remained to hold together the several states.
Morazan, and he alone, did not relinquish all hope of restoring the
republic, and without delivering up an office which had ceased to
exist, the strife was continued under his leadership. His efforts,
supported by force though they were, met with resistance on the part of
Nicaragua and Honduras, united by a treaty of alliance since January
18, 1839, which had been entered into for the purpose of maintaining
the independence and sovereignty of the two states.[VII-45] Similar
agreements were made in the following months between nearly all
the other states, always protesting a willingness to form a federal
convention of the Central American states, but opposing the idea of
confederation.[VII-46]
[Sidenote: FIGHTING IN SALVADOR.]
A conciliatory spirit, to bring to an end the war against Salvador,
and to act as mediator, was effected in these treaties; but it had no
influence for good, and the hostilities continued between Nicaragua and
Honduras on the one part, and Salvador on the other. Troops of the two
former states entered Salvador territory in March 1839, and surprising
a federal party at the crossings of the Lempa River, called Xicaral
and Petacones, took without resistance the town of San Vicente; but
having advanced to the heights of Xiboa, were repulsed and beaten by
Colonel Narciso Benitez.[VII-47] The allies were signally defeated at
Espíritu Santo, near the Lempa, by the Salvadorans, called federals,
under Morazan, on the 6th of April.[VII-48] Equally successful were
Morazan's operations during the rest of the year. His officers invaded
Honduras, took the capital and Tegucigalpa, and routed the allies in
several encounters.[VII-49]
But affairs underwent a change against him early in the following
year. A joint force of Nicaraguans and Hondurans, under Manuel
Quijano,[VII-50] attacked the federals under Cabañas at the hacienda
del Potrero, on the 31st of January, 1840, and forced them to leave the
state of Honduras.[VII-51] A formidable servile coalition was being
formed against Morazan. Nicaragua was resolved to drive this jefe
of Salvador from the executive chair. Honduras, under Jáuregui, was
controlled by Quijano's sword. Los Altos had become again a department
of Guatemala, which was subject to Carrera's will. This chieftain,
in his pronunciamiento of March 24, 1839, had avowed his intention
to champion the sovereignty of the several states as concordant with
his own ideas.[VII-52] Morazan thought the situation might be saved
with an extraordinarily bold move, attacking the serviles in their
headquarters, and made preparation to bring matters to a final issue
in the city of Guatemala. The serviles, on their part, pursuing their
aim of overthrowing Morazan, entered into a league with Carrera, and
invited him to take possession of Guatemala.
[Sidenote: TRIUMPH AND DEFEAT OF MORAZAN.]
Morazan convoked the assembly of Salvador, and caused the vice-jefe,
Silva, to assume the executive office of the state, in order to enable
himself to take command of the forces for the campaign in Guatemala,
which at first amounted to 900 men. He was afterward joined by many
who had been persecuted by the aristocrats, who pledged themselves
to conquer or perish at his side, and faithfully carried out the
promise.[VII-53] Morazan marched upon the city of Guatemala, and his
movement created the greatest alarm when he neared Corral de Piedra.
Consternation then seized the serviles.[VII-54] Preparations were made,
however, for defence. All men capable of bearing arms were called
to the service,[VII-55] and Carrera established his headquarters
at Aceituno, his plan being to catch the men of Salvador between
the fortifications of the city and his own force.[VII-56] The plan
failed. Morazan entered the city on the 18th of March at sunrise, by
the Buenavista gate, and after some fighting, made himself master of
it, and of all the defences.[VII-57] Liberals who were in the prisons
were set free. Among them was General Agustin Guzman, whom Carrera
had outrageously treated, confining him shackled in a dungeon. Guzman
hailed the victor who returned him to freedom, but was unable to
afford any aid; the shackles had made him a cripple. The numerous
prisoners taken were all treated with every kindness. Such had always
been his practice. However, it was not destined that he should enjoy
his victory. Carrera attacked him on the next day—the 19th—and after a
fight of twenty-two hours, compelled Morazan to retreat.[VII-58] His
forces had been shattered at the Calvario. The number of assailants,
known as cachurecos, was overwhelming.[VII-59] At 4 o'clock in the
morning he left the city by the plaza de Guadalupe with upwards of 400
men, and was far away before the escape became known. No pursuit of the
fugitives was attempted.[VII-60]
[Sidenote: FALL OF MORAZAN.]
On arriving at San Salvador, Morazan found the tables turned against
him. He was openly insulted in the streets; and becoming convinced that
it would be impossible to raise a new army and continue the war, he
concluded to cease the struggle and leave the country. He accordingly
called a meeting and made known the necessity of such a course in order
to save the state from anarchy. On the 5th of April he embarked at
La Libertad upon the schooner _Izalco_, together with Vice-president
Vijil and thirty-five of his supporters.[VII-61] The vessel reached
Puntarenas, where the chief of Costa Rica, Braulio Carrillo, who had
congratulated Guatemala on the defeat of Morazan, refused him residence
in the state, though it was granted to some of his companions.[VII-62]
Morazan and his remaining companions continued their voyage to South
America, where he remained about two years. After a time, touching
at David, in Colombia, he issued a stirring manifesto to the Central
American people.[VII-63] He was the last champion of the 'Confederacion
de Centro América,' whose establishment had been greeted with so much
joy on the 1st of July, 1823.
The governments of Nicaragua and Honduras, which had promised Guatemala
aid to resist Morazan, on hearing of his downfall congratulated the
victor on the defeat of the 'common enemy of all the states.' They
thought that with the fall of Morazan, Central American nationality
would be revived. They could not yet see that they had been the dupes
of the aristocrats and their clerical allies in Guatemala, who, while
holding out the promise of reuniting Central America, had been all
along working for the destruction of federal nationality.
After the departure of Morazan and Vijil, Antonio José Cañas, by
virtue of his position as a councillor of state, assumed the rulership
of Salvador, and called the assembly to hold a special session. It
was expected that, Morazan being out of the way,[VII-64] with so
honorable and upright a man as Cañas at the head, concord would be
restored. But Salvador was still the subject of abuses, and on the
remonstrances of Cañas, the government of Guatemala despatched a
diplomatic mission to San Salvador. It was composed of the former
pig-driver Rafael Carrera, and Joaquin Duran, and had for an attaché
Francisco Malespin, a military officer whose sword had been dyed in
the best blood of Quezaltenango.[VII-65] A convention was concluded
on the 13th of May, 1840, placing Salvador at the mercy of Guatemala,
Cañas having to submit to the conditions imposed.[VII-66] The most
humiliating condition of the understanding was not mentioned in the
convention, namely, that the attaché Francisco Malespin should remain
in San Salvador, with the office of comandante de armas. This treaty
convinced the people of Salvador that they could expect no favor from
the aristocracy of Guatemala, their implacable foe.