_View of Mr. Mill._--Nearly every thing which is now theory, was once

hypothesis, says Mill. "The process of tracing regularity in any

complicated, and, at first sight, confused set of appearances, is

necessarily tentative: we begin by making any supposition, even a false

one, to see what consequences will follow from it; and by observing

how these differ from the real phenomena we learn what corrections to

make in our assumption. The simplest supposition which accords with

any of the most obvious facts, is the best to begin with, because its

consequences are the most easily traced. This rude hypothesis is then

rudely corrected, and the operation repeated, until the deductive

results are at last made to tally with the phenomena. Let any one

watch the manner in which he himself unravels any complicated mass

of evidence; let him observe how, for instance, he elicits the true

history of any occurrence from the involved statements of one or of

many witnesses. He will find that he does not take all the items of

evidence into his mind at once, and attempt to weave them together; the

human faculties are not equal to such an undertaking; he extemporizes,

from a few of the particulars, a first rude theory of the mode in which

the facts took place, and then looks at the other statements, one by

one, to try whether they can be reconciled with the provisional theory,

or what corrections or additions it requires to make it square with

them. In this way, which, as M. Comte remarks, has some resemblance to

the methods of approximation of mathematicians, we arrive by means of

hypothesis at conclusions not hypothetical."

§ V.--DIFFERENT FORMS OF REASONING.

It remains to treat briefly of the _different forms_ of reasoning, as

founded in the laws of thought.

_How far these Forms fall within the Province of Psychology._--As there

are different kinds or modes of reasoning, according to the difference

of the subject-matter or material about which our reasoning is

employed, so there are certain general forms into which all reasoning

may be cast, and which, according to the laws of thought, it naturally

assumes. To treat specifically of these forms, their nature, use,

and value, is the business of _logic_; but, in so far as they depend

upon the laws of thought, and are merely modes of mental activity as

exercised in reasoning, they are to be considered, in connection with

other phenomena of the mind, by the psychologist. Briefly to describe

these forms, and then to consider their value, is all that I now

propose. I begin with the proposition, as the starting point in every

process of reasoning.

I. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSITION.

_What constitutes a Proposition._--All reasoning deals with

propositions, which are judgments expressed. Every proposition involves

two distinct conceptions, and expresses the relation between them;

affirms the agreement or disagreement of the one with the other. As

when I say, Snow is white, the conception of snow is before my mind,

and also of whiteness; I perceive that the latter element enters

into my notion of snow, and constitutes one of the qualities of the

substance so called; I affirm the relation of the two, accordingly,

and this gives the proposition enunciated. Every proposition then

consists of these several parts, a word or words expressing some

conception, a word or words expressing some other conception, a word

or words expressing the relation of the two. The words which designate

these two conceptions are called the _terms_ of the proposition, and,

according to the above analysis, there are, in every proposition,

always two terms. That term or conception of which something is

affirmed, is called the _subject_, that which is affirmed of the same,

the _predicate_, and the word which expresses the relation of the two,

the _copula_. In the above proposition, snow is the subject, white, the

predicate, and is, the copula.

_Quality and Quantity._--Propositions are distinguished as to _quality_

and _quantity_. The former has reference to the affirmative or negative

character of the proposition, the latter to its comprehensiveness.

Every proposition is either affirmative or negative, which is called

its quality. As to quantity, every proposition is either _universal_,

affirming something of the whole of the subject--as, All men are

mortal; or else _particular_, affirming something of only a part of the

subject--as, Some tyrants are miserable.

_Four kinds of categorical Propositions._--We have, then, four kinds

of categorical propositions, viz., universal affirmative, universal

negative, particular affirmative, particular negative. That is, with

the same subject and predicate, it is always possible to state four

distinct propositions; as, every A is B, no A is B, some A is B, some

A is not B. For the sake of convenience, logicians designate these

different kinds of propositions severally by the letters A, E, I,

O. Propositions that thus differ in quantity and quality are said

to be opposed to each other. Of these, the two universals, A and E,

are called contraries; the two particulars, I and O, sub-contraries;

the universal affirmative, and the particular affirmative, A and I,

also the universal negative and the particular negative, E and O,

are respectively subalterns; while the universal affirmative and the

particular negative, A and O, as also the universal negative and

particular affirmative, E and I, are contradictories.

_Rules of Opposition._--The following rules will be found universally

applicable to propositions as opposed to each other. If the universal

is true, so is the particular. If the particular is false, so is

the universal. Contraries are never both true, but may be both

false. Sub-contraries are never both false, but may be both true.

Contradictories are never both true, or both false, but always one is

true, the other false. The truth of these maxims will be evident on

applying them to any proposition and its opposites, as for example, to

the affirmation, Every man is mortal.

_Categorical and hypothetical Propositions._--Propositions may be

further distinguished as categorical or hypothetical; the one asserting

or denying directly, as, _e. g._, The earth is round; the other

conditionally,--as, If the earth is round, it is not oblong.

_Pure, and Modal._--The proposition, moreover, may be either pure or

modal, the former asserting or denying without qualification,--as, Man

is liable to err; the latter qualifying the statement,--as, Man is

extremely or unquestionably liable to err.

II. ANALYSIS OF THE SYLLOGISM.

_Proposition the Link, Syllogism the Chain._--All reasoning admits

of being reduced to the form of a syllogism. Having discussed the

proposition which forms the material or groundwork of every connected

chain of argument, we are prepared now to examine the syllogism, or

chain itself, into which the several propositions, as so many links,

are wrought.

_Syllogism defined._--A syllogism is an argument so expressed that the

conclusiveness of it is manifest from the mere form of expression.

When, for example, I affirm that all A is B, that all B is C, and

that, consequently, all A is C, it is impossible that any one who is

able to reason at all, and who comprehends the force of these several

propositions taken singly, should fail to perceive that the conclusion

follows inevitably from the premises. That which is affirmed, may or

may not be _true_, but it is _conclusive_. If the premises are true, so

is the conclusion; but whether they are true or not, the argument, as

such, is conclusive; nay, even if they are false, the conclusion may

possibly be true. For example, Every tyrant is a good man; Washington

was a tyrant; therefore, Washington was a good man, Both the premises

are false, but the argument, as regards the form, is valid, and the

conclusion is not only correctly drawn, but is, moreover, a true

proposition. In a word, the syllogism concerns itself not at all with

the truth or falsity of the thing stated, but only with the form of

stating, and that form must be such, that the premises being conceded,

the conclusion shall be obvious and inevitable. All valid reasoning

admits of such statement.

_Composition of a Syllogism._--Every syllogism contains three

propositions, of which two state the grounds or reasons, and are called

the premises, the other states the inference from those positions, and

is called the conclusion. These three propositions contain three, and

only three, distinct terms, of which one is common to both premises,

and is called the _middle_ term; the others are the extremes, one of

which is the subject of the conclusion, and is called the _minor_

term; the other the predicate of the conclusion, and is called the

_major_ term, from the fact that it denotes the class to which the

subject or minor term belongs. In the syllogism,--Every man is mortal;

Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal,--the three terms are,

man, mortal, and Socrates: of these, Socrates, or the subject of the

conclusion, is the minor; mortal, or the predicate of the conclusion,

is the major; and man, with which both the others are compared, is the

middle term.

_Major and minor Premiss._--The premiss which contains the _major_

term, and compares it with the middle, is called the _major premiss_;

that which, in like manner, compares the _minor_ term with the middle,

is called the _minor premiss_. In the syllogism already given, 'Every

man is mortal' is the major premiss; 'Socrates is a man' is the minor

premiss.

_The Order variable._--The order of the terms in the respective

propositions, and even the order of the propositions themselves, is not

invariable, but depends on circumstances. In the above proposition, it

is immaterial whether I say, Every man is mortal, or, Mortal is every

man; it is immaterial whether I state first the major or the minor

premiss; nay, it is allowable even to state the conclusion first, and

then the grounds and reasons for the same.

III. LAWS OF SYLLOGISM.

The following rules or maxims will be found applicable to all cases,

and may be regarded as laws of the syllogism.

_Middle Term unequivocal._--_The middle term must not be

equivocal._--This rule is violated in the following syllogism. Nothing

is heavier than lead; feathers are heavier than nothing; therefore,

feathers are heavier than lead. The middle term, nothing, is here used

in different senses in the two premises.

_Middle Term to be distributed._--Essentially the same thing occurs

when the middle term is not, at least once, in the premises, used in

its most complete and comprehensive sense, or, as the logicians express

it, _distributed_. As, for example, when I say, White is a color, the

term color is not here distributed, for it properly includes many

things besides white. If now I introduce into another proposition the

same term in a similar manner, as Black is a color, I evidently include

under the term, as now used, some part of the class of things denoted

by the general word color, which was not included under the same term

as first used. The color which is affirmed to agree with black, is

not the same color which is affirmed to agree with white. The term,

in fact, denotes one thing in the one proposition, and another in the

other. A syllogism thus constructed, is invalid. Hence the rule, that

the _middle term must be distributed_, or taken in its completeness,

to include the whole class which it properly denotes, _at least once

in the premises_. This is done either by making it the _subject of an

affirmative_, or the _predicate of a negative proposition_; as, All

men are mortal, or, No vice is useful. Here the term man in the one

case, and the term useful in the other, are each distributed or taken

in their completeness. There is no individual to whom the term man can

properly be applied, who is not included in the expression, all men,

nor is there any useful thing which is not here denied of vice.

_What distributed in the Conclusion._--On the same principle, _no term

must be distributed in the conclusion which was not distributed in one

of the premises_. This rule is violated in the following syllogism, All

birds are bipeds; no man is a bird; therefore, no man is a biped. Here

the term biped, in the major premiss, is not taken in its completeness,

since many creatures besides birds are bipeds. Birds are only one

sort of bipeds. In the conclusion, however, the term biped, being the

predicate of a negative proposition, is distributed, the whole class

of bipeds is spoken of, and man is excluded from the whole class. The

syllogism is, of course, invalid.

_Law of negative Premiss._--It is further a law of the syllogism, that

_from negative premises nothing can be inferred_. Also, that _if one

premiss is negative, the conclusion will be negative_.

_Law of particular Premiss._--_From two particular premises nothing

follows, but if one premiss is particular, the conclusion will be so._

These rules are too obvious, and too easily verified, to require

illustration.

IV. DIFFERENT KINDS OF SYLLOGISM.

_Syllogisms differ._--We have mentioned as yet only those properties of

the syllogism which universally belong to it. There are differences,

however, which require to be noticed, and which constitute a

distinction of some importance, presenting, in fact, two distinct kinds

of syllogism.

_Two Modes of procedure._--There are manifestly two entirely distinct

modes of procedure in reasoning. We may infer from the whole to the

parts, or from the parts to the whole. The former is called deductive,

the latter inductive reasoning. The one is precisely the reverse of

the other in method of procedure. Each is a perfectly valid method

of reasoning, and each is, in itself, a distinct and valid kind of

syllogism. Each requires the other. The deductive is wholly dependent

on the inductive for its major premiss, which is only the conclusion

of a previous induction, while, on the other hand, the induction is

valuable chiefly as preparing the way for subsequent deduction. Each

has equal claims with the other to be regarded as a distinct and

independent form of syllogism. They have not, however, been so treated

by logicians, but, on the contrary, the inductive method has been

regarded, almost universally, as a mere appendage of the deductive,

an imperfect form of one or another of the several figures of the

syllogism deductive. Of this we shall have occasion to speak more fully

in the historical sketch.

_The two Modes compared._--The precise relation of the two modes

will best appear by the comparison of the following syllogisms. The

inductive syllogism runs thus: _x, y, z_, are A; _x, y, z_, constitute

B; therefore, B is A.

The deductive runs thus: B is A; _x, y, z_, constitute B; therefore,

_x, y, z_, are A.

The latter, it will be seen at a glance, is the precise counterpart of

the other, beginning where the former ends, and exactly reversing the

several steps in their order.

_The Law of each._--The general law or rule which governs the former,

is, What belongs (or does not belong) to all the constituent parts,

belongs (or does not belong) to the constituted whole. The law of the

latter is, What belongs (or not) to the containing whole, belongs (or

not) to all the contained parts.

