PENDLETON’S REPORT
“Pendleton’s report will destroy many illusions of Lee’s
misguided friends who are unwittingly doing deadly injury to
his military fame by magnifying the mistakes of Gettysburg and
ascribing them to another.”--LESLIE J. PERRY, formerly of the War
Records Department.
There is even more positive proof than has yet been produced. That
Lee gave no such order as described in Pendleton’s Lexington lecture,
or for an “early attack,” as asserted by Gordon now, is absolutely
proved by an official report of Gettysburg, penned by General Pendleton
himself. That Pendleton was an oral falsifier of history is established
by his own hand, under date of September 12, 1863, only nine weeks
after the battle.
Confident in his own rectitude of purpose and conduct, and far from
being an expert controversialist, for he was without guile himself,
it is not at all singular that the significance of Pendleton’s report
in connection with the Lexington story should for years have entirely
escaped General Longstreet’s notice. He knew that the document was
printed in its sequence in the Gettysburg volumes of the War Records,
and for certain purposes had even quoted from it regarding other
questions. He was also fully aware that General Pendleton had long
been distinguished for the unreliability of his memory. Nevertheless
General Longstreet had never analyzed the report to the extent of
observing that it made ridiculous the reverend gentleman’s version of
1873.
It is most striking that the extraordinary tenor of this old
Pendletonian exhumation of the War Records office in Washington
should so long have passed entirely unnoticed by everybody, despite
the researches of the most industrious. It remained for Mr. Leslie J.
Perry, one of the historical experts then in charge of the government
publication of the Union and Confederate records of the Civil War, to
point out some nine years ago how glaringly the Pendleton report of
1863 stultified the Pendleton story of 1873.
The immediate result of the exploitation of the Pendleton report
was the elimination of the sunrise story from the repertory of the
anti-Longstreet crusaders. In the subsequent literature of the
subject a decided change of tone regarding other allegations was
soon perceived, more favorable to Longstreet. General Longstreet was
astounded by this bald disclosure of his old military associate’s
tergiversation, to call it nothing worse. For a time after the
appearance of the Lexington story, he had charitably presumed that, in
an excess of zeal to protect General Lee’s military fame, Pendleton
might really have harbored in good faith the belief that his Lexington
statements were true. But after reading the detailed analysis of the
Pendleton report, and carefully studying the report itself, General
Longstreet speedily arrived at the conclusion that he was the victim
of a deliberate conspiracy. It is not strange that he found it hard
to forgive the conspirators, even after becoming fully aware that the
world was practically convinced that he had been cruelly misrepresented.
Let us see how “fairly” Pendleton stated the case against General
Longstreet in his Lexington lecture. His official report[E] of
Gettysburg was written only about sixty days after the battle. It was
dated September 12, 1863. It is a detailed report of the operations of
the Confederate artillery in the Pennsylvania campaign, embodying a
minute description of General Pendleton’s personal movements on that
day. That is its only value to this discussion. The paragraphs having a
bearing upon the time of Longstreet’s attack are as follows:
“From the farthest occupied point on the right and front, in
company with Colonels Long and Walker and Captain Johnston
(engineer), soon _after sunrise_ I surveyed the enemy’s position
towards some estimate of the ground and best mode of attack.
So far as judgment could be formed from such a view, assault
on the enemy’s left by our extreme right might succeed, should
the mountain there offer no insuperable obstacle. The attack on
that side, if practicable, I understood to be the purpose of the
commanding general.
“Returning from this position more to the right and rear, for the
sake of tracing more exactly the mode of approach, I proceeded
some distance along the ravine road noticed the previous evening,
and was made aware of having entered the enemy’s lines by meeting
two armed dismounted cavalrymen. Apparently surprised, they
immediately surrendered, and were disarmed and sent to the rear.
“Having satisfied myself of the course and character of this
road, I returned to an elevated point on the Fairfield road,
which furnished a very extensive view, and despatched messengers
to General Longstreet and the commanding general. This front was,
after some time, examined by Colonel Smith and Captain Johnston
(engineers), and about midday General Longstreet arrived and
viewed the ground. He desired Colonel Alexander to obtain the
best view he then could of the front. I therefore conducted the
colonel to the advanced point of observation previously visited.
Its approach was now more hazardous from the fire of the enemy’s
sharp-shooters, so that special caution was necessary in making
the desired observation. Just then a sharp contest occurred in
the woods to the right and rear of this forward point. Anderson’s
division, Third Corps, had moved up and was driving the enemy
from these woods. These woods having thus been cleared of the
enemy, some view of the ground beyond them, and much farther
to the right than had yet been examined, seemed practicable. I
therefore rode in that direction, and when about to enter the
woods, met the commanding general _en route_ himself to survey
the ground.
“There being here still a good deal of sharp-shooting, the front
had to be examined with caution.... Having noticed the field and
the enemy’s batteries, etc., I returned to General Longstreet
for the purpose of conducting his column to this point, and
supervising, as might be necessary, the disposition of his
artillery. He was advancing by the ravine road (as most out of
view), time having already been lost in attempting another, which
proved objectionable because exposed to observation. On learning
the state of facts ahead, the general halted, and sent back to
hasten his artillery. Members of my staff were also despatched to
remedy, as far as practicable, the delay. Cabell’s, Alexander’s,
and Henry’s battalions at length arrived, and the whole column
moved towards the enemy’s left.... The enemy opened a furious
cannonade, the course of which rendered necessary a change in
the main artillery column. Cabell’s deflected to the left, while
Alexander’s was mainly parked for a season, somewhat under cover,
till it could advance to better purpose.... Soon after, at about
4 P.M., the general assault was made.”
Here is the whole of Pendleton’s celebrated report, so far as it bears
upon the hour of Longstreet’s attack on the 2d of July. Nothing is
omitted relating to the preliminary movements of Longstreet’s column
of attack, or that in any manner modifies the tenor of the parts
introduced.