CHAPTER III. THE TIME OF TATAR DOMINATION

[Sidenote: [1235-1462 A.D.]]

In the thirteenth century the steppes of central Asia sent forth a

new conquering horde, constituting the last wave of that migration of

peoples which had commenced in remote antiquity.[10] This Mongol-Tatar

horde dominated Russia for 240 years and left enduring traces of its

domination. It definitively broke the bond between western and eastern

Russia, and thus contributed to the formation of the principality of

Lithuania in the west; while in the east it promoted the rise of the

principality of Moscow, which finally absorbed all the other Russian

principalities, threw off their Tatar yoke, recoiled in its turn upon

the steppe, and finally, by turning Russia into an empire, made forever

impossible another invasion from the steppe.

The cradle of the Mongolian race was in all probability the country

lying at the foot of the Altai Mountains. At the time of the appearance

of Jenghiz Khan the Mongols were divided into numerous tribes, which

were governed by their elders and lived in mutual enmity. An unpleasing

description of the exterior and life of the Mongols is given by a Chinese

writer, a contemporary of Jenghiz Khan, and also by Mussulman writers:

“Their faces are wide, flat, and square, with prominent cheek-bones,

their eyes have no upper lashes, their beard and moustaches are of scanty

growth, their general appearance is repulsive. But the present Tatar

sovereign, Temuchin (Jenghiz Khan) is of enormous stature, with broad

forehead and long beard, and distinguished for his valour. They reckon

the year according to the growth of grass. When one of them is asked

for his age, he replies--so many grasses. When asked for the number of

the month, they laugh and reply that they do not know. The Tatars are

born in the saddle and grow up on horseback. They learn to fight almost

by instinct, for they hunt the whole year round. They have no infantry,

but only cavalry, of which they can raise several hundred thousand. They

hardly ever resort to writing, but all, from the commander-in-chief to

the commander of ten, give their orders in person. When they want to take

a big town, they first attack the small places in the vicinity, take all

the inhabitants prisoners, and drive them forward to the attack. For this

purpose a command is issued that every man on horseback should capture

ten prisoners, and when this number is completed they are compelled to

collect a certain amount of grass or wood, earth or stones. The Tatars

urge them on night and day, killing those who become exhausted. Having

reached the town, they are compelled to dig trenches or fill up fosses.

In a siege the Tatars reck not of the loss of tens of thousands: hence

they are invariably successful. When they capture a city they kill

all without sparing either young or old, the beautiful or the ugly,

rich or poor, those who submit or those who resist. No person, however

distinguished, escapes this unrevokable penalty of death. The spoil is

divided in proportionate shares among high and low. This people have no

need of baggage or provision wagons; their herds of sheep, cows, horses,

and other animals follow them on their marches, and they eat meat and

nothing else. Their horses do not know barley, but they tear up the

ground with their hoofs and live on the roots. As to their faith, the

Tatars worship the sun at the time of its rising. They do not regard

anything as forbidden, and eat all animals, even dogs and pigs. Marriage

is unknown to them, but many men come to a woman, and when a child is

born it does not know its father.”

Similar descriptions are met with in the narratives of Europeans who knew

the Mongols in the days of their power.

JENGHIZ KHAN; THE TATAR INVASION

It was among this rude nomad people that Jenghiz Khan was born in 1162.

The son of the chief of a tribe dwelling at the mouths of the Onon and

the Ingoda, affluents of the Amur, Jenghiz was far removed from the

focus of central Asian political life, and his power was originally very

small. The first forty years of his life were spent in struggles with

the surrounding peoples; it is even said that for ten years he was in

captivity with the Nyûché, or Chûrché (the Manchurian rulers of northern

China known under the name of the dynasty of Kin), during which time

he became acquainted with Chinese customs and manners, and also with

the weakness of the rulers of China. Having conquered various Mongolian

tribes, he proclaimed himself emperor at a general assembly of the

princes, which was held at the sources of the river Onon (1206).

“By thus taking the imperial title,” says V. P. Vasiliev, “he gave

perfect expression to the purely Chinese conception that, as there is

only one sun in the heavens, so there must be only one emperor on earth;

and all others bearing this title, all states having any pretensions

to independent existence thereby offend the will of heaven and invite

chastisement.” His successes in Mongolia are explained by his surpassing

military talent, the system of purely military organisation adopted by

him, and by the fact that he gave places in his service to all those

who were gifted, of whatever race they might be.[11] Jenghiz Khan’s

conquests advanced rapidly; in 1206 he devastated the kingdom of Tangut

(in southern Mongolia) and in 1210 he commenced a war with the Nyûché,

ruling in northern China. The war dragged on, and meanwhile the shah of

Khuarezm (Bokhara) gave offence to Jenghiz Khan by slaying the Mongolian

ambassadors. Leaving his captains in China, the Mongolian khan marched

to Bokhara (1219), whence, partly in pursuit of the shah and partly led

on by the passion for pillage, the Mongolian troops directed their way

to the west, doubled the southern shore of the Caspian Sea, crossed the

Caucasus, and penetrated into the steppes of the Polovtsi.

[Sidenote: [1223-1228 A.D.]]

The leaders of these troops were Chépé and Subutai Bahadar. The Polovtsi

applied for help to the Russian prince Mstislav Mstislavitch, and he

called together the princes of southern Russia, amongst whom the most

important were Mstislav Romanovitch of Kiev and Mstislav Sviatoslavitch

of Tchernigov. The armies of the princes moved to the help of the

Polovtsi, and although the Tatars sent ambassadors saying, “God has

permitted us to come on our steeds with our slaves against the accursed

Polovtsi; come and make peace with us, for we have no quarrel with you,”

the princes decided upon a battle which took place by the river Kalka in

the government of Iekaterinoslav. The Russian princes, who did not act in

unison, were beaten (1223), and many were killed, amongst others Mstislav

of Kiev. The Tatars did not penetrate far into Russia, but turned back

and were soon forgotten.[12] Meanwhile the Tatar captains returned to

Jenghiz Khan, who, having definitively subdued Tangut and northern

China, died in 1227. He had during his lifetime divided his possessions

amongst his four sons: to the descendants of Juji (then already dead) was

allotted Kiptchak (that is the steppe extending from central Asia into

southern Russia); to Jagatai, Turkestan; to Okkodai (Ogdai) China; to

Tuli, the nomad camps adjoining the share of Okkodai. Over these princes

was to be exalted the great khan, chosen in a solemn assembly of all the

princes. In 1228 Okkodai was proclaimed great khan.

[Sidenote: [1237-1241 A.D.]]

At first the question of succession, then the final consolidation of the

empire in northern China, and then again the commencement of the war with

the south kept the princes around the great khan, and it was only in 1235

that Okkodai sent his nephew Batu, son of Juji, together with Manku, son

of Tuli, and his own son Kuiuk, to conquer the western lands; to their

number was added Sabutai, famous for his Kiptchak campaign. First of all

they conquered the Bulgarians on the Volga, and then came to the land of

Riazan. Here they exacted from the princes a tribute of a tenth of all

their possessions both in lands and in men; the courageous resistance

of the Riazan princes proved unsuccessful, chiefly because the princes

of northern Russia did not unite, but decided on defending themselves

separately. After the devastation of Riazan and the slaughter of her

princes (1237), followed that of Suzdal. Having taken Moscow, the Tatars

marched to Vladimir, where they slew the family of the grand prince,

while he himself was defeated and killed on the banks of the Sit (1238).

Thence they were apparently going to Novgorod, but returned--probably to

avoid the marshes. On their way back, Kozelsk detained them for a long

time, but it was finally taken and pillaged.

The tactics of the Tatars in this war consisted in first encompassing

each region as hunters do, and then joining forces at one centre, thus

devastating all. In the years 1239-1240 the Tatars ravaged southern

Russia, and in 1240 they took and laid waste Kiev. All Europe trembled

at the horrors of the Tatar invasion; the emperor Frederick II called

for a general arming, but his calls were in vain. Meanwhile the Tatars

advanced to Hungary (1241) and Poland, and defeated the Polish princes

at Liegnitz in Silesia; and it was only the courageous defence of

Olmütz in Moravia, by the Czech voyevod Iaroslav, and the gathering of

armies under the command of the Czech king and the dukes of Austria and

Carinthia, that finally caused the Tatars to turn back. They then founded

their chief dwelling place on the Volga, where near the present town of

Tsareva (government of Astrakhan) they established a wintering place

for the horde--Sarai. There the Russian princes began to arrive with

tribute. At first, however, they were obliged to go to the great khan in

Mongolia; for the first khans, Okkodai, Kuiuk, and Mangku, were lawfully

chosen by the princes, and maintained their authority over all the

empire of Jenghiz Khan; and it was only from the time of Kublai (1260),

who arbitrarily took possession of the throne and removed the seat of

government to China, that the bond was definitively severed.

INFLUENCES OF TATAR DOMINATION

The domination of the Tatars over Russia is regarded by historians from

various points of view: some (such as Karamzin and especially N. I.

Kostomarov) ascribe a decided influence to the Tatars in the development

of Russian life. S. M. Soloviov, on the contrary, is of the opinion that

the influence of the Tatars was not greater than that of the Polovtsi.

Both these opinions are extreme: it is senseless to deny the influence

of the Tatars, for the reason that Russia was long associated with

them, and that, since in her intercourse with the east, Moscow employed

Tatar services, much that was eastern entered into the administration,

notably the financial system; traces of eastern custom may also be

found in the military organisation. These are direct consequences; the

indirect ones are hardly less important, because a considerable share in

the interruption of civilisation and the roughening of the manners and

customs of the people may be ascribed to the separation of eastern Russia

from western. On the other hand, it is impossible to regard the corporal

punishments as entirely Tatar, for they were known in Byzantium, and came

to Russia in the manuals of church statutes; they were known also in the

west, and are to be met with in places which were but little under Tatar

domination, such as Pskov. The opinion that the autocratic power had its

origin in the domination of the Tatars must, it would seem, be entirely

rejected, especially when we call to mind the constant preaching of the

clergy, and the fact that John the Terrible directly appeals to the

authority of the Bible and the example of the Roman emperors.

Civilisation and letters were almost unknown to the Tatars. The writers

in their chanceries were for the greater part taken from the nations they

had conquered, as were also the artists who embellished the wintering

places of their khans. Much luxury was to be met with amongst them,

but neither elegance nor cleanliness: in this respect they kept to the

very end the customs of the Mongolian steppes. Also in moral respects

they showed themselves dwellers of the steppes even to the end of their

career in history. Cruel and coarse though they were, they possessed,

however, some good qualities. They were temperate in their lives, and

their cupidity was not so great as that of other Asiatic nations; they

were far less given to deceit in trade--in general, with them, violence

predominated over deceit.[b]

Throughout all of their conquests in Russia, they obviously acted upon

a principle which was well calculated to facilitate their own complete

ascendency. At first they destroyed the walled places that stood in

the way of their projects, and afforded a means of defence to the

people; they destroyed the population wherever they went, in order that

the remnant which survived should feel the more surely the weight of

their power; and, at length, as their advance became the more safe and

certain, they relaxed slightly in their cruelties, enrolling under their

standard the slaves they captured, thus turning their conquests into

armaments. But the climate of Russia rendered it an unsuitable place

for their location. As they could not remain upon the soil which they

had vanquished, they established themselves on the frontiers to watch

over their new possessions, leaving nominal Russian princes to fight for

them against the invading tribes that continually rushed in. Those very

invasions served also to strengthen the Tatar yoke, by weakening the

resisting power of the natives.[d]

In conquering Russia they had no wish to take possession of the soil, or

to take into their own hands the local administration. What they wanted

was not land, of which they had enough and to spare, but movable property

which they might enjoy without giving up their pastoral, nomadic life.

