LONGSTREET’S VERSION OF THE OPERATIONS OF JULY 2
“General Lee never in his life gave me orders to open an attack
at a specific hour. He was perfectly satisfied that when I had my
troops in position and was ordered to attack, no time was ever
lost.”--LONGSTREET ON THE SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG.
The hour, the feasibility, and point of attack have now been thoroughly
discussed, mainly from the stand-point of the official records. As
supplementary to the recitations of the official reports of Lee,
Longstreet, Pendleton, and others quoted on these heads, it seems
desirable to introduce just here General Longstreet’s version of his
operations on July 2, published so long ago as 1877, only twelve
years after Appomattox and two decades before he knew the tenor
of Pendleton’s report. It was given to the world long before the
publication of the official records by the government, to which he
could therefore have had no access. How closely he is confirmed in all
essential particulars by the records is marvellous. In this regard it
is to be noted that in all these controversies his statements have
always stood analysis in the light of all the evidence far better than
those of his reckless critics. The following is useful because it
comprehensively sums up from Longstreet’s stand-point all the movements
relating to fixing the point and time of his attack, the movement and
disposition of his troops, and other incidents:
[Illustration: SECOND DAY’S BATTLE, GETTYSBURG.]
“General Lee never in his life gave me orders to open an attack
at a specific hour. He was perfectly satisfied that when I had
my troops in position and was ordered to attack, no time was
ever lost. On the night of the 1st I left him without any
orders at all. On the morning of the 2d I went to General Lee’s
head-quarters at daylight and renewed my views against making
an attack. He seemed resolved, however, and we discussed the
probable results. We observed the position of the Federals and
got a general idea of the nature of the ground. About sunrise
General Lee sent Colonel Venable, of his staff, to General
Ewell’s head-quarters, ordering him to make a reconnoissance of
the ground in his front, with a view of making the main attack on
his left. A short time afterwards he followed Colonel Venable in
person. He returned at about nine o’clock and informed me that it
would not do to have Ewell open the attack. He finally determined
that I should make the main attack on the extreme right. It was
fully eleven o’clock when General Lee arrived at this conclusion
and ordered the movement. In the mean time, by General Lee’s
authority, Law’s brigade, which had been put upon picket duty,
was ordered to rejoin my command, and upon my suggestion that
it would be better to await its arrival, General Lee assented.
We waited about forty minutes for these troops and then moved
forward. A delay of several hours occurred in the march of the
troops. The cause of this delay was that we had been ordered by
General Lee to proceed cautiously upon the forward movement so
as to avoid being seen by the enemy. General Lee ordered Captain
Johnston, of his engineer corps, to lead and conduct the head
of the column. My troops therefore moved forward under guidance
of a special officer of General Lee, and with instructions to
follow his directions. I left General Lee only after the line had
stretched out on the march, and rode along with Hood’s division,
which was in the rear. The march was necessarily slow, the
conductor frequently encountering points that exposed the troops
to the view of the signal station on Round Top. At length the
column halted.
“After waiting some time, supposing that it would soon move
forward, I sent to the front to inquire the occasion of the
delay. It was reported that the column was awaiting the movements
of Captain Johnston, who was trying to lead it by some route by
which it could pursue its march without falling under view of the
Federal signal station. Looking up towards Round Top, I saw that
the signal station was in full view, and, as we could plainly
see this station, it was apparent that our heavy columns were
seen from their position and that further efforts to conceal
ourselves would be a waste of time.
“I became very impatient at this delay, and determined to take
upon myself the responsibility of hurrying the troops forward.
I did not order General McLaws forward because, as the head of
the column, he had direct orders from General Lee to follow the
conduct of Colonel Johnston. Therefore I sent orders to Hood,
who was in the rear and not encumbered by these instructions, to
push his division forward by the most direct route so as to take
position on my right. He did so, and thus broke up the delay. The
troops were rapidly thrown into position and preparations were
made for the attack.
“We had learned on the night of the 1st, from some prisoners
captured near Seminary Ridge, that the First, Eleventh, and
Third Corps had arrived by the Emmitsburg road and had taken
position on the heights in front of us, and that reinforcements
had been seen coming by the Baltimore road just after the fight
of the 1st. From an intercepted despatch we learned that another
corps was in camp about four miles from the field. We had every
reason, therefore, to believe that the Federals were prepared to
renew the battle. Our army was stretched in an elliptical curve,
reaching from the front of Round Top around Seminary Ridge, and
enveloping Cemetery Heights on the left; thus covering a space of
four or five miles. The enemy occupied the high ground in front
of us, being massed within a curve of about two miles, nearly
concentric with the curve described by our forces. His line was
about fourteen hundred yards from ours. Any one will see that
the proposition for this inferior force to assault and drive out
the masses of troops upon the heights was a very problematical
one. My orders from General Lee were ‘to envelop the enemy’s left
and begin the attack there, following up as near as possible the
direction of the Emmitsburg road.’
“My corps occupied our right, with Hood on the extreme right
and McLaws next. Hill’s corps was next to mine, in front of the
Federal centre, and Ewell was on our extreme left. My corps, with
Pickett’s division absent, numbered hardly thirteen thousand
men. I realized that the fight was to be a fearful one; but
being assured that my flank would be protected by the brigades of
Wilcox, Perry, Wright, Posey, and Mahone, moving _en echelon_,
and that Ewell was to co-operate by a direct attack on the
enemy’s right, and Hill to threaten his centre and attack if
opportunity offered, and thus prevent reinforcements from being
launched either against myself or Ewell, it seemed that we might
possibly dislodge the great army in front of us.”