CHAPTER IV. FROM IVAN THE GREAT TO IVAN THE TERRIBLE

The great ruler who occupied the throne of Moscow at the end of

the fifteenth century, was richly endowed with understanding;

to his contemporaries he appeared more lucky than active,

but meanwhile it was his active mind that directed all the

complicated and tangled threads of the foreign and domestic

relations. If his contemporaries did not always do justice

to the great unificator of the land of Russia, neither is

posterity always just to him. We must allow that much had been

prepared by his predecessors, and this was also recognised

by contemporaries; but it is nevertheless impossible not to

acknowledge that Ivan towers far above his predecessors,

both by his solution of ancient problems--the unification of

Russia (which he had almost completed) and the throwing off

of the Tatar yoke--and the raising of new ones. The ability

to take advantage of circumstances places Ivan in the rank

of great men. If we do not recognise his greatness, then we

must apply the same judgment in part to Peter, who was largely

only the more determined successor of his brother, father, and

grandfather.--BESTUZHEV RIUMIN.[b]

ACCESSION OF IVAN (III) VASILIEVITCH

[Sidenote: [1462-1584 A.D.]]

The dynasty of the Muscovite princes, which commenced in the person

of Ivan Kalita, and was preserved unbroken in the lineal descent,

was fortunately strengthened by the accident of the longevity of his

successors. The reigns of Ivan, of Simeon the Proud, of Dmitri Donskoi,

of Vasili, and of Vasili the Blind, embraced a period of 130 years.

During that time the people had become habituated to a right which saved

them from the contests of rival competitors. So many protracted reigns

had stamped the legitimate authority with an unquestioned ascendency, and

with this growth of time its powers inevitably increased. The manners of

the Russians were now formed under a rule in which the succession was

fixed and immutable, and under which a progressive system of legislation

was gradually assuming a compact and tangible form. The chaos of

antagonistic principles--of that misrule which is born of short-lived

theories, of constant interruption, and unsettled governments--was

rapidly dissolving; the light of defined administration and regulated

power was rising upon the empire; and the people, who were now beginning

to understand the benefits of constituted rights, were ready to support

their maintenance.

Under these auspicious circumstances, Ivan III, or, as he is called by

some historians, Ivan the Great, ascended the throne.

It was not to be expected that a liberal and enlightened government could

at once spring from the materials which were accumulated in seasons of

anarchy, relieved only by interstitial gleams of peace. The natural

issue of a power purchased by enormous sacrifices, and reared up amidst

difficulties, was unmitigated despotism. The grand princedom was erected

in storms. Its power was built up by constant accessions won at the point

of the sword, or procured by profligate bribery. It was not the growth

of steady improvement, of public opinion, of the voluntary acquiescence

of the people. It began by direct oppression, absolute tyranny, and

open injustice. The acts of outrage which the grand princes committed

in their efforts to sustain their authority were acts of necessity.

They were placed in a situation of peril that exposed them equally to

barbarian spoilers without, and insidious enemies within; and they were

compelled to vindicate their authority by the force of arms and the arts

of perfidy. Their whole career was a fluctuating war against a series of

resistances. They conciliated less than they subdued, and the unity which

was at last gained by perseverance in a mixed policy of violence and

hypocrisy was more the bond of an interest in common, than the reasonable

allegiance of a free people to a government of their own choice.

Throughout the struggle for the concentration of the supreme control

in one head the church, as will already have been perceived, bore a

prominent part. The authority of the clergy had gone on gradually

assuming a more stern and arbitrary aspect, even while the political

affairs of the country were undergoing daily vicissitudes. The evils

that afflicted the state passed harmless over the church; and while

the one was subjected to disasters that checked its progress towards

prosperity, the other was constantly enlarging its powers, profiting

by the misfortunes that surrounded it, and gleaning its share of the

good fortune that occasionally improved the hopes of the people. In the

early periods when Russia was merely the victim of her own dissensions,

the church was freely admitted as a mediator, partly in virtue of her

office as the dispenser of charity and peace, and partly from the

veneration in which religion and its ordinances were held. When the

Tatars invaded Russia, they perceived the mighty influence which the

priests exercised over the passions of the people, and, fully persuaded

of the wisdom of attaching to their cause an order of men who wielded so

enormous a power, they increased their privileges, exonerated them from

taxes, and placed such premiums of gain and protection upon the monkish

habit, that the highest amongst the nobility, and many of the princes,

embraced the clerical profession, and added their rich possessions to

the revenues of the church. To such an extravagance was this estimation

of the benefits of the cowl carried, that the majority of the grand

princes took vows before their death, and died in the retired sanctuaries

of the religious houses. The monks of the Greek religion, loaded with

the spoils of friends and enemies, lived in fortified dwellings, like

the nobles of other lands, and were defended by formidable retinues.

The primate held a court superior in magnificence to that of the grand

prince, and surrounded by boyars, guards, and all the luxuries of the

east, he possessed almost unlimited power over life and death; he was

the first person who was consulted on all questions of difficulty, and,

as a means of exhibiting the supremacy of his station, he instituted

public ceremonies, at which the princes assisted, holding the bridle

of the ass on which he rode. This tendency of the church to outgrow

the space wherein its roots were laid, was greatly forwarded by the

fertilizing contributions which flowed in upon it from all quarters.

Whenever a phenomenon in the physical world alarmed the superstitions

of the people, the major part of the population bequeathed their wealth

to the monasteries, with the hope of propitiating the favour of Heaven

and securing happiness in the next world. The corruptions of the church

of Rome had already crept into the administration of the Greek faith.

The system of donations that prevailed in Papal Italy, where even the

kingdoms of earth were bartered for the kingdom of heaven, had set an

example of which the Russian clergy were not slow to avail themselves.

It was, perhaps, a natural conclusion that the clemency of the Godhead

could be purchased in a country where earthly justice and exemptions from

punishments were sold for pecuniary considerations.

But the lenity and favour shown by the Tatars to the Greek clergy did not

produce the effect upon which they calculated. The Tatars, accustomed to

rule people of different religions, and possessing within themselves no

ecclesiastical foundations, for their wandering mode of life prevented

their priesthood from resolving itself into a corporation, viewed with

comparative indifference the spreading institutions and growing strength

of the church. They only contemplated in the honours and advantages they

heaped upon it, the policy of gaining over to their side a powerful

body of auxiliaries. But the indestructible spirit of Christianity

shrunk from a union with the creed of the pagans; while the barbarous

intolerance of the Tatars furnished a further motive to array the priests

against the enemies of their religion and their country. They knew that

in the grand princedom resided the sole power by which the Tatars were

ultimately to be driven out of the land; they saw that to arm that

power with sufficient means it was necessary to enrich its treasury, to

enlarge its bounds, and to attract within the circle of its sway the

allegiance of the whole of the Russian principalities; they perceived

in the civil commotions that oppressed the empire a constant source of

internal weakness, and they dedicated their energies and their influence

to the one object of rendering the grand prince supreme. Mohammedanism

assailed them on the one hand, and the papal church on the other: they

wanted a rallying point of resistance against both; and they could only

find it in the elevation of the throne to an imperial height. Hence, the

clergy supported the principle of legitimacy, which by its consistency

and perpetuity was calculated to promote the progressive ascension

of the princely authority; and thus by degrees, and the inevitable

progress of an active doctrine that survived through every obstacle, the

church became blended with the state; and the policy of the priesthood,

exercising its subtle influence governed and directed the motions of the

civil jurisdiction.

CHARACTER AND AIMS OF IVAN

Ivan the Great, favoured by such auspicious dispositions on the part of

the clergy, and by the rapid coherence of the principalities, ascended

the throne in 1462, at the age of twenty-two. He was a man of great

cunning and prudence, and was remarkable for indomitable perseverance,

which carried him triumphantly to the conclusions of his designs in a

spirit of utter indifference to the ruin or bad faith that tracked his

progress. Such a man alone, who was prepared to sacrifice the scruples

of honour and the demands of justice, was fit to meet the difficulties

by which the grand princedom was surrounded. He saw them all clearly,

resolved upon the course he should take; and throughout a long reign,

in which the paramount ambition of rendering Russia independent and

the throne supreme was the leading feature of his policy, he pursued

his plans with undeviating consistency. But that policy was not to be

accomplished by open and responsible acts. The whole character of Ivan

was tinged with the duplicity of the churchmen who held so high a place

in his councils. His proceedings were neither direct, nor at first

apparently conducive to the interests of the empire; but the great cause

was secretly advancing against all impediments. While he forbore to risk

his advantages, he left an opportunity for disunion amongst his enemies,

by which he was certain to gain in the end. He never committed himself

to a position of the security of which he was not sure; and he carried

this spirit of caution to such an extremity that many of the early years

of his reign present a succession of timid and vacillating movements,

that more nearly resemble the subterfuges of a coward than the crafty

artifices of a despot.

[Sidenote: [1467-1472 A.D.]]

The objects of which he never lost sight were, to free himself from

enemies abroad, and to convert the princedom at home into an autocracy.