They applied, therefore, to Russia the same method of extracting supplies

as they had used in other countries. As soon as their authority had been

formally acknowledged they sent officials into the country to number the

inhabitants and to collect an amount of tribute proportionate to the

population. This was a severe burden for the people, not only on account

of the sum demanded, but also on account of the manner in which it was

raised. The exactions and cruelty of the tax-gatherers led to local

insurrections, and the insurrectionists were of course always severely

punished. But there was never any general military occupation nor any

wholesale confiscations of land, and the existing political organisation

was left undisturbed. The modern method of dealing with annexed provinces

was wholly unknown to the Tatars. The khans never for a moment dreamed

of attempting to Tatarise their Russian subjects. They demanded simply

an oath of allegiance from the princes, and a certain sum of tribute

from the people. The vanquished were allowed to retain their land, their

religion, their language, their courts of justice, and all their other

institutions.

[Illustration: A FEMALE SAMOYED]

The nature of the Tatar domination is well illustrated by the policy

which the conquerors adopted towards the Russian church. For more than

half a century after the conquest the religion of the Tatars was a

mixture of Buddhism and paganism, with traces of sabaism or fire-worship.

During this period Christianity was more than simply tolerated. The grand

khan Kuiuk caused a Christian chapel to be erected near his domicile,

and one of his successors, Khubilai, was in the habit of publicly taking

part in the Easter festivals. In 1261 the khan of the Golden Horde

allowed the Russians to found a bishopric in his capital, and several

members of his family adopted Christianity. One of them even founded a

monastery, and became a saint of the Russian church! The orthodox clergy

were exempted from the poll tax, and in the charters granted to them it

was expressly declared that if anyone committed blasphemy against the

faith of the Russians he should be put to death. Some time afterwards

the Golden Horde was converted to Islam, but the khans did not on that

account change their policy. They continued to favour the clergy, and

their protection was long remembered. Many generations later, when the

property of the church was threatened by the autocratic power, refractory

ecclesiastics contrasted the policy of the orthodox sovereign with that

of the “godless Tatars,” much to the advantage of the latter.

At first there was and could be very little mutual confidence between

the conquerors and the conquered. The princes anxiously looked for an

opportunity of throwing off the galling yoke, and the people chafed under

the exactions and cruelty of the tribute collectors, whilst the khans

took precautions to prevent insurrection, and threatened to devastate

the country if their authority was not respected. But in the course of

time this mutual distrust and hostility greatly lessened. The princes

gradually perceived that all attempts at resistance would be fruitless,

and became reconciled to their new position. Instead of seeking to throw

off the khan’s authority, they sought to gain his favour, in the hope

of thereby forwarding their personal interests. For this purpose they

paid frequent visits to the Tatar chief, made rich presents to his wives

and courtiers, received from him charters confirming their authority,

and sometimes even married members of his family. Some of them used the

favour thus acquired for extending their possessions at the expense of

neighbouring princes of their own race, and did not hesitate to call

in Tatar hordes to their assistance. The khans, in their turn, placed

greater confidence in their vassals, entrusted them with the task of

collecting the tribute, recalled their own officials who were a constant

eyesore to the people, and abstained from all interference in the

internal affairs of the principalities so long as tribute was regularly

paid. The princes acted, in short, as the khan’s lieutenants, and became

to a certain extent Tartarised. Some of them carried this policy so far

that they were reproached by the people with “loving beyond measure the

Tatars and their language, and giving them too freely land, and gold, and

goods of every kind.”[c]

ALEXANDER NEVSKI

[Sidenote: [1245 A.D.]]

The recognition of Tatar sovereignty was complete in the homage and

tribute they demanded and received. Every prince was forced to solicit

his investiture from the khan of Kiptchak; and even when Iaroslav was

established as grand prince over the rest, Batu cunningly allowed several

rivals to put in their claims to that authority, and obliged them to wait

so long for his decision that the order of succession remained unsettled.

This state of suspense in which the feudal lords were kept, and a series

of famines which followed the destructive march of the Tatars, plunged

the country into a condition of abject wretchedness.

During this period of indecision on the one hand, and forlorn imbecility

on the other, the Lithuanians succeeded in appropriating to themselves

some portions of the northwestern division of Russia; and the Swedes, and

Danes, and Livonian knights of the sword proceeded to make demonstrations

of a descent upon Novgorod. Alexander, however, who had succeeded his

father in that principality, finding that the grand prince was unable to

render him any assistance towards the defence of the city, anticipated

the advance of the intruders, and giving them battle on the banks of the

Neva gained a decisive victory. He immediately built strong forts on the

spot to repel any future attempts, and returned in triumph to Novgorod.

So signal was the overthrow of the enemy that Alexander was honoured by

the surname of Nevski, in commemoration of the achievement.

Flushed with a triumph as unexpected as it was important, Alexander

Nevski desired to enlarge the bounds of his power at home. The army

was warmly attached to him, for his personal intrepidity was no less

remarkable than his sagacity--qualities which were rarely so strongly

developed in so young a man. The Novgorodians, however, always jealous

of their municipal privileges, and suspicious of the motives of their

rulers, resisted the extension of Alexander’s power, and, apprehensive

that he would abuse his advantages, they remonstrated against his

proceedings, and at last broke out into open rebellion. The proud spirit

of the young prince was justly offended at the impetuous revolt of his

subjects, and he retired at once from the city, going over to his father

at Vladimir, to request the aid of a sufficient force to restore order.

But Iaroslav, in the conviction of his own inadequacy, was unwilling

to interfere with the wishes of the Novgorodians; and, conferring upon

Alexander the inferior principality of Pereiaslavl, he sent another of

his sons, at the request of the people, to reign over the disaffected

province.

The Novgorodians, however, speedily discovered their error. The Danes,

induced to speculate upon the absence of Alexander, a second time

appeared within the boundary, and the new prince, an inexperienced young

man, made choice of such measures as clearly proved him to be unfit for

his office. The people became dissatisfied, and, being now convinced that

Alexander was the only man who could relieve them in their difficulty,

petitioned him to return; but he indignantly rejected the request.

A second embassy, headed by the archbishop, was more fortunate, and

Alexander Nevski once more placed himself at the head of the army, and

obtained a second victory over the invaders. Resolved to profit by the

obligations under which he laid his subjects by resuming, at their own

instance, the reins of government, and by freeing them from the presence

of a dangerous foe, he now pushed on to Livonia, and routed the combined

forces of a triple alliance of Germans, Danes, and Tchuds, on the borders

of Lake Peipus. This exploit, which the youthful hero achieved in the

year 1245, not only obtained him the love and admiration of his own

subjects, but speedily spread his name through every part of the empire,

until it finally reached the court of the Golden Horde, where it elicited

an unusual degree of curiosity and applause.

In the person of the prince of Novgorod, a new dawn of hope broke over

Russia, and nothing but the disheartening feuds of the chiefs checked

the growth of that incipient desire for liberty which the influence of

his successes was calculated to create. Alexander was adapted to the

occasion; and if the disunited sovereigns could now have consented to

forego their low animosities, and to merge their personal differences in

the common cause, Alexander was the instrument of all others the most fit

to undertake the conduct of so gallant an enterprise. But it required an

extraordinary combination of circumstances to awaken the Russian princes

to a full sense of their degradation, and to inspire them with resolution

to set about the rescue of their country from the chains of the spoiler.

Alexander’s example was useless. He could do no more than demonstrate the

possibility of improvement within the reach of his own domain; but for

all purposes of a national and extensive character, his exertions failed

to procure any favourable results.

[Sidenote: [1252 A.D.]]

On the death of the grand prince Iaroslav, whose reign appears to have

passed unmarked by any events of importance, the khan invited or rather

summoned Alexander to the horde. A number of competitors or claimants

for the grand princedom had already brought forward their petitions:

some were lingering in person at the court; others were represented

by ambassadors bearing rich tributes; and all were in a state of

considerable anxiety pending the decision of the Tatar. Alexander

alone was silent. The fame of his deeds had preceded him. He did not

come to supplicate for an honour to which he felt that he possessed

an unexceptionable claim, but he attended as a point of duty, without

reference to a nomination that could hardly increase his popularity.

His independent bearing, his manly figure, and the general candour

and fearlessness of his manners gained him at once the confidence

and admiration of the khan, who did not hesitate to assure him that,

although he had heard much in his favour, report had fallen short of his

distinguished merits.

Auspicious, however, as this reception was, it did not terminate in

Alexander’s appointment to the suspended sceptre of Vladimir. The

policy of the Tatar was to keep the order of succession in periodical

uncertainty, so that the Russians might the more distinctly see how much

the destinies of the country depended on his supreme will. It was not

until Alexander paid a second visit to the horde, in 1252, that he was

raised to the dignity of grand prince. It was accorded to him in a very

gracious spirit, and he entered upon his new office with more earnest

zeal than had for a long time before been displayed by his predecessors.

The first act of the grand prince was an expedition against Sweden,

undertaken with two objects: (1) to crush a formidable foe that

occasionally harassed the frontier districts; and (2) to give employment

and opportunity for pillage to his numerous army, which he had already

taught to calculate upon the rewards of spoliation. The expedition

terminated in victory. The triumphant army laid a part of the Swedish

territory under contribution, succeeded in capturing a number of

prisoners, and returned home laden with spoils.

These successes and the skilful policy of the grand prince made the

most favourable impression on the mind of the khan, who now, whenever

dissensions arose amongst the princes, either referred the adjustment

of their differences to Alexander, or confiscated their dominions and

annexed them to the grand princedom. Two instances of the latter

description may be recorded as evidences of the cunning displayed by

the Tatar in the protection of the Greek religion. While Alexander was

at the height of his prosperity, the prince of Kiev, affected by some

sudden admiration of the Roman Catholic ritual, signified his submission

to the pope, acknowledging his holiness’s supremacy over the churches of

his principality. Another prince, his brother-in-law, adopted a similar

measure, which was equally offensive to Tatars and Russians. The khan,

irritated by proceedings so directly at variance with his will, deprived

them of their authority, and transferred their territories to the grand

prince, who, according to some writers, was even assisted by the Tatars

in seizing upon them.

The tribute which had been originally imposed upon the Russians by

their conquerors had always been levied by the princes, the khan being

satisfied to receive it at their hands. As the power of Alexander

increased, the khan gradually recalled this system of delegation,

and adopted a more strict and jealous mode of collection. The first

contribution was raised upon the princes, as tribute money, and they

were left to procure it amongst their subjects as well as they could.

But it now assumed the shape of a tax on persons and property. In order

to ensure the regularity of its payment, and protect the khan against

evasions, Tatar officers were appointed in every district to attend

exclusively to the rigid collection of the revenue. From this tax,

which was imposed without distinction upon every Russian, and rated

according to his means, the clergy alone were exempt: and even they, in

one instance, were attempted to be taxed in later times; but the khan

who sought to enforce it was obliged to yield to the double argument of

long-established usage and weighty presents from the wealthy monks.

The new burthen lay heavily upon the people, and the mode in which

it was enforced through foreign collectors, of the nation of their

oppressors enhanced its mortifications. Universal discontent followed

the tax-gatherers. They were treated with unreserved displeasure. It was

with great difficulty they could carry into effect the objects of their

unpopular mission, and in some places, particularly the cities where the

population was more compact, and the communication of opinion more rapid

and complete, they were received with execration. This resistance on

the one hand no doubt produced increased severity on the other; and as

the levy advanced, the people became less cautious in the exhibition of

their feelings, and the collectors more rigorous and despotic. Novgorod,

which had always been the rallying point for the assertion of freedom in

Russia, took the lead in this revolt against the khan’s authority. The

Novgorodians, to a man, refused to pay the tax, and even threatened to

wreak their vengeance upon the officers who were appointed to collect it.

The prince of Novgorod, one of Alexander’s sons, urged to extremities by

his republican advisers, sanctioned these declarations of independence,

and openly signified his determination to prevent the exactions of so

ignominious a tribute within the districts dependent upon his rule.