_Application of the inductive Method._--Applying the inductive method

to a particular case, we reason thus: Magnets _x, y, z_, etc.,

including so many as I have observed, attract iron. But it is fair to

presume that what I have observed as true of _x, y, z_, is equally

true of _e, f, g_, and all other magnets; in other words, _x, y, z_,

do represent, and may fairly be taken as constituting the whole class

of magnets; consequently, I conclude that all magnets attract iron.

Thus stated, the truth which was at first observed and affirmed only of

particular instances, becomes a general proposition, and may, in turn,

become the premiss of a process of deduction. Thus, from the general

proposition, obtained as now explained by the inductive mode, that

all horned animals ruminate, I may proceed, by the deductive mode, to

infer that this is true of deer or goats, or any particular species or

individual whose habits I have not as yet observed.

V. DIFFERENT FORMS OF SYLLOGISM.

_The Form of Statement not invariable._--As there are different kinds

of syllogism, so also there are different forms in which any kind of

syllogism may be stated. These forms are not essential, pertaining to

the nature of the syllogism itself, but accidental, pertaining merely

to the order of announcing the several propositions. It has already

been remarked, in speaking of the general structure of the syllogism,

that the order of propositions is not essential. Either premiss may

precede, either follow. Nay, we may state _first the conclusion_, and

_then the reasons_, _or grounds_. This latter method, as Hamilton has

shown in his _New Analytic of Logical forms_, is perfectly valid,

though usually neglected by writers on logic. It is not only valid,

but the more natural of the two methods. When asked if Socrates is

mortal, it is more natural to say, He is mortal, for he is a man, and

all men are mortal, than to say, All men are mortal, he is a man, and

therefore, he is mortal. In fact, most of our reasoning takes the first

of these forms. The two are designated by Hamilton, respectively, as

the _analytic_ and _synthetic_ syllogism.

_Order of Premises may vary._--As to the order of the premises,

which shall precede the other, this, too, is quite unessential and

accidental. The earlier method, practised by Greek, Arabian, Jewish

and Latin schools, was to state first the minor premiss, precisely the

reverse of our modern custom.

_Order of Terms not essential._--The order of the _terms_, in the

several propositions, is also accidental rather than essential. There

are several possible and allowable arrangements of these terms with

reference to the order of precedence and succession, giving rise to

what are called _figures_ of the syllogism. These arrangements and

figures have usually been reckoned as four; three only are admitted

by Hamilton, the fourth being abolished. The first figure occurs when

the middle term is the subject of one premiss and the predicate of the

other. The second figure gives the middle term the place of predicate

in both premises. The third makes it the subject of both.

_A further Variation._--There is still another form of statement, in

which the terms compared are not, as above, severally subject and

predicate, but, in the same proposition, are both subject, or both

predicate, as when we say, A and B are equal; B and C are equal;

therefore, A and C are equal. This is a valid synthetic syllogism,

though not recognized by logicians previously to the _New Analytic_ of

Hamilton. It is termed by him the unfigured syllogism.

_Hypothetical reasoning not syllogistic._--It has been customary to

treat of _hypothetical_ reasoning, in its two forms of conditional and

disjunctive, as forms or kinds of syllogism. As when we say, if A is B,

C is D; but A is B, therefore C is D; or, disjunctively, either A is B,

or C is D; but A is not B, therefore C is D. These, however, are not

properly syllogisms. The inference is not mediate, through comparison

with a common or middle term, but _immediate_, whereas the syllogism

is, in all its forms, a process of mediate inference.

_Summary of Distinctions._--To sum up the distinctions now pointed

out. All inference is either immediate, as in the case of hypothetical

reasoning, whether conjunctive or disjunctive, or else mediate, as in

the syllogism. The latter may be inductive or deductive; and, as to

form, analytic or synthetic, figured or unfigured.

VI. LAWS OF THOUGHT ON WHICH THE SYLLOGISM DEPENDS.

_Statement._--There are certain universal laws of thought on which

all reasoning, and, of course, all syllogisms, depend. These

laws, according to Hamilton, are the principles of _identity_, of

_contradiction_, and of _excluded middle_; from which primary laws

results a fourth, that of _reason and consequent_.

_Law of Identity, what._--The principle of _identity_ compels us to

recognize the equivalence of a whole and its several parts taken

together, as applied to any conception and its distinctive characters.

As, for example, the sameness or equivalence of the notion man with the

aggregate of qualities or characters that constitute that notion.

_Law of Contradiction, what_.--The law of contradiction is the

principle that what is contradictory is unthinkable: as, for example,

that A has, and yet has not, a given quality, B.

_Law of excluded Middle._--The principle of _excluded middle_ is this,

that of two contradictory notions, we must think one or the other to be

true; as, that A either has or has not the quality B.

_Law of Reason and Consequent._--From these primary principles results

the law of _reason and consequent_. All logical inference is based on

that law of our nature, that one notion shall always depend on another.

This inference is of two kinds, from the whole to the parts, or from

the parts to the whole, respectively called deductive and inductive, as

already explained.

_Certain Points not included in the preceding Synopsis._--I have

presented, as was proposed, in brief outline, a synopsis of the forms

of reasoning. For a full treatment of these forms, and the laws which

govern them, the treatises on logic must be consulted.

Some things usually considered essential to logical forms, as the

_modality_ of propositions and syllogisms, and the _conversion_ of the

other figures of the syllogism into the first, I have not included in

the above outline, for the reason that the former does not properly

fall within the province of logic, which has to do only with the _form_

and not with the _matter_ of a proposition or an argument, while,

as to the latter, it is only an accidental, and not an essential

circumstance, what may be the figure of a syllogism, and it is,

therefore, of no importance to reduce the second and third figures to

the first.

VII. USE AND VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM.

Having considered the various forms which the syllogism may assume,

as also the laws or canons which govern it, we proceed to inquire,

finally, as to its _use_ and _value_ in reasoning.

_All mediate reasoning syllogistic._--It must be conceded, I think,

that all _mediate_ reasoning, all inference, which is not immediate

and direct, but which, in order to reach its conclusion, compares one

thing with another, is essentially syllogistic. The greater part of our

reasoning processes are of this sort. When fully and explicitly stated,

such reasoning resolves itself into some form of syllogism. It is not,

as sometimes stated, _a_ mode of reasoning, but _the_ mode which all

reasoning, except such as is direct and immediate, tends to assume.

Not always, indeed, is this reasoning fully drawn out and explicitly

stated, but all valid reasoning admits of being thus stated; nay, it is

not, as to form at least, complete until it is so expressed.

_Not always syllogistically expressed._--In ordinary conversation, and

even in public address, we omit many intermediate steps in the trains

and processes of our arguments, for the reason that their statement is

not essential to our being understood, the hearer's mind supplying,

for itself, the connecting links as we proceed; just as in speaking

or writing, we make many abbreviations, drop out some letters and

syllables here and there, in our hasty utterance, and yet all such

short-hand processes imply and are based upon the full form; and it

would be as correct and as reasonable to say that the fully written or

fully spoken word is merely _a_ mode of speaking and writing, which,

when the grammarian and rhetorician come into contact with common

people, they lay aside for the ordinary forms of speech, as to say that

syllogism is merely _a_ mode of reasoning, which the logician lays

aside when he comes out of his study, and reasons with other men.

_Chief Value of the Syllogism._--The chief use of the syllogism, I

apprehend, however, to be, not in presenting a train of argument for

the purpose of convincing and persuading others; for the laws of

thought do not require us in such a case to state every thing that

is even essential to the argument, but only so much as shall clearly

indicate our meaning, and enable the hearer or reader to follow us;

but rather in testing the soundness or detecting the unsoundness of an

argument, whether our own, or that of an opponent. For this purpose,

an acquaintance with the forms and laws of syllogism may be of great

service to the writer and to the orator.

_Objection to the Syllogism._--But it is objected to the syllogism

that it is of no value in the discovery and establishment of truth,

inasmuch as, by the very laws of the syllogism, there can be nothing

more in the conclusion than was assumed in the premises. There is,

and can be, in this way, no progress from the known to the unknown.

The very construction of the syllogism, it is said, involves a

_petitio principii_. When I say, All men are mortal; Socrates is a

man; therefore, Socrates is mortal; the major premiss, it is said,

affirms the very thing to be proved; that Socrates is mortal is

virtually affirmed in the proposition that _all_ men are so. Either,

then, the syllogism proves nothing which was not known before, or

else the general proposition, with which it sets out, is unwarranted,

as asserting more than we know to be true, and, in that case, the

conclusion is equally unreliable; in either case nothing is gained by

the process; the syllogism is worthless.

_Lies equally against all reasoning._--This objection, if valid against

the syllogism, is valid against and overthrows not the syllogism

merely, but all reasoning of whatever kind, and in whatever form. It is

an objection which really applies, not to the form which an argument

may happen to assume, but to the essential nature of reasoning itself.

As was shown in discussing the nature of the reasoning process, all

reasoning is, in its nature, essentially analytic. It is the evolution

of a truth that lies involved in some already admitted truth. It simply

develops, draws out, what was therein contained. Its starting-point

must always be some admitted position, its conclusions must always be

some inevitable necessary consequence of that admission. The mortality

of Socrates is, indeed, involved and contained in the general

proposition which affirms the mortality of all men, and so, also, is

every inferred truth contained in that from which it is inferred.

_Conclusion not affirmed in the Premiss._--But while _contained_, it

is not _affirmed_, in the premiss. To say that all men are mortal, is

not to say that Socrates is so, but only to say what implies that.

The conclusion which draws out and affirms what was involved, but not

affirmed, in the premiss, is an advance in the order of thought, a step

of progress, and not merely an idle repetition, and the syllogism, as a

whole, moves the mind onward from the starting-point to a position not

otherwise explicitly and positively reached. It is a movement onward,

and not merely a rotation of the wheel about its own axis.

_The Form accidental._--In so far as the objection of _petitio

principii_ relates, not to the _nature_ of reasoning, but only to its

_form_, this is entirely a matter of accident, and does not pertain to

the syllogism as such. As was shown in treating of the different forms

of syllogism, the order of the propositions is not essential. We may,

if we like, state the conclusion first, and then the reasons, as, All A

is C, for all A is B, and all B is C; or we may state the same thing in

a different form, as, A and B are equal; B and C are equal; therefore,

A and C are equal. Both are syllogisms, the former _analytic_, the

latter _unfigured_, but to neither does the objection of _petitio

principii_ apply so far as regards the mere form of statement. Nor

does it apply to that form of syllogism in which the major premiss is

a singular proposition, as, _e. g._, Cæsar was fortunate; Cæsar was a

tyrant; therefore, a tyrant may be fortunate. Here the subject of the

conclusion is not formally contained in that of the major premiss, as

Socrates is contained in the expression, all men, a part of the whole.

_Objection inapplicable to the inductive Syllogism._--Nor does the

objection apply again to the _inductive_ syllogism, in which the

conclusion is more comprehensive than the premiss. The objection

applies, in fact, only to the deductive syllogism, and to that only in

its synthetic form, and to that only as figured, and as presenting, in

its major premiss, other than a singular proposition.

_Major Premiss, whence derived._--But whence, it may still be asked,

comes the general proposition which every deductive syllogism contains,

whether analytic or synthetic, the proposition _e. g._, that all men

are mortal? Whether this be stated before or after the conclusion is

a mere matter of form; but what is our authority for stating such a

proposition at all? How do we know that which is here affirmed?

I reply, it is a truth reached by previous induction. Every deduction

implies previous induction. I observe the mortality of individuals,

_x_, _y_, _z_. I find no exceptions. My observation extends to a great

number of cases, insomuch that I am authorized to take those cases as

fairly representing the whole class to which they belong. I conclude,

therefore, that what I have observed of the many is true of the whole.

So comes the general proposition, All men are mortal.

_Authority for this Belief._--But what reason have I to believe that

what is true of the many is true of the whole, and how do I know this?

I reply, I do not know it by observation, nor by demonstration; my

belief of it rests upon, and resolves itself into, that general law or

constitution of the mind according to which I am led to expect, under

like circumstances, like results, in other words, that nature acts

uniformly. This is my warrant, and my only warrant, for the inference,

that what I have observed in many cases is true in others that I have

not observed.

