use of the words _abstract_ and _concrete_ to which no clear idea can be
attached, as far as I can see.
[106] I cannot but disapprove of this use of the word “construction” to
mean a studied theory, because the word is imperatively required in the
theory of cognition to denote a mathematical diagram framed according to
a general precept.
[107] I apply this term because it is essentially like the passage from
the concrete “virtuous” to the abstract “virtue,” or from the concrete
“white” (adjective) to the abstract “whiteness,” or “white” (substantive).
[108] I can never use this word without thinking of the explanation of
it given by Petrus Peregrinus in his _Epistole de Magnete_. He says that
physical properties are occult in the sense that they are only brought
out by experimentation, and are not to be deduced from admixtures of
_hot_ and _cold_, _moist_ and _dry_.
[109] It follows as a corollary from this that if the positions of the
particles at any one instant, together with the velocities at that
instant, and the law of force, are given, the positions at all instants
can be calculated. Of course, to give the positions and velocities at
one instant, is a special case of the giving of the positions at two
instants. The two instants may be such that there will be more than one
solution of the problem; but this is an insignificant detail.
[110] It would seem to follow from his notion that in uniform motion each
minute’s motion is the cause of that of the next. Yet he says (¶ 19)
“there is no cause that is equal to its effect.”
[111] But, as I have elsewhere said, I should like to persuade
mathematicians to speak of “positional energy” as _Kinetic potency_, the
_vis viva_ as _Kinetic energy_, and the total “energy” as the _Kinetic
entelechy_.
[112] The differential equation being an ordinary, not a partial one,
this is an absolute constant, determined by initial (or final, or any
instantaneous) conditions.
[113] Dr. Carus calls attention to the connection between my doctrine of
the fixation of opinion and his anti-originalism.
[114] Dr. Carus passes a sweeping judgment on Post-Kantian philosophy, as
being original.
[115] This was a remark of my father’s.
[116] A person in the last _Monist_, breaks in upon my series of articles
to foretell what the “issues of synechism” will be. Were he able to do
so, it would certainly be the height of ill-manners thus to take the
words out of my mouth.
[117] As I am writing, I am shown a letter, in which the writer says:
“Peirce with all his materialistic ideas, yet,” etc I never promulgated
a materialistic idea in my life. The writer simply assumes that science
is materialistic. As I am correcting the proofs, I notice that Mr. B.
C. Burt, in his new _History of Modern Philosophy_, sets me down as
sceptical, though doubtfully. There are a good many inaccuracies in the
work. This was inevitable in a first edition. But the ingenious plan of
the book admirably adapts it to the wants of just that class of students
who cannot understand that no repertory of facts ever can be trusted
implicitly.
[118] Its being hypothetical will not prevent its being established with
a very high degree of certainty. Thus, all history is of the nature of
hypothesis; since its facts cannot be directly observed, but are only
supposed to be true to account for the characters of the monuments and
other documents.
[119] Somebody may notice that I here admit a proposition as absolutely
true. Undoubtedly; because it relates to the Absolute.
[120] Indeed, to admit that reply is all but to admit the non-absolute
grade of necessity.
[121] I rightly go somewhat further in my _Theory of Probable Inference_;
but that has no bearing on the present discussion.
[122] Dr. Carus, in his _Ursache, Grund und Zweck_, well says that
_reasons_ are discovered by induction, in the strict sense. It is often
admitted that _causes_ can only be inferred by hypothetic reasoning.
[123] The conservation of a vortex, which consists of the preservation of
a certain character of motion by the same particles, though derived from
the coöperation of other laws, is, in form, quite different.
[124] In speaking of directions, we assume the Euclidean hypothesis that
the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.
THE FOUNDER OF TYCHISM, HIS METHODS, PHILOSOPHY, AND CRITICISMS.
IN REPLY TO MR. CHARLES S. PEIRCE.
INTRODUCTORY AND PERSONAL.
Soon after I had received Mr. Peirce’s manuscript he wrote me in a
private letter as follows:
“You have not found, I trust, that in my rejoinder I have
anywhere overstepped the limit of amiable disputation. If
anything of that kind did, unconsciously to me, in the heat
of composition, slip from my pen, I am most anxious to have
it pointed out to me, so that there may be no feeling in the
matter of a disagreeable kind. For if you should not mention
it, I should at some future time discover it, and it would be a
source of real unhappiness to me.”