Alexander, perceiving, in this dangerous obstinacy of his son, the source

of serious calamity to the empire at large, and knowing well that neither

the Novgorodians, nor any other fraction of the Russian people, were

in a condition to resist the powerful armies of the khan, should he be

provoked to compel compliance at the point of the sword, undertook in

person to appease the growing tumult, and presenting himself in the city,

rebuked the inhabitants for having perilled the safety of the country by

their contumacy, severely punished rash advisers of his son, and finally

arranged the payment of the tax to the satisfaction of the Tatar offices.

Still the Novgorodians were not content. They remonstrated against the

unequal pressure of the tax, setting forth that it fell more grievously

upon the poor than upon the rich, and that if they were obliged to submit

to such a penalty, it should at all events be adjusted proportionately to

the means of individuals. Even this difficulty Alexander was enabled to

meet by assuming the responsibility of the payment himself, a vexatious

and ungrateful duty, which, however, he willingly accepted, as it

afforded him the means of quelling discontents that might have otherwise

terminated in a sanguinary convulsion.[d]

_Death of Alexander Nevski; Appreciation of His Character_

[Sidenote: [1263 A.D.]]

In 1262, disturbances arose in the country of Rostov, where the people

became exasperated at the violence of the Tatar collectors of tribute;

a council was called together and the collectors were driven out of

Rostov, Vladimir, Suzdal, Pereiaslavl, and Iaroslavl; in the last

mentioned town the enraged inhabitants killed the collector Izosim, who

had embraced Mohammedanism to become a Tatar tax-gatherer, and persecuted

his former fellow-citizens worse than the Tatars themselves. Naturally

such an occurrence could not be calmly passed over by the horde, and

Tatar regiments were already sent to take the Christians into captivity.

In order to avert this calamity from the people, Alexander repaired a

fourth time to the horde; he was evidently successful, possibly because

of the Persian War which was then greatly occupying the khan Bergé.

But it was his last work; he left the horde, where he had passed the

whole winter, a sick man, and died on the way back to Vladimir on the

14th of November, 1263; “having laboured greatly for the Russian land,

for Novgorod and Pskov, for all the grand princedom, and having given

his life for the orthodox faith.” By preserving Russia from calamities

on the east, and by his famous exploits for faith and country in the

west, Alexander gained for himself a glorious memory throughout Russia

and became the most conspicuous historical personage in Russian history

from Monomakh to Donskoi. A token of this remembrance and fame is to be

found in the special narrative of his exploits that has come down to

us. “The grand prince Alexander Iaroslavitch,” says the author of the

narrative, “conquered everywhere, but himself was nowhere conquered;”

there came to Novgorod from the western countries a famous knight, who

saw Alexander, and when he returned to his own land he said: “I have

gone through many countries and nations, but nowhere have I seen such a

one, no such king among kings and no such prince among princes;” and a

similar honourable mention was made of him by the khan. When, after the

death of his father, Alexander came to Vladimir, his coming was terrible,

and the news of it flew even to the mouth of the Volga, and the Moabite

women began to frighten their children by saying: “Be quiet, the grand

duke Alexander is coming!” It happened once that ambassadors were sent

to him from great Rome by the pope, who had commanded them to speak to

Alexander as follows: “We have heard of thee, O Prince, that thou art

honourable and wonderful, and that thy country is great, therefore have

we sent unto thee two of the wisest of our twelve cardinals, that thou

mayest hearken to their teaching.” Alexander, having taken counsel with

his wise men, wrote down and described to the pope all that had taken

place from the creation of the world to the seventh œcumenical council,

and added: “All this is well known unto us, but we cannot accept your

teachings.” Following in the footsteps of his father, Alexander gave much

gold and silver to the horde to ransom prisoners. The metropolitan Cyril

was in Vladimir when he heard of the death of Alexander, which he thus

announced to the people: “My beloved children! learn that the sun of the

land of Russia has set;” and all the people cried out in reply: “Then we

perish!”[e]

“It was as vassal and agent of the khan,” says Brueckner, “that Alexander

broke the resistance of Novgorod and compelled it to pay tribute. On

the one hand representing the interests of the khan and repressing the

revolts of the Russians, on the other hand mollifying the anger of the

khan and acting like a shrewd diplomat, Alexander represents a curious

combination of egotism and patriotism. We are not in the possession

of sufficient evidence to form a just estimate of the measure of his

services or of his opportunistic policy, but he is certainly a most

interesting character in that unfortunate and disgraceful period of

Russian history.”[i]

_The Grand Princedom_

With the death of Alexander commenced afresh the hurtful contests of the

princes for the grand princedom. The division of interests which had

gradually grown up amongst the Tatars, greatly increased the internal

disorders of Russia. Nogay, the Tatar chieftain, who had thrown off the

rule of the khan of Kiptchak, asserted his sovereignty in the southern

provinces, and contended against his rival of the horde, for the right

of tribute in many districts which had hitherto acknowledged implicitly

the government of the first conqueror. This strife between the ruling

powers produced much treachery amongst the Russian princes, who generally

allied themselves to the chief who happened at the moment to obtain

the ascendency, and who thus played a false game to assist them in

the accomplishment of their own individual objects. In this way they

wasted their strength; for whenever a prince profited by the sale of his

allegiance, he paid so dearly for the assistance which procured him the

end he had in view, that the gain in such a case was usually discovered

to be a severe loss. The grand princedom was the prize for which they all

struggled; and in the contentions which marked the struggle, almost every

inferior principality became more enfeebled than before.

Alexander Nevski was one of the few great men whose names stand apart

from the tumultuous throng that crowd the early pages of Russian history.

He was a wise statesman, and a brave soldier. His victories over the

enemies of his country were not less remarkable for completeness and

brilliancy, than his measures of domestic improvement were distinguished

by prudence and foresight. The Danes, the Swedes, the Lithuanians,

and the Teutonic knights severally gave way before him: he enlarged

the bounds of his territory, inspired his army with a fresh spirit of

activity, rebuilt several Russian cities that had been destroyed during

the Tatar invasions, and founded others in well-chosen situations.

Russia, under his sway, might have redeemed her fallen fortunes; but

the unnatural hostility of the feudal princes to the grand princedom,

their hatred to any chief whose virtues elevated him above them, and

their ruinous conflicts amongst themselves upon insignificant grounds

of quarrel, paralysed the efforts of Alexander, and deprived him

of the power of rendering that service to his country which he was

eminently qualified to confer. His fame was so universal, that his

death gave opportunity to the display of a fresh burst of superstitious

feelings. His approaching decease was said to have been notified to

the metropolitan by a voice from heaven; and as the body lay in the

coffin, the dead man was said to have opened one of his hands, as the

prayer of absolution was spoken by the officiating clergyman. These

miracles obtained Alexander a niche amongst the Russian saints; and,

less in honour of his real merits than his attributed powers, he was

duly canonised after death. Some centuries subsequently, a monastery

was raised to his memory by Peter I, and his relics were removed to

St. Petersburg with extraordinary ceremonies of devotion. An order of

knighthood was afterwards instituted in his name, which ranks amongst its

members some of the monarchs of Europe. These facts connected with the

reputation of Alexander Nevski in Russia are memorable, as proofs of the

veneration in which he was held.[d]

The khans committed a serious fault in preserving a grand prince; it

was a still more striking one, and a consequence of the first, to place

in his hands a sovereignty disproportioned to those by which he was

surrounded, to select him for too long a time from the same branch, and

to give him armies to establish himself, and the means of seducing even

themselves by the most costly presents. The consequence of this was, that

the appanaged princes dared not enter so readily into a contest with the

grand princes, who were already more powerful than themselves, and were

so formidably supported. Not daring to contend with them, they turned

their arms against each other, and thus enhanced by their own weakness

the strength of the grand princes.

Nevertheless, till 1324, that is, for a century posterior to the Tatar

invasion, the power of the grand princes was doubtful; but then, amidst

the crowd of pretenders to the grand princedom, two rival branches made

themselves conspicuous, and the other princes of the blood resigned to

them an arena, in which the scantiness of their own resources no longer

permitted them to appear. One of these branches was that of the princes

of Tver; the other that of the princes of Moscow.[g]

THE GROWING ASCENDENCY OF MOSCOW

[Sidenote: [1303-1313 A.D.]]

[Illustration: MUSCOVITE WOMAN]

Moscow becomes a princely appanage at a rather late date, although it is

mentioned in the chronicle as early as 1147. The place is also called

Kutchkovo. With this appellation there is connected a tradition, which

seems quite trustworthy, that Moscow had belonged to a certain Kutchka,

and the chronicle also speaks of the Kutchkas as relatives of the wife of

Andrew Bogoliubski and of his murderers. It seems that the first prince

of Moscow was Michael Iaroslavitch, who died in 1248. Other princes are

mentioned as having been at Moscow before that time, but it is difficult

to decide whether they resided there temporarily or permanently. The

true line of Moscow princes begins with Daniel Alexandrovitch [a son of

Alexander Nevski], who died in 1303 and was succeeded by his son Iuri,

the famous rival of the Tver princes.[b]

Iuri married, in 1313, the sister of Usbek Khan. It was then that, after

having excited the hatred of the Novgorodians, in persisting to subdue

them by means of the Tatars, Michael of Tver drew down upon his head all

the wrath of Usbek, by defeating Iuri, and taking prisoners his wife, who

was the khan’s sister, and Kavadgi, a Tatar general, who came to put the

prince of Moscow in possession of the grand princedom.

For Usbek, after having preferred and supported the rights of Michael of

Tver to the grand principality, had changed his mind in favour of Iuri of

Moscow, who had become his brother-in-law. The enmity of Usbek, however,

remained suspended, until his sister, the wife of Iuri, and the prisoner

of Michael, expired at Tver. Iuri then hastened to the horde, and accused

Michael of having poisoned the princess. The offended pride of Usbek lent

itself to this base calumny; he entrusted the investigation of the affair

to Kavadgi; appeared to the summons; the vanquished passed sentence on

his vanquisher, whom he caused to be put to death; and the infamous Iuri

of Moscow was appointed grand prince in the place of his murdered rival

(1320). His triumph was short: being accused of withholding the tribute

due to the khan, he journeyed to the horde, and was assassinated by the

son of his victim, who was himself immediately executed by Usbek. This

vengeance restored the grand principality to the branch of Tver, in the

person of Prince Alexander Michael’s second son. It remained in it for

three years; but then, in 1328, this madman caused all the Tatars at Tver

to be massacred. To the brother of Iuri, Ivan I, surnamed Kalita,[13]

prince of Moscow, Usbek immediately gave Vladimir and Novgorod, the

double possession of which always distinguished the grand princedom.

This concession formed, in the hands of Ivan, a mass, the connection of

which Tver, weakened as it was, did but little diminish. Consequently,

with this power, and the troops that Usbek added to it, Ivan speedily

compelled all the Russian princes to combine, under his orders, against

the prince of Tver; who, after having undergone various misfortunes, was

executed with his son at the horde.

Here begin the two hundred and seventy years of the reign of the branch

of Moscow. This first union of the Russians, under Ivan I, denominated

Kalita, constitutes an epoch; it exhibits the ascendancy of this second

grand prince of Moscow over his subjects; an ascendancy the increase

of which we shall witness under his successors; and for which, at

the outset, this branch of the Ruriks was indebted to the support

they received from the Tatars. For as a word from the khan decided

the possession of the throne, that one of the two rival branches of

Moscow and Tver was sure to triumph which displayed the most shrewd and

consistent policy towards the horde. It was not that of the princes of

Tver which thus acted. On the contrary they sometimes solicited the

protection of the khans, and sometimes fought against them; we have even

seen one of them ordering the massacre of the Tatars in his principality.

The princes of Moscow pursued a different system; they no doubt,

detested the yoke of the khans as much as their rivals did; but they

were aware that, before they could cope with the Tatars, the Russians

must be united, and that is was impossible to subject and unite the

latter without the assistance of the former. They therefore espoused the

daughters of the khans, manifested the utmost submission to the horde,

and appeared to be wholly devoted to its interests.