_A Difficulty suggested._--But in what manner, now, shall this mere

belief of mine, for it is nothing more, come to take its place as

a general proposition, as positive categorical affirmation in the

syllogism whose major premiss reads, All men are mortal?

A law of the mind may be a sufficient explanation of my belief; but the

science of syllogisms cannot take cognizance of laws of the mind, as

such, and has nothing to do with beliefs, but is concerned only with

the _forms_ in which an argument shall be presented. Those forms must

be conclusive. How shall I convert, then, my conjecture, my plausible

belief, in the present case, into that general positive affirmation

which alone will answer the demands of the syllogism?

_The Process explained._--The process is this: The precise result of

my observation stands thus--_x_, _y_, _z_, are mortal. But I know

that _x_, _y_, _z_, are so numerous as fairly to represent the class

to which they belong. On the strength of this position, the inductive

syllogism takes its stand, and overlooking the fact that there are some

cases which have not fallen under my observation, _positively affirms_

what I only _believe_ and _presume_ to be true, and the argument then

reads, _x_, _y_, _z_, are mortal. But _x_, _y_, _z_, are all men,

therefore, all men are mortal.

The general proposition thus reached by induction becomes, in turn, the

major premiss of the deductive syllogism, which concludes, from the

mortality of all men, that of Socrates in particular.

_Position of Mill._--An able and ingenious writer, Mr. Mill, in his

treatise on logic, takes the ground that we have no need to embody

the result of our observations in the form of a general proposition,

from which again to descend to the particular conclusion, but that,

dispensing with the general proposition altogether, and with the

syllogism of every kind and form, we may, and virtually do, reason

directly from one particular instance to another, as, _e. g._, _x_,

_y_, _z_, are mortal; therefore, _f_, _g_, _h_, are so. "If from our

experience of John, Thomas, etc., who were once living, but are now

dead, we are entitled to conclude that all human beings are mortal,

we might surely, without any logical inconsequence, have concluded at

once, from those instances, that the Duke of Wellington is mortal.

The mortality of John, Thomas, and company, is, after all, the whole

evidence we have of the mortality of the Duke of Wellington. Not one

iota is added to the proof by interpolating a general proposition."

Our earliest inferences, he contends, are precisely of this sort. The

child burning his fingers, reasons thus: "That fire burnt me, therefore

this will." He does not generalize, "All fire burns; this is fire;

therefore, this will burn." The only use of a general proposition, Mill

contends, is simply to furnish collateral security for the correctness

of our inference.

_Remarks upon this View._--This view sweeps away at once, and forever,

all mediate reasoning, and shuts us up to the narrow limits of such

inference alone as proceeds from a given instance directly to a

conclusion therefrom. No doubt we do sometimes reason thus. But it is

a reasoning, the conclusiveness of which is not, and cannot be made,

apparent by any form of statement. If called in question, we can only

say, I think so, or, I believe so. The mortality of John does not prove

the mortality of Thomas. It may not even render it probable; it is only

when I have observed such and so many cases as to leave no reasonable

doubt that the property in question _is a law of the class as such_,

and _not a mere accident of the individual_, that I am really warranted

in the belief that any individual, not as yet observed, will come under

the same law, because belonging to the same class. To reason in this

way is to generalize; whatever process stops short of this, stops so

far short of any and all conclusive evidence of the truth of what it

affirms.

VIII. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC.

_Indian Logic earlier than that of Aristotle._--It is of the Greek

logic, that of Aristotle, that we usually speak when we have occasion

to refer to this science. It is usually attributed to Aristotle,

indeed, as his peculiar glory, that he should at once have originated,

and brought to perfection, a science which, for more than two thousand

years, has received few alterations, found few minds capable of

suggesting improvements. Recent labors of Orientalists have, however,

brought to light the fact that in India, long before the palmy days

of Grecian philosophy, logic was pursued with vigor as a study

and science. The Nyàya of Gotama holds, in the Indian systems of

philosophy, much the same place that the Organon of Aristotle holds

with us. The two, however, are quite independent of each other.

Aristotle was no disciple of Gotama.

_Aristotle's Logic not perfect._--Nor, on the other hand, was the logic

of Aristotle by any means perfect, as it is often represented. Its

imperfections are many, and have been, for the most part, faithfully

copied by his disciples.

_Aristotle the first Greek Logician._--Previous to Aristotle there

had been nothing worthy the name of science in this department of

philosophy. The Sophists had made some attempts at logic, but of no

great value. Plato had not devoted much attention to it. Aristotle

himself says, in the close of his Organon, that he had worked without

models or predecessors to guide him.

_Subsequent Writers._--The work of Aristotle is in six parts, the first

four treating of logic pure, the remaining two of its application.

The school of Aristotle carried the cultivation and study of logic

to a high degree. Theophrastus and Eudemus labored assiduously as

commentators on their master, but made no change in the essential

principles of the system. The Stoics, however, gave logic more

attention and honor, more time and care, than did any other of the

rival schools of philosophy. They sought to enlarge its boundaries and

make it an instrument for the discovery of truth. It held the first

place in their system, ethics and physics ranking after it.

St. Hilaire is wrong in saying that with Epicurus logic was of little

consideration, that sensation was the source and criterion of thought

with that school. The Epicurean logic was a peculiar system, differing

from the Aristotelian, and very little known in the subsequent

centuries.

In Alexandria the logic of Aristotle was in great honor, and had

numerous commentators in the first centuries of the Christian era.

_Introduced into Rome._--For a time the original works of Aristotle

were lost. They lay buried in an obscure retreat whither they had been

carried for safe preservation, and no one knew what they were. Sylla,

capturing the city, brought them to Rome, where they were discovered

to be the works of the great master, and Cicero gives them, with some

labor and learning, to the public. But the Roman mind never mastered

the logic of Aristotle. In all Roman philosophy, says St. Hilaire,

there is scarcely a logician worthy of the name.

For several centuries, if not in Rome, yet in Alexandria and Athens, in

Greece and in Egypt, the logic of Aristotle continued to be assiduously

cultivated.

_Logic in the Middle Ages._--It was in the middle ages, however, that

logic received its chief cultivation and its highest honors. Aristotle

was for some six centuries almost the only teacher of the human mind,

and the Organon was the foundation of his knowledge. Nor during the

irruption of the northern hordes, and the revolutions of society, and

empire, and human manners, which followed, did the philosophy and logic

of Aristotle pass out of sight or out of mind. It seemed impossible

for any revolution of empire or of time to shake its foundations or

break its sceptre over the human mind. In the seventh century, Isidore

of Seville, and Bede the Venerable, gave it their labors and renown.

In the eighth, Alcuin introduced it into the court of Charlemagne. In

the twelfth, Abelard, and the controversy between the Realists and

Nominalists, gave this science still more importance.

_Logic in the Arabian Schools._--Meanwhile, the Mohammedans had been in

advance of the Christians in the study of this science. The Arabs had

inherited the learning of antiquity, and had carried the cultivation

of the peripatetic philosophy to a high degree of perfection more than

a century before it had received the homage of the West. From Arabia it

passed, with the march of conquest, into Spain, and some of the ablest

commentators Europe has produced, on the works of Aristotle, have been

the Moors of Spain.

_Continuance of Aristotle's Dominion._--The Crusades tended only to

enlarge the sphere of this influence. Such men as Albert the Great,

and Thomas Aquinas, became, in the thirteenth century, expounders of

Aristotle. Not till the sixteenth century did this long dominion over

the human mind show symptoms of decadence.

_The Reformers._--Luther, among the Protestant reformers, sought

to banish logic from the schools; but it was retained, and in the

Protestant universities was still professed.

_Attacks upon Aristotle._--It now became the fashion, however, in

certain quarters, especially among the mystics in the Catholic

communion, to decry Aristotle, and each original genius took this way

to show his independence. Ramus is noted among these. Bacon followed

in this track, and did little more than repeat the invectives of his

predecessors. He attempted to set aside the syllogism, and put in its

place induction.

Induction, however, in some form, is as old as the syllogism. From

Plato and Aristotle downward, a thousand philosophers had availed

themselves of this method of reasoning and had also stated and defended

it.

_The Moderns._--From Bacon and Descartes till our day logic has been

in process of decadence. Locke condemns it. Reid and the Scotch school

ridicule its pretensions. Kant and Hegel, on the other hand, give it

a due place in their systems--the latter especially; while in France,

it has admirers in St. Hilaire, Cousin, and others of like genius;

and in Edinburgh, the great Hamilton devoted to it the powers of his

unrivalled intellect.

_Logic of Hamilton._--As no writer, since the days of Aristotle, has

done more to complete and perfect the science of reasoning, than Sir

William Hamilton, it seems due that even so brief a sketch of the

history of logic as the present, should indicate, at least, the more

important changes which his system introduces. Whatever may be thought

of some of his views and proposed reforms in this ancient science

and sanctuary of past learning, it is not too much to say, that no

writer on logic can henceforth present a claim to be considered, who

has not, at least, thoroughly mastered and carefully weighed these

views and proposed changes, even if he do not adopt them. They are,

moreover, for the most part, changes so obviously demanded in order to

the completeness of the science, and so thorough-going withal, that

they are destined, it would seem, to be sooner or later adopted, and

if adopted, to work a radical change in the whole structure of this

ancient and time-honored science.

I shall attempt nothing more, in this connection, than, in the briefest

manner, to enumerate some of the more important of these improvements.

_Assigns Induction its true Place._--Hamilton is the first, so far as I

know, to elevate to its true place the inductive method of reasoning,

making it coördinate with the deductive, and assigning its true

character and value as a form of syllogism.

_Recognizes the analytic Syllogism._--He is the first to bring to

notice the claims of the _analytic_ syllogism to a distinctive place

and recognition in logic; a form of reasoning, which, however natural

and necessary, and in use almost universal, had been strangely

overlooked by logicians from Aristotle down.

_Rejects Modality._--He strenuously and consistently rejects the

modality of the proposition and the syllogism, on the ground that logic

is not concerned with the character of the matter, whether it be true

or false, necessary or contingent, but only with the form of statement,

and consequently, all distinctions founded on the truth or falsity,

the necessity or contingence of the matter, are utterly irrelevant to

the science--a principle admitted by others, but not previously carried

out to its true results.

_Doctrine of Figure._--He shows that the figure of the syllogism is a

matter accidental, rather than essential, that it may be even entirely

_unfigured_; abolishes the fourth figure as superfluous; and sets

aside, as quite useless and unnecessary, the old laborious processes of

reducing and connecting the several figures to the first.

_Rejects hypothetical Syllogism._--He throws out of the syllogism

entirely, the so-called _hypothetical_ forms, both conjunctive and

disjunctive, as reducible to _immediate_ inference, and not, therefore,

to be included under syllogistic reasoning, which is always mediate.

_The single Canon._--He reduces the several laws and canons of the

figured syllogism to a single comprehensive canon.

_Quantification of the Predicate._--But the most important discovery

made by Hamilton in this science, is the quantification of the

predicate. The predicate is always a given quantity in relation to

the subject, and that quantity should be stated. This, logicians have

always overlooked, quantifying only the subject, as, All men, Some

men, etc., but never the predicate. Fully quantified, the proposition

reads, All man is _some_ animal, no animal, etc., _i. e._, some sort or

species of animal. This doubles the number of possible propositions,

giving eight in place of four, and gives a corresponding increase in

the number of words. These eight propositions are shown to be, not only

possible, but admissible and valid. They are thus enumerated and named:

AFFIRMATIVE. NEGATIVE.

I. _Toto-total_: All A is all B. Any A is not any B.

II. _Toto-partial_: All A is some B. Any A is not some B.

III. _Parti-total_: Some A is all B. Some A is not any B.

IV. _Parti-partial_: Some A is some B. Some A is not some B.

_Reference._--For a more full and exact account of Hamilton's system,

the reader is referred to the article on logic in the volume of

_Discussions on Philosophy and Literature_, by Sir W. Hamilton; also,

to "_An Essay on the New Analytic of Logical Forms_," by Thomas Spencer

Baynes, L. L. B. On the history of logic in general, see _Dictionnaire

des Sciences Philosophiques_--Article _Logique_, by Barthèleme St.