So extensive a design could not have been effected by mere force of arms,

for he had so many domestic and foreign foes to meet at once, and so many

points of attack and defence to cover, that it was impossible to conduct

so grand a project by military means alone. That which he could not

effect, therefore, by the sword, he endeavoured to perform by diplomatic

intrigue; and thus, between the occasional victories of his armies,

and the still more powerful influence of his subtle policy, he reduced

his foes, and raised himself to an eminence to which none of his most

ambitious predecessors had aspired.

The powers against whom he had to wage this double war of arms and

diplomacy were the Tatars and Lithuanians, beyond the frontier; and the

independent republics of Novgorod, Viatka, and Pskov, and the princes

of the yet unsettled appanages within. The means he had at his command

were fully sufficient to have enabled him to subdue those princes of the

blood who exhibited faint signs of discontent in their appanages, and who

could have been easily reached through the widely diffused agency of the

boyars; but the obstinate republics of the north were more difficult of

access. They stood boldly upon their independence, and every attempt to

reduce them was followed by as fierce a resistance, and by such a lavish

outlay of the wealth which their commercial advantages had enabled them

to amass, that the task was one of extraordinary difficulty. Kazan, too,

the first and greatest of the Tatar cities, claimed a sovereignty over

the republics, which Ivan was afraid to contest, lest that which was but

a vague and empty claim might end in confirmed authority. It was better

to permit the insolent republicans to maintain their entire freedom, than

to hazard by indiscretion their transference to the hands of those Tatars

who were loosened from the parent stock.

His first act, therefore, was to acknowledge, directly or indirectly,

according to the nature of their different tenures, the rights of all

his foes within and without. He appeared to admit the justice of things

as he found them; betrayed his foreign enemies into a confidential

reliance upon his acquiescence in their exactions; and even yielded

without a murmur to an abuse of those pretensions to which he affected to

submit, but which he was secretly resolved to annihilate. This plausible

conformity procured him time to prepare and mature his designs; and so

insidiously did he pursue his purpose, that he extended that time by

a servility which nearly forfeited the attachment of the people. The

immediate object of consideration was obviously the Golden Horde, because

all the princes and republics, and even the Poles and Lithuanians, were

interested in any movement that was calculated to embarrass the common

enemy. Ivan’s policy was to unite as many of his enemies as he could

against a single one, and finally to subdue them all by the aid of each

other. Had he ventured upon any less certain course, he must have risked

a similar combination against himself. He began by withholding the

ordinary tribute from the khan, but without exhibiting any symptoms of

inallegiance. He merely evaded the tax, while he acknowledged the right;

and his dissimulation succeeded in blinding the Tatar, who still believed

that he held the grand prince as a tributary, although he did not

receive his tribute. The khan, completely deceived, not only permitted

this recusancy to escape with impunity, but was further prevailed upon

to withdraw the Tatar residents, and their retinues, and the Tatar

merchants, who dwelt in Moscow, and who infested with the haughty bearing

of masters even the avenues of the Kremlin.[g]

IVAN VASILIEVITCH MARRIES THE GREEK PRINCESS SOPHIA (1472 A.D.)

[Sidenote: [1472 A.D.]]

By completing the work of his predecessors in destroying the independence

of the townships and the appanaged princes, Ivan created the empire

of Moscow. The form of government of this empire and all the outward

surroundings of power were greatly influenced by the marriage of Ivan

to Sophia, daughter of Thomas Palæologus, and niece of the last emperor

of Byzantium, who brought to Moscow the customs and traditions of the

Byzantine Empire. Ivan had lost his first wife in 1467, and two years

later the question arose of his marriage with the Greek princess. Thomas

Palæologus had retired with his family to Rome; the idea of finding

a bridegroom for his daughter belongs to the Greek vissarion, one of

the most zealous partisans of the union and at that time cardinal. The

cardinal and pope had naturally in view the finding of a new champion

against the then terrible Turks, and at the same time of bringing Russia

into the union. The envoy sent to Moscow was a Greek by the name of Iuri,

who said that Sophia had several suitors, whom she had refused because

she did not wish to enter the Latin church. Ivan, after taking counsel

with his mother and boyars, sent to Rome Karl Friazin (whose brother

Ivan had been coiner of money at the court of Moscow) to see the bride

and confer with the pope; the latter gave his consent and required that

boyars should be sent from Moscow to fetch the bride; Friazin was sent

for the bride and carried on the negotiations; finally in June, 1472,

Sophia, accompanied by the papal legate, left Rome. She was met with

honours at Pskov in November of the same year, and was afterwards greeted

with like homage at Novgorod. When Sophia was drawing near Moscow, warm

disputes arose in the grand prince’s council as to whether it could be

allowed that a Latin crucifix should be carried before the legate. The

metropolitan declared that in the event of it being permitted, the pope’s

legate should enter by one gate and he at another: it is unbecoming to

us to hear of such a thing, not to say witness it, for he who shows

honour and love to another religion offends his own; finally the legate

had to enter without the crucifix. On the day of the entry the marriage

ceremony took place (November 12), after which the legate presented his

credentials and entered into a controversy with the metropolitan Philip,

who called to his aid the scribe Nikita Popovitch. The chronicler says

that being in despair of getting the better of the Russian scribes, the

legate gave up the controversy, saying that he had no books with him.[b]

The marriage of the sovereign of Moscow with the Greek princess was

an event of great importance in Russian history. Properly speaking,

an alliance with the Byzantine emperors was not a novelty, and such

marriages, excepting the first of them--that of St. Vladimir--had no

important consequences and changed nothing essential in Russian life.

But the marriage of Ivan with Sophia was concluded under peculiar

circumstances. In the first place, his bride did not come from Greece,

but from Italy, and her marriage opened the way to intercourse between

Muscovite Russia and the west. In the second place, the empire of

Byzantium had ceased to exist, and the customs, political conceptions,

the manners and ceremonies of court life, deprived of their original

soil, sought a fresh field and found it in a country of a like

faith--Russia. As long as Byzantium had existed, although Russia adopted

her entire ecclesiastical system, yet in political respects she had

always remained purely Russian, and the Greeks had no inclination to

transform Russia into a Byzantium; now, however, that Byzantium no longer

existed, the idea arose that Greece ought to re-incarnate herself in

Russia and that the Russian monarchy ought to be a continuation by right

of succession of Byzantium, in the same degree as the Russian Church

was by order of succession bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of

the Greek church. It happened opportunely that eastern Russia had freed

herself from the subjugation of the Tatars precisely at the time when

Byzantium was enslaved by the Turks, and there arose the hope that the

youthful Russian monarchy, strengthened and consolidated, would become

the chief mover in the liberation of Greece.

The marriage of Sophia with the Russian grand prince thus acquired the

signification of a transfer of the hereditary rights of the descendants

of Palæologus to the ruling house of Russia. It is true that Sophia had

brothers who had otherwise disposed of their hereditary rights; one of

them, Manuel, had submitted to the Turkish sultan, another, Andrew, had

twice visited Moscow, but had not stayed there long, and had gone to

Italy and sold his hereditary rights, first to the French king Charles

VIII, and afterwards to the Spanish Ferdinand the Catholic. But in the

eyes of the orthodox a transfer of the rights of the Byzantine monarchs

to Catholic kings could not be regarded as lawful; and such being the

case a far greater right was represented by Sophia, who had remained

faithful to orthodoxy, who was the wife of an orthodox sovereign, who

must become and did become the mother and ancestress of his successors,

and who during her lifetime earned the reproaches of the pope and his

partisans, who had been greatly mistaken in counting on her mediation to

bring Muscovite Russia into the Florentine union.

THE GROWTH OF AUTOCRACY

The first visible and outward sign of the fact that Russia came to regard

herself as a successor to Greece, was the adoption of the two-headed

eagle, the arms of the eastern Roman Empire, which thenceforth became the

arms of Russia. From that time much in Russia was changed and assumed a

Byzantine likeness; the change was not effected suddenly, but proceeded

during the entire reign of Ivan Vasilievitch and continued after his

death. In the court household the high-sounding title of czar was

introduced, and the custom of kissing the monarch’s hand. Court ranks

were established also: master of the stables, master of the horse, and

chamberlains (the latter, however, appeared only at the end of Ivan’s

reign). The importance of the boyars as the highest class of society

fell before an autocratic sovereign; all became equal, all alike were

his slaves. The honourable appellation of boyar was bestowed by the

grand prince as a reward for services; besides the boyars there was

also created a somewhat lower rank--that of the Iokolnitchi[24]--the

commencement of the Russian hierarchy of ranks. To the time of Ivan

Vasilievitch may also be attributed the establishment of bureaus

(_prikazi_) with their secretaries and clerks. But most important and

essential of all was the change in the dignity attaching to the grand

prince, strongly to be felt and clearly visible in the actions of the

deliberate Ivan Vasilievitch; the grand prince had become an autocratic

sovereign. Even in his predecessors do we notice an approximation to

this, but the first autocrat in the full sense of the word was Ivan

Vasilievitch, and he became so especially after his marriage to Sophia.