This is a very amiable disposition of mind. Mr. Peirce presses me very
hard in the struggle for truth: he does not hesitate to take advantage of
even the smallest weak point which he espies or rather which he believes
he espies. He does not shrink from using plain terms, such as “absurd,”
“unthinking,” “weak,” “hasty,” “irrational.” Yet he preserves in the
heat of the controversy a friendly spirit towards his antagonist, which
I cannot but appreciate and wish publicly to acknowledge. But I would
not have him change a word or soften the language of his article in the
least, _for my sake_. If Mr. Peirce is wrong, I will take care of myself;
if he is right, let the truth come out.
We are both, as it were, by profession champions of truth; so we need not
mind an occasional fling if in the end the cause of truth be promoted.
Especially, in the present case, I need not mind the hard blows which
Mr. Peirce deals with such assurance, for all the points at which he
strikes are well protected. The fiercer the onslaught, the better the
test. I feel satisfied that his severe scrutiny only serves to prove the
strength of the position which I defend.
I shall speak my mind as freely and unreservedly as does Mr. Peirce, and
hope he in his turn will resent plain words as little as I do. As offense
is not intended, so offense should not be taken.
Let me add here in these introductory remarks that I am always open
to conviction. The views which I uphold have been well considered and
thought out in their most important consequences. They are consistent
and well guarded in spite of Mr. Peirce’s thinking the contrary, so that
I feel no need of changing them. But should some unforeseen difficulty
arise which would oblige me to revise the whole system of my ideas, I
shall not hesitate publicly to confess it and allow myself to be lead by
truth whithersoever it be.
* * * * *
The issue of our controversy is the problem of chance—not of chance as it
occurs, for instance, in the throw of dice, but of “absolute chance,” or
perfect lawlessness. Mr. Peirce makes absolute chance the corner-stone of
his philosophy; he propounds a radical and sweeping indeterminism, while
I reject the idea, not of chance, but of absolute chance as incompatible
with the philosophy of science.
I. DIFFERENCES OF METHOD.
Mr. Peirce calls himself a Scotist and professes to represent mediæval
Realism, speaking at the same time of me as a Nominalist. We find,
however, that the inverse statement would be nearer the truth.
Before discussing Mr. Peirce’s philosophy itself, we must examine his
methods. Difference of method will produce important divergencies of
opinion.
1. ATTENTION TO DETAIL.
Mr. Peirce takes up in his rejoinder many incidental points, which have
little or no bearing upon the main issues between us. On the one hand,
things of no consequence, such as my granting that “absolute chance”
like the impossibilities of fairy tales, is not unimaginable, and my
saying that tychism is attractive but weak for lack of arguments, are
adduced as “momentous admissions,” and “inconsiderate concessions.”
On the other hand, Mr. Peirce catches at straws to prove a lack of
information on my part. He cannot forbear calling attention to the little
breach of etiquette committed in not giving an English baronet his proper
title.
Mr. Peirce shows on all these and other occasions a love of the
incidental, and if I were to allow myself to follow his example the
battle would soon be broken up into innumerable skirmishes.
It is noteworthy that Mr. Peirce’s procedure appears to be a nominalistic
tradition. Nominalists, regarding universals as mere names of many
particular things, have always showed a great preference for the single,
the incidental, the scattered; while realists viewing universals as
real things were in the habit of laying perhaps too much stress upon
universalities and generalities to the neglect of the particular and
individual.
Indeed, Mr. Peirce’s favorite idea, which is a belief in absolute chance,
is in my opinion the most nominalistic and anti-realistic proposition I
have ever met with. Regularity, or natural law, is to him the product
of evolution. Thus he demolishes the eternity of the universal, and
eternity is only universality in time. Now suppose that eternity (i. e.
universality in time) could be proved an error; then, the universality
of the universal in space also will become illusory. If those abiding
features of nature which we call natural laws have indeed originated from
a general sporting, from chance, from a chaotic lawlessness, by a gradual
habit taking, who can assure us that nature has not taken different
habits in other parts of the universe?