Hilaire, Professor of Philosophy to the College of France, member of

the Institute, etc., etc.; also, Blakey's _History of Logic_. The

_Memoir_ of St. Hilaire, on the logic of Aristotle, is one of the best

works of modern times on the subject of which it treats.

INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES

PART FOURTH.

INTUITIVE POWER.

CHAPTER I.

EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THE INTUITIVE FACULTY.

_Office of this Power._--In our analysis of the powers of the mind,

one was described as having for its office the conception of truths

that lie apart from the region and domain of sense--first principles

and primary ideas, fundamental to, and presupposed in, the operations

of the understanding, yet not directly furnished by sense. They are

awakened in the mind on occasion of sensible experience, but it is

not sensible experience which produces them. On the contrary, they

spring up in the mind as by intuition, whenever the fitting occasion

is presented. We must attribute their origin to a special power of the

mind by virtue of which, under appropriate circumstances, it conceives

the truths and ideas to which we refer. This power we have termed the

_originative_ or _intuitive_ faculty.

_Specific Character._--In its specific character and function it

is quite distinct from any of the faculties as yet considered. It

does not, like the presentative power, bring before us, in direct

cognizance, sensible objects; nor does it, like the representative

faculty, replace those objects to thought, in their absence. It neither

presents, nor represents, any object whatever. It forms no picture of

any thing to the mind's eye. It is a power of simple conception; and

yet it differs in an important sense from the other conceptive powers

and that is, that it is not _reflective_ but intuitive in its action.

Its data are conceptions, but conceptions necessary and intuitive,

seen at a glance, not the results of the reflective and discursive

process. These data are ideas of reason, rather than notions of the

understanding, or processes of reflection. There is no sensible object

corresponding to these ideas. We do not see, or hear, or feel, or by

any means cognize, any thing of the sort; nor can we form a picture, or

represent to ourselves any such thing as, _e. g._, time, or space, or

substance, or cause, and the like. They are conceptions of the mind,

and yet we conceive of them as _realities_. We cannot think them the

mere creations and figments of the brain. And in this respect, again,

they differ from the notions of the understanding--those classes and

genera which we know to be the mere creations of the mind.

_Existence of such a Faculty._--If any are disposed to doubt the

existence of the faculty under consideration, as a distinct power

of the mind, we have only to ask, whence come these ideas? They are

given, not by perception, evidently, nor by memory, nor by imagination,

for they fall not within the sphere of any of these faculties, that

is the sphere of sense. They relate not to the sensible, but to the

super-sensible.

Nor are they the result of abstraction, as might at first appear.

Particular instances being given, certain times, certain spaces,

certain substances, certain instances of right and wrong conduct--it

is the province of the faculty now named, to form, from these concrete

ideas, the abstract notions of time, space, etc. But whence comes, in

the first instance, the concrete idea? Whence comes the notion of a

time, a space, a substance, a cause, a right or wrong act? Abstraction

cannot give these. Manifestly, however, we have a faculty of forming

such conceptions, of perceiving such truths and realities; and as

manifestly, it is a faculty distinct from any hitherto considered.

There are such realities as time, space, substance, cause, right and

wrong, etc.,

The mind takes cognizance of them as such, knows them, and knows them

to be realities; has, therefore, the faculty of knowing such truths.

We may call it, if we please, the faculty of original and intuitive

conception.

_Generally admitted._--The existence of ideas not directly furnished

by sense or experience, and not given by the faculties whose office it

is to deal with objects of sense, is a doctrine now generally admitted

by the most eminent philosophers. Nor is it a doctrine peculiar to any

one school. Under different names it is the doctrine substantially of

Reid, Stewart, Brown, Price, among English metaphysicians; Kant and

his disciples in Germany; Cousin, Jouffroy and others in France. It is

denied by Hobbes, Condillac, Gassendi, and others of that class who

trace all our ideas to sense as their ultimate source and parentage.

_Opinion of Locke._--The position of Locke respecting this matter, has

been the subject of much controversy. By a certain class of writers he

has been regarded as denying the existence of any and all ideas not

derived from sense, and has been classed with the school of Hobbes,

Condillac, etc. His philosophy has been regarded by many as of doubtful

and dangerous tendency, as leading to the denial of all truth and

knowledge not within the narrow domain of sense, and so conducting to

materialism and skepticism. This can by no means be fairly charged

upon him, nor upon his philosophy. He held no such views, nor are they

implied or contained in his doctrine. Locke, indeed, takes the ground

that all our ideas may be traced ultimately to one of two sources,

sensation or reflection; the one taking cognizance of external objects,

the other of our own mental operations: and that, whatever other

knowledge we have not given directly by these faculties, is produced

by adding, repeating, and variously combining, in our own minds, the

simple ideas derived from these sources. In this process, however,

of adding, combining, etc., he really includes what we prefer to

designate as a separate faculty of the mind, and by another name. He

distinctly recognizes the existence of the ideas which we attribute

to this faculty--ideas of space, power, etc.--and gives a clear, and

for the most part correct account of their origin. The mind, he says,

observes what passes without--the changes there occurring; it reflects

also on what passes within--the changes of its own ideas and purposes;

it concludes that like changes will be produced in the same things,

under the same circumstances, in future; it considers the possibility

of effecting such changes, and so comes by the idea of _power_. In

this Locke really includes essentially what we mean by suggestion or

original conception. Experience, it is universally admitted, furnishes

the occasion, suggests the idea, must precede as the indispensable

condition of the mind's having that idea, and is, at least in this

sense, the source of it, that it suggests the idea to the mind. All

this, Locke fully admits, while, at the same time, he fails to draw the

dividing line clearly between the ideas of sense and those in question.

_Objections to the term Suggestion._--The name original suggestion

has been commonly applied, of late, especially in this country, to

designate the faculty now under consideration. It is so used by

Professor Upham, and by Dr. Wayland. It is liable, however, to serious

objections. The term suggestion does not seem to me to express the

peculiar characteristic, the distinctive element and office of this

faculty. It is not peculiar to the ideas now in question, that they

are _suggested_ to the mind; many other ideas, all ideas, in fact,

are suggested by something. This class of our thoughts, therefore,

is no more entitled to that name than any other class. Nor is it

peculiar to this class that they are _original_ suggestions. The mind

has many other equally original ideas that are likewise suggestions

from things without, or from its own operations--mere fancies many of

them, imaginations. We need to distinguish, in this case, the merely

fanciful, the ideal, from the real. The terms intuitive and intuition,

while they imply the reality of the thing perceived, indicate, also,

the immediateness of the process.

_More serious Objection._--But there is a still further and more

serious objection to the term suggestion as thus employed. The word

does not, and cannot, with propriety, be made to denote what is now

intended. It has a transitive significance, and cannot be made to

denote a purely subjective process. Objects external suggest certain

ideas to my mind. I suggest ideas to other minds. The faculty of

suggestion lies, properly, not with the mind that receives the

suggestion, but with the mind or object that gives it. But when we say

the mind has the faculty of original suggestion, we do not mean that

it has the power of suggesting original ideas to other minds; we refer

to that power of the mind by which, in virtue of its constitution,

certain ideas, not strictly derived from sense, are awakened in it when

the occasion presents itself. We intend not a power of suggesting, but

rather of receiving suggestions, a power of _conceiving_ ideas, a power

of original and intuitive conceptions. To say that the mind suggests

to itself ideas of space, time, etc., is a singular use of terms. I

understand what is meant by suggesting ideas to others, and what it

is to receive suggestions from others, and to have ideas suggested by

events, occurrences and objects without, and how one thought may, by

some law of association, suggest another. But how the mind suggests

ideas to _itself_, is not so clear. A man, in a fit of abstraction,

talks to himself, but whether he suggests ideas to himself in that way,

so that he finds his own conversation instructive and profitable, may

admit of question. The truth is, the idea is suggested, not _by_ the

mind, but _to_ the mind--suggested from without. The mind has the power

of conceiving certain ideas, which are awakened or excited in it by

the occasion which presents itself. To call this faculty a faculty of

suggestion, is simply a misnomer.

_The true Doctrine._--All we can truly say, is, that the idea is

awakened or called up in the mind when the occasion presents, is

suggested _to_ it, not by it, suggested by the occasion, and not by the

mind itself. The mind has the idea within, has, moreover, the faculty

of _conceiving_ the idea, is so constituted, that, under certain

circumstances, in view of what it observes without, or is conscious of

within, the given idea is naturally and universally awakened in it; but

the _source_ of the suggestion lies not within the mind itself, and is

not to be confounded with the mind's faculty of conception.

_Use of the term by Reid and others._--Dr. Reid has been referred to

as authority for the use of the word suggestion to denote the faculty

in question. Dr. Reid makes use of the word, but not in the sense now

intended, not to denote a specific faculty of the mind, coördinate

with perception, memory, imagination, etc., not, in fact, as a faculty

at all. He refers to the well known fact, that ideas are suggested to

the mind by objects and events without, and by the sensations thus

awakened; as, _e. g._, a certain sound suggests the passing of a coach

in the street. So, also, one idea or sensation will suggest another.

He uses the term to denote the suggestion of one thing _to_ the mind

_by_ another thing, and not to denote a power in the mind of suggesting

things to itself. This is the correct use, and was not original with

Reid. Berkley had used the term in the same way before him. Locke had

used the word _excited_ in the same sense. The idea expressed by these

terms, and the use of the same or similar terms by which to express it,

may be traced back as far, at least, as to the Christian Fathers. St.

Augustine so uses it. Reid expressly applies the term to the perception

of external objects, as, _e. g._, certain sensations suggest the notion

of extension and space. This is correct use.

_The Facts in the Case._--The truth is, things exist thus and thus,

and we are constituted with reference to them as thus existing. Sense

and experience inform us of these existences and realities. Some of

them are objects of direct perception by the senses, as matter and its

qualities. Some of them are not directly objects of perception, but are

suggested to the mind by the operations of sense, and are intuitively

perceived by the mind, and recognized as truths and realities when thus

suggested, as time, space, substance, cause, the right, the wrong, the

beautiful, etc.

The mind has the faculty of receiving and recognizing such truths and

realities as thus suggested; and this faculty we call the power of

_original and intuitive conception_.

_These Ideas of internal Origin, in what Sense._--It has been customary

of late, especially in our country, to speak of the class of ideas now

referred to as of _internal origin_, in distinction from other ideas,

derived more directly from sense, and which are consequently designated

as of external origin. As it is desirable to be exact in our use of

terms, it may be well to inquire in what sense any of our ideas are of

external, and in what sense of internal origin, and wherein the ideas,

now under consideration, differ from any others in respect to their

source.

_Ideas of external Origin._--A large class of our ideas evidently

relate to objects of sense, objects external and material, of which

we take cognizance through the senses. Such ideas may be said to be

of external origin, inasmuch as they relate to things without, and

are dependent on the external object as the indispensable condition

of their development. Were it not for the external object producing

the sensation of color or of hardness, I should not have the idea of

redness or of hardness; were it not for the external object resisting

my movements, I should not get the idea of externality. The idea is,

in these cases, dependent on, and limited by, the sensation or the

perception. They correspond as shadow and substance. The idea of

resistance, and the perception of it, the idea of sound or color, and

the sensation of it, are coëxtensive, synchronous, and, as to contents,

identical.

_These, in a Sense, internal._--In another sense, however, even these

ideas are of internal origin, that is, they are the mind's own ideas;

they spring up in the mind, and not out of it; they are, as ideas,

strictly internal states, affections, acts of the mind itself. Take

away intelligence, reason, the light divine, from the soul of man, and

the external objects may exist as before, and produce the same effect

on the organs of sense, but the ideas no longer follow. The physical

organs of the idiot are affected in the same way by external objects as

those of any other person, but he gets not the same ideas. These, it

is the office of the mind to produce and fashion for itself out of the

occasion and material furnished by sense. And this is as true of ideas

relating to external objects as to any other.