Now this policy, which, at the commencement of the Mongol invasion

acquired for Alexander Nevski the empire of all Russia, gave it,

seventy-four years later, still more completely to Ivan I: for the sway

of the Tatars was then more recognised; the Russians were more docile to

their yoke; and the cities, which composed the grand principality were

more powerful in themselves, and also by comparison with the rest of

Russia, which became daily more and more exhausted. The wealth of Ivan I

was another cause of the extension of his power.

[Sidenote: [1323 A.D.]]

The complaints of the prince of Tver, in 1323, prove that Iuri I,

grand prince of Moscow, when he undertook to execute the vengeance of

his brother-in-law Usbek, against Tver, was also entrusted with the

collecting of the tributes; which, however, he retained, instead of

sending them to the horde. Ivan Kalita, his brother and successor,

profited by this example. Thus it was, that by making themselves

lieutenants of the khan, the Muscovite grand princes first became the

collectors, and finally the possessors, of the taxes throughout the whole

of Russia; and thus they succeeded to all the rights of conquest enjoyed

by the Tatars, and to their despotism.

There can be no doubt that one of the most copious sources of power to

those sovereigns was the periodical census and the perpetual imposts,

so alien to feudalism, and especially to a feudalism of princes:

these imposts and censuses nothing but the Tatar conquest could have

established, and they were inherited by the grand princes. Already, in

the first half of the fourteenth century, these taxes had rendered Ivan

Kalita rich enough to purchase entire domains and appanages,[14] the

protection of Usbek Khan, and the preference of the primate, who removed

his residence from Vladimir to Moscow, by which means the latter city

became the capital of the empire.

It was by virtue of his authority as collector for the Tatars that Ivan

Kalita practised extortion upon his subjects. We see him requiring a

double tribute from the Novgorodians, under pretext that such was the

will of the khan. Armed against the Russians with the dread inspired by

the Tatar name, and against the Tatars with the money of the Russians;

intoxicating the khan and his courtiers with gold and adulation in his

frequent journeys to the horde; he was enabled, as lord paramount, to

bring about the first union of all the appanaged princes against his

competitor, the prince of Tver, whom he drove from Pskov and from Russia,

being aided by the primate with the thunder of the church, then heard in

the empire for the first time. The nobility imitated the clergy. Impelled

either by fear, or cupidity, several boyars of other princes rallied

round this grand prince, preferring the fiefs of so rich and so potent a

lord paramount to those of the petty princes whom they abandoned.

Ivan Kalita pushed forward with horrible vigour in his ambitious career.

“Woe, woe to the princes of Rostov!” exclaims Nicon, “because their power

was destroyed, and everything was concentrated in Moscow.” In fact, from

the Kremlin, which he fortified, Ivan proclaimed himself the arbiter of

his kinsfolk; he reigned in their principalities by the medium of his

boyars; he arrogated to himself the right of being the sole distributor

of fiefs, judge, and legislator; and if the princes resisted, and

dared to wage against him a war of the public good,[15] he hurried to

the horde, with purse in hand, and denunciation on his lips; and the

short-sighted Usbek, deceived by this ambitious monitor, was impolitic

enough to disembarrass him of the most dangerous of his competitors, whom

he consigned to frightful torments. The prince of Tver and his son were

the most remarkable victims of this atrocious policy.

Meanwhile, Lithuania, which, from the period of the first overwhelming

of Russia by the Tatars, had emancipated itself from its yoke, had now

become a conquering state. About 1320, Gedimin, its leader, seized on

the Russian appanages of the south and west, which had long ceased to

be dependent upon the grand principality of Vladimir. Kiev, Galitch,

Volhinia, became sometimes Lithuanian, sometimes Polish or Hungarian:

driven to despair, their inhabitants emigrated; they formed the two

military republics of the Zaparogians and Cossacks of Don. Rallying

around them the unfortunate of all countries, they were destined to

become one day strong enough to make head against the Turks and Tatars,

between whom they were situated; and thus to embarrass the communication

between those two peoples, whom a common religion, origin, and interest

conspired to unite.

The grand principality was, on the other hand, repeopled by unfortunate

fugitives from the southern Russian provinces, who sought refuge at

Moscow. The empire, it is true, lost in extension; but it was thus

rendered more proportionate to the revived power of its grand prince, who

had also fewer competitors in it: those who remained could not, in point

of resources, be compared with the grand principality. After all, it was

much better that the latter should one day have to recover some provinces

from a foreign foe, than from its domestic enemies: it was suffering an

external evil instead of an internal one, which is the worst of all.

Thus, the macchiavellism of Ivan prospered. It is true that, by the

confidence with which he inspired the horde, and the terrible war which

he waged against his kinsmen, he restored to Russia a tranquillity to

which she had long been a stranger. A dawning of order and justice

reappeared under a sceptre acquired and preserved by such horrible acts

of injustice; the depredations to which Russia had been a prey were

repressed; commerce again flourished; great marts and new fairs were

established, in which were displayed the productions of the East, of

Greece, and of Italy; and the treasury of the prince was swelled still

further by the profit arising from the customs.[16]

Such were the rapid effects of the first steps which Ivan took to execute

the system of concentration of power; this great political impulse was so

vigorously given, that it was perpetuated in his son Simeon the Proud,

to whom Ivan left wherewithal to purchase the grand princedom from the

horde, and in whom he revived the direct succession. Accordingly, Simeon

effected, against Novgorod, a second union of all the Russian princes.

It is to be remarked, that he was obliged to cede one half of the taxes

to his brothers; but, at the same time, he reserved to himself the whole

authority, which soon gives to its possessor the mastery of the revenue.

[Sidenote: [1353 A.D.]]

Simeon having died without children, in 1353, after a reign of twelve

years, Ivan II, his brother, purchased the sovereignty with the wealth

of Kalita. After the six years’ reign of Ivan II, this system and this

order of succession were, indeed, transiently interrupted in the person

of a prince, alien to the branch of Moscow; but we shall soon see the

great Dmitri Donskoi establish them as fixed principles; that prince

did not neglect to increase the wealth[17] of his grandfather Ivan. The

people had given to Ivan the surname of The Purse; as much, perhaps, with

allusion to his treasures, as to the purse, filled with alms for the

poor, which is said to have been always carried before him. At a later

period, the constantly progressive riches of the grand princes of Moscow

enabled them to enfeoff directly from the crown lands three hundred

thousand boyar followers; and next, to keep up a body of regular troops,

sufficiently strong to reduce their enemies and their subjects.[18]

[Sidenote: [1359 A.D.]]

This system of concentration of power which Ivan Kalita commenced, by

means of his wealth, by the union of the sceptre with the tiara, and

by restoring the direct order of succession; his horrible but skilful

macchiavellism against the princes holding appanages; finally, the fifty

years’ repose which, thanks to his policy, and to their dissensions,

the Tatars permitted Russia to enjoy; these are the circumstances which

entitle Ivan to be considered as standing next after Alexander Nevski

among the most remarkable grand princes of the third period. It was he

who had the sagacity on this stubborn soil to open and to trace so deeply

the path which led to monarchical unity, and to point out its direction

so clearly to his successors that they had nothing to do but to persevere

in it, as the only safe road which it was then possible for Russia to

follow.

This concentration of power brought about great changes from 1320 to

1329; as, at that epoch, all the Russian princes in concert solicited

from the horde the recall of the Tatar governors. It was then that,

more firmly fixed, the throne of the grand princes became the rallying

point of the Russians: along with the consciousness of their strength,

it inspired them with a public spirit, which emboldened them. This good

understanding was, in reality, an effect of the ascendency which a direct

and sustained succession, in a single branch of the Ruriks, had already

given to it over all the others.

_The Principle of Direct Succession_

In fact, sometimes natural justice, sometimes oriental negligence and

cupidity, often the fear of being disobeyed, and lastly, and especially,

the power and riches of the princes of Moscow--whose presents always

surpassed those of the other princes--all these motives had induced

the khans to allow the succession to the grand principality to descend

regularly from father to son in the branch of Moscow.[19] This natural

order of succession Dmitri Donskoi, in 1359, established by a treaty,

in which his kinsmen consented to renounce the mode of succession from

brother to brother. It was the most remarkable among them, Vladimir the

Brave, who was the first to sign this act. In several other conventions,

Vladimir acknowledged himself the vassal and lieutenant, not merely of

Dmitri, but also of Vasili his son, and even of the son of Vasili, when

he was only five years of age. This example, set by a prince who, of all

the possessors of appanages, was the most renowned for his prudence and

his valour, was followed by the others. Thus, like the Capets, kings of

France, did Ivan I, and particularly Dmitri Donskoi, begin the monarchy

by restoring the direct succession, in causing, while they lived, their

eldest sons to be recognised as their successors. Afterwards we see

Vasili, son of Dmitri, persevering in this practice, and Vasili the

Blind, his grandson, raising up his tottering throne, and preparing the

autocracy of the fourth Russian period, by associating with himself his

next heir, the great Ivan III.

It is easy to conceive the infallible effect of this order of succession,

and with what promptitude it must necessarily have extended and

consolidated the power of the grand princes. In fact, the ideas of the

father being transmitted to the son by education, their policy was more

consistently followed up, and their ambition had a more direct object.

The nobles could not fail to attach themselves more devotedly to a prince

whose son and heir, growing up amongst them, would know only them, and

would recompense their services in the persons of their children; for the

necessary consequence of the succession of power in the same branch, was

the succession of favours and dignities in the same families.

Even before Dmitri had established the principle, the boyars saw the

advantages which this order of succession held out to them. Here, as

elsewhere, the fact preceded the law. This was the reason of their

restoring the direct line in the grandson of Ivan Kalita; it was they

who made him grand prince at the age of twelve years, and who subjected

the other princes to him. In like manner, about 1430, they maintained

this order of succession in Vasili the Blind. Contemporary annalists

declare that these ancient boyars of the grand principality detested

the descent from brother to brother; for, in that system, each prince

of the lateral branch arrived from his appanage with other boyars, whom

he always preferred, and whom he could not satisfy and establish but

at the expense of the old. On the other hand, the most important and

transmissible places, the most valuable favours, an hereditary and more

certain protection, and greater hopes, attracted a military nobility

around the grand princes. In a very short time, their elevation to the

level of the humbled petty princes flattered their vanity, and completed

their junction with the principal authority. This circumstance explains

the last words of Dmitri Donskoi to his boyars, when he recommended his

son to their protection. “Under my reign,” said he, “you were not boyars,

but really Russian princes.” In fact (to cite only some examples), we

see that his armies were as often commanded by boyars as by princes, and

that, from this epoch, it was no longer a prince of the blood, but a

boyar of the grand prince, who was his lieutenant at Novgorod.

Nay, more, when the succession from father to son was once established,

there were, at the very beginning, two minorities (those of Dmitri, and

of Vasili, his grandson), during which the boyars composed the council of

regency, governed the state, and were the equals, and even the superiors,

of the princes who held appanages. This will explain why, in 1392, the

boyars of Boris, the last prince of Suzdal, gave up him and his appanage

to Vasili Dmitrievitch of Moscow. The motive is to be found only in

their interest; as the grand prince of Moscow entrusted them with the

government of the appanages, and thus substituted the nobles in the place

of the princes.

A very remarkable circumstance, with respect to Dmitri Donskoi, is, on

the one hand, the energy with which he subdued those princes, and, on the

other, his circumspect treatment of his boyars. According to Karamsin,

it is more especially to their pride and jealousy of the tyssiatchsky of

Moscow (the boyar of the city, or of the commune, a sort of civil and

military tribune, elected by the people), that we are to attribute the

abolition of that office by Donskoi. During the preceding reign, another

tyssiatchsky of Moscow, who claimed precedence of even the boyars of the

grand prince, had been murdered by them.

[Illustration: DMITRI DONSKOI]

When this hereditary protection afforded by the grand princes of the

Moscow branch was once fairly established, the nobles of each appanage,

who constituted its army, had thenceforth an asylum, and, as it were,

a tribunal for redress, to which they could appeal whenever they were

dissatisfied with their prince. It was this which made Tver fall before

Ivan Kalita; for the sovereign prince of that first and last rival of

Moscow having preferred to his boyars the people of Pskov, who had

defended him, the former withdrew to Moscow.