From that time all his activity was consistently and unswervingly

consecrated to the strengthening of monarchy and autocracy.[c]

SUBJUGATION OF THE REPUBLICS

From the beginning of Ivan’s reign there was no change in political

policy; the old system of the gradual annihilation of the independent

republican communities and appanaged princes continued, as well as

the old waiting policy in regard to the Tatars, which was based on

the exploitation of their internecine quarrels. Vasili had already

prepared to deal the final blow to Novgorod, but had been prevented by

the interference of Archbishop Jonas; and the inhabitants, remembering

this, were in expectation of fresh action on the part of Moscow and

sought support from other quarters. Such support could at that time be

afforded them only by the grand prince of Lithuania, but it was difficult

for the people of Novgorod to enter into relations with him, because

such relations would have the signification of a betrayal of orthodoxy.

This being well understood at Moscow, the rulers there hastened to

forestall the danger: the grand prince wrote a letter to Archbishop

Jonas, declaring to him that the Lithuanian metropolitan Gregory was a

disciple of Isidore and a defender of the “unia,” and that relations

with him must not be entered into. In order to support the right on his

side, the metropolitan of Moscow in the interests of Novgorod rejected

the solicitations of the people of Pskov who wished to have a separate

bishop; the grand prince himself left unheeded the insults shown to men

of Moscow in Novgorod, and even the infringement of his ancient princely

rights. Occupied in a war with Kazan, he only exchanged embassies with

Novgorod.

[Sidenote: [1475 A.D.]]

Meanwhile the party in Novgorod which was hostile to Moscow became more

and more rampant; the leaders of this party were the Boretski, the

children of the dead burgomaster (_posadnick_). They were incited by

their mother Martha, who as an “honourable widow” enjoyed great esteem;

the Boretski were wealthy and had great influence in the _vetché_. At

their instigation Prince Michael Olelkovitch, brother of Simon, prince

of Kiev, was invited to come from Lithuania to Novgorod. Previously the

Lithuanian princes that had been called upon to serve Novgorod had lived

together with the Muscovite lieutenants; now the question was already

different and the Lithuanian party decided to go further. At the end of

1470 Jonas died and the question was raised in the vetché of having the

archbishop nominated in Lithuania; this time, however, the archbishop

Theophilus was chosen and his partisans stood out for his consecration

in Moscow and were successful, so that a consent to his passing through

was obtained from the grand prince. An ambassador coming from Pskov with

the news that the grand prince called the men of Pskov upon Novgorod,

and offering proposals of mediation, again gave preponderance to the

Lithuanian party. The vetché assembled, and people in it began to cry

out: “We are free men of great Novgorod and the grand prince of Moscow

does us many wrongs and much injustice; we are for the king of Poland;”

with the help of the “wicked peasants of the vetché” they gained the

victory, and an embassy was sent to Casimir, the result of which was a

convention for the submission of Novgorod to him. Olelkovitch soon left

Novgorod, having wronged the provinces of Novgorod in various ways.

The grand prince still wished to try peaceful measures and sent his

ambassador to Novgorod with an exhortation, and the metropolitan Philip

sent a letter of admonishment. After the failure of this embassy the

grand prince assembled his council (_douma_) and proposed the question:

Shall we march on Novgorod now or wait until winter? It was well known

that a march to Novgorod in summer was very difficult, yet it was decided

to go at once, and a declaration of war was sent. In July, 1471, the

grand prince himself with troops from Moscow and Tver, and accompanied

by his brothers, set out from Moscow; the men of Pskov joined the Moscow

troops on the way. A religious character was given to the expedition.

Before starting, the grand prince went to pray in the cathedral of

Moscow, and chroniclers liken this expedition to that of Gideon against

the Midianites and that of Dmitri against Mamai.

After the battle at Tskorost, Prince Kholmski, a voyevod of Ivan,

decisively defeated the people of Novgorod at the river Shelon (July

14th, 1475?) and the same day the Moscow voyevod Obrazets defeated

Prince Vasili Shuiski, who was in the service of Novgorod, at the river

Shilenga, and subjugated all the Dvinsk territories; “everywhere the

Lord God helped the grand prince to defend his rights.” Nothing remained

for Novgorod but to submit, for Casimir, occupied with his own affairs,

had not come to her defence. Ivan, coming after his armies, first had

Boretski and three other prisoners put to death, then he relented,

accepted the petition of Theophilus which was supported by a letter from

the metropolitan, took a ransom of 15,500 roubles from Novgorod, and

concluded a treaty by which the inhabitants were bound not to be subject

to Lithuania and to have their archbishop nominated at Moscow.

[Sidenote: [1477-1479 A.D.]]

In October, 1475, Ivan visited Novgorod and remained there until

February, 1476. Received with honours and gifts by great Novgorod and

her dignitaries, the grand prince administered justice as of old;

the Slavnovski and Nikitinski appeared with a complaint against the

honourable burgomaster (_posadnick_), Vasili Annanin, and nineteen other

boyars who had attacked and robbed them; a similar complaint was brought

by the boyars Ponarin against other boyars who had made incursions into

their lands and robbed them; for such incursions were of very frequent

occurrence in Novgorod. Ivan sent the guilty persons to be imprisoned in

Moscow, observing in his judgment all the ancient forms, and requiring

that with his commissaries there should also be sent commissaries from

Novgorod; it was also then that he allowed the authorities of Novgorod

to conclude, as in ancient times, a treaty with Sweden. In 1477

complainants from Novgorod came to Moscow; “Such a thing,” says the

chronicle, “had never happened before since the beginning of Novgorod

and since it began to have grand princes from the house of Rurik.” Their

coming was quite comprehensible; the smaller folk were persuaded that it

was only by appealing to the tribunal of the grand prince that they could

obtain redress against the greater, and therefore they had recourse to

him. Such a result having been attained, it only remained to await the

first pretext in order to put an end to the independence of Novgorod. The

occasion soon presented itself; in 1477 the envoys from the bishop and

from all Novgorod, Nazar of Podvoiski and Zacharias, the secretary of the

vetché, called Ivan and his son, young Ivan, _gospodá_ and not lords,[25]

as had always been previously done, and the grand prince sent ambassadors

to Novgorod to demand the confirmation of this title. Tumults, brawls,

and even murder took place in Novgorod, and the ambassador was sent away

with an insulting message. Then Ivan assembled his troops to go against

Novgorod; he called upon Tver and Pskov for aid, ordered his brothers to

assemble, and sending before him the Tatar prince, Daniar Kasimovitch,

he set out himself. The people of Novgorod began to negotiate while the

grand prince was still on the way; they had even tried to do so before,

but Ivan, properly calculating that a satisfactory result could only be

obtained by a warlike demonstration, avoided negotiations. All December,

1477, and the beginning of January, 1478, passed in negotiations; finally

Novgorod submitted when her defender, Prince Vasili Shuiski, bent his

knee[26] before Ivan and refused to serve Novgorod any longer. Novgorod

submitted to the “entire will” of Ivan; the vetché was abolished and its

great bell taken to Moscow to ring with other bells; estates were taken

from the monasteries, and allotted to the grand prince, the first example

of secularisation: till then the princes had not possessed estates

in Novgorod. When he left, Ivan took with him the boyars and Martha

Boretski, who is said to have died at Staritza.

It is reported that in 1479 Novgorod again tried to enter into relations

with Casimir, and taking advantage of threatening danger from the Golden

Horde, re-established the ancient form of government, and that the grand

prince came to the town, ordered the gates to be opened, frustrated the

attempt at the very beginning, and took away many of the inhabitants with

him. This account is confirmed by the fact that other chronicles speak

of the arrival of the grand prince at Novgorod, and of the imprisonment

of the archbishop Theophilus. The loss of their independence was a heavy

blow to the people, and as a consolation legends were composed of the

foolishness of the first bishop sent from Moscow, Sergius by name, and of

the flame that came out of the tomb of St. Bartholomew of Khoutinski and

burned the feet of the grand prince.

Viatka, whose inhabitants refused to help the Moscow troops in the war

against Kazan in 1469, was definitively subdued in 1489. The policy of

the transfer of the natives to the ancient provinces and of sending

others to take their places, was also applied to Viatka.

Pskov remained submissive and thereby preserved a shadow of independence;

but the grand prince kept a zealous watch over all that was done there

and did not allow any aspirations to greater independence. Although

consenting that the inhabitants might ask for any prince they wished, he

did not approve of any wilful change of princes, and strongly took the

part of Prince Iaroslav Obolenski, who had had a quarrel with Pskov and

whom the people wished to get rid of; it was only the desire to have done

with Novgorod that induced the grand prince to give way to Pskov and give

them a new lieutenant--Prince Vasili Shuiski (1477). When, later, Ivan

named his son Vasili grand prince of Novgorod and Pskov, the inhabitants

sent an envoy begging that they might be separated, but the grand prince

replied wrathfully that he would give the principality to whomsoever he

liked; Pskov also endeavoured in vain to get its province separated from

the rule of the bishop of Novgorod.

[Sidenote: [1482-1485 A.D.]]

Towards the appanaged princes Ivan pursued the same policy as towards

the townships. Vasili, prince of Riazan, had already been taken by

Vasili the Dark to be educated in Moscow; in 1464 he was sent back to

Riazan, returned to Moscow, married a sister of the grand prince and went

back to Riazan. He died in 1483, leaving two sons: Ivan and Theodore.

