GRADUAL CREATION OF AN EFFICIENT POLICE FORCE
Lord Dufferin left India in December, 1888. I went to Calcutta to see
him before he left, and had the honour of being introduced by him to
the new Viceroy, the Marquis of Lansdowne. I had reason to be very
grateful to Lord Dufferin for his confidence and encouragement and
unceasing support, and if he could have stayed to see the work finished
it would have given me infinite satisfaction. I had no less cause,
however, to be thankful to Lord Lansdowne.
During the four years I was in Burma, I was in constant communication
with the Viceroy; and every week, unless I was absent in distant
places, I wrote to him confidentially, keeping him fully informed of
events and of my wants and wishes. Lord Dufferin had asked me to write
to him in full confidence and regularly, and Lord Lansdowne allowed
me to continue the practice. It was an addition, and often not an
insignificant addition, to my work. It repaid me, for it established
and maintained confidential relations between the Viceroy and his
subordinate in Burma. It was a great help to the Chief Commissioner,
who had no one on the spot to whom he could open his mind.
I have noticed already the change in the province and the diversion
of attention from the interior to the frontier districts. This change
shows itself very clearly in my correspondence with the Viceroy, which
reflected the matters giving me most anxiety from week to week. During
the first half of 1889 the affairs of the frontiers occupied the chief
place. I have given their history in separate chapters.
It might be thought, from the space I have given to dacoits and their
leaders, that the time had hardly yet come for reducing the military
police. In truth the struggle with the dacoits was drawing to a close,
and the forces of order were winning all along the line. The outbursts
in Magwè and elsewhere were like the last dying efforts of a fire.
The extent to which the military police and the troops had changed
places can best be understood from this, that on the 1st of January,
1887, the troops held one hundred and forty-two posts and the military
police fifty-six. On the 1st of January, 1889, the police held one
hundred and ninety-two posts and the troops forty-one. And the state
of the province was such as to lead me to consider the possibility of
reducing the military police strength.
It has been seen how the withdrawal of the troops led for a time to
renewed activity on the part of the discontented and criminal classes.
With this experience before us it was resolved to move with the
greatest caution, and to feel our way step by step. The following
procedure was adopted. The state of each district and of its
subdivisions was carefully reviewed. The posts which might be
altogether withdrawn were first selected, then those of which the
garrisons might be reduced in numbers. The changes thus determined were
to be made gradually, so as to attract as little attention as might
be. The men brought in from the posts were not to leave the district
at once, but were to remain at headquarters, where their discipline,
drill, and musketry could be worked up.
If it should appear from an increase in disorder that reduction had
been premature, the mistake could be remedied at once by ordering the
men back to their posts. If, on the contrary, no mischief followed,
the surplus men were to be drafted, by companies if possible, into a
provincial reserve battalion, which would be brought to a high standard
of military efficiency, and would be available in case of need for
any part of the province. Finally, when the reserve battalion became
crowded, I proposed to offer the trained companies to the army, if the
Commander-in-Chief would accept them and if the men would take military
service, of which there was no doubt.
This scheme was carried out, and continued until the strength of the
military police force was not greater than the Government of Burma
needed.
Another change was made in order to reduce the forces, namely, the
amalgamation of two or more battalions under one Commandant. It was
necessary at first to give a separate battalion to each district, in
order that each Deputy Commissioner should have a sufficient force of
military police at his hand and under his control. But when the country
became peaceful and active service was rarely called for, there was
no reason for maintaining an organization that was costly in money
and men. Thus by doubling up the battalions, aggregating nineteen
companies, in the Eastern Division, into one battalion of fifteen
companies, four companies were saved and drafted into the Reserve.
This process went on until, in the year 1892, seven fine regiments
had been given to the army. These were treated at first and for some
time as local regiments attached to the province. Of late years,
however, the policy in the Indian Army has been to obliterate all local
distinctions and to make service general.