The power of Ivan Kalita being once raised by the Tatars’ aid, and by

the re-establishment of the direct line of succession, and thoroughly

developed by his son and grandson, Simeon the Proud and Dmitri Donskoi,

it followed, as a natural consequence, that he who was most able to

reward and to punish drew around him, and retained, the whole of the

nobles. These constituted the sole strength of the appanaged princes;

their defection, therefore, completed the subjugation of the princes.

Dmitri Donskoi was, therefore, in reality sovereign, as is proved by his

treaties with the princes who held appanages, all of whom he reduced to

be his vassals. And, accordingly, notwithstanding the appanages which he

gave to his sons, and the dissensions which arose out of that error--an

error as yet, perhaps, unavoidable--the attachment of the nobles, for

which we have just assigned a reason, always replaced the legitimate heir

on the throne.

[Sidenote: [1366 A.D.]]

Already, so early as about 1366, the Russian princes could no longer

venture to contend against their lord paramount by any other means than

by denunciations to the horde; but to what khan could they be addressed?

Discord had created several: what result was to be hoped from them?

Divided among themselves, the Tatar armies had ceased to be an available

force. The journeys to the Golden Horde, which had originally contributed

to keep the Russian princes in awe, now served to afford them an insight

into the weakness of their enemies. The grand princes returned from the

horde with the confidence that they might usurp with impunity; and their

competitors with envoys and letters, which even they themselves well

knew would be of no avail. It was, then, obvious in Russia, that the

only protecting power was at Moscow: to have recourse to its support was

a matter of necessity. The petty princes could obtain it only by the

sacrifice of their independence; and thus all of them became vassals to

the grand prince Dmitri.

Never did a great man arise more opportunely than this Dmitri. It was

a propitious circumstance, that the dissensions of the Tatars gave

them full occupation during the eighteen years subsequent to the first

three of his reign:[20] this, in the first place, allowed him time to

extinguish the devastating fury of Olgerd the Lithuanian, son of Gedimin,

father of Iagello, and conqueror of all Lithuania, Volhinia, Smolensk,

Kiev, and even of Taurida; secondly, to unite several principalities with

his throne; and lastly, to compel the other princes, and even the prince

of Tver, to acknowledge his paramount authority.

The contest with the latter was terrible: four times did Dmitri overcome

Michael, and four times did the prince of Tver, aided by his son-in-law,

the great Olgerd, prince of Lithuania, rise again victorious. In this

obstinate conflict, Moscow itself was twice besieged, and must have

fallen, had it not been for its stone walls, the recent work of the

first regency of the Muscovite boyars. But, at length, Olgerd died; and

Dmitri, who, but three years before, could appear only on his knees at

the horde, now dared to refuse the khan his tribute, and to put to death

the insolent ambassador who had been sent to claim it.

We have seen that, fifty years earlier, a similar instance of temerity

caused the branch of Tver to fall beneath that of Moscow; but times

were changed. The triple alliance of the primate, the boyars, and the

grand prince, had now restored to the Russians a confidence in their own

strength: they had acquired boldness from a conviction of the power of

their grand prince, and from the dissensions of the Tatars. Some bands

of the latter, wandering in Muscovy in search of plunder, were defeated;

at last the Tatars have fled before the Russians! they are become their

slaves, the delusion of their invincibility is no more!

The burst of fury which the khan exhibited on learning the murder of his

representative, accordingly served as a signal for the confederation of

all the Russian princes against the prince of Tver. He was compelled to

submit to the grand prince, and to join with him against the horde.

_The Battle of the Don or Kulikovo (1380 A.D.)_

[Sidenote: [1380 A.D.]]

Russia now began to feel that there were three things which were

indispensably necessary to her; the establishment of the direct

succession, the concentration of the supreme power, and the union of all

parties against the Tatars. The movement in this direction was taken very

opportunely; for it happened simultaneously that the Mongolian chief,

Mamai, was also disembarrassed of his civil wars (1380), and he hastened

with all his forces into Russia to re-establish his slighted authority;

but he found the grand prince Dmitri confronting him on the Don, at

the head of the combined Russian princes and an army of two hundred

thousand[21] men. Dmitri put it to the choice of his troops whether they

would go to encounter the foe, who were encamped at no great distance

on the opposite shore of the river, or remain on this side and wait the

attack? With one voice they declared for going over to the assault. The

grand prince immediately transported his battalions across the river,

and then turned the vessels adrift, in order to cut off all hopes of

escaping by retreat, and inspire his men with a more desperate valour

against an enemy who was three times stronger in numbers. The fight

began. The Russians defended themselves valiantly against the furious

attacks of the Tatars; the hosts of combatants pressed in such numbers to

the field of battle, that multitudes of them were trampled under foot by

the tumult of men and horses. The Tatars, continually relieved by fresh

bodies of soldiers as any part was fatigued by the conflict, seemed at

length to have victory on their side. Nothing but the impossibility of

getting over the river, and the firm persuasion that death would directly

transport them from the hands of the infidel enemy into the mansions of

bliss, restrained the Russians from a general flight. But all at once,

at the very moment when everything seemed to be lost, a detachment of

the grand prince’s army, which he had stationed as a reserve, and which

till now had remained inactive and unobserved, came up in full force,

fell upon the rear of the Tatars, and threw them into such amazement and

terror that they fled, and left the Russians masters of the field. This

momentous victory, however, cost them dear; thousands lay dead upon the

ground, and the whole army was occupied eight days in burying the bodies

of the dead Russians: those of the Tatars were left uninterred upon the

ground. It was in harmony of this achievement that Dmitri received his

honourable surname of Donskoi.[g]

_Significance of Battle of Kulikovo_

The chronicles say that such a battle as that of Kulikovo had never

before been known in Russia; even Europe had not seen the like of it for

a long time. Such bloody conflicts had taken place in the western half

of Europe at the beginning of the so-called Middle Ages, at the time of

the great migration of nations, in those terrible collisions between

European and Asiatic armies; such was the battle of Châlons-sur-Marne,

when the Roman general saved western Europe from the Huns; such too was

the battle of Tours, where the Frankish leader saved western Europe

from the Arabs (Saracens). Western Europe was saved from the Asiatics,

but her eastern half remained long open to their attacks. Here, about

the middle of the ninth century, was formed an empire which should have

served Europe as a bulwark against Asia; in the thirteenth century this

bulwark was seemingly destroyed, but the foundations of the European

empire were saved in the distant northwest; thanks to the preservation of

these foundations, in a hundred and fifty years the empire succeeded in

becoming unified, consolidated--and the victory of Kulikovo served as a

proof of its strength. It was an omen of the triumph of Europe over Asia,

and has exactly the same signification in the history of eastern Europe

as the victories of Châlons and Tours have in that of western Europe.

It also bears a like character with them--that of a terrible, bloody

slaughter, a desperate struggle between Europe and Asia, which was to

decide the great question in the history of humanity: which of these two

parts of the world was to triumph over the other.

But the victory of Kulikovo was one of those victories which closely

border upon grievous defeats. When, says the tradition, the grand prince

ordered a count to be made of those who were left alive after the battle,

the boyar Michael Aleksandrovitch reported to him that there remained in

all forty thousand men, while more than four hundred thousand had been in

action. And although the historian is not obliged to accept the latter

statement literally, yet the ratio here given between the living and the

dead is of great importance to him. Four princes, thirteen boyars, and a

monk of the monastery of Troitsa, were among the slain. It is for this

reason that in the embellished narratives of the defeat of Mamai we see

the event represented on one hand as a great triumph and on the other

as a woeful and lamentable event. There was great joy in Russia, says

the chronicler, but there was also great grief over those slain by Mamai

at the Don; the land of Russia was bereft of all voyevods (captains)

and men and all kinds of warriors, and therefore there was a great fear

throughout all the land of Russia. It was this depopulation through loss

of men that gave the Tatars a short-lived triumph over the victors of

Kulikovo.[e]

THE DESTRUCTION OF MOSCOW (1382 A.D.)

[Sidenote: [1382 A.D.]]

The immediate and inevitable consequence of the battle was a sensible

reduction of the Russian army. The numbers that fell before the Tatars

could not be easily or speedily supplied: nor were the means of a

fresh levy accessible. Those districts from which the grand army was

ordinarily recruited had already exhausted their population; all the

remote principalities had contributed in nearly equal proportion, and

the majority of the rest of the empire was composed of persons who

were unaccustomed to the use of arms, having been exclusively occupied

in tillage or commerce. These circumstances, which did not damp the

joy of the victory, or diminish its real importance, presented to the

implacable foe a new temptation for crossing the border. But it was

not until two of the wandering hordes had formed a junction that the

Tatars were able to undertake the enterprise. The preparations for it

occupied them two years. In 1382, the hordes of the Don and the Volga

united, and making a descent upon the frontier provinces with success,

penetrated as far as Moscow. The city had been previously fortified by

the boyars with strong ramparts and iron gates; and Dmitri, trusting with

confidence to the invincibility of the fortifications, left the capital

in the charge of one of his generals, while he imprudently went into the

interior to recruit his army. His absence in the hour of danger spread

consternation amongst the peaceable part of the inhabitants, particularly

the clergy, who relied upon his energies on the most trying occasions.

The metropolitan, accompanied by a great number of the citizens, left the

city upon the approach of the Tatars. The small garrison that remained

made an ineffectual show on the ramparts, and the Tatars, who might not

otherwise have gained their object, prevailed upon the timidity of the

Russians, who consented to capitulate upon a promise of pardon. The

Tatars observed their pledge in this instance as they had done in every

similar case--by availing themselves of the first opportunity to violate

it. They no sooner entered Moscow than they gave it to the flames, and

massacred every living person they met in the streets. Having glutted

their revenge with a terrible scene of slaughter and conflagration, they

returned home, satisfied with having reduced the grand princedom once

more, after their own fashion, to subjection. They did not perceive that

in this exercise of brutal rage they strengthened the moral power of

Russia, by giving an increased motive to co-operation, and by rendering

the abhorrence of their yoke still more bitter than before. All they

desired was the physical and visible evidence of superiority; either not

heeding, or not comprehending, the silent and unseen progress of that

strength which combined opinion acquires under the pressure of blind

tyranny.

Dmitri, thus reduced to submission, was compelled once more to perform

the humiliating penance of begging his dignity at the hands of the khan.

Empire had just been within his grasp; he had bound up the shattered

parts of the great mass; he had effected a union of sentiment, and a bond

of co-operation; but in the effort to establish this desirable end, he

had exhausted the means by which alone it could be perpetuated. Had the

Tatars suffered a short period more to have elapsed before they resumed

the work of spoliation, it is not improbable but that a sufficient force

could have been raised to repel them: but they appeared in considerable

numbers, animated by the wildest passions, at a time when Dmitri was

unable to make head against their approach. The result was unavoidable;

and the grand prince, in suing to be reinstated on the throne from which

he was virtually expelled, merely acquiesced in a necessity which he

could not avert.

But the destruction of Moscow had no effect upon the great principle that

was now in course of development all over the empire. The grand princedom

was still the centre of all the Russian operations: the grand prince was

still the acknowledged authority to which all the subordinate rulers

deferred. While this paramount virtue of cohesion remained unimpaired,

the incursions of the Tatars, however calamitous in their passing

visitations, had no other influence upon the ultimate destiny of the

country than that of stimulating the latent patriotism of the population,

and of convincing the petty princes, if indeed any further evidence were

wanted, of the disastrous impolicy of wasting their resources in private

feuds.

