1. That America always has obtained, and for a long period to come will
obtain, her seamen altogether from Great Britain.
2. That those seamen can be naturalised immediately, and become
American seamen by law.
3. That, under present circumstances, England is under the necessity of
raising seamen, not only for her own navy, but also for the Americans;
and that, in proportion as the commerce and shipping of America shall
increase, so will the demand upon us become more onerous; and that
should we fail in producing the number of seamen necessary for both
services, the Americans will always be full manned, whilst any
defalcation must fall upon ourselves.
And it may be added that, in all cases, the Americans have the choice
and refusal of our men; and, therefore, they have invariably all the
prime and best seamen which we have raised.
The cause of this is as simple as it is notorious; it is the difference
between the wages paid in the navies and merchant vessels of the two
nations:
+=========================+=========================+
Y Ypounds shils pounds shilsY
+-------------------------+-------------------------+
YAmerican ships per month Y 3 10Y
+-------------------------+-------------------------+
YBritish ships ditto Y2 2 to 2 10 Y
+-------------------------+-------------------------+
YAmerican men-of-war dittoY 2 0Y
+-------------------------+-------------------------+
YBritish men-of-war ditto Y 1 14Y
+=========================+=========================+
It will be observed, that in the American men-of-war the able-seaman's
pay is only 2 pounds; the consequence is that they remain for months in
port without being able to obtain men.
But we must now pass by this cause, and look to the origin of it; or, in
other words, how is it that the Americans are able to give such high
wages to our seamen as to secure the choice of any number of our best
men for their service; and how is it that they can compete with, and
even under-bid, our merchant vessels in freight, at the same time that
they sail at a greater expense?
This has arisen partly from circumstances, partly from a series of
mismanagement on our part, and partly from the fear of impressment. But
it is principally to be ascribed to the former peculiarly unscientific
mode of calculating the tonnage of our vessels; the error of which
system induced the merchants to build their ships so as to evade the
heavy channel and river duties; disregarding all the first principles of
naval architecture, and considering the sailing properties of vessels as
of no consequence.
The fact is, that we over-taxed our shipping.
In order to carry as much freight as possible, and, at the same time, to
pay as few of the onerous duties, our mercantile shipping generally
assumed more the form of floating bores of merchandise than sailing
vessels; and by the false method of measuring the tonnage, they were
enabled to carry 600 tons, when, by measurement, they were only taxed as
being of the burden of 400 tons: but every increase of tonnage thus
surreptitiously obtained, was accompanied with a decrease in the sailing
properties of the vessels. Circumstances, however, rendered this of
less importance during the war, as few vessels ran without the
protection of a convoy; and it must be also observed, that vessels being
employed in one trade only, such as the West India, Canada,
Mediterranean, etcetera, their voyages during the year were limited, and
they were for a certain portion of the year unemployed.
During the war the fear of impressment was certainly a strong inducement
to our seamen to enter into the American vessels, and naturalise
themselves as American subjects; but they were also stimulated even at
that period, by the higher wages, as they still are now that the dread
of impressment no longer operates upon them.
It appears, then, that from various causes, our merchant vessels have
lost their sailing properties, whilst the Americans are the fastest
sailers in the world; and it is for that reason, and no other, that,
although sailing at a much greater expense, the Americans can afford to
outbid us, and take all our best seamen.
An American vessel is in no particular trade, but ready and willing to
take freight anywhere when offered. She sails so fast that she can make
three voyages whilst one of our vessels can make but two: consequently
she has the preference, as being the better manned, and giving the
quickest return to the merchant; and as she receives three freights
whilst the English vessel receives only two, it is clear that the extra
freight wilt more than compensate for the extra expense the vessel sails
at in consequence of paying extra wages to the seamen. Add to this,
that the captains, generally speaking, being better paid, are better
informed, and more active men; that, from having all the picked seamen,
they get through their work with fewer hands; that the activity on board
is followed up and supported by an equal activity on the part of the
agents and factors on shore--and you have the true cause why America can
afford to pay and secure for herself all our best seamen.
One thing is evident, that it is a mere question of pounds, shillings,
and pence, between us and America, and that the same men who are now in
the American service would, if our wages were higher than those offered
by America, immediately return to us and leave her destitute.
That it would be worth the while of this country, in case of a war with
the United States, to offer 4 pounds a-head to able seamen, is most
certain. It would swell the naval estimates, but it would shorten the
duration of the war, and in the end would probably be the saving of many
millions. But the question is, cannot and ought not something to be
done, now in time of peace, to relieve our mercantile shipping interest,
and hold out a bounty for a return to those true principles of naval
architecture, the deviation from which has proved to be attended with
such serious consequences.
Fast-sailing vessels will always be able to pay higher wages than
others, as what they lose in increase of daily expense, they will gain
by the short time in which the voyage is accomplished; but it is by
encouragement alone that we can expect that the change will take place.
Surely some of the onerous duties imposed by the Trinity House might be
removed, not from the present class of vessels, but from those built
hereafter with first-rate sailing properties. These, however, are
points which call for a much fuller investigation than I can here afford
them; but they are of vital importance to our maritime superiority, and
as such should be immediately considered by the government of Great
Britain.