I look upon Mr. Peirce as an extreme nominalist, or, if he prefers it, as
a nominal realist soaked with nominalistic opinions. He professes to be a
realist, but he rescinds the foundation of realism.
Like the bear of the hermit Mr. Peirce throws the stone at the fly of
necessary connection, and in doing so kills the philosophy of realism
itself.
2. ORIGINALITY.
Originality, wherever we find it, is pleasing; but a hankering after
originality is dangerous. Experience teaches us to regard a thinker’s
love of originality as one of the main causes of his going astray. Let
the poet be original, but not the scientist, not the philosopher, not the
searcher for truth. The conceit of being original flatters our vanity,
and original ideas in philosophy are tantamount to original errors.
I do not deny the value of originality, but I do deny that it is a
criterion of truth.
Originality consists in the free exercise of our imagination, and a vivid
imagination is very valuable to the thinker. But it so happens that every
dreamer cherishes with a mother’s love the children of his fancy. And it
is, therefore, necessary to be especially critical with the offspring of
one’s own brain.
Kepler (“who,” Mr. Peirce says, “comes very close to realising my ideal
of the scientific method”) was endowed with an extraordinarily vivid
imagination. He invented an extremely original scheme of explanation for
the solar system, and expounded it with great poetical fervor in his
“Mysterium Cosmographicum.”[125]
Kepler at once became famous by his “Mysterium Cosmographicum” and was
generally admired for his originality. But his bent for hatching original
ideas did not alone make Kepler what he is to us now in the history
of science. A greater quality than his poetical fervor and original
imagination was his rigorous self-criticism. He took notice of every
little fact that did not agree with his theories, and for the sake of
truth, of objectively provable truth, that is, the agreement of his views
with positive facts, he sternly slew all those creatures of his fancy
which he foresaw could not survive.
Having myself a good deal of imagination, and having tried myself
many original ideas, I can appreciate the self-denial and discipline
of Kepler. I have come to the conclusion that originality is only an
important means of attaining truth. Our ways of reaching the truth,
our methods of finding it, may deserve the praise of originality, but
truth itself is never original; for truth is the faithfulness of a copy
which in our representations we make of reality, and to praise ideas as
original is certainly no argument that they are true.
There is no need of showing that Mr. Peirce is not just in his statement
of my view of originality, by maintaining that I have advised people
“think not for yourself.” Confessedly he exaggerates, but in truth he
misrepresents.
Mr. Peirce does not relish what I have to say on the subject, and,
to pacify his mind, he does not tire of praising originality as the
high-water mark of genius.
Mr. Peirce’s love of originality is a nominalistic feature of his mind. A
nominalist who denies the existence of universals cannot understand that
everything in science must be sacrificed to truthfulness. The question,
Does this idea correctly represent its respective reality? has no sense
to a nominalist. The nominalist is only interested in what a thinker
makes of things. The subjective conception, in his opinion, exhausts the
subject. I can understand that a nominalist should be greatly pleased
with originality, but a realist should not allow himself to be seduced by
its charms.
Mr. Peirce’s penchant for, and my distrust of, originality, have a direct
influence upon our respective methods of thought. It naturally makes him
bolder and me more cautious.[126]
3. A MODERN PROCRUSTES.
There was a man in ancient Greece named Procrustes, who had two beds;
one long, the other short. He used to lay his tall guests upon the short
bed, and his short guests upon the long bed, cutting off the limbs of the
former and stretching out the bodies of the latter, until they fitted
the size of their unpleasant resting places. In the same way Mr. Peirce
treats philosophical views.
There is the bed of the materialist and, as all processes to the
materialist are purely mechanical, necessitarianism is stretched in the
materialist’s bed to mechanicalism. I plead, since ideas and feelings
are not motions, that mental processes cannot be explained by the laws
of motion, but can, for that reason, be none the less determined; but I
plead in vain. That view of necessitarianism does not suit the bed upon
which my Procrustes places me. Other views, however, are cut down without
further ado because they are said to be nominalistic. Anything that does
not appeal to Mr. Peirce’s realistic mind is dismissed with a shrug.