Ivan, as grand prince, concluded a treaty with Moscow by which he was

placed on a level with the brother of the grand prince of Moscow, Andrew

Vasilievitch. In 1496 a treaty was concluded between the brothers, by

which the younger was bound, in case he were to die childless, to leave

his share to his elder brother; but Prince Theodore survived his brother

and bequeathed his share to the grand prince of Moscow. In the year

1500 Ivan, grand prince of Riazan, died, leaving a young son under the

guardianship of his mother and grandmother, who were entirely subservient

to the prince of Moscow.

Since 1461 the prince of Tver, Michael Borisovitch, was Ivan’s

brother-in-law. When he came to the throne Ivan concluded a treaty with

him, but although Michael helped Ivan against Novgorod, yet in their

mutual relations the signs that usually preceded the fall of a separate

principality might be observed. In 1476 certain boyars of Tver went over

to Moscow. In 1484 it became known in Moscow that the prince of Tver

had concluded a treaty with Casimir and married his granddaughter. Ivan

sent troops to lay waste the districts around Tver; Michael hastened to

appease him and concluded a new treaty with him, by which the prince

of Tver was placed on a level with the second brother of the Moscow

grand prince and bound himself not to appeal to Lithuania without his

consent. Meanwhile the departure of the boyars from Tver continued and

Ivan encouraged them by his policy; in the event of frontier disputes,

if the men of Tver were injured they could not obtain justice, but if

those of Moscow were injured, Ivan rigorously demanded satisfaction.

Michael entered into relations with Casimir, but the envoy was seized,

and Ivan sent his troops to Tver; the town surrendered, and Michael fled

to Lithuania. In 1463 the princes of Iaroslav ceded their domain to the

Muscovite monarch, and in 1474 the princes of Rostov, who ruled over only

half of Rostov, for the other half had already been acquired by Kalita,

sold their half to the grand prince. Equally slowly and gradually did

the grand prince also crush the appanaged princes of Moscow; all these

princes were his brothers, with the exception of Michael Andreevitch

Vereiski (the son of Andrew Dmitrievitch, brother of Ivan of Mozhaisk).

With Michael Ivan concluded several treaties that gradually cut down his

rights; finally by the treaty of 1482 Michael ceded, after his death,

Belozero to the grand prince. There was no pretext for this annexation,

but one was soon found; desiring to make a present to his daughter-in-law

Helen[27] (upon the occasion of the birth of his grandson Dmitri) of the

ornaments that had belonged to his first wife, Ivan learned that the

grand princess Sophia had given away much to her niece, who was married

to a son of Michael named Vasili; the irritated grand prince then

ordered Vasili to be seized, but he fled to Lithuania; whereupon Ivan

took Vereia from Michael and only returned it to him as a possession for

life. Michael Andreevitch died in 1485, leaving his domains by will to

the grand prince. The appanages of the brothers also little by little,

for one reason or another, were joined to the grand principality; in 1472

Iuri Vasilievitch, of Dmitriev, died, without leaving any testamentary

disposition of his territory; the grand prince took possession of it; the

brothers were angered, but satisfying them with some provinces, the grand

prince concluded a treaty with two of them, Andrew of Uglitch and Boris

of Volotsk, by which they recognised the priority of their nephew Ivan

the Younger and renounced the succession after their brother.

In 1480 the younger brothers again rose against the elder, and Prince

Obolenski Liko went from Moscow to enter the service of Boris; Ivan,

probably learning of his brother’s relations with the people of Novgorod,

ordered Prince Obolenski to be seized at the court of Boris. The princes

went to Rzhev, thence to the boundary of Lithuania, and entered into

relations with Casimir, who however did not help them. Until then they

had rejected negotiations, but seeing Casimir’s inaction, they asked for

the intercession of their mother, but Ivan refused them; they also sought

support in Pskov, but were unsuccessful. The invasion of Ahmed induced

Ivan to make peace with his brothers, and Andrew received a part of the

appanage of Iuriev. Andrew the younger died in 1481, leaving his domain

to the grand prince. In 1484 the mother of the grand prince, who had in

some degree restrained the dissensions of the brothers, died, and in

1486 Ivan bound his brothers by a new treaty to renounce their rights of

inheritance in regard to appanages. In 1491 Andrew was seized and thrown

into prison, where he died in 1494; his sons were imprisoned with him.

Boris also died soon after, leaving his domains to his sons Theodore

and Ivan: the latter, dying in 1504, left his part by will to the grand

prince, whom he calls “gossudar”[28] (sovereign or sire).

THE FINAL OVERTHROW OF THE TATARS

The most conspicuous event in the reign of Ivan--the casting off of the

Tatar yoke--is connected by many with his marriage. But it should be

borne in mind that this was the ancient and sacred ideal of the Moscow

princes, to the fulfilment of which all their desires had long been

directed, and for which they had been gradually preparing the means.

Such an event cannot be explained by one merely accidental circumstance,

although it is impossible not to agree that the dependence of her husband

upon the Tatar khan must have been humiliating to the proud Sophia, and

therefore it cannot be denied that there is some truth in the traditions

relating to this subject. But in any event the circumstance was a merely

accessory one, for it is known that long before this the expression: “May

the Lord cause the horde to perish,” was to be met with in the wills of

the Moscow princes; the same expression also occurs in the testament

of Vasili the Dark. The Moscow princes had prepared for this by taking

into their service Tatar princes, in whom they saw the best means of

fighting their enemies, the Tatars. And in this work bequeathed to him

by his forefathers, Ivan Vasilievitch remained true to the deliberate,

persistent policy of his predecessors, never losing sight of his aim, but

never hurrying too much in its attainment.

At the time when Ivan Vasilievitch began to reign, the Tatar horde no

longer constituted an undivided kingdom; previously it had been sometimes

divided and then again reunited, but at this period it was definitively

divided into three chief hordes; the Golden, the Kazanese, and the

Crimean, at the head of the last of which, during the reign of Vasili the

Dark, was Azi Girai.

Ivan’s policy consisted in exploiting one horde against the other and

one pretender against the other. Of the principal Tatar hordes, the

nearest and weakest was the Kazan horde, and it was the first which he

attempted to bring under his influence. In 1467 the vassal Kasim, who

was in the service of Ivan, was invited by some of the Tatar princes

(_mourzas_) to come to Kazan, but the khan Ibrahim met him at the Volga

and prevented him from crossing the river; after insignificant mutual

devastations in 1469 a great army was sent against Kazan, composed of

sons of the boyars and Moscow troops, under the leadership of Constantine

Bezzubtiev. The troops marched right up to the town, but beyond ravaging

its territory nothing was done. In the summer of the same year, two of

the grand prince’s brothers, Iuri and Andrew the Big, marched against

Kazan, besieged the town, and Ibrahim hastened to conclude peace “at

the entire will of the grand prince and his voyevods,” and liberated

the prisoners that had been taken during the preceding forty years. For

eight years there was peace, but in 1479 the Kazanese army made a raid

on Russian territory (at Ustiug and Viatka). To avenge this, troops were

sent from Moscow under the leadership of the voyevod Vasili Obrazets,

while from the other side came the men of Viatka and Ustiug and besieged

Kazan. Ibrahim again concluded peace “according to the will of the grand

prince.” At the death of Ibrahim disturbances arose in Kazan; one of his

sons Ali Khan or Alegam, from the younger wife, became khan, and Muhammed

Amin, the son of the elder wife, came to Moscow and asked for help

against his brother.

[Sidenote: [1487 A.D.]]

In 1487 troops were despatched from Moscow under the leadership of Daniel

Kholmski, the town was taken, Alegam made prisoner, and Muhammed Amin

established on the throne of Kazan; he was so entirely subject to Moscow

that he asked the grand prince’s permission to marry, and even paid a

certain tribute to Moscow. In 1496 the people of Kazan, dissatisfied with

Muhammed Amin, called in the Nogaians; the Moscow troops came to the

aid of the khan, but hardly had they been dismissed before the Nogaian

prince Mamuk came to Kazan, and the khan fled to Moscow. Mamuk, fearing

treason, seized the very persons who had called for him, and in general

began to act arbitrarily. When he went to attack the princes of Arsk, the

inhabitants of Kazan shut the gates against him and sent to Moscow to

ask for another khan, only not Muhammed Amin. Ivan sent them Muhammed’s

brother, Abdul Letiv, and gave to the former Koshira and Serpukhov as

fiefs. In 1502, at the complaint of the people of Kazan, Abdul Letiv

was deposed and banished to Belozero. Muhammed Amin again returned, but

he was already dissatisfied with Moscow, and in this attitude he was

supported by his wife, the widow of Alegam. In 1505, under the pretext

that the grand prince had not satisfied his complaints, Muhammed Amin

plundered some Russian merchants that had come to the fair and marched

against Nijni-Novgorod; Ivan died soon after, before he was able to

revenge himself.