THE DEATH OF DMITRI DONSKOI; HIS PLACE IN HISTORY

The example of Dmitri Donskoi had clearly pointed out the course which

it was the policy of the grand prince to follow; but, in order to place

his own views beyond the reach of speculation, and to enforce them

in as solemn a manner as he could upon his successors, that prince

placed a last injunction upon his son, which he also addressed in his

will to all future grand princes, to persevere in the lofty object of

regeneration by maintaining and strengthening the domestic alliances of

the sovereignty, and resisting the Tatars until they should be finally

driven out of Russia. His reign of twenty-seven years, crowned with

eventful circumstances, and subjected to many fluctuations, established

two objects which were of the highest consequence to the ultimate

completion of the great design. Amidst all the impediments that lay in

his way, or that sprang up as he advanced, Dmitri continued his efforts

to create an order of nobility--the boyars, who, scattered through

every part of the empire, and surrounding his court on all occasions of

political importance, held the keys of communication and control in their

hands, by which the means of concentration were at all times facilitated.

That was one object, involving in its fulfilment the gradual reduction of

the power of the petty princes, and contributing mainly to the security

of the second object, which was the chief agent of his designs against

the Tatars. In proportion as he won over the boyars to his side, and

gave them an interest in his prosperity, he increased the power of the

grand princedom. These were the elements of his plan: the progressive

concentration of the empire, and the elevation of the grand princedom

to the supreme authority. The checks that he met in the prosecution of

these purposes, of which the descent of the Tatar army upon Moscow was

the principal, slightly retarded, but never obscured, his progress.

The advances that he had made were evident. It did not require the

attestation of his dying instructions to explain the aim of his life:

it was visibly exemplified in the institutions he bequeathed to his

country; in the altered state of society; and in the general submission

of the appanages to a throne which, at the period of his accession, was

shaken to its centre by rebellion.[d]

[Sidenote: [1389 A.D.]]

In 1389 Dmitri died at the early age of thirty-nine. His grandfather,

his uncle, and his father had quietly prepared ample means for an

open decisive struggle. Dmitri’s merit consisted in the fact that he

understood how to take advantage of these means, understood how to

develop the forces at his disposal and to impart to them the proper

direction at the proper time. We do not intend to weigh the merits

of Dmitri in comparison with those of his predecessors; we will only

remark that the application of forces is usually more evident and

more resounding than their preparation, and that the reign of Dmitri,

crowded as it was from beginning to end with the events of a persistent

and momentous struggle, easily eclipsed the reigns of his predecessors

with their sparse incidents. Events like the battle of Kulikovo make

a powerful impression upon the imagination of contemporaries and

endure long in the remembrance of their descendants. It is therefore

not surprising that the victor of Mamai should have been given beside

Alexander Nevski so conspicuous a place amongst the princes of the new

northeastern Russia. The best proof of the great importance attributed

to Dmitri’s deeds by contemporaries is to be found in the existence of a

separate narrative of the exploits of this prince, a separate embellished

biography. Dmitri’s appearance is thus described: “He was strong and

valiant, and great and broad in body, broad shouldered and very heavy,

his beard and hair were black, and very wonderful was his gaze.” In his

biography the severity of his life is extolled, his aversion to pleasure,

his piety, gentleness, his chastity both before and after marriage; among

other things it is said: “Although he was not learned in books, yet he

had spiritual books in his heart.” The end of Dmitri is thus described:

“He fell ill and was in great pain, then it abated, but he again fell

into a great sickness and his groaning came to his heart, for it touched

his inner parts and his soul already drew near to death.”

[Illustration: LIVE-FISH MERCHANT]

The important consequences of Dmitri’s activity are manifested in

his will and testament, in which we meet with hitherto unheard-of

dispositions. The Moscow prince blesses his eldest son Vasili and

endows him with the grand principality of Vladimir, which he calls his

paternal inheritance. Donskoi no longer fears any rivals to his son,

either from Tver or Suzdal. Besides Vasili, Dmitri had five sons: Iuri,

Andrew, Peter, John, and Constantine; but the two latter were under

age, Constantine having been born only four days before his father’s

death, and the grand prince confides his paternal domain of Moscow to

his four elder sons. In this domain, that is in the town of Moscow and

the districts appertaining to it, Donskoi had ruled over two parts or

shares, the share of his father Ivan and of his uncle Simeon, while the

third share was under the rule of Vladimir Andreevitch, to whom it now

remained. Of his two shares the grand prince left one half to his eldest

son Vasili; the other half was divided in three parts among the remaining

sons, and the other towns of the principality of Moscow were divided

among the four sons; Kolomna went to Vasili, the eldest, Zvenigorod to

Iuri, Mozhaisk to Andrew, Dmitrov to Peter.

THE REIGN OF VASILI-DMITRIEVITCH (1389-1425 A.D.)

From the very commencement of his reign the young son of Donskoi

showed that he would remain true to the traditions of his father and

grandfather. A year after the khan’s ambassador had placed him on the

grand prince’s throne at Vladimir, Vasili set out for the horde and there

purchased a _iarlik_ (letter-patent of the khans) for the principality

of Nijni-Novgorod, which not long before, after many entreaties had been

obtained from the horde by Boris Constantinovitch. When the letter heard

of Vasili’s designs, Boris called together his boyars and said to them

with tears in his eyes: “My lords and brothers, my boyars and friends!

remember your oath on the cross, remember what you swore to me!” The

senior among his boyars was Vasili Rumianietz, who replied to the prince:

“Do not grieve, my lord prince! we are all faithful to thee and ready to

lay down our heads and to shed our blood for thee.” Thus he spoke to his

prince, but meanwhile he sent to Vasili Dmitrievitch, promising to give

up Boris Constantinovitch to him. On his way back from the horde, when

he had reached Kolomna, Vasili sent from there to Nijni the ambassador

of Toktamish and his own boyars. At first Boris would not let them

enter the town, but Rumianietz said to him: “My lord prince, the khan’s

ambassador and the Muscovite boyars come here in order to confirm peace

and establish everlasting love, but thou wishest to raise dissensions

and war; let them come into the town; what can they do to thee? we are

all with thee.” But as soon as the ambassador and boyars had entered

the town, they ordered the bells to be rung, assembled the people, and

announced to them that Nijni already belonged to the prince of Moscow.

When Boris heard this he sent for his boyars and said to them: “My lords

and brothers, my beloved drujina! remember your oath on the cross, do

not give me up to my enemies.” But this same Rumianietz replied: “Lord

prince! do not hope in us, we are no longer thine, we are not with thee,

but against thee!” Boris was seized, and when somewhat later Vasili

Dmitrievitch came to Nijni, he placed there his lieutenants; and Prince

Boris, with his wife, children, and partisans, he ordered to be carried

away in chains to various towns and kept in strict imprisonment.[e]

[Sidenote: [1395-1412 A.D.]]

The princes of Suzdal, Boris’ nephews, were banished, and Vasili also

acquired Suzdal. Later on the princes of Suzdal made peace with the

grand prince and received back from him their patrimonial estates,

but from generation to generation they remained dependants of Moscow

and not independent rulers. In 1395 took place an event which raised

the moral importance of Moscow: on account of an expected invasion of

Timur (Tamerlane), which, however, never took place, Vasili Dmitrievitch

ordered to be transported from Vladimir to Moscow that famous ikon which

Andrew had formerly taken from Kiev to his beloved town of Vladimir; this

ikon now served to consecrate the pre-eminence of Moscow over all other

Russian towns.

Following in the steps of his predecessors, Vasili Dmitrievitch oppressed

Novgorod, but did not however entirely attain to the goal of his designs.

Twice he endeavoured to wrest her Dvinsk colonies from her, taking

advantage of the fact that in the Dvinsk territories a party had been

formed which preferred the rule of the Moscow grand prince to that of

Grand Novgorod. The people of Novgorod were fortunate in defending their

colonies, but they paid dearly for it: the grand prince laid waste the

territory of Novgorod, and ordered some of the inhabitants who had

killed a partisan of his at Torzhok to be strangled; but worse than all,

Novgorod itself could not get on without the grand prince and was obliged

to turn to him for help when another grand prince, namely the Lithuanian,

attempted its conquest.

At that period the horde was so torn up with inward dissensions that

Vasili had not for some years paid tribute to the khan and regarded

himself as independent; but in 1408 an unexpected attack was made

on Moscow by the Tatar prince Edigei, who like Mamai, without being

khan himself, made those who bore the name of khan obey him. Vasili

Dmitrievitch being off his guard and thinking that the horde had become

weakened, did not take early measures against his wily adversary, who

deceived him by his hypocrisy and pretended good-will. Like his father

he escaped to Kostroma, but provided better than his father for the

defence of Moscow by confiding it to his brave uncle, Prince Vladimir

Andreevitch. The inhabitants themselves burned their faubourg, and

Edigei could not take the Kremlin, but the horde laid waste many Russian

towns and villages. Moscow now learned that although the horde had no

longer the power to hold Russia in servitude, yet it might still make

itself terrible by its sudden incursions, devastations, and capture of

the inhabitants. Shortly thereafter, in 1412, Vasili went to the horde

to do homage to the new khan Djelalledin, brought him tribute, and made

presents to the Tatar grandees, so that the khan confirmed the grand

principality to the prince of Moscow, although he had previously intended

to bestow it upon the exiled prince of Nijni-Novgorod. The power of the

khans over Russia was now only held by a thread; but for some time yet

the Moscow princes could take advantage of it in order to strengthen

their own authority over Russia and to shelter their inclinations under

the shadow of its ancient might. Meanwhile they took measures of defence

against the Tatar invasions, which might be all the more annoying because

they were directed from various sides and from various fragments of the

crumbling horde. In the west the Lithuanian power, which had sprung up

under Gedimin, and grown great under Olgerd, had attained to its utmost

limits under Vitovt.

Strictly speaking, the supreme authority over Lithuania and the part

of Russia in subjection to it belonged to Iagello, king of Poland; but

Lithuania was governed independently in the quality of viceroy by his

cousin Vitovt, the son of that Keistut who had been strangled by Iagello.

Vitovt, following the example of his predecessors, aimed at extending the

frontiers of Lithuania at the expense of the Russian territories, and

gradually subjugated one after another of them. Vasili Dmitrievitch was

married to the daughter of Vitovt, Sophia; throughout his reign, he had

to keep up friendly relations with his kinsman, and yet be on his guard

against the ambitious designs of his father-in-law. The Muscovite prince

acted with great caution and prudence, giving way to his father-in-law

as far as possible, but safeguarded himself and Russia from him. He did

not hinder Vitovt from taking Smolensk, chiefly because the last prince

of Smolensk, Iuri, was a villain in the full sense of the word, and the

inhabitants themselves preferred to submit to Vitovt, rather than to

their own prince. When however Vitovt showed too plainly his intentions

of capturing Pskov and Novgorod, the grand prince of Moscow openly took

up arms against his father-in-law and a war seemed imminent; but in

1407 the matter was settled between them, and a peace was concluded by

which the river Ougra was made a boundary between the Muscovite and the

Lithuanian possessions.

VASILI VASILIEVITCH (AFTERWARDS CALLED “THE BLIND” OR “THE DARK”)

[Sidenote: [1425-1435 A.D.]]

Vasili Dmitrievitch died in 1425. His successor, Vasili Vasilievitch,

was a man of limited gifts and of weak mind and will, but capable of

every villainy and treachery. The members of the princely house had been

held in utter subjection under Vasili Dmitrievitch, but at his death

they raised their heads, and Iuri, the uncle of Vasili Vasilievitch,

endeavoured to obtain the grand principality from the horde. But the

artful and wily boyar, Ivan Dmitrievitch Vsevolozhsky, succeeded in 1432

in setting aside Iuri and assuring the grand principality to Vasili

Vasilievitch. When Iuri pleaded his right of seniority as uncle, and in

support of his claim cited precedents by which uncles had been preferred,

as seniors in years and birth, to their nephews, Vsevolozhsky represented

to the khan that Vasili had already received the principality by will of

the khan and that this will should be held above all laws and customs.