_Sensation an internal Affection._--It may even be said of this class

of ideas, that their _suggestion_ is of internal origin. The immediate

occasion of the mind's having the idea of extension, weight, hardness,

color, etc., is not the existence of the object itself, possessing such

and such qualities, but the impression produced by the object and its

qualities on the sense; in other words, the sensation awakened in us.

This it is which awakens and calls forth in the mind the idea of the

external object. Were there, for any reason, no sensation, then the

objects might exist as now, but we should have no idea of them. But

sensation is an internal affection, revealed by consciousness, and the

ideas awakened by it and dependent on it, are immediately of internal

origin, though mediately dependent on some preceding external condition

and occasion.

_Ideas of internal Origin._--If we examine, now, the ideas of

internal origin, so called, furnished by the faculty of original

and intuitive conception, we find that, while they do not directly

relate to objects of sense external and material, they nevertheless

depend, in like manner, on some preceding operation of sense as the

occasion of their development. Observation of what goes on without, or

consciousness of what goes on within furnishes the occasion, as all

admit, on which these ideas are awakened in the mind. The idea of

time, _e. g._, is connected with the succession of events, external or

internal--things without and thought and feeling within following each

other--which succession is matter of observation or of consciousness.

The idea of space is connected with the observation or sensation of

body as extended. The idea of beauty and deformity is awakened by

the perception of external objects as possessing certain qualities

which we thus designate. The idea of right and wrong in like manner

connects with something observed in human conduct. So of all ideas of

this class. They are not disconnected with, nor independent of, the

appropriate objects of observation and consciousness. These objects

must exist, these occasions must be furnished, as the _indispensable

condition_ of the existence of the idea in the mind. Dispense with the

succession of events or the observation of it, and you dispense with

the idea of time in the human mind.

_Conclusion._--So far as regards the origin of the ideas in question,

it is not easy to draw a dividing line, then, between the two classes,

marking the one as _external_, the other as _internal_. Both are of

external origin, and equally so, in this sense--that they both depend,

and equally depend, on some previous exercise of sense as the occasion

and condition of their development. Both are of internal origin, in

another sense--that they are both awakened in the mind--are both the

product of its own activity.

_Difference lies in what._--The difference is not so much that of

externality or internality of origin, as it is a difference of

character. The one relates to objects of sense, which can be seen,

heard, felt; the other to matters not less real, not less obvious,

but of which sense does not take direct cognizance. In either case

they spring from the constitution and laws of the mind. Such is my

constitution that external and material objects, affecting my senses,

furnish me ideas relating to such objects. And such is my constitution

that certain relations and qualities of things not directly cognizable

by sense, and certain realities and facts of an æsthetic and moral

nature, likewise impress my mind, and thus awaken in me the idea

of such relations and realities. The objects, the relations, the

realities, exist, they are perceived by the mind, and thus the first

idea of them is obtained. Color exists, and the eye is so constituted

as to be able to perceive it, and thus the idea of color is awakened in

the mind. So right and wrong exist, and the mind is so constituted as

to be able to perceive and recognize their existence, and thus the idea

of right is awakened in the mind. The faculty we call perception in the

one case, original conception in the other.

CHAPTER II.

TRUTHS AND CONCEPTIONS FURNISHED BY THIS FACULTY

§ I.--PRIMARY TRUTHS.

_Primary Truths and Primary Ideas as distinguished._--The faculty in

question may be regarded as the source of primary beliefs, truths,

cognitions, intuitively _perceived_, and also of primary and original

conceptions, notions, ideas, also intuitively _conceived_.

The difference between a conception or idea, and a belief or truth, is

obvious. The notion of existence, and the knowledge or belief that I,

myself, exist, are clearly distinguishable. The idea of cause, and the

conviction that every event has a cause, are distinct mental states.

The one is a primitive and intuitive conception, the other a primitive

and intuitive truth. Every primary truth involves a primitive and

original conception.

_Existence of first Truths._--All science and all reasoning depend

ultimately on certain first truths or principles, not learned by

experience, but prior to it, the evidence and certainty of which lie

back of all reasoning and all experience. Take away these elementary

truths, and neither science nor reasoning are longer possible, for want

of a beginning and foundation. Every proposition which carries evidence

with it, either contains that evidence in itself, or derives it from

some other proposition on which it depends. And the same is true of

this other proposition, and so on forever, until we come, at last, to

some proposition which depends on no other, but is self-evident, a

first truth or principle. Whence come these first principles? Not of

course from experience, for they are involved in and essential to all

experience. They are native or _à priori_ convictions of the mind,

instinctive and intuitive judgments.

_Existence of first Truths admitted._--The existence of first truths

or principles, as the basis of all acquired knowledge, has been

very generally admitted by philosophers. They have designated these

elementary principles, however, by widely different appellations.

By some, they have been termed _instinctive_ beliefs, cognitions,

judgments, etc., an appellation mentioned by Hamilton as employed

by a very great number of writers from Cicero downward, including,

among the rest, Scaliger, Bacon, Descartes, Pascal, Leibnitz, Hume,

Reid, Stewart, Jacobi. Others, again, have termed them _à priori_ or

_transcendental_ principles, cognitions, judgments, etc., as being

prior to experience, and transcending the knowledge derived from sense.

So Kant and his school termed them. By the Scotch writers they have

been termed, also, principles of _common sense_, in place of which

expression Stewart prefers the title, _fundamental laws of human

belief_.

_Criteria of primary Truths._--It becomes an important inquiry, in

what manner we may recognize and distinguish first truths from all

others. Besides common consent, or universality of belief on the part

of those who have arrived at years of discretion, _Buffier_ relies,

also, upon the following, as criteria of first principles; that

they are such truths as can neither be defended nor attacked by any

propositions, either more manifest or more certain than themselves;

and that their practical influence extends even to those who would

deny them. Reid gives, among other criteria, the following: consent of

ages and nations; the absurdity of the opposite; early appearance in

the mind, prior to education and reasoning; practical necessity to the

conduct and concerns of life. _Hamilton_ gives the following as tests

or criteria of first truths: 1. _Incomprehensibilty._--We comprehend

that the thing is, but not _how_ or _why_ it is. 2. _Simplicity._--If

the cognition or belief can be resolved into several cognitions or

beliefs, it is complex, and so, no longer original. 3. _Necessity,

and consequent universality._--If necessary, it is universal, and

if absolutely universal, then it must be necessary. 4. _Comparative

evidence and certainty._

_Summary of Criteria._--The following may be regarded as a summary of

the more important criteria by which to distinguish primary truths from

all others.

_a._ As first truths, or primary data of intelligence, they are, of

course, not derived from observation or experience, but are prior and

necessary to such experience.

_b._ They are _simple_ truths, not resolvable into some prior and

comprehending truth from which they may be deduced.

_c._ As simple truths, they _do not admit of proof_, there being

nothing more certain which can be brought in evidence of them.

_d._ While they do not admit of proof, _the denial of them involves us

in absurdity_.

_e._ Accordingly, as simple, and as self-evident, they are universally

admitted.

_Enumeration of some of the Truths usually regarded as

primary._--Different writers have included some more, some fewer, of

these first principles in their list; while no one has professed,

so far as I am aware, to give a complete enumeration of them. Such

an enumeration, if it were possible, would be of great service in

philosophy. The following have been generally included among primary

truths by those who have attempted any specification, viz.; our

personal existence, our personal identity, the existence of efficient

causes, the existence of the material world, the uniformity of nature;

to which would be added, by others, the reliability of memory, and of

our natural faculties generally, and personal freedom or power over our

own actions and volitions.

_Correctness of this Enumeration._--That the truths now specified are

in some sense primary, that they are generally admitted and acted

upon, among men, without process of reasoning, and that, when stated,

they command the universal and instant assent of even the untaught and

unreflecting mind, there can be little doubt. Whether, in all cases,

however, they come strictly under the rules and criteria now given;

whether, for example, our own existence and identity are primary

data of consciousness; or whether, on the contrary, they are not

_inferred_ from the existence of those thoughts and feelings of which

we are directly conscious, as, for example, in the famous argument of

Descartes, _Cogito, ergo sum_, may admit of question.

§ II.--INTUITIVE CONCEPTIONS.

Of the results or operations of the faculty under consideration, we

have considered, as yet, only that class which may be designated

as primary _truths_, in distinction from primitive or intuitive

_conceptions_. To this latter class let us now direct our attention.

_Proposed consideration of some of the more important._--Without

undertaking to give a complete list of our original or intuitive

conceptions, there are certain of the more important, which seem

to require specific consideration. Such are the ideas of space,

time, identity, cause, the beautiful, the right--ideas difficult to

define and explain, but, on that account, requiring the more careful

investigation. Let us, then, take up these conceptions one by one, and

inquire more particularly into their nature.

I. _Space._

_Subjective View._--What is space? Is it a mere idea, a mere conception

of the mind, or has it reality? This is a question which has much

perplexed philosophers. Kant and his school regard both time and space

as merely subjective, mere conceptions or forms which the mind imposes

upon outward things, having no reality, save as conceptions, or laws of

thought.

_Opposite View._--On the other hand, if we make space a reality, and

not a mere conception, what is it, and where is it? Not matter, and

yet real, a something which exists, distinct from matter, and yet not

mind. Pressed with these difficulties, some distinguished and acute

writers have resolved time and space into qualities of the one infinite

and absolute Being, the divine mind. Such was the view of Clarke and

Newton, a view favored also by a recent French writer of some note--C.

H. Bernard, Professor of Philosophy in the Lycée Bonaparte.

_A middle Ground._--These must be regarded as, on either hand, extreme

views. But is there a middle ground possible or conceivable? Let us

see. What, then, is the simple idea of space? What mean we by that word?

_Idea of Space._--When we contemplate any material object, any

existence of which the senses can take cognizance, we are cognizant

of it as _extended_, _i. e._, _occupying space_, nor can we possibly

conceive of it as otherwise. The idea of space, then, is involved in

the very idea of extended substance, or material existence, given

along with it, impossible to be separated from it. We may regard it,

therefore, as _the condition or postulate of being, considered as

material existence, possessing extension_, etc. The idea of it is

essential to the idea of matter, the reality of it to the reality of

matter; for if there were no space, there could be no extension in

space, and, without extension, no matter.

_Not a mere Conception._--Is space, then, a mere conception of the

mind, merely subjective? Unquestionably not. It is not, indeed, a

_substance_ or _entity_, it has no _being_. It is not matter, for it

is, itself, the _condition_ of matter; it is not spirit, for then it

were intelligent. It is not an _existence_, then, strictly speaking,

not a thing created, nor is it in the power of deity either to create

or to annihilate it, for creation and annihilation relate only to

_existence_. And yet space is a _reality_, and not a _mere conception_

of the mind. For, if so, then were there no longer any mind to conceive

it, there would be no longer any space; if no mind to think, then no

thought. Were the whole race of intelligent beings, then, to be blotted

out of existence, and all things else to remain as now, space would be

gone, while, yet, matter would exist, extension--worlds moving on as

before. Extension in what, motion in what? Not in space, for that is

no longer extant; defunct, rather, with the last mind whose expiring

torch went out in the gloom of night. Unless we make _matter_, then, to

be also a mere conception of the mind, space is not so. If the one is

real, the other is. If one is a mere conception, so is the other; and

to this result the school of Kant actually come. Matter, itself, is a

subjective phenomenon, a mode of mind, or, rather, if it be any thing

more, we have no means of knowing it to be so.

If, on the contrary, as we hold, matter _exists_, and is an object

of immediate perception by the senses, then there is such a thing as

space also, the _condition_ of its existence, a _reality_, though

not an _entity_, the idea of it given along with that of matter, the

reality of it implied in the reality of matter. Matter _presupposes_

it, depends on it as its _sine quâ non_. It depends on nothing. Were

there no matter, there would be none the less space, but only space

unoccupied. In that case, the idea of space might never occur to any

mind, but the reality would exist just as now. Were all matter and all

mind to be blotted out of being, space would still be what it is now.

_The Idea, how awakened_--_How come we by our Idea of Space?_--Sense

gives us our first knowledge of matter, as extended, etc., and so

furnishes the _occasion_ on which the idea of space is first awakened

in the mind. In this sense, and no other, does it originate in

sensation or experience. It is a simple idea, _logically_ prior to

experience, because the very notion of matter _presupposes_ space; yet,

_chronologically_, as regards the matter of development in the mind,

subsequent to experience and cognizance of matter.