The extension of the Russian possessions in the east was accomplished

in another way; in 1472 the grand prince sent troops to the territory

of Perm--which was numbered amongst the Novgorodian possessions--and

its prince was taken prisoner; but until 1505 native princes were

left to reign there, and it was only in that year that Prince Vasili

Kover was sent to Perm as lieutenant. The continual incursions of the

Voguls obliged Ivan to send troops to the Ugrian territory and Prince

Kurbski even crossed the Ural. While leaving there native princes, Ivan

nevertheless included the lands of Perm and Ugria in his title. With the

Golden Horde Ivan did not begin war, although from the very beginning

he did not pay tribute punctually. Ivan’s enemy, the grand prince of

Lithuania, incited the Tatars against Moscow, and in 1471 Casimir called

upon Ahmed to rise against the grand prince of Moscow; Ahmed however took

a whole year to assemble his troops, and meanwhile during the migration

of the Tatars from Sarai, which took place every summer, the people of

Viatka came and plundered it. In 1472 Ahmed at last assembled his troops

and took Alexin, but on meeting the grand prince’s brothers with a strong

army at the river Oka, he decided not to go further.

After this, until 1480, the relations with the Golden Horde remained

indefinite. Meanwhile intercourse was established with the Crimean

horde. Azi Girai died in 1467, and his son Nordovlat succeeded him, but

he was deposed by his brother Mengli Girai, and sought a refuge with

Casimir. Ivan hastened to enter into relations with Mengli Girai through

the intermediation of a Jew of Feodosia, named Kokos; Mengli Girai,

without breaking with Casimir, hastened to affirm these relations, which,

however, were not very profitable, on account of the disturbances in the

Crimea: the overthrow of Mengli Girai, by Aidar, the taking of Feodosia

by the Turks, and the consequent destruction of the power of the Genoese

in the Crimea; the capture of Mengli Girai and his liberation on the

condition of his becoming a Turkish tributary; the devastation of the

Crimea by the son of Ahmed, and the rise of the czarevitch Zenebek to the

supreme power. It was only in 1479 that Mengli Girai finally established

himself in the Crimea and that his constant relations with Moscow

commenced.[29]

In 1480 the khan of the Golden Horde, Ahmed, incited by Casimir of

Lithuania, prepared to march against Russia. It is reported that about

that time Ivan refused to pay tribute, and that Sophia persuaded Ivan

not to go out to meet the Tatar envoys under the pretext of illness,

and also by her cunning managed to destroy the hospice of the Tatars in

the Kremlin; it is said that she wrote to the wife of the khan telling

her that she had had a vision in which she had been commanded to build

a church upon the very same site, and that the wife of the khan, who

was bribed with presents, managed to arrange the matter, and when the

envoys came there was no resting place to be found for them in Moscow.

However this may be, it is certain that Ivan ceased to pay tribute.

When he heard of Ahmed’s coming Ivan took up his position on the banks

of the Oka, where he remained encamped from July until September; Ahmed

being informed that the passage was here occupied, passed through the

territories of Lithuania and came to the Ugra, but here he also found

the passages occupied. The two armies remained in this position until

November, and in the camp of the grand prince councils were held as to

what should be done, for two parties had arisen, the one proposing to

offer a ransom, while the other was for fighting; the famous letter

of Archbishop Vassain of Moscow was written in the latter spirit. The

grand prince was sometimes at Kolomna and sometimes at Moscow to consult

with the metropolitan. When the frosts set in, by which the Tatars

greatly suffered, the grand prince commanded the Russians to fall back

on Kremenets, and meanwhile the Tatars fled.[30] Soon after his return

to Sarai, Ahmed was killed by Ivak, prince of the Nogaian Tatars; and

Mengli Girai delivered Russia from the sons of Ahmed, with whom he was

constantly at war.

The relations with the Crimea, which were of importance in the struggle

against the Golden Horde, were also of importance in the conflict with

Lithuania, and therefore Ivan constantly maintained them; but zealously

looked after his own interests. Of course many presents had to be given

to the Tatars of the Crimea, although Ivan was economical to such a

degree that when sheep were given to the envoys he required the skins

to be returned; but he spent his wealth all the more willingly for this

object, because Lithuania on her side also endeavoured to bribe the

horde, and a regular auction went on in the Crimea. The conquest of

Feodosia by the Turks made it necessary for the Russians to enter into

relations with them for commercial reasons.

AFFAIRS OF LITHUANIA

[Sidenote: [1494-1495 A.D.]]

The friendship of Mengli Girai, which had been of value to Ivan in

his conflicts with the Tatars, was of still greater importance in his

dealings with Lithuania: Casimir, occupied with matters in the west,

principally the establishment of his son on the throne of Bohemia, had

incited both the inhabitants of Novgorod and the Golden Horde against

Ivan, while Ivan on his side had instigated Mengli Girai against

Lithuania and carried on relations with Casimir’s enemy, the king of

Hungary, Matthias (I) Corvinus. The quarrels of the border princes

serving in the various armies, and their passing into the service of the

Muscovite sovereign, served as the chief pretext for dissatisfaction. The

grand prince of Moscow, taking advantage of the fact that in the treaty

concluded between Vasili Vasilievitch and Casimir, the subject of the

princes had been treated very vaguely, began to receive those that passed

into his service. Thus he received together with their domains Prince

I. M. Vorotinski, Prince I. V. Bielski, and Prince D. Th. Vorotinski.

The complaints at their desertions, the quarrels of the border princes,

and in general, the frontier disagreements, were a continual subject of

friction, which occasionally went as far as slight skirmishes. In 1492

Casimir died, and Lithuania chose as king his son Alexander, while Poland

took as king his other son John. Ivan again roused Mengli Girai against

Lithuania and sent detachments of his troops to lay waste the frontiers.

Propositions of peace were sent from Lithuania and negotiations for a

marriage with one of the daughters of Ivan were entered upon. In Moscow

it was insisted that the negotiations for peace should precede those

for marriage. Meanwhile more princes passed into the Russian service:

two more princes Vorotinski, Prince Mezetski and Prince Viazemski; the

frontier incursions also continued. Finally in 1494 Alexander sent his

ambassadors to open negotiations both for peace and for the marriage.

The treaty concluded by them recognised the passing of the princes

into Ivan’s service, and what was of even greater importance, Ivan was

therein called sovereign of all Russia. Ivan then gave his consent to

the marriage of his daughter Helen with the grand prince of Lithuania,

Alexander, stipulating however that a promise in writing should be given

that Helen would not be constrained to change her religion. When all this

was concluded, in 1495 Ivan sent Helen to Lithuania, giving her detailed

instructions. At the celebration of the marriage ceremony the Russian

ambassadors insisted that the ceremony should also be celebrated by an

orthodox priest. But even from the very beginning it was manifest that

seeds of discord lay hidden in this alliance. Alexander refused to build

an orthodox church at his court, the boyars from Moscow who were with

Helen were soon sent back, and finally Alexander ceased to give Ivan the

title of sovereign of all Russia. The dissatisfaction grew, so that Ivan

wrote to Mengli Girai: “If Alexander makes peace with you now, let us

know if he does not, also let us know, and we are with you, our brother.”

More princes passed into the service of the grand prince of Moscow,

amongst them Prince Simon Bielski, who asserted that persecutions against

orthodoxy had commenced in Lithuania, and accused the bishop of Smolensk,

Joseph, of co-operating with the Latins; Prince Simon Ivanovitch (son

of Ivan of Mozhaisk) with Tchernigov, and Prince Vasili Ivanovitch (a

grandson of Shemiaka) with Novgorod Severski also came over (1499). Ivan

sent Alexander a declaration of war; which began with incursions of the

vassal princes, and on the 14th of July, 1500, Prince Daniel Kholmski,

who led the troops of Tver and Moscow, and the vassal Tatars and princes,

met the Lithuanian hetman Prince Constantine, defeated him, and took

him prisoner; on the other hand the grand prince’s son, Prince Dmitri

Ivanovitch, was unable to take Smolensk, and in general during four years

warlike action proceeded very feebly. Diplomatic intrigue was however

carried on with great activity; Moscow incited Mengli Girai against

Lithuania, who sent his sons to devastate Lithuania and Poland, in spite

of tempting offers from Alexander.

[Sidenote: [1495-1503 A.D.]]

Stephen of Moldavia, however, hearing of the disgrace and abandonment

into which his daughter Helen (widow of Ivan’s son) had fallen at the

court of Moscow, made peace with Alexander; his enmity however did

not express itself in any important act. Far more important was the

help given to Alexander by the Livonian grand master Plettenberg.

Notwithstanding the truce which had been concluded, the continual

collisions between the Livonians and the inhabitants of Pskov did not

cease. To avenge one of these incursions, Ivan sent twenty thousand

troops to Livonia who laid waste the land, captured towns, and carried

away prisoners. A fresh truce was concluded (1482) which was extended in

1493, but the Germans burned a certain Russian in Reval, and in answer

to Russian complaints they replied that they would have burned the grand

prince himself. This, it is supposed, explains the order given in 1495 to

expel the Hanseatic merchants and close their shops; but perhaps it is

more probable that the true reason was the treaty concluded with the king

of Denmark, the enemy of the Hansa, who had asked for help against the

Swedes, promising in the event of success to cede a part of Finland to

Russia. Ivan sent an army against Sweden; but when the Danish king took

possession of Sweden he gave nothing to Russia. Such being the relations

between Russia and Livonia, it was quite natural that the grand master

Plettenberg should hasten to conclude an alliance with Lithuania (1501).