This appeal to the absolute will of the khan pleased the latter and

Vasili Vasilievitch remained grand prince. Some years later this same

boyar, angered at Vasili because the latter had first promised to marry

his daughter and then married Marie Iaroslavna, the granddaughter of

Vladimir Andreevitch Serpukhovski, himself incited Iuri to wrest the

principality from his nephew. Thus Russia again became the prey of civil

wars, which were signalised by hideous crimes. Iuri, who had taken

possession of Moscow, was again expelled and soon after died. The son

of Iuri, Vasili Kossoi (the Squinting) concluded peace with Vasili, and

then, having treacherously violated the treaty, attacked Vasili, but

he was vanquished, captured, and blinded (1435). After a few years the

following events took place at the Golden Horde: the khan Ulu Makhmet was

deprived of his throne and sought the aid of the grand prince of Moscow.

The grand prince not only refused him his aid, but also drove him out of

the boundaries of the territory of Moscow. Ulu Makhmet and his partisans

then established themselves on the banks of the Volga at Kazan, and

there laid the foundations of a Tatar empire that during a whole century

brought desolation on Russia. Ulu Makhmet, as ruler of Kazan, avenged

himself on the Muscovite prince for the past, was victorious over him in

battle, and took him prisoner. Vasili Vasilievitch only recovered his

liberty by paying an enormous ransom. When he returned to his native

land, he was against his will obliged to lay upon the people heavy taxes

and to receive Tatars into his principality and give them estates. All

this awakened dissatisfaction against him, of which the Galician prince

Dmitri Shemiaka, the brother of Kossoi, hastened to take advantage,

and joining himself to the princes of Tver and Mozhaisk, in 1446 he

ordered Vasili to be treacherously seized at the monastery of Troitsa and

blinded. Shemiaka took possession of the grand principality and kept the

blind Vasili in confinement, but observing an agitation among the people,

he yielded to the request of Jonas, bishop of Riazan, and gave Vasili

his liberty, at the same time making him swear that he would not seek to

regain the grand principality. Vasili did not keep his oath, and in 1447

the partisans of the blind prince again raised him to the throne.

[Sidenote: [1447-1448 A.D.]]

It is remarkable that from this period the reign of Vasili Vasilievitch

entirely changed in character. While he had his eyesight, Vasili was a

most insignificant sovereign, but from the time that he lost his eyes,

his reign becomes distinguished for its firmness, intelligence, and

decision. It is evident that clever and active men must have ruled in the

name of the blind prince. Such were the boyars: the princes Patrikeev,

Riapolovski, Koshkin, Plesktcheev, Morozov, and the famous voyevods,

Striga-Obolenski and Theodore Bassenok, but above all the metropolitan

Jonas.

_Jonas Becomes Metropolitan_

[Illustration: RUSSIAN WOMAN]

Jonas was a native of Kostroma. When he was made bishop of Riazan he did

not in any wise become a partisan of the local views, his sympathies

inclined to Moscow because, in conformity with the conditions of that

epoch, Jonas saw in Moscow alone the centre of Russian unification.

In 1431, at the death of the metropolitan Photius, Jonas was elected

metropolitan, but the patriarch of Constantinople had already named

the Greek Isidore to that office. This Isidore had participated in the

capacity of Russian metropolitan, in the Florentine council which had

proclaimed the union of the Greek church with the Roman, the pope of

Rome to be the head of the Universal church. Isidore, together with the

patriarch of Constantinople and the Byzantine emperor had submitted to

the pope; for Isidore was at heart a Greek: all his aims were directed

to the salvation of his perishing country, and like many other Greeks

he hoped through the pope to arouse Europe against the Turks. It was

these hopes that had caused the Greeks of that time to sacrifice the

independence of their church. In the eyes of Isidore Russia too was

to serve as an instrument for Greek patriotic designs; but the union

was rejected at Moscow, Isidore was driven out, and for some years the

office of metropolitan of Moscow remained unoccupied. Kiev had its own

metropolitans since the days of Vitovt, but Moscow did not wish to have

anything to do with them. The bishop of Riazan, Jonas, having been

already named metropolitan by the Russian clergy, enjoyed at Moscow

a pre-eminent importance and influence, and finally, in 1448, this

archbishop was raised to the rank of metropolitan by an assembly of the

Russian bishops, without regard to the patriarch. This event was a

decisive breach with the past, and from that time the eastern-Russian

church ceased to depend upon the patriarch of Constantinople and acquired

full independence. The centre of her supreme power was Moscow, and this

circumstance definitively established that moral importance of Moscow,

which had been aimed for by the metropolitan Peter, which had been held

up by Alexis, and which had received greater brilliancy from the transfer

of the ikon of the Blessed Virgin from Vladimir. From that time the

Russian territories not yet subject to Moscow and aiming to preserve

their independence from her--Tver, Riazan, Novgorod--were bound to her

more closely by spiritual bonds.

When he had for the third time ascended the throne of Moscow, the grand

prince designated as co-regent with himself his eldest son Ivan, who

was thenceforth called grand prince like his father, as is shown by

the treaties of that period. It was from that time that the political

activity of Ivan commenced and gradually widened; and there is no

doubt that when he attained his majority it was he, and not his blind

father that directed the accomplishment of the events which led to the

strengthening of Moscow. Prince Dmitri Shemiaka, who had been obliged to

promise on his oath to desist from any further attempts upon the grand

principality, did not cease to show his enmity against Vasili the Dark.

The clergy wrote to Shemiaka a letter of admonishment, but he would

not listen to their remonstrances, and the armies of Moscow marched

with the blessing of Jonas and accompanied by the young prince, against

Shemiaka in Galicia. Shemiaka was defeated and fled to Novgorod, where

the inhabitants gave him a refuge, and Galicia with its dependencies

was again joined to Moscow. Shemiaka continued to plot against Vasili,

took Ustiug, and established himself there; but the young prince Ivan

Vasilievitch drove him out, and Shemiaka again fled to Novgorod. The

metropolitan Jonas issued an edict declaring Shemiaka excommunicated from

the church, forbidding orthodox persons to eat and drink with him, and

reproaching the people of Novgorod for having received him. It was then

decided at Moscow to put an end to Shemiaka by secretly murdering him;

the secretary Borodati, through Shemiaka’s boyar Ivan Kotov, induced

Shemiaka’s cook to prepare and serve to him a poisoned fowl (1453).

[Sidenote: [1462 A.D.]]

Vasili the Dark died on the 5th of March, 1462, from an unsuccessful

treatment of burns. He outlived his chief counsellor, the metropolitan

Jonas, by a year, the latter having died on the 31st of March, 1461.[h]

A REVIEW OF THE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE TATAR PERIOD

The beginning of the fourteenth century was the commencement of a new

epoch in the life of Russia; in its two halves two empires began to

crystallize: that of Moscow in the east and that of Lithuania in the

west, and the scattered elements began to gather around the new centres.

Such a centre for eastern Russia was Moscow, until then an insignificant

town, rarely mentioned in the chronicles, being the share of the younger

and therefore less powerful princes. Under Daniel Aleksandrovitch[22]

the town of Moscow constituted the whole principality. With the

acquisition of Pereiaslavl (1302), Mozhaisk (1303), and Kolomna (1308)

this region became somewhat more extended, but when it fell to the

share of Ivan Danilovitch after the death of his brother Iuri, it was

still very insignificant; and yet through its resources the princes

of Moscow managed to become the first in eastern Russia and little by

little to gather round them the whole of eastern Russia. The rise of

the principality of Moscow is one of the most remarkable phenomena in

the history of Russia. It is therefore not surprising that particular

attention should have been directed towards it by historians, and by the

light of their united investigations the phenomenon becomes sufficiently

clear.

In the thirteenth century, under the domination of the Tatars in eastern

Russia, there was a continual struggle amongst the princes for the title

of grand prince, to which they also strove to unite the possession of

Vladimir. We also observe another distinctive feature of the time,

which was that the princes did not remain to live in Vladimir, but only

strove to unite it to their own possessions, and thus augment them, and,

if possible, secure them for their families. The struggle was for the

preponderance of one family over another through the extension of its

territorial possessions. In the Kievan period, whoever became prince of

Kiev, removed to Kiev, and named someone of his own family as ruler in

his own principality, so that if Kiev were lost and it should pass into

another family, he would not lose his own patrimony.

During the Tatar period we note a new phenomenon: the princes did not

merely separate themselves from their patrimonial lands, but even from

their capitals; for instance: Iaroslav lived in Tver, Basil in Kostroma,

Andrew in Gorodeza, Dmitri in Pereiaslavl, and so on. The power of a

grand prince at that time was only a hegemony, a preponderance over

other princes; as a testimony of their independence the other princes,

the elders of their families (such as Riazan, Tver, etc.) began also

to call themselves grand princes, and the preponderance of the grand

prince of Vladimir little by little lost its significance. To all this

there must yet be added another special circumstance, that in order for

anyone to unite Vladimir and its territory to his possessions and thus

obtain the predominance, a _iarlik_ or letter of the khan was required;

no rights were necessary and a wide field was open for every guest. Thus

there appeared a new basis for the right of succession: the favour of

the khan. To obtain this favour was the aim of all the princes, to keep

it--a peculiar art. Whoever possessed this art would be the head over all

eastern Russia, and whoever could maintain this position was bound to

subordinate all the rest to himself. In consequence of this, the first

condition for success at that time was a dexterous tactfulness, and

whoever possessed this quality must come out victor. This dexterousness

was a peculiar distinction of the Muscovite princes, and in it lay the

chief cause of their success. They had neither power nor higher rights,

and all their hopes were founded on their own skill and the favour of

the khan. They had no riches, and their patrimonial lands, poor and

secluded, away from the great rivers which were then the chief means of

communication, did not yield them large means.

But to ensure success with the khan, his wife, and the princes of the

horde, money was necessary; so they became saving and scraping, and

all their capacities were directed to the acquisition of gain. Their

qualities were neither brilliant nor attractive, but in their position

it was only by these sober qualities that anything could be obtained.

Alexander Iaroslavitch (Nevski) pointed out to his successors that their

policy should be to give way when necessary and to wait when uncertain.

He who followed this counsel was successful; whosoever hurried, like

Alexander Mikhailovitch (of Tver), was a loser in the game.

But while taking advantage of every means of influence at the horde, the

Muscovite princes did not lose sight of those means by which they could

also act within Russia itself. Ivan Danilovitch managed to induce the

metropolitan St. Peter to come to Moscow, and his successors continued

to reside in that town. The alliance with the spiritual power, the only

power that embraced the whole of Russia, was of extraordinary advantage

to the Muscovite princes.

The metropolitan could exert his influence everywhere. Thus Theognost

closed the churches at Pskov when that city offered an asylum to

Alexander Mikhailovitch, and St. Sergius did likewise at Nijni-Novgorod

when it accepted a prince to whom Moscow was opposed. This alliance was

a most natural one: if the princes needed the authority of the church,

the clergy--at that time the representatives of the most advanced ideas

concerning the civil order--sought to realise that order of which it

stood in need even for its purely economic interests. There is not the

slightest doubt that one of the chief causes of the devotion of the

clergy to the views and policies of the Muscovite princes, lay in its

conviction that it was bound to derive material advantages from the

concentration of all power in the hands of one prince. In fact, while

the system of appanages prevailed, it was, on the one hand, extremely

difficult for the clergy to enjoy its possessions and privileges in

security, because the maintenance of this security depended not on

one, but on many; while on the other hand, the princes of appanages

infringed on clerical privileges more frequently than the grand prince.

The dispersion of the monastic estates over several principalities still

further contributed to the desire of the clergy for the abolition of

the appanage system, which increased the difficulties of managing those

estates. Especially in the case of war among the princes of appanages,

the clergy of one appanage might easily be deprived of its possessions in

another appanage, because at such a time all means of injuring the enemy

were considered permissible.