II. TIME.

_Idea and Definition._--What we have said of space will enable

us better to understand what is the nature of that analogous and

kindred conception of the mind, in itself so simple, yet so difficult

of definition and explanation--_Time._ The remarks already made,

respecting space, will almost equally apply to this subject also.

Space, we defined as the _condition of being, regarded as extended,

material_. Time is the _condition of being, regarded as in action,

movement, change_.

Sense informs us not only of magnitudes, extensions, material objects,

and existences, as around us in nature, but of movements and changes

continually taking place among these various existences; as _extension_

is essential to those material forms, so _succession_ is essential to

these movements and changes; they cannot take place, nor be conceived

to take place, without it; and as space is involved in, and given

along with, the very idea of _extension_, so time is involved in, and

given along with, the very idea of _succession_. Time, then, is the

condition of action, movement, change, event, as space is of extended

and material existence. It is that which is required in order that

something should _take place_ or occur, just as space is that which

is required in order that something should exist as material and

having form. As space gives us the question _where_, time gives us the

question _when_. It is the place of events, as space is of forms.

_Brown's View._--Dr. Brown defines time to be the mere relation of

one event to another, as prior and subsequent. It follows, from this

view, that if there were no _events_, then no _time_, since the latter

is a mere relation subsisting among the former. Is this so? No doubt

we derive our _idea_ of time from the succession of events; but is

time merely an idea, merely a conception, merely a relation, or has it

reality out of and aside from our mind's conceiving it, and independent

of the series of events that take place in it?

_Not a mere Conception._--Like space, it is a law of thought, a

conception, and like space it is not a _mere_ law of thought, not a

mere conception of the mind, not altogether subjective. Nor is it a

mere relation of one event to another in succession. It is, on the

contrary, _necessary to_, and prior to, all succession and all events.

It does not depend on the occurrence of events, but the occurrence

of events depends on _it_. As space would still exist were matter

annihilated, so time would continue were events to cease. But were

time blotted out there could be no succession, no occurrence or event.

Time is essential, not to the mere thought or _conception_ of events,

but to the _possibility_ of the thing itself. It is not, then, a mere

idea, or conception of the mind, nor a mere relation. It has, in a

sense, objectivity and reality, since it is the ground and condition

of all continuous active existence, as space is of all extended formal

existence, the _sine quâ non_, without which not merely our idea and

conception of such existence would vanish, but the thing itself. There

could be no such thing as active continuous existence, either of mind

or matter, since mind and spirit, as continuous and persistent in

any of its moods and phases, much more as passing from one to another

of those moods, implies succession. Time is to mind what space is to

matter. _Matter_ protends in _space_, _mind_ in _time_. Time is even

less purely subjective than space, for should we say that both matter

and space are mere subjective phenomena, mere conceptions, yet even to

those very conceptions, to those subjective phenomena, as states of

mind, time is essential.

_Whence our Idea of Time._--It is with the idea of time as with that of

space. _Logically_, time is the condition, à priori, of all experience,

because of all continuous existence and all consciousness; but

_chronologically_ it is à posteriori, _i. e._, it is, to us, a matter

of sensible experience. Sense is the occasion on which the idea of time

is first awakened in our minds. We first exist, continue to exist,

are conscious of that existence, conscious of succession, thoughts,

feelings, sensations, and so we get the idea of time.

Time is necessary to _succession_; yet had there been no succession

known to us, we should have had no _idea_ of time. We are to

distinguish, of course, between our _idea_ of time and the thing

itself. Locke is incorrect in making the idea of succession prior to

that of duration, _in itself considered_, and not merely as regards our

knowledge. In this respect, Cousin has ably and justly criticised the

philosophy of Locke.

_Time a relative Idea._--Looking at time merely as an idea or

conception of our own minds, it is simply the perception of _relation_;

the relation of passing events to each other, the relation of our

various modes and states of being, our thoughts, feelings, etc., to

each other, as successive, or to external objects and events, as also

successive; the whereabouts, in a word, of one's self, one's present

consciousness, in relation to what passes, or has passed, within or

without, the relation of the present me to the former me, as regards

both the succession of internal or external events. Hence the mind has

only to withdraw itself completely from the consciousness of its former

states and of events passing without, and it _loses_ altogether its

idea of time.

_Thus in Sleep._--This we find to be the case in sleep. The thinking

goes on; the idea of present self is kept up, but not of self in

relation to the objects that are really about us, or to the actual part

of its own existence. Whatever relation seems to exist, is imaginary

and untrue. We no longer know where we are, nor exactly who we are.

The avenues of communication with the external world are shut up,

the eye, the ear, etc., are inactive, the spirit withdraws from the

outward into itself, as far as this is possible, while the connection

of body and mind still continues; its relations to former things and

to present things are forgotten and unknown. What is the consequence?

We lose all idea of _time_; the moment of falling asleep and of our

beginning to awake, if the sleep have been sound, is apparently one

and the same moment. The first effect of returning consciousness is

to resume the broken thread of time, to find your place again in the

series of things, whether it is morning or night, what morning or what

night it is; to find yourself, in fact. You had _forgotten yourself_,

to use a familiar phrase exactly descriptive of the present case. What

of yourself had you forgotten? Simply your _relation_ to the order and

succession of things without, and of thoughts and feelings within--your

place in the series. In sleep, your existence, so far as it is an

object of consciousness at all, is simply that of each passing moment

by itself.

_Thus in absorbing Pursuits._--You have only, in your waking moments,

to lose sight as completely of that relation and succession of the

present self to the past self, of the me to the not me, and you lose as

completely all idea of time. Does this ever occur? Partially, whenever

the attention is absorbed in any intensely interesting pursuit or

study. Time passes insensibly then. We are abstracted from the series,

our attention is withdrawn from surrounding objects and events, and

even from our own thoughts, _as such_. We lose sight of the me, and,

of course, of the relation of the me, to passing events, and therefore

lose the sense of time. When the spell is at last broken we must go to

seek ourselves again, as we would seek a child, that, in its play, had

wandered from our side.

_Also in Disease._--Something of the same sort occurs in severe and

protracted sickness. The mind loses its reckoning, so to speak, as a

ship in a storm loses latitude and longitude, and wanders from its

course, unable longer to take its daily observations.

_Idea of Time in Children._--You have doubtless noticed that children

have little idea of time. It is much the same to them, one day with

another, one week with another; it is morning, or afternoon, or night

indifferently. The distinction and recognition of time, and of one time

as different from another, is slowly acquired, and with difficulty.

They have not that self-consciousness, that apprehension of the present

and of the past, as related to each other in the series of events,

which is involved in the idea of time. They are more like one in sleep,

like one dreaming, like one in reverie, wholly absorbed with the

present moment, the present consciousness.

_Time longer to a Child than an Adult._--What has been said explains,

also, the well-known fact, that time seems longer to a child than to

an adult person. It is, as we have seen, the relation of the present

self, as affected by changes internal and external, to the past self

as thus affected, that gives us the idea and the standard of time. Of

course, the shorter the line that represents the past, the longer, in

comparison, that present duration which is measured by it. Now the

child has fewer past thoughts and events with which to compare the

present ones; hence, they hold a greater comparative magnitude to

him than to us, who have a greater range of past existence and past

consciousness with which to connect the passing moments. Hence, the

longer we live, the more quickly pass our years, the shorter appears

any given period of duration.

_Applied to eternal Duration._--You have but to apply this thought to

Him whose going forth is from of old, who _inhabiteth eternity_, and

you have a new meaning in the beautiful thought of the Hebrew poet,

that with Him a thousand years are but as a day. To that eternal mind,

the remoteness of the period when the first star lighted up the vault

of night at his bidding, may be recent as an event of yesterday.

III. IDENTITY.

_Difficult of Explanation._--Perhaps no subject, in the whole range

of intellectual philosophy, has been the occasion of more perplexity

and embarrassment than this. It is, in itself, a difficult subject

to comprehend and explain. We know what we mean by identity, but to

tell what that meaning is, to state the thing lucidly, and explain it

philosophically, is another matter. It becomes necessary to examine

the subject, therefore, with some care, in order to avoid confusion of

ideas, and positively erroneous opinions. The subject is one of some

importance in its theological, as well as its strictly philosophical

bearings.

_Not Similarity._--Identity is _not similarity_, not mere

resemblance--_similar_ things are not the _same_ thing. We may suppose

two globes or spheres precisely alike in every respect--of the

same size, color, form, of the same material, of the same chemical

composition and substance, presenting to the eye and the touch, and

every other sense, the very same appearance and qualities, so that,

if viewed successively, we should not recognize the difference; yet

they are not identical; they are, by the very supposition, _two_

distinct globes, two entities, two substances, and to say that they are

identical, is to say that two things are only one. _Similarity_ is not

identity, so far from it, as Archbishop Whately has well remarked,

it is not even implied of necessity in identity. A person may so far

change as to be quite unlike his former self in appearance, size, etc.,

and yet be the same person. Not only are the two ideas quite distinct,

but the one may be, and in fact is, in most cases, the virtual

_negation_ of the other. Resemblance, in most cases, implies difference

of objects, the opposite of identity. To say that A and B resemble each

other, is to say that, as known to us, they are _not_ one and the same,

not identical. It is only when one and the same object falls under

cognizance at diverse times, so that we compare the object, as now

known, with the same object as previously known, that resemblance and

identity can possibly be predicated of the same thing.

Identity is only another term for _sameness_ (_idem_); any one who

knows what that means, knows what identity means, and that it does not

mean mere similarity or resemblance.

_Not sameness of chemical Composition._--Nor does sameness of chemical

composition constitute identity. This is merely similarity. Two

bodies may be composed of the same chemical elements, in the same

proportion, and possessing the same general form and structure, yet

they are not the same body. A given piece of wood or iron may be

divided into a number of parts, each closely resembling the others,

of the same appearance, size, figure, color, weight, and of the same

chemical components; yet no one of these is identical with any other.

When we say, in such a case, that the different pieces are of the

same material, we use the word _same_ with some latitude, to denote,

not that they are composed of strictly the same particles, that the

substance of the one is the very identical substance of the other,

but only that they consist of the same _sort_ or _kind_ of substance,

that they are, _e. g._, both wood, or both iron. But this does not

constitute identity.

There is no limit to the number of identical bodies which it is

possible to conceive on this theory of identity. The same power that

constructs one body of given chemical elements, and of given form

and structure, may make two such, or ten, and if the first two are

identical, the ten are, and they may exist at one and the same time,

beside each other, identical with each other, yet ten, every one of

which is itself, and yet every one is each of the others!

_A relative Term._--Identity is a relative term, like most others that

are expressive of quality. The term straight implies the idea of that

which is not straight; beauty, the idea of deformity; greatness, its

opposite; and so of others. Identity stands related to _diversity_

as its opposite. To have the idea of identity, is to have that of

diversity also. To affirm the former, is to deny the latter, and to

deny is to have the idea of that which is denied. I do not say there

can be no _identity_ without diversity, but only that there can be no

_idea_ of the one without the idea, also, of the other, any more than

there can be the idea of a tall man without the idea of short men.

_Opposite of Diversity._--To affirm identity, then, is simply to deny

_diversity_, to predicate unity, sameness, oneness. Other objects

there are, like this, it may be, similar in every respect, capable of

being confounded with it, and mistaken for it, but they are _other_

and not _it_. This we affirm when we affirm identity, _non-diversity_,

_non-otherness_. Whatever it be that marks off and distinguishes a

thing from all other like or unlike objects--whatever constitutes its

_individuality_, its _essence_--_in that consists its identity_.

_Different applications of the Term._--Evidently, then, the word has

somewhat different senses as applied to different classes of objects,

whose individuality or essence varies. There are three distinct classes

of objects to which the term is applicable. 1. Spiritual existence. 2.

Organic and animate material existence. 3. Inorganic matter.