He defeated the Russians near Izborsk, but did not take the town and

turned back, while the Russians continued to ravage Livonia. Plettenberg

again entered Russian territory, besieged Pskov, and a battle took place

near Lake Smolin, but it was not decisive (1502). Meanwhile Alexander

began negotiations for peace, partly through his brothers John (after

whose death in 1502 he occupied the throne of Poland) and Vladislav, and

partly through embassies. Finally, in 1503, a treaty was concluded by

which Russia kept all her acquisitions and Ivan was granted the title of

sovereign of all Russia. A truce was then concluded with Livonia.

Relations with the German Empire began under Ivan. They commenced with

the visit of the knight Poppel to Moscow; his narratives revealed Russia

to Germany and he came as ambassador in 1489. Negotiations were opened

for the marriage of one of the grand prince’s daughters with Maximilian,

the son of the emperor Frederick; but nothing came of them. The hope that

it might be possible to incite the emperor against the Polish king was

also frustrated, for Maximilian, who had pretensions to the throne of

Hungary, made peace with Vladislav.

LAST YEARS OF IVAN; INHERITANCE LEFT TO HIS SONS

[Sidenote: [1505 A.D.]]

The last years of Ivan’s life were darkened by dissensions and intrigues

in his family. In 1490 died Ivan the Younger, whom Ivan had proclaimed

as his co-ruler. Two parties were then formed at the court; the boyars

wished to see Dmitri, the son of Ivan the Younger, and Helen of Moldavia

recognised as heir; and Sophia designed her son Vasili (born in 1479)

to be heir. A plot was laid against Dmitri; the sovereign heard of it,

ordered the conspirators to be executed, and was greatly angered with

Sophia, because he had been told that she had called in sorcerers to

her aid (1497). Ivan then had his grandson crowned as his successor

(1498); but soon Sophia again triumphed: a conspiracy was discovered in

which were involved the princes Patrikëiev and Riapolovski; Prince Simon

Riapolovski was beheaded and the Patrikëievs were forced to take holy

orders. It was supposed that the plot had been directed against Sophia.

From the first Ivan did not “rejoice in his grandson,” and proclaimed

Vasili grand prince of Novgorod and Pskov, and in 1502 he had Dmitri

placed under arrest and declared Vasili his successor. The ambassadors to

the various courts were given orders to explain these occurrences.

Ivan died on the 27th of October, 1505, leaving a will and testament by

which he bequeathed sixty-six of the most important towns to Vasili, and

only thirty to his remaining sons (Iuri, Dmitri, Simon, and Andrew);

Moscow was divided into parts, Vasili receiving two-thirds and the others

one-third in all, but the elder was to have a share even in this third;

the younger brothers were commanded to esteem the elder as a father and

to leave him their inheritance in the event of their dying childless.

Thus were changed the relations of the grand prince to the appanaged

princes! In the treaty concluded between the brothers Vasili and Iuri

during the lifetime of Ivan, Iuri calls his brother “lord,” and binds

himself to hold his principality “honourably and strictly.”

APPRECIATIONS OF IVAN VASILIEVITCH

“He sits at home and sleeps, and his dominions augment, while I fight

every day and yet can hardly defend my frontiers.” Such were the words,

it is said, with which Stephen of Moldavia frequently characterised his

daughter’s father-in-law, the grand prince Ivan Vasilievitch.

The observation is a remarkable one, for it represents the first and

most salient feature in the policy of the famous Russian monarch, who

in himself concludes one period of Russian history and opens another.

Under him Russia passes out of its condition of exclusiveness; the west

learns that besides that Russia which is subject to Lithuania, there is

already another Russia, independent, powerful, and self-sufficing; it is

even possible that at first this power was somewhat exaggerated, but it

struck contemporaries because it had, so to say, grown imperceptibly. It

would seem that all around it, as if submitting to some fatal influence,

hastened to yield to this newborn power, while Russia herself did not

hasten to announce herself, but only manifested herself at the last

moment when everything was already prepared for this manifestation, and

when it only remained to gather the fully ripened fruits.

S. M. Soloviov[h] compares Ivan to the fortunate heir of a long line

of careful merchants who, having amassed a considerable capital,

provided their heir with the means for carrying on vast enterprises.

N. I. Kostomarov’s[c] judgment is still more severe; he denies any

merit in Ivan, judges his activity by the requirements of other times

and circumstances, and does not recognise in him and his descendants

anything beyond their own ambitious and self-interested motives. Such

views were probably called forth as a contradiction to Karamzin, who on

his part, carried away by his dislike of the violence which--according

to him--characterised the reform of Peter, placed Ivan above Peter.

The question “Lithuania or Moscow” was raised with entire firmness and

determination by Ivan, for by the defence of Helen’s orthodoxy and

by receiving into his service the Lithuanian princes who expatriated

themselves because of the persecution of orthodoxy, he became the

protector of the Greek church in Lithuania and thus strove to gain

influence in its internal affairs. The secular policy of Russia was thus

marked out; it was also marked out by his insistence on the recognition

of his title grand prince of all Russia and by his demand for the

restoration of Kiev; intercourse with the west also begins with him.[b]

In war Ivan showed a caution which his enemies called cowardice. As

behooved a prince, he conducted everything of importance himself. He

exacted strict obedience, and was indefatigable in studying the thoughts

and private circumstances of all important men in his kingdom, and even

in foreign lands. The whole court and people trembled before his spirit

and will; shy women are said to have fainted before his angry and fiery

look; seldom, if ever, did a petitioner dare to approach his throne,

and none of the nobles at the princely table ventured to say a word to

another, or to leave his place, if the ruler, overcome by eating or

drinking, happened to fall asleep and remained so for many hours. All

the guests sat there dumb until Ivan awoke and gave them further orders,

either to amuse or to leave him.

He was by no means prodigal of the life of his warriors; in fact, he

expected to gain more from the mistakes of his enemies than others do

from battles; and he knew how to incite his enemies into committing

mistakes, as well as to make use of them. He had the enlargement of his

kingdom as much at heart as his absolute power. He boldly projected

many far-seeing plans, and sought with indefatigable zeal to realise

them. After he had broken the pride of Novgorod he considered nothing

impossible, and regarded his own will as the supreme command. We find no

trace of his having been accessible to the petitions of his subjects, or

of his granting public audience days for the hearing of their requests

and complaints.

Arbitrary power over the common people became stronger and prevailed, and

officials abused their power unpunished, for complainants and helpers

were wanting. To enlighten the minds of his people through the study of

science was not a part of his plans, perhaps because he may have thought

that it is easier for the tyrant to rule over rude slaves than over a

free-thinking and enlightened people. He must not be denied the merit of

having raised great edifices at Moscow by means of foreign, especially

Italian, architects; but vanity and love of show probably had more to do

with this than artistic sense and taste. The wide and majestic walls of

the venerable Kremlin with its battlements and towers, secret underground

passages, and fortified gates, were to serve less as objects of beauty

than as means of protection against domestic and foreign enemies. Amongst

the useful arts he especially favoured those of the cannon founder and

silversmith; with the former he desired to terrify his enemies, and with

the latter to spread the renown of his power and glory. His greatest

services to the Russian state include, besides the regulation of the law

code, the increase of the state revenues, partly through the conquest of

new provinces, and partly through a better system of taxation, so that

the government could collect a treasure for unforeseen emergencies and

would become less dependent upon chance.

Thus there can be no doubt that as a prince Ivan ranks high and belongs

to the number of those regents who decide the fate of their people

and land for many years, and are a blessed or a cursed remembrance to

posterity: but neither can it be denied that his greatness and fame lose

much when we come to consider him as a man, and see the harshness of

his character, his unlimited pride, his contempt of all human rights,

his wild and passionate nature, and his greed of power. That he was the

founder of autocracy, as modern writers assert, is not altogether his

own exclusive merit, although it cannot be denied that he contributed

much towards it by his shrewdness and wise moderation. When in the

early days of his youth he seized the reins of government, he found

much that had been prepared towards the future greatness of Russia; but

Russia was still in a chaotic condition, and its forces were scattered

and sunk as it were in a lethargy; they required an awakening and

regulating hand, and this was principally Ivan’s work. Owing to the

unfortunate system of appanages, which had been the ruin of Russia for

many centuries, by destroying all unity in course of time, sowing the

seeds of discord, and making the Russian state an easy prey to its

enemies, the idea of a common fatherland had quite disappeared; and the

internal dissensions among the princes, as well as the despotic pressure

of the foreign barbarians, had so deranged and disjointed it, that the

praiseworthy attempts of individual grand princes could meet with no

brilliant success, and it seemed as if Russia were fated to play a deeply

subordinate part in the hierarchy of states.

Nevertheless those attempts were not quite lost, and the prudent might

surmise that the time would yet come when they would bear fruit, once

the hydra of discord had been conquered and the scattered forces had

been reunited. Ivan’s proceedings in this respect were certainly of

a macchiavellian nature. We have seen that for twenty-three years he

patiently acknowledged the rights of other Russian princes and even

their independence, and that by keeping his conquests to himself and not

sharing them with his brothers and the other princes, and by taking his

brother’s inheritance and giving none to his other brothers, he first

began to consider himself as autocrat and ruler of all Russia, and thus

gradually prepared the princes for a recognition of his undivided sway

and their own impotency and subordination.