I am neither a realist nor a nominalist, or rather, I am both realist
and nominalist. I am convinced that to some extent both sides were right
and both sides were wrong, and regard it as our duty to sift their
propositions and accept the truth whether it be nominalistic or realistic.
We must follow the principle of hearing both sides, and not consider
at all whether a statement agrees or disagrees with certain party
principles.[127]
4. OCCAM’S RAZOR.
The most brilliant disciple of Duns Scotus was William of Occam, whose
fame almost rivalled that of his master. Occam became an adversary of
realism; he became a nominalist, and after him was named a method known
as Occam’s razor, especially useful to nominalists in their warfare
against realists.
Occam’s razor is expressed in the sentence: “_Entia non sunt
multiplicanda præter necessitatem_,” which means: Only in cases
of extremest necessity are we allowed to assume the existence of
hypothetical facts. If assumed facts are not absolutely indispensable,
cut them off!
Occam’s razor was invented for a special purpose, that of cutting off the
realistic hypostatisation of abstract ideas.
I do not know which is more startling, that a realist in name, such as
Mr. Peirce, should use a weapon forged by nominalists against realism,
or that he whom in other respects we found in such a close contact with
nominalistic methods, should not understand how to handle a nominalistic
weapon.
Mr. Peirce censures me for making the statement that the formal is
subjective as well as objective. This, he says, is cut off by Occam’s
razor.
The formal is subjective, for our sensation is possessed of form and our
mind is in possession of formal thought. It is objective, for reality is
not void of form and the things are such as they are by virtue of their
peculiar shape.
The proposition that the formal is objective and subjective at the
same time is as little cut off by Occam’s razor as, for instance, the
proposition that there is air inside and outside of us, viz. in our lungs
and in the surrounding atmosphere.
Mr. Peirce’s usage of the beds of Procrustes is cruel, but his usage of
Occam’s razor is inconsiderate. He should be careful in handling such a
sharp knife, lest he do himself harm.
Mr. Peirce uses Occam’s razor to cut off statements and facts which make
his pet theories dispensable; but he forgets that Occam’s razor cuts off
ideas only, and when it comes in contact with facts its edge is turned.
Occam’s razor is an excellent instrument to dispose of such hypotheses as
absolute chance, for it declares that if their assumption is not quite
indispensable, we must cut them off.
Now it either is or is not a fact that the formal is objective and
subjective at once. It cannot be untrue in my philosophy while it is
true in Mr. Peirce’s system. My proposition of the formal being at once
objective and subjective is, according to Mr. Peirce, “cut off by Occam’s
razor.” “But,” adds he, “when synechism has united the two worlds this
view gains new life.” So long as I say so, it is wrong; but should I
adopt Mr. Peirce’s system, it will pass as right.
5. THE APPLICATION OF LEARNING.
Philosophers should make it a rule not to encumber their thoughts
unnecessarily with learning. The great problems of philosophy are, in my
opinion, much simpler than they are generally supposed to be. The art
mainly consists in stating them in the simplest possible manner.
It is indispensable for a philosopher to be familiar, at least in a
general way, with all the most important sciences, especially with
psychology, physiology, logic, physics, mathematics, and mechanics. But
he should not for that reason introduce any more than he can help their
complicated details into his expositions.
Every specialist is inclined to look at things through the spectacles of
his own speciality. But the philosopher who takes a higher standpoint
should be on his guard. He should always endeavor to simplify matters and
avoid introducing into philosophy issues which belong to a special field,
and derive their peculiarities from special conditions. To confound the
methods of the various sciences, or to generalise without sufficient
discrimination, will throw everything into confusion.
Mr. Peirce, as we well know, has greatly distinguished himself in
logic by valuable discoveries and independent investigations. We have
repeatedly taken occasion to pronounce unreservedly our admiration of his
achievements in this field. But we cannot approve of his application of
certain methods of his speciality to philosophy in general. Mr. Peirce
is inclined to look at the world through the spectacles of that new and
extremely specialised branch of logic which he is at present about to
invent.