_As applied to the first Class._--As regards the first class,

_spiritual existences_, their identity consists in simple oneness and

continuity of existence. It is enough that the soul or spirit exist,

and continue to exist. So long as this is the case, identity is

predicable of it. Should that existence cease, the identity ceases,

since the object no longer exists of which identity can be affirmed.

Should another spirit be created in its place, and even, _if the thing

be supposable_, should it be endowed, not only with the same qualities,

but the same _consciousness_, so as to be conscious of all that of

which the former was conscious, still it would not be identical with

the former. It is, by the very supposition, _another_ spirit, and not

the same. To be identical with it, it must be the very same essence,

being, or existence, and not some other in its place.

It is only of spiritual immaterial existence that identity, in its

strict and complete sense, is properly predicable, since it is only

this class of existences that retains, unimpaired, its simple oneness,

sameness, continuity of essence.

_Personal Identity._--When we speak of _personal_ identity, we mean

that of the spirit, the soul, the ego, in distinction from the

corporeal material part. The _evidence_ of personal identity is

_consciousness_. We know that the thinking conscious existence of

to-day, which we call _self_, _me_, is one and the same with the

thinking conscious self or me of yesterday, and not some other personal

existence of like attributes and condition.

_Locke's Idea._--Mr. Locke strangely mistook the _evidence_ of personal

identity for identity _itself_, and affirmed that our identity

_consists_ in our consciousness. If this were so, then, whenever our

consciousness were interrupted, as in sound sleep, or in fainting, or

delirium, our identity would be gone. This error has been pointed out,

and fully explained, by Dr. Reid, and Bishop Butler, the former of

whom makes this supposition: that the same individual is, at different

periods of life, a boy at school, a private in the army, and a military

commander; while a boy, he is whipped for robbing an orchard; when

a soldier, he takes a standard from the enemy, and at that time

recollects, perfectly, the whipping when a boy; when commander, he

remembers taking the standard but not the whipping. It follows,

according to Mr. Locke, that the soldier is identical with the boy, and

the general with the soldier, because conscious of the same things, but

the general is not identical with the boy, because not conscious of the

same things, that is, _a_ is _b_, and _b_ is _c_, yet _a_ is not _c_.

The truth is, _identity_, and the _evidence_ of it, are two things.

Were there no consciousness of any thing past, there would still be

identity so long as unity and continuity of existence remained.

_2. Identity as applied to the second Class._--As regards _organic

material_ existence, whether animal or vegetable, the identity consists

in that which constitutes the essence or being of the thing, which

constitutes it an animal or vegetable existence. It is not mere body,

not mere particles of matter, of such number and nature, or even of

such arrangement and structure, but along with this, there is a higher

principle involved--that of life. The continuity of this mysterious

principle of life, under the same general structure and organization

of material parts, making throughout one complex unity, one entity,

one being, though with many changes, it may be, of separate parts and

particles composing the organization; this constitutes the identity of

the object.

The identity is no longer complete, no longer absolute, because there

is no longer, as in the case of spiritual existence, absolute sameness

of essence. Of the complex being under consideration, animal or

vegetable, the life-principle is, indeed, one and the same throughout

all periods of its existence, but the material organization retains not

the same absolute essence, only the same general structure, and form,

and adaptation of parts, while the parts and particles themselves are

continually changing. It is only in a modified and partial sense, then,

not in strict philosophical use of language, that we can predicate

identity of any material organic existence. We mean by it, simply,

_continuity of life_ under the same general structure and organization;

for so far as it has unity at all, this is it. This enables us to

distinguish such an object from any and all other like objects of the

same kind or sort.

_3. Identity as applied to the third Class._--As regards mere inorganic

matter, its identity consists, again, in its absolute oneness and

sameness. There must be no change of particles, for the essence of

the thing now considered lies not in any peculiarity of form, or

structure, or life-principle, all which are wanting, but simply in the

number and nature of the particles that make up the mass or substance

of the thing, and if these change in the least, it is no longer the

same essence. There is, properly, then, no such thing as identity in

the cases now under consideration, since the particles of any material

substance are liable to constant changes. It is only in a secondary

and popular sense that we speak of the identity of merely inorganic

material substance; strictly speaking, it has no identity, and

continues not the same for any two moments.

We say, however, of two pieces of paper, that they are of the _same_

color, meaning that they are both white or both red; of two coins,

that they are of the same fineness, the same size, and weight, etc.,

meaning, thereby, only that the two things are of the same _sort_ of

color, the same degree of fineness, etc., and not that the color of the

one or the fineness and size of the one is absolutely the essential and

identical color, size, fineness of the other. It is by a similar use

of terms, not in their strict and proper, but in a loose and secondary

sense, that we speak of the identity or sameness of any material

substance in itself considered. Strictly, it has no identity unless

its substance is absolutely unchanged, which is not true of most, if,

indeed, of any material existence, for any successive periods of time.

_Popular Use._--There is a popular use of this term which requires

further notice. We speak of the identity of a mountain, a river, a

tree, or any like object in nature. It is the same mountain, we say,

that we looked upon in childhood, the same tree under which we sat

when a boy, the same river in which we bathed or fished in youth.

Now there is a sense in which this is true and correct. There has

been change of substance unquestionably, and therefore there is not

_absolute_ identity; but there is, after all, _numerical_ sameness,

and this is what we mean when we speak of the sameness or identity of

the object. It constitutes a sufficient ground for such use of terms.

You recognize the book, the mountain, the river, as one you have seen

before. The tree that you pass in your morning walk you recognize as

the very tree under which you sat ten years ago. Leaves have changed,

bark and fibres have changed; branches are larger and more numerous;

boughs, perhaps, have fallen by time and by tempest; it has changed

as you have changed, it has grown old like yourself, with changing

seasons; its verdure and foliage, like your hopes and plans, lie

scattered around it, and yet it is _to you_ the same tree. How so? It

is the same numerical unity. Of a thousand or ten thousand _similar_

trees, similar in species, in growth, and form, and adaptation of

parts, in size, color, general appearance, etc., it is this individual

one, and not some other of the same sort or species growing elsewhere,

that you refer to. It is the same numerical unity and not some other

one of the series. Still there must be continuity of existence in order

to identity even in this popular sense of the term. Were the parts

entirely changed and new ones substituted, as in the puzzle of the

knife with several successive handles and blades, or the ship whose

original timbers, planks, cordage, and entire substance, had, in course

of time, by continued repairs, been removed and replaced by new; in

such a case, we do not ordinarily speak or think of the object as being

any longer the same.

_This not absolute Identity._--In the cases now under consideration, in

which, in popular language, objects are termed "same" and "identical,"

which are not strictly so, there is _comparative_ rather than

_absolute_ unity and identity. There is reference always in such cases

to other objects of the same kind, sort, and description, a series of

which the object of present cognition is one, and to which series it

holds the same relation now that it held formerly. As when, of several

books on a table, you touch _one_, and after the interval of some

moments or hours touch the same again; you say, The book I last touched

is the same I touched before, the _identical_ one; you do not mean that

its _substance_ is absolutely unchanged, that it has the same precise

number of particles in its composition as before--this is not in your

mind at all--but only that the unity thus designated is the same unity

previously designated, that, and not some other one of the series of

similar objects. It is a _comparative_ idea, a comparative identity, in

which numerical unity is the element chiefly regarded.

_Possible Plurality implied._--In all cases where the idea of identity

arises in the mind, there is implied a _possible_ plurality of

objects of the same general character; the idea of such diversity or

plurality is before the mind, and the foundation of that idea is the

difference of cognition. The same object is viewed by the same person

at _different times_ or by _different persons_ at the same time, and

in that case, though the object itself should be absolutely one and

the same, yet there have been distinct, separate cognitions of it, and

this plurality or difference of cognition is a sufficient foundation

for the idea of a possible diversity of object. The book _as known_

to-day and the book _as known_ yesterday, are two distinct objects of

thought. The cognition now, and the cognition then, are two separate

acts of the mind; and the question arises, Are the _objects_ distinct,

as well as the cognitions? This is the question of identity. You have

an immediate, irresistible conviction that the object of these several

cognitions is one and the same. You affirm its identity, absolute or

comparative, as the case may be.

_The Conception of Identity amounts to what._--In every case of

affirmed identity, then, there is implied a possible plurality of

objects; a difference of cognition of a given object, whether one

person cognizant at different times, or different persons at the same

time; a question whether the possible plurality, as regards the object

of these different cognitions, is an _actual_ plurality; a conviction

and decision that it is not, that the object is one and the same; and

this sameness and unity are _absolute_ or _comparative_, according as

we use the language in its strict, primitive, philosophical meaning,

or in its loose and popular sense. In the one case, it is sameness of

absolute essence, in the other, sameness of nominal relation to others

of a series or class.

IV. CAUSE.

_Meaning of the Term._--The idea of cause is one with which every mind

is familiar. It is not easy, however, to explain precisely what we mean

by it, nor to fix its limits, nor to unfold its origin.

We mean by this term, I think, as ordinarily employed, that on which

some consequence depends, that but for which some event or phenomenon

would not occur. In order to affirm that one thing is the cause of

another, I must know, not merely that they are connected, but that the

existence of the one depends on that of the other. This is more than

mere antecedence, however invariable. The approach of a storm may be

invariably indicated by the changes of the barometer. These changes

precede the storm, but are not the cause of it.

_Origin of the Idea._--_Whence do we derive_ the idea of cause?--a

question of some importance, and much discussed.

Evidently not from sense. I observe, for example, the melting of snow

before the fire, or wax before the flame of a taper. What is it that I

see in this case? Merely the phenomenon, nothing more. All that sense

conveys, all that the eye reports, is simply the melting of the one

substance in the presence and vicinity of the other. I _see_ no cause,

no form transmitted from the one to the other, no action of the one on

the other, but simply the vicinity of the two, and the change taking

place in one. I _infer_ that the change takes place in consequence of

the vicinity. I believe it; and if the experiment is often repeated

with the same results, I cannot doubt that it is so. The idea of

causality is, indeed, _suggested_ by what I have seen, but is not

given by sense. I have not seen the cause; that lies hidden, occult,

its nature wholly unknown, and its very existence known, not by what

I have actually seen, but by that law of the mind which leads me to

believe that every event must have a cause, and to look for that cause

in whatever circumstance is known to be invariably connected with the

given change or event.

_Constitution of the Mind._--That such is the constitution of the mind,

such the law of its action, admits of no reasonable doubt. No sooner is

an event or phenomenon observed, than we conclude, at once, that it is

an effect, and begin to inquire the cause. We cannot, by any effort of

conception, persuade ourselves that there is absolutely no cause.

_Not derived from Sense._--But is not this principle of causality

derived from experience? We have already said that sense does not give

it. I do not see with the eye the cause of the melting of the wax, much

less does what I see contain the general principle, that _every_ event

must have a cause. Sense does not give me this.

_Whether from Consciousness._--Still, may it not be a matter of

experience in another way, given by _consciousness_, though not by

_sense_. For example, I am conscious of certain volitions. These

volitions are accompanied with certain muscular movements, and these,

again, are followed by certain sensible effects upon surrounding

objects. These changes produced on objects without are directly

connected thus with my own mental states and changes, with the

volitions of which I am directly conscious. Given, the volition on my

part, with the corresponding muscular effort, and the external change

is produced. I never observe it taking place without such preceding

volition. I learn to regard my will as the _cause_, and the external

change as the _effect_. I observe that it is in the power of others

to produce changes in like manner. Thus I obtain the general idea of

cause. It is given by consciousness and experience.

_Notion of Causality not thus derived._--It is to this source that

a very able and ingenious French philosopher would attribute our

first idea of cause. I refer to Maine de Biran. I should agree with

M. de Biran, that consciousness of our own voluntary efforts, and of

the effects thus produced, may give us our first notion of cause.

But it does not give us the law of causality. It extends to a given

instance only, explains that, explains nothing further than that,

cannot go beyond. I am conscious that in this given instance I have

set in operation a train of antecedents and sequences which results

in the given effect. I am not conscious that _every_ event has, in

like manner, a cause. My experience warrants no such assumption. No

induction of facts and cases can possibly amount to this. Induction

can multiply and generalize, but cannot stamp on that which is merely

empirical and contingent, the character of universality and necessity.