We do not inquire as to whether the means he used for the attainment of

his end deserve our approval; we will only remark that great conquerors

and founders of new empires, or such as reorganise and rejuvenate old and

decaying states, cannot be judged with the same standard by which wise

regents are judged in regulated states. The resort to violent measures is

often their highest duty, if they are to persist in their work and arrive

at the aim they have imposed on themselves. From a political point of

view, Ivan’s harsh proceedings therefore deserve some exculpation, all

the more so when we consider that he lived at a time when revolutions of

every kind were taking place in the states and their institutions, in the

modes of thinking and in the religion of men, in the arts and sciences,

the new forms often seeking to supplant the old in a violent manner; and

when this change also began in Russia, where intellectual enlightenment

was so rare, we should not be surprised to see the forces of brutality

often gaining the upper hand over the forces of reason.

We now find ourselves at one of the most important turning points of

Russian political history, when by a regulated system of succession

and by the incorporation of the independent principalities with the

grand principality, the Russian monarchy began to establish itself

firmly and to extend its bounds; when the hitherto terrible defiance

of over-powerful nobles and of princes who claimed equal rank with the

grand prince submits to the restraints of a common obedience; when no

more dangers threaten Russia from the side of Novgorod and the Tatars;

when a regulated system of taxation, a treasury and an organised army

protect the throne; and finally when science and art, the administration

of justice, personal safety on the roads and in the towns, besides

other blessings of peace and order, also begin to attract attention,

protection, and cultivation in Russia.[d]

ACCESSION OF VASILI IVANOVITCH (1505 A.D.)

Vasili Ivanovitch succeeded his father, and continued his policy both in

foreign and domestic affairs. He endeavoured to extend the frontiers of

the Russian monarchy on the Lithuanian side, destroyed the independence

of the last appanaged princes and the last republican township, Pskov,

and strove to keep Kazan in subjection.

In his personal character Vasili resembled his father in his sterner

aspect. He let his nephew, the unfortunate Dmitri, die “destitute”

in prison; over his brothers he maintained a strict surveillance,

not allowing his brother Andrew to marry until 1533, when he himself

had already two children; with his boyars he was also stern, though

there were but few executions and punishments during his reign. He

preferred, in case of any suspected intention of departure on the part

of a boyar, to take a written guarantee in which the security promised,

in the event of departure, to pay a sum of money for those for whom

he went bail. Vasili even forgave his brother Simon, who had the

intention of going over to Lithuania, and only changed his counsellors.

Stern on the occasion of his divorce from his first wife, Vasili was

tender towards his second wife, and was very fond of his children. In

general the characteristics of Vasili are most faithfully summed up by

Karamzin in the following sentence: “He followed the path indicated by

the wisdom of his father, without fear, without impulses of passion,

moving forward with measured and prudent steps, and drew near to his

aim, the aggrandisement of Russia, without leaving to his successor

either the duty or the glory of repairing his faults.” In the eyes of

the historian this, of course, redeems the personally rather stern

sides of his character, which were, however, quite comprehensible to

contemporaries.[31]

WARS WITH LITHUANIA

[Sidenote: [1506 A.D.]]

From the very commencement of his reign Vasili found himself confronted

with two questions: that of Kazan--for Muhammed Amin had risen even

during the reign of Ivan and had to be subdued--and that of Lithuania.

From the ambassadors whom Alexander had sent to Ivan he learned that a

new sovereign was now reigning in Moscow. Having given information of

this in Livonia, so that in any case the grand master might be prepared,

Alexander despatched an embassy to Moscow demanding the cession of the

towns that had been conquered by Ivan. The ambassadors received a firm

reply from the new sovereign to the effect that he only reigned over his

legitimate possessions, which he intended to retain.

Alexander saw the necessity of delay before taking a decisive line of

action, of which course he informed the grand master. Meanwhile the

ambassadors who had come from Moscow to announce Vasili’s accession to

the throne required that Alexander should not constrain his wife to

change her religion. But Alexander died in 1506, and when Vasili heard of

his death he wrote to his sister that she should endeavour to persuade

the Polish lords and landed gentry to serve the Russian sovereign,

promising at the same time to protect the Catholic faith. In answer to

this first attempt on the part of Moscow to unite with Lithuania, Helen

replied that Sigismund, the son of Casimir, was being chosen to the

throne of Lithuania. Sigismund also sent ambassadors with the demand to

return the conquered towns, and received the same reply demanding that

Helen should not be constrained to adopt the Catholic faith. At this time

Sigismund found an unexpected ally in the Crimean khan Mengli Girai,

who having met with support in Lithuania before the death of Alexander

and being dissatisfied with the Muscovite sovereign because of his

expedition against Kazan, sent an embassy to Lithuania with proposals for

an alliance. Sigismund promised him tribute, and Mengli Girai gave him

a _yarlik_ for the Russian territories of Novgorod, Pskov, and Riazan.

Sigismund informed the grand master of Livonia of the relations with the

Crimea and with Kazan and called upon him to go to war, and measures

for the commencement of war were taken in the diet; but this time his

allies were of but little assistance to Sigismund; Kazan submitted, while

the Crimea and Livonia did not move. On the other hand, Vasili found

an important ally in Lithuania itself in the person of Prince Michael

Vasilievitch Glinski.

Prince Michael Glinski, the descendant of a Tatar prince that had left

the horde during the reign of Vitovt and been baptised, had enjoyed great

distinction and influence under Alexander. Glinski was a skilful general

and a highly educated man for those times; he had spent twelve years

abroad and had learned the art of war in the armies of Albrecht of Saxony

during the war in Friesland and of the emperor Maximilian in Italy; he

also visited Spain. In these expeditions and in his continual intercourse

with western kings and princes, Glinski had adopted all the German

customs and had become penetrated with the civilisation of the west.

When he returned to Lithuania, Glinski gained the favour and confidence

of King Alexander, who raised him to the dignity of court marshal and so

increased his possessions that, according to the hyperbolical expression

of a Polish historian, he owned almost half of the entire Lithuanian

principality and stood at the head of the numerous Russian party amongst

the Lithuanian lords. It was for this reason that at the death of

Alexander the Lithuanian party hastened to choose Sigismund, for they

feared that Glinski might obtain the throne of the grand principality and

transfer the centre from Lithuania to Russia.

When Sigismund came to the throne he showed an offensive coldness to

Glinski, and paying no attention to his complaints against the lords who

were at enmity with him, at the head of whom was Zaberezhsky, he left

for Poland. Glinski thereupon decided to obtain satisfaction on his own

account; he made an incursion on the estates of Zaberezhsky, killed

him, and raised a revolt against the king. To this end he entered into

relations with Mengli Girai, and Vasili Ivanovitch, on his side, sent one

of his secretaries to propose to him to become the subject of Russia, and

promising to leave him the lands which he might occupy. Glinski however

still wavered and tried to effect a reconciliation with the king; finally

losing all hope of this, he joined the grand prince’s voyevods, who had

marched up to the frontiers of Lithuania. To Glinski and the foreign

princes in the Russian service was confided the task of devastating

Lithuania, but the voyevods did not move to their help, for in Moscow it

was counted advantageous to let others do its work. Meanwhile Sigismund

sent an embassy, complaining of Glinski’s reception by Vasili and of the

opening of hostilities. The letter was written in the name of Helen,

and in his reply to her the grand prince directed her attention to the

constraint put upon the orthodox in Lithuania and enjoined her to remain

firm in her faith. Sigismund received no aid from Mengli Girai, but

nevertheless he began warlike operations, which however were limited to

insignificant skirmishes. Finally a treaty was concluded by which all

Ivan’s acquisitions remained to Russia, and all that had been taken by

Glinski was given back (1508). Glinski came to Moscow, where Medin and

Maloiaroslavetz were given to him but he remained dissatisfied.

[Sidenote: [1508-1514 A.D.]]

The peace of 1508 could not however put an end to the inimical relations

between the two principalities: Glinski could not remain quiet until

he was avenged on his enemies, and Lithuania could not be quiet so

long as Glinski lived; while on his side Vasili Ivanovitch demanded

better treatment for his sister Helen. Thus the relations between the

two neighbouring states were strained. In 1509 Sigismund demanded

the surrender or execution of Glinski, accusing him of the death of

Alexander; in the same year he announced his connection with the

Danish king; it can also be easily understood that each reciprocal

embassy complained of frontier quarrels, as is always the case in such

circumstances. In 1512 Vasili informed Sigismund that it had come to his

ears that the voyevods of Vilna and Trotski had seized Helen and held her

captive--which does not appear at all improbable when the unruliness of

the Lithuanian lords is borne in mind--Sigismund denied the fact. That

Helen officially received various rights, for instance that of a tribute

or tax from the town of Bielsk, also does not prove that her position

was a very advantageous one, for this was worth nothing more than other

official favours. In 1513 Helen died and the metropolitan of Kiev was

sent for to officiate at her funeral; thus this victim of political

calculations left the scene. Helen herself, as far as can be judged

from her correspondence with her father and brother, was possessed of

considerable tact and energy.