The strength of the military police in Upper Burma now is, I
understand, fifteen thousand men in round numbers. The strength in
1889 was eighteen thousand. The reduction, therefore, has not been
so very great. The fact is that no sooner had the interior of the
province been reduced to order, than fresh territory began to come
under administration. Vast tracts of hill country on the east, on the
north, and on the west, which were left to themselves in 1890, are now
held by the military police. From the frontier of French Indo-China
on the east to the Bengal boundary on the west, and northwards along
the Chinese boundary wherever it may be, the military police keep the
marches of Burma. In the mountains inhabited by Kachin tribes on the
north and east of the Myitkyina district, the whole of this troublesome
borderland is held by the police. Sixteen hundred and twelve rifles,
with forty-one native officers and nine British officers, more than a
tenth of the whole strength, are stationed in this district, which in
1887 was outside the pale. The Shan States and the Chin country are
similarly garrisoned.[32]
I have always felt that our failure to train the Burmans to be soldiers
is a blot on our escutcheon. I have mentioned an experiment to enlist
Karens. This succeeded for a time. The men learnt their drill quickly,
and as trackers and for forest work they were very useful. It was
decided in 1891 to raise a Karen battalion, with which, and an Indian
battalion, it was proposed to form a military police force for Lower
Burma. The Karens were placed on the same footing as the Indians, and
British officers were appointed to command them. In drill, endurance in
the field, and courage, the Karen showed himself a good man. But from
some cause he failed in discipline, and in 1899 it was found advisable,
owing to insubordinate conduct, to disband the battalion and distribute
the companies among the Indian battalions. There has been more success,
I am told, with the Kachins, who are showing themselves trustworthy.
They are certainly a strong race, probably the strongest we have in
Burma.
Another direction in which the change from the sword to the plough
and the pen was showing itself was in the prominence given to the
administration of the civil police. It is very easy to get up a cry
against the police in Burma or in India, but they will not be improved
by constant abuse, frequent prosecutions, censures, and condemnations
by High Court judges, or still less competent critics, or by other
methods of giving a service a bad name.
One of the hardest tasks connected with the administration of a country
by foreign rulers is the creation of a good police force. When the
people from whom the force has to be recruited have lived for years
under a despotic and altogether corrupt government, the task becomes
doubly hard. And when the foreigners appointed to officer and train
the force have for the most part no knowledge of police work and no
acquaintance with the vernacular of the people, the task would have
made Hercules drown himself in the nearest ditch.
It had to be done, however, and it was undertaken. The work had not
gone far in 1890, but it was started, and two good and experienced
police officers of high standing had been appointed to go round Upper
Burma, district by district, and instruct the English officers. It
was not possible at that time to find Burmans fit to take charge of
the police of a district. I do not know whether such men are yet
forthcoming.[33] We are well advanced in the second century of our rule
in India, yet I believe there are few Indian gentlemen who are willing
to take an appointment in the police and fewer still who are well
fitted for it.
The question of the civil police in Lower Burma was taken up
systematically in 1888. A committee was appointed by me to diagnose
the ailment from which the police were suffering, and to prescribe
remedies. On their report in 1889 a scheme was drawn up, the main
features of which were the division of the Lower Burma force into
military and civil, the former, as in Upper Burma, to be recruited from
India and partly, it was then hoped, from the Karen people, the latter
to be natives of the country. To the latter was to be entrusted all
police work of detection and prevention. They were to be subjected to
drill and discipline and accustomed to stand alone, and they were to
be schooled and trained to police duties. The military police force
was to be organized as one regiment under a military officer. Their
headquarters were to be in Rangoon, and they were to furnish such
detachments for outdistricts as might be wanted from time to time. This
scheme, with little alteration, was carried out in 1891, and I believe
is still in force.
[Illustration: SHAN STATES]
FOOTNOTES:
[32] This is well brought out by Lieut-Colonel S. C. F. Peile in his
"History of the Burma Military Police" (Rangoon, 1906), p. 12.
[33] I have learnt from Sir Herbert White that two Burman officers hold
the rank of District Superintendents of Police with credit.