The law of causality, in a word, is to be distinguished from any given

instance, or number of instances, of actually observed causation. The

latter fall within the range of consciousness and experience, the

former is given, if at all, as a law of the mind, a primary truth, an

idea of reason.

_Remarks of Professor Bowen._--As Professor Bowen has well observed,

"The maxim, '_Every event must have a cause_,' is not, like the

so-called laws of nature, a mere induction founded on experience, and

holding good only until an instance is discovered to the contrary; it

is a necessary and immutable truth. It is not derived from observation

of natural phenomena, but is super-imposed upon such observation by a

necessity of the human intellect. It is not made known through the

senses; and its falsity, under any circumstances, is not possible, is

not even conceivable. The _cause_ to which it points us, is not to

be found in nature. The mere physicist, after vainly searching, ever

since the world began, for a single instance of it, has, at length,

abandoned the attempt as hopeless, and now confines himself to the mere

_description_ of natural phenomena. The _true cause_ of these phenomena

must be sought for in the realm, not of _matter_, but of _mind_."

_What constitutes Cause._--In this last remark, the author quoted

touches upon a question of no little moment. What constitutes a cause?

We cannot here enter into the discussion of this question. It is

sufficient to remark, that in the ordinary use of the word, as denoting

that, but for which a given result will not be, many things beside mind

are included as causes. A hammer, or some like instrument, is essential

to the driving of a nail. The hammer may be called the cause of the

nail being driven; the blow struck by means of the hammer may also be

so designated. More properly, the arm which gave the blow, and, more

correctly still, the mind which willed the movement of the arm, and not

the consequent blow of the hammer, may be said to be the cause. If we

seek for _ultimate_ and _efficient_ causes, we must, doubtless, come

back to the realm of mind. It is mind that is, in every case, the first

mover, the originator of any effect, and it may, therefore, be called

the true and prime cause, the cause of causes.

_History of the Doctrine._--_Aristotle's View._--The history of the

doctrine of causality presents a number of widely different theories, a

brief outline of which is all that we can here give. The most ancient

division and classification of causes is that of Aristotle, which is

based on the following analysis: Every work brought to completion

implies four things: an agent by whom it is done, an element or

material of which it is wrought, a plan or idea according to which

it is fashioned, and an end for which it is produced. Thus, to the

production of a statue there must be a statuary, a block of marble,

a plan in the mind of the artist, and a motive for the execution of

the work. The first of these is termed the _efficient_ cause, the

second the _material_ cause, the third the _formal_, and the fourth

the _final_ cause. This classification was universally adopted by the

scholastic philosophers, and, to some extent, is still prevalent. We

still speak of _efficient_ and of _final_ causes.

_Locke's Derivation of Cause._--With regard to the origin of the idea

of cause, there has been the greatest diversity of opinion. Locke

derives it from sense; so do the philosophers of the sensationalist

school. We perceive bodies modifying each other, and hence the notion

of causality.

_Theory of Hume and of Brown._--Hume denies the existence of what we

call cause, or power of one object over another. He resolves it into

succession or sequence of objects in regular order, and consequent

association of them in our thoughts. Essentially the same is the theory

of Brown, who resolves cause and effect into simple antecedence and

sequence, beyond which we know nothing, and can affirm nothing.

_Theory of Leibnitz._--The theory of Leibnitz verges upon the opposite

extreme, and assigns the element of power or causal efficiency to every

form of existence; every substance is a force, a cause, in itself.

_Of Kant._--Kant and his school make cause a merely subjective notion,

a law of the understanding, which it impresses upon outward things, a

condition of our thought. We observe external phenomena, and, according

to this law of our intelligence, are under the necessity of arranging

them as cause and effect; but we do not know that, independent of our

conception, there exists in reality any thing corresponding to this

idea. The tendency of this theory, as well as that of Hume and Brown,

to a thorough-going skepticism, is obvious at a glance. The theory of

Maine de Biran has been already noticed.

V. THE IDEA OF THE BEAUTIFUL, AND OF RIGHT.

_These Ideas Intuitive._--- Among the primary ideas awakened in the

mind by the faculty of original or intuitive conception, ideas of

reason, as some writers would prefer to call them, must be included

the notion of the _beautiful_, and also that of _right_--ideas more

important in themselves, and in their bearing on human happiness, than

almost any others which the mind entertains. That these ideas are to

be traced, ultimately, to the originative or intuitive faculty, there

can be little doubt. They are simple and primary ideas. They have

the characteristics of universality and necessity. They are awakened

intuitively and instantaneously in the mind, when the appropriate

occasion is presented by sense. There are certain objects in nature

and art, which, so soon as perceived, strike us as beautiful. There

are certain traits of character and courses of conduct, which, so soon

as observed, strike us as morally right and wrong. The ideas of the

beautiful and the right are thus awakened in the mind on the perception

of the corresponding objects.

_Things to be considered respecting them._--Viewed as notions of the

intuitive faculty, or original conceptions, it would be in place

to consider more particularly the _circumstances_ under which each

of these ideas originates, and the _characteristics_ of each; also

what _constitutes_, in either case, the object, what constitutes the

beautiful and the right.

_These Topics reserved for separate Discussion._--These matters

deserve a wider and fuller discussion, however, than would here be

in place. The ideas under consideration are to be viewed, not merely

as conceptions of the reason or intuition, but as constituting the

material of two distinct and important departments of mental activity,

two distinct classes of judgments, viz., the _æsthetic_ and the

_moral_. The conceptions of the beautiful and the right, furnished

by the originative or intuitive power of the mind, constitute the

material and basis on which the reflective power works, and as thus

employed, the mental activity assumes the form, and is known under the

familiar names of _taste_ and _conscience_, or, as we may term them,

the æsthetic and moral faculties. As such, we reserve them for distinct

consideration in the following pages, bearing in mind, as we proceed,

that these faculties, so called, are not properly new powers of the

mind, but merely forms of the reflective faculty, as exercised upon

this particular class of ideas.

CHAPTER III.

THE CONCEPTION AND COGNIZANCE OF THE BEAUTIFUL

§ I.--CONCEPTION OF THE BEAUTIFUL.

_The Science which treats of this._--The investigation of this topic

brings us upon the domain of a science as yet comparatively new,

and which, in fact, has scarcely yet assumed its place among the

philosophic sciences--_Æsthetics_, the science of the beautiful.

_Difficulty of defining._--What, then, is the beautiful?--A question

that meets us at the threshold, and that has received, from different

sources, answers almost as many and diverse as the writers that have

undertaken its discussion. It is easy to specify instances of the

beautiful without number, and of endless variety; but that is not

defining it. On the contrary, it is only increasing the difficulty;

for, where so many things are beautiful, and so diverse from each

other, how are we to decide what is that one property which they all

have in common, viz., beauty? The difficulty is to fix upon any one

quality or attribute that shall pertain alike to all the objects that

seem to us beautiful. A figure of speech, a statue, a star, an air from

an opera, all strike us as beautiful, all awaken in us the emotion

which beauty alone can excite. But what have they in common? It were

easy to fix upon something in the case of the statue, or of the star,

which should account, perhaps, for the pleasure those objects afford

us; but the same thing might not apply to the figure of speech, or to

the musical air. It would seem almost hopeless to attempt the solution

of the problem in this method. And yet there _must be_, it would seem,

some principle or attribute in which these various objects that we call

beautiful agree, which is the secret and substance of their beauty,

and the cause of that uniform effect which they all produce upon

us. Philosophers have accordingly proposed various solutions of the

problem, some fixing upon one thing, some upon another; and it may be

instructive to glance at some of these definitions.

_Some make it a Sensation._--Of those who have undertaken to define

what beauty is, there are some who make it a mere _feeling_ or

sensation of the mind, and not an objective reality of any sort. It

is not this, that, or the other quality of the external object, but

simply a subjective emotion. It lies within us, and not without. Thus,

Sir George Mackenzie describes it as "a certain degree of a certain

species of pleasurable effect impressed on the mind." So also Grohman,

Professor of Philosophy at Hamburg, in his treatise on æsthetic as

science, defines the beautiful to be "the infinite consciousness of the

reason as _feeling_." As the true is the activity of reason at work

as _intellect_ or knowledge, and as the good is its province when it

appears as _will_, so the beautiful is its activity in the domain of

_sensibility_. Brown, Upham, and others, among English and American

writers, frequently speak of the emotion of beauty, as if beauty itself

were an emotion.

_Others an Association._--Closely agreeing with this class of writers,

and hardly to be distinguished from it, is that which makes beauty

consist in certain _associations of idea and feeling_ with the

object contemplated. This is the favorite doctrine with the Scotch

metaphysicians. Thus Lord Jeffrey, who has written with great clearness

and force on this subject, regards beauty as dependent entirely on

association, "the reflection of our own inward sensations." It is not,

according to this view, a quality of the object external, but only a

feeling in our own minds. Its seat is within and not without.

_Theory that Beauty consists in Expression._--Of the same general

class, also, are those who, with Alison, Reid, and Cousin, regard

beauty as the _sign_ or _expression_ of some quality fitted to awaken

pleasing emotions in us. Nothing is beautiful, say these writers, which

is not thus expressive of some mental or moral quality or attribute.

It is not an original and independent quality of any peculiar forms or

colors, says Alison, for then we should have a definite rule for the

creation of beauty. It lies ultimately in the mind, not in matter, and

matter becomes beautiful only as it becomes, by analogy or association,

suggestive of mental qualities. The same is substantially the ancient

Platonic view. Kant, also, followed in the main by Schiller and

Fichte, takes the subjective view, and makes beauty a mere play of the

imagination.

_All these Theories make it subjective._--Whether we regard beauty,

then, as a mere emotion, or as an association of thought and feeling

with the external object, or as the sign and expression of mental

qualities, in either case we make it ultimately subjective, and deny

its external objective reality.

_Different Forms of the objective Theory._--Of those who take the

opposite view, some seek for the hidden principle of beauty in

_novelty_; others, as Galen and Marmontel, in _utility_; others,

as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hogarth, in the principle of _unity in

variety_; others, in that of _order and proportion_, as Aristotle,

Augustine, Crousez.

All these writers, while they admit the existence of beauty in the

external object, make it to consist in some quality or conformation of

matter, as such.

_The spiritual Theory._--There is still another theory of the

beautiful, which, while admitting its external objective reality, seeks

to divest it of that material nature in which the writers last named

present it, and searches for its essence among principles ethereal

and spiritual. According to this view beauty is the _spiritual life

in its immediate sensible manifestation_; the hidden, invisible

principle--spirit in distinction from matter, animating, manifesting

itself in, looking out through, the material form. It is not matter

as such, it is not spirit as such, much less a mere mental quality or

mental feeling; it is the expression of the invisible and spiritual

under sensible material forms. This view was first fully developed

by Schelling and Hegel, and is adopted, in the main, by Jouffroy in

his Cours d'Esthetique, by Dr. August Ruhlert, of the university

of Breslau, in his able system of æsthetics, and by many other

philosophical writers of distinction in Europe.

_Questions for Consideration._--The following questions grow out of

these various and conflicting definitions, as presenting the real

points at issue, and, as such, requiring investigation.

I. Is beauty something objective, or merely subjective and emotional?

II. If the former, then what is it in the object that constitutes its

beauty?

I. _Question stated._--Is beauty merely subjective, an emotion of our

own minds, or is it a quality of objects? When we speak, _e. g._,

of the beauty of a landscape, or of a painting, do we mean merely a

certain excitement of our sensitive nature, a certain feeling awakened

by the object, or do we mean some quality or property belonging to that

object? If the latter, then are we _correct_ in attributing any such

quality to the object?

_Emotion admitted._--Unquestionably, certain pleasing emotions

are awakened in the mind in view of certain objects which we term

beautiful; unquestionably those objects are the cause or occasion of

such emotions; they have, under favorable circumstances, the power

of producing them; unquestionably they have this power by virtue,

moreover, of some quality or property pertaining to them. All this will

be admitted by those who deny the objective reality of beauty. The

question is not, whether there is in the object any quality which is

the occasion or cause of our emotion, but whether the term beauty is

properly the name of that cause, or of the emotion it produces.