One hindrance to properly appreciating his doctrines, says Mr. Peirce,
lies in my “laboring under the great disadvantage of not understanding
the logic of relatives,” which, he adds (p. 533):
“Is a subject I have been studying for a great many years, and
I feel and know that I have an important report that I ought
to make upon it. This branch of logic is, however, so abstruse
that I have never been able to find the leisure to translate my
conclusions into a form in which their significance would be
manifest even to powerful thinkers, whose thoughts had not long
been turned in that direction.”
I shall be glad to sit at Mr. Peirce’s feet as an attentive student, as
soon as he has worked out his logic of relatives, or any other subject.
But I cannot now accept any of his theories on the credit of some
half-developed science, be it ever so profound or intricate, until I see
plainly its connection with the present issues.
Mr. Peirce trusts that his favorite ideas will find support in his
peculiar conception of the logic of relatives. Judging from the
quiddities which he now so confidently propounds as weighty arguments,
we cannot share his sanguine hopes. His arguments, to be derived from
the logic of relatives, are like promises to pay out of the returns of a
gold-mine, just discovered and boomed by the owners. There may be gold in
the mine, but I do not as yet take any stock in it.
Mr. Peirce promises to prove by the logic of relatives what, if it were
true, he should be able to demonstrate in plain language.
I have an idea that the logic of relatives can be worked out into as
clear a science as is mathematics or algebra. But what shall we say when
told that the logic of relatives is really abstruse, and that he who
labors under the disadvantage of not understanding this abstruse science
is not prepared to grasp Mr. Peirce’s philosophy? The abstrusity, in my
mind, counts against Mr. Peirce’s philosophy, as much as against his
logic of relatives.
In my childhood I was much plagued with Latin, but as soon as I had
acquired a smattering of it, I began to talk Latin to the servants, and
when they did not understand me I thought that they were “laboring under
the great disadvantage” of not speaking Latin. Since then I have learned
to translate my Latin into the language of the people with whom I have to
deal.
Mr. Peirce seems to rely on his learning in proportion to its abstrusity;
he likes to walk on stilts.
Mr. Peirce is scholarly to excess. He has a special talent of rendering
issues involved. Not even his references to my articles in _The Monist_
are made directly by quoting the pages on which they appear. That method
would be too common. He invents a ponderous system, necessitating the
reader to look twice when he wishes to find a passage,—a scheme which
is original and very dignified in appearance, but makes quotation
unnecessarily complicated.
Learning is a virtue, but even virtues should be used with discretion.
6. THE PRINCIPLE OF POSITIVISM.
Says Mr. Peirce in confirmation of Whewell (p. 546):
“Progress in science depends upon the observation of the right
facts by minds _furnished with appropriate ideas_.”
To rely on the observation of facts is, in my opinion, a principle
of positivism. That facts must be observed “by minds furnished with
appropriate ideas” is undeniable, but ideas, in order to be appropriate,
must be true; they must be representations of facts.
Because he relies on facts I have characterised Mr. Peirce’s method as
positivistic. But he indignantly repudiates “the charge” as “totally
unfounded.”
Positivism (which I have always carefully distinguished from Comtism,
the latter being a special kind of positivism[128]) is not a peculiar
philosophy, but a most important principle of science.
Mr. Peirce seems to use the term positivism in a different sense from
that in which I use it. Be it so. I shall not nominalistically quarrel
about words so long as there are more urgent subjects under discussion.
Noticing that Mr. Peirce does not state that all ideas should be
ultimately reducible to facts, he is to be acquitted.
7. LOPPING OFF THE ABSOLUTE.
Mr. Peirce thinks that an agreement between us could be arrived at. He
says (p. 545):
“Dr. Carus’s philosophy would, in its general features, offer
no violent opposition to my opinions” (§ 16).
But the condition is (p. 545):
“To lop off the heads of all absolute propositions whose
subject is not the Absolute.”
As a matter of fact I have lopped off all absolutes. If Mr. Peirce
were more familiar with my views he would have known that. Thus, on
my part, I had done all I could to come to an agreement with him long
before he asked me to do it. But I fear that having also lopped off the
Absolute itself, I did too much of a good thing, for Mr. Peirce carefully
records his opposition to all philosophies which deny the reality of the
Absolute. (See § 18.)