At last a reason for beginning war presented itself; it became known at

Moscow that the incursions made by the Crimeans on the Russian frontier

territories in 1512 were the result of a secret treaty that had been

concluded between Sigismund and Mengli Girai, by which the king had

promised to pay the khan a yearly sum of 15,000 ducats to attack his

enemies. Having sent Sigismund a declaration of war, Vasili began his

warlike preparations. The time was well chosen. In 1511 Albrecht of

Brandenburg had been chosen as Prussian grand master, and although he

was a nephew of the Polish king he refused to acknowledge himself as his

vassal, which he was obliged to do by the Treaty of Thorn; the emperor

and the estates of the empire declared themselves for the grand master.

Advised by Glinski, Vasili had entered into relations with the emperor as

early as 1508, but the treaty between them was only concluded in 1514.

[Sidenote: [1514-1518 A.D.]]

Without waiting for the termination of these negotiations, the grand

prince assembled an army and in December, 1512, took the field. He

marched against Smolensk and having besieged it unsuccessfully, returned

in March, 1513. His second expedition, from June until November of the

same year, was also unsuccessful, but in the third (June, 1514), Smolensk

was at last captured. Vasili made a triumphal entry into the town,

being received with an address of welcome by the bishop of Smolensk.

He confirmed the rights that had been given to its inhabitants by the

Lithuanian government; those in the Lithuanian service who did not desire

to remain under him he sent back to Lithuania, and he appointed Prince V.

V. Shuiski, governor of Smolensk. After the submission of Smolensk the

prince of Mstislavl also submitted to the grand prince. Sigismund himself

hastened to the deliverance of Smolensk. Glinski, probably dissatisfied

because Smolensk had not been given to him, entered into secret

intercourse with him. Learning of this treachery Vasili ordered Glinski

to be brought in fetters to Moscow and sent a voyevod against the king;

the king himself remained at Borissov and sent Constantine Ostrozhski to

meet the Moscow troops.

The Russian voyevods, Tcheliadin and Prince Michael Golitza met

Ostrozhski at Orsha on the Dnieper and sustained a terrible defeat. The

fidelity of the boyars of Smolensk and of the bishop himself wavered and

they entered into communication with Sigismund; but the burghers informed

Shuiski of this treachery, and it was only the terribly energetic

measures taken by him that preserved Smolensk for Russia: he ordered all

the traitors except the bishop to be hanged on the walls of the city, the

presents that had been given them by the sovereign to be suspended round

the neck of each one. The assault on Smolensk was unsuccessful, and the

war was afterward carried on feebly, which is explained by the exhaustion

of Moscow after the battle of Orsha and the probable reluctance of the

Lithuanian nobility to take an active part in it. After this Sigismund

instigated the Tatars against Russia, in particular those of the Crimea,

where in 1515 Mengli Girai had been succeeded by Muhammed Girai, who,

notwithstanding his relations with Moscow, made in 1517 an attack on Tula

and was repulsed. On his side Vasili strengthened his relations with

Albrecht who kept his vassal, the grand master of Livonia, in check.

However while Albrecht hesitated and demanded money, Vasili required that

he should begin to act. The emperor, instead of beginning the war, as had

been at first supposed he would do, offered his mediation, and it was

with this aim in view that in 1517 the famous baron Sigismund Herberstein

came to Moscow. Polish ambassadors also came; but with the news of their

coming, Moscow also learned of the attack on Opochka by the Lithuanian

troops and their repulse, and when Vasili heard of its failure he allowed

the ambassadors access to him. The negotiations however came to nothing.

The Moscow sovereign demanded Kiev and other towns, and the Lithuanian

king refused to give up Smolensk. The death of Maximilian (1519) put

an end to the imperial mediation; anyhow the emperor had not wished to

give any real assistance: “It is not well”--he wrote to the grand master

Albrecht--“to drive out the king, and make the czar of all Russia great.”

In 1518 Albrecht again asked for money; the grand prince agreed, and at

the former’s request sent a notification of his alliance with him to

the French king, Francis I--the first instance of intercourse between

Russia and France. In answer to a fresh embassy from Albrecht bringing

information of an invitation from the pope to join an alliance against

the Turks, which Albrecht would not enter into without the grand prince’s

consent, an ambassador was sent to Koenigsberg from Moscow, who was

received with the highest honours by the grand master. But Albrecht’s

help was not very efficacious; he was soon obliged to conclude a treaty

with King Sigismund by which he acknowledged himself his vassal, in

return for which he obtained Prussia as an hereditary possession, laid

aside his title of grand master, and assumed a new title with his new

faith, that of duke of Prussia.

[Sidenote: [1521-1523 A.D.]]

The war at that time was limited to incursions, and Vasili Ivanovitch

had even decided to seek peace; but the envoys that came would not

make any concessions, only letting negotiations drag on in the hope

of some event coming to their assistance; in this manner the war was

prolonged until the Lent of 1521, when negotiations were to be again

renewed; however they were not opened: in Kazan reigned Sahib Girai, the

brother of Muhammed Girai, and they both threatened Moscow, indeed the

former advanced as far as Moscow itself (1521). The devastations of the

Tatars weakened Russia for a time and the negotiations with Lithuania

were renewed; although a lasting peace was not concluded, a truce was

continued for five years without the exchange of prisoners, and by this

truce Smolensk remained to Russia. In 1526, through the medium of the

emperor’s envoys, negotiations for a definitive peace were again opened,

but Smolensk was an obstacle, neither side consenting to give up the town

which was regarded as the key to Kiev. Smolensk was treated in the same

manner as the other territories annexed; the inhabitants were transferred

to Moscow as had been done with the inhabitants of Pskov and Novgorod,

and it was for this reason that Smolensk stood by Moscow in 1612.

WARS WITH THE TATARS

Besides the relations with Lithuania, the relations with the Tatars

constituted the chief problem of the reign of Vasili Ivanovitch. At

his accession his first enterprise was to send against Kazan an army,

amongst the leaders of which was his brother Dmitri; the siege of Kazan

(1506) was unsuccessful, nevertheless in 1507 Muhammed Amin sent a

letter to the grand prince with proposals of peace. Intercourse with

the Crimea originally bore the same character as in the time of Ivan;

a difference was however soon observable; the Crimea had no longer

anything to fear from the remnants of the Golden Horde, and the Crimeans

were therefore ready to make friends with whatever state would give

them most. “Intercourse between the Crimea and the states of Moscow and

Lithuania”--justly remarks Soloviov--“assumed the character of a bribery

of robbers.”

Such being the condition of affairs, it is not surprising that in spite

of the confirmation of the treaty concluded between Ivan and Mengli

Girai, the Tatars should have begun their attacks. In 1507 they were

defeated at the Oka, and in consequence of this, envoys were sent

demanding presents, the liberation of Abdul Letiv, former czar of Kazan

and stepson of Mengli Girai, and asking for assistance against Astrakhan.

Vasili Ivanovitch liberated Abdul Letiv, gave him the town of Iuriev, and

by an oath of alliance obliged him to promise faithfully to serve the

czar, not to have relations with his enemies, not to permit his servants

to plunder on the roads or insult the churches, to live at peace with

the other princes, not to wage war against Kazan without permission,

and not to leave the confines of the state of Moscow. In 1515 Mengli

Girai died, and his son Muhammed Girai, who succeeded him, demanded

from Vasili Ivanovitch not only the cession to the Polish king of

Smolensk, at the acquisition of which without his knowledge he was much

incensed, but also of those towns which had been taken by Ivan. After

long delays and much trouble, many insults and, of course, presents, an

oath of alliance was obtained of Muhammed Girai in 1519, but meanwhile

the attacks of the Crimeans continued. The son of Muhammed Girai, the

czarevitch Bogatir, laid waste the borderland of Riazan; and in 1517 the

Tatars--notwithstanding the Russian offer of Koshira, bordering on the

steppes, to Ahmed Girai, brother of the khan--penetrated as far as Tula,

where they were repulsed.

The grand prince then proposed to the council (_douma_) the question

whether relations with the Crimea should be maintained, and it was

decided that they must be maintained in order to prevent the rupture from

becoming an open one. Meanwhile in 1518 Muhammed Amin of Kazan died,

and Abdul Letiv, who had previously been czar, died a month after him;

at the request of the inhabitants of Kazan a czar was named from Moscow

in 1519--Shig Alei, a prince of Astrakhan, and descendant of the czars

of the Golden Horde. The Crimean khan was greatly dissatisfied at this

choice of one whose family was at an eternal enmity with his own. Shig

Alei remained in Kazan until 1521 when the inhabitants, dissatisfied with

him, formed a conspiracy and invited Sahib Girai, brother of Muhammed

Girai, to come and rule over them. Having established his brother on

the throne of Kazan, Muhammed Girai advanced towards Moscow. The grand

prince, warned too late by his well-wishers at Azov, could not take

the necessary measures, and left Moscow, confiding the defence of the

city to the boyars and baptised Tatar prince, Peter; they entered into

negotiations with the enemy and paid him a ransom. The heroic defence of

Pereiaslavl in Riazan by Khabar Simski somewhat softened the mournful

impression of this calamity, which was augmented by the fact that Sahib

Girai had at the same time devastated the territories of Nijni-Novgorod

and Vladimir. The khan was preparing to repeat his expedition, and the

grand prince himself took the field in expectation of his coming, but he

never came.