In the increase of power of the Muscovite princes a leading part also

belongs to the Moscow boyars, whose activity was principally displayed

during the youth or minority of the grand princes.[23]

Such were the principal causes of the strength of the Moscow princes;

to them should be added (according to the historians N. V. Stankevitch

and S. M. Soloviov) the central position of the principality of Moscow,

both in the sense that Moscow is near the sources of the chief rivers,

and that an attack from without must first fall on the surrounding

principalities. But these causes are evidently secondary and would have

no significance without the others: Moscow is not so far from the other

principalities that these advantages would belong to her alone. It was

much more important that a wise policy, by preserving Moscow from the

attacks of the Tatars, attracted thither an increased population and thus

enriched the principality. A final important cause was the weakening

of the Tatar horde and its dismemberment at the end of this period, of

which the princes of Moscow did not fail to take advantage for their own

ends.[b]

THE INFLUENCE OF TATAR DOMINATION

Karamsin, in relating the history of the invasion of Russia by the

Mongols, makes some reflections on the consequences of the domination

of these barbarians for the Russian people. In spite of his devotion to

autocratic power, he cannot prevent himself from keenly regretting the

liberty which this power had superseded.

“There was a time,” he says, “when Russia, shaped and elevated by the

unity of the sovereign power, yielded neither in force nor civilisation

to the foremost of the European powers founded by the peoples of Germany

on the ruins of the Western Empire. Having the same character, the same

laws, the same usages, the same political institutions, which were

communicated to Russia by the Varangian or Norman princes, she took her

place in the new political system of Europe with some real claims to a

great importance, and with the remarkable advantage of being under the

influence of Greece, the only one of all the powers which had not been

overthrown by the barbarians. This happy time for Russia, is that of

Iaroslav the Great. Strengthened by both Christianity and public order,

she possessed a religious teaching, schools, laws, an important trade,

a numerous army, a fleet, unity of power, and civil liberty. What was

Europe at the beginning of the eleventh century? The theatre of feudal

tyranny, of the weakness of sovereigns, of audacity amongst the barons,

of slavery in the peoples, of superstition and of ignorance. The genius

of Alfred and Charlemagne shone through the darkness, but soon faded

away; their memory only has survived, their beneficent institutions,

their generous intentions, disappeared with them.

“The shadow of barbarism, by veiling the horizon of Russia, hid Europe

from its sight at the very time at which enlightenment was beginning to

spread there; when the people began to shake off slavery, and the towns

to contract alliances for their mutual guarantee against oppression; when

the invention of the compass extended navigation and commerce; the time

which saw the foundation of universities, in which fine manners began

to soften, etc. During this period Russia, oppressed and torn asunder

by the Mongols, was collecting all her forces merely that she might not

perish. There was then no question of civilisation for the Russians. The

rigours of the climate did not permit the Mongols to establish themselves

in Russia as they had done in China and India. The khans wished to reign

over Russia only from afar. But the envoys of the horde, representing

the person of the khan, did what they chose in Russia; the traders,

even the Mongol vagabonds, treated Russians as vile slaves. What was

the natural consequence? Moral degradation. Forgetting national pride

Russians learnt base cunning--the ruses and bravado of the weak. They

deceived the Tatars, and one another they deceived still more. While

ransoming themselves at the price of gold from the oppressions of the

barbarians, they became more greedy, and less sensitive to insults and

to shame, exposed as they were to the violence of foreign tyrants. From

the time of Vasili Iaroslavitch down to that of Ivan Kalita (that most

unhappy period!) Russia resembled a black forest rather than a state;

might appeared to be right; he who could pillage, pillaged, foreigners

and natives alike; there was no safety, either on the roads or at home;

robbery destroyed property everywhere. And when this terrible anarchy

began to disappear, when the stupor and the terror had ceased, and law,

which is the soul of society, could at least be re-established, it was

then necessary to have recourse to a severity unknown to the ancient

Russians. Light pecuniary fines had formerly sufficed for the repression

of theft, but already in the fourteenth century, thieves were hanged. The

Russian of Iaroslav’s day knew no other blows than those he might receive

in a private quarrel; under the yoke of the Mongols corporal punishment

was introduced. It may be that the present character of the nation

still offers traces which were impressed upon it by the barbarity of

the conqueror. It must be remarked also that, together with other noble

qualities, valour and military courage grew visibly weaker. Formerly the

princes had struck with the sword; during this period they redressed

their grievances by means only of baseness and complaints brought before

the khans. If, after two centuries of such slavery, Russians have not

lost all moral sense, all love for virtue, and all patriotism, let us

thank the influence of religion; it is religion which has maintained them

in the position of men and citizens, which has not allowed hearts to grow

hard, and conscience to be silenced. Humiliated as Russians they again

raised themselves under the name of Christians, and they loved their

country as being a country of true believers.

“The internal constitution of the state was changed; everything which

was free, everything which was founded on ancient rights, civil or

political, became extinct. After having humbly cringed to the horde,

the princes returned to their homes as terrible masters, for they were

commanding in the name of a supreme suzerain. That which could not be

done either in the days of Iaroslav the Great or in those of Andrew and

of Vsevolod III, was accomplished noiselessly and without difficulty in

the time of the Mongols. At Vladimir and everywhere else, except Novgorod

and Pskov, there was no longer heard the sound of the vetché bell, that

manifestation of popular sovereignty; a manifestation which was often

tumultuous, but dear to the descendants of Slavo-Russians. This right of

the ancient towns was no longer known to the new towns, like Moscow and

Tver, which became important during the Mongol dominion. Once only do the

chronicles make mention of the vetché of Moscow and they speak of it as

an extraordinary event--when the capital, threatened by the enemy, and

abandoned by the sovereign, found itself thrown on its own resources.

The towns had lost the right of electing their chiefs, who, by their

importance and the splendour of their elective dignity, had given umbrage

not only to the princely dignitaries but to the princes themselves.”[f]

_Wallace’s View_

The Tatar domination did not by any means Tatarise the country. The

Tatars never settled in Russia proper, and never amalgamated with the

people. So long as they retained their semi-pagan, semi-Buddhistic

religion, a certain number of their notables became Christians and were

absorbed by the Russian noblesse; but as soon as the horde adopted Islam,

this movement was arrested. There was no blending of the two races

such as has taken place--and is still taking place--between the Russian

peasantry and the Finnish tribes of the north. The Russians remained

Christians, and the Tatars remained Mahommedans; and this difference of

religion raised an impassable barrier between the two nationalities.

It must, however, be admitted that the Tatar domination, though it

had little influence on the life and habits of the people, had a very

deep and lasting influence on the political development of the nation.

At the time of the conquest Russia was composed of a large number of

independent principalities, all governed by the descendants of Rurik.

As these principalities were not geographical or ethnographical units,

but mere artificial, arbitrarily defined districts, which were regularly

subdivided or combined according to the hereditary rights of the princes,

it is highly probable that they would in any case have been sooner or

later united under one sceptre; but it is quite certain that the policy

of the khans helped to accelerate this unification and to create the

autocratic power which has since been wielded by the czars.[c]

FOOTNOTES

[10] [This is, of course, meant only in a limited sense. The migration

of peoples still continues with unabated force, but its centre has moved

from Asia to Europe. Thence it moves in a two-fold direction: on the one

hand, from western Europe to America and Australia; and on the other

hand, from eastern Europe to the remotest confines of Asia.]

[11] [A modern army inevitably loses in numbers and its difficulties

increase as it advances from its base of operations into the enemy’s

country. The very reverse was the situation of the Tatars. They needed

no base of operations, for they took along with them their flocks, their

tents, and all their belongings, and while their flocks fed upon the

grassy steppes, they in turn fed upon their flocks. And the nomadic and

predatory tribes whom they encountered on their march led the same kind

of life as themselves, and were easily induced to join in the certain

expectation of plunder. Thus the tide kept on ever increasing and gaining

in force. In fact, the Tatars can hardly be styled an army, but a people

in motion.[k][a]]

[12] [At first the Russians had only very vague notions as to who this

terrible enemy was. The old chronicler remarks briefly: “For our sins

unknown people have appeared. No one knows who they are or whence they

have come, or to what race and faith they belong. They are commonly

called Tatars, but some call them Tauermen, and others Petchenegs. Who

they really are is known only to God, and perhaps to wise men deeply read

in books.” Some of these “wise men deeply read in books” supposed them to

be the idolatrous Moabites who had in Old Testament times harassed God’s

chosen people; whilst others thought that they must be the descendants

of the men whom Gideon had driven out, of whom a reverent saint had

prophesied that they would come in the latter days and conquer the whole

earth, from the East even unto the Euphrates, and from the Tigris even

unto the Black Sea.[c]]

[13] Or the Purse.

[14] In the governments of Novgorod, Vladimir, Kostroma, and Rostov, and

the cities of Duglitch, Bielozersk, and Galitch.--[See Karamsin, and an

act of Dmitri Donskoi.]

[15] From 1333 to 1339 the princes who held appanages espoused the

cause of the prince of Tver against the grand prince of Moscow, whom

they called a tyrant. In 1339 the grand prince of Moscow returned to

the horde, and so terrified Usbek Khan by his denunciations against the

prince of Tver and other princes, that the khan immediately summoned them

to the horde, in order to restrain, or get rid of them.--[See Karamsin.]

[16] See Kamenevitch (translated by Karamsin), describing the great mart

of Mologa, where the commerce of Asia and of Europe met in the seventy

inns of its Slavonian suburb; and where seven thousand two hundred

pounds’ weight of silver were collected for the treasury of the prince.

[17] See the treaty of Dmitri Donskoi with Vladimir his uncle, who

promised to pay to him the tribute of his appanage, which bore the name

of the khan’s tribute; and the second treaty with the same Vladimir, by

which the latter prince engaged that his boyars should pay to Dmitri the

same tax which the grand prince might think proper to impose on his own

boyars.

[18] It was thus that, in France, in 1445, Charles VII took advantage of

the exactions of the English, and of the terror which they inspired, to

render perpetual the temporary taxes, and to keep up a permanent corps of

twenty-five thousand men.

[19] Usbek, it is true, with macchiavellian policy, designated all the

children of Ivan I as his successors; but, in 1340, he allowed Simeon,

the oldest and ablest of them, to make himself sole master of the throne.

Ianisbek Khan nominated Ivan II, the brother of Simeon, after his death

and that of his children, to the exclusion of a prince of the branch

of Tver or Nevski. A prince Dmitri, of the Nevski branch, who had been

made grand prince by a whim of Naurus Khan, was deposed in 1362 by Murat

Khan, who chose Dmitri Donskoi, grandson of Ivan I, and son of Ivan II.

Taktamuisch also gave the throne to Vasili II, the eldest son of Donskoi

(1389). Lastly, Ulu-Mahomet nominated Vasili III, son of Vasili II, and

father of the great Ivan III, whom this long succession rendered so

powerful that he completely crushed the horde.

[20] From 1362 to 1380.

[21] [150,000 in Soloviov and Rambaud.]

[22] A son of Alexander Nevski.

[23] “The origin of the Russian aristocracy,” says Turgeniev[f], quoting

from Karamzin, “is lost in the most remote antiquity. The dignity of

boyar is perhaps even more ancient than that of prince; it distinguished

the knights and the most notable citizens, who, in the Slav republics,

commanded the armies and administrated the country. This dignity appears

never to have been hereditary, but only personal. Although in the

course of time it was sometimes conferred by the princes, each of the

ancient towns had nevertheless its own boyars, who filled the principal

elective offices; even the boyars created by the princes enjoyed a

certain independence. Thus, in the treaties of the fourteenth and

fifteenth centuries, we often see the contracting parties confirming

to the boyars the right of quitting the service of one prince to enter

the service of another. Dissatisfied at Tchernigov, the boyar went with

his numerous following to Kiev, Galitch, or Vladimir, where he found

new fiefs and tokens of general respect. But when southern Russia had

become transformed into Lithuania, when Moscow began to grow larger

at the expense of the neighbouring principalities, when the number of

princes possessing appanages began to diminish, at the same time that

the sovereign’s power over the people was becoming more unlimited, then

the dignity of boyar also lost its ancient importance. Popular power

was favourable to that of the boyars, which acting through the prince

on the people, could also act through these latter on the prince. This

support at last failed them. Nothing remained to the boyars but to obey

their prince, or to become traitors or rebels; there was no golden mean

to take, and in the face of the sovereign, no legal means of opposition

existed. In a word absolute power was developing itself.”

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