THE LOSS OF WARSAW
Dated:
PETROGRAD,
_August 15, 1915_.
The giving up of Warsaw marks the end of a definite period in the war,
and represents the climax of one of the most remarkable campaigns in
the history of the world. Military records do not present anything
even approaching the effort which in three months has been made by
the enemy. From the moment they began their attack on the Dunajec
line in early May, until their entrance into Warsaw, almost exactly
three months later, their campaign has represented one continuous
attack. Every detail seems to have been arranged, and once the movement
started, men and munitions were fed into the maw of war without
intermission until their objective, Warsaw, was attained. All of this
one must in justice accord the Germans, for it is their due. The
determination and bravery of their soldiers in these three months of
ghastly sacrifice have never faltered.
Their objective has been attained; but when we have said this, our
admiration for a purpose fulfilled stops short. Though obtaining
Warsaw they have not secured the results that they believed Warsaw
represented; and I believe it perfectly safe to say that the capture of
Warsaw, without the inflicting of a crashing blow to the Russian Army,
was perhaps the greatest disappointment to the Germans which this war
has brought them. I know from conversations with many prisoners, that
generally speaking, every soldier in the German Army on this Front felt
that with the capture of the great Polish capital, the war with Russia
was practically finished. It was because this was so earnestly believed
that it was possible to keep driving the soldiers on and on, regardless
of life and of their physical exhaustion.
The German plan involved the destruction of the army. They have the
husk of victory, while the kernel, as has happened many times before in
this war, has slipped from their grasp. Everything that has happened
since Warsaw is in the nature of a secondary campaign, and really
represents an entirely new programme and probably a new objective or
series of objectives. From the wider point of view, the war against
Russia has begun all over again, and for the present it seems unwise to
discuss or prophesy the outcome of the vast operations which have
taken place since August 5. But it is a desperate new undertaking for
Germany to enter upon after her incomparable exertions these last three
months.
[Illustration: The retreat from Warsaw. Ammunition on the road.]
In dealing with such extended operations at this time, it is
impossible to write accurately, because the Front has been so great
that nine-tenths of the information in regard to details is not yet
available. The writer was for the period from July 10 to August 5 in
daily contact with this Front, and in that period motored thousands of
versts, was in practically all of the armies involved in what may be
called the Warsaw movement, and at the positions in innumerable places.
Yet he hesitates to attempt to write anything of an authoritative
nature for the moment, although he believes the rough outline which
follows will prove approximately accurate when the history of the
movement is written from the broader perspective which time only can
bring.
It was the opinion of many observers early in May, including the
writer, that Warsaw was the main objective of the great Galician drive.
The Germans intended first to strengthen the _moral_ of the Austrians
by returning them Galicia, but probably the greatest value of the
capture of Galicia was the position which left the Germans on the
flank of Warsaw. Since last Autumn it has been clear that the Germans
regarded Warsaw as the most important strategic prize on this Front,
and those who have followed the war will recall the constant series of
attacks on the Polish capital. First came their direct advance which
frittered away the middle of December, and left them sticking in the
mud and snow on the Bzura line in Poland, still 50 versts from their
prize. Spasmodic fighting continued until January, when their great
Bolimov drive was undertaken. Beginning in the last days of January
it continued for six consecutive days. We are told that ten divisions
backed by 600 guns attacked practically without interruption for six
days and six nights. I cannot accurately state what the German losses
were, but I know the Russians estimated them to be 100,000.
It was clear that Warsaw was not to be taken from the front, and as
the last gun was being fired on the Bolimov position, the new Prussian
flanking movement was launched in East Prussia. This, though scoring
heavily in its early days, soon dissipated as the Russians adjusted
themselves to the shock. That was followed instantly by another series
of operations directed against Warsaw from the North. This too went
up in smoke, and for several weeks there was a lull, interrupted here
and there by preliminary punches in different parts of the line,
intended to discover weakness which did not appear. By April it was
clear that Warsaw was not vulnerable from the front or North. Then
followed the great Galician campaign which ended with the fall of
Lemberg, and by the end of June left the Germans in their new position
with the southern flank of the armies in Poland prepared for their
final drive for Warsaw on the South. From the light which I have on
this campaign I will try and give the sketch as it has appeared to me.
[Illustration: During the retreat from Warsaw.]
[Illustration: Russian armoured motor-car.]
There is no question that the German strategy aimed not merely at the
capture of Warsaw, but at the destruction or capture of the greater
part of the army defending the Polish capital. The German programme was
carefully prepared, and this time they had no isolated movements, but
two great movements developing simultaneously; one aimed to cut the
Warsaw-Petrograd lines from the North, and the other aimed at Warsaw
from the South. The time which has elapsed is not sufficient, nor is
the information available, to enable one to judge at this time whether
the Northern or Southern movement was the main German objective. I
was in the Cholm-Lublin Army head-quarters just before the heavy
fighting began, and was then of the opinion that the most important
German activity was contemplated on this sector. It is apparent by a
glance at the map, that an overwhelming success here would have been
of incredible importance to the enemy. Had they been able to destroy
this army as they did the one bearing the same number on the Dunajec in
May, they could have moved directly on Brest-Litowsk by Wlodava and cut
the Warsaw line of communications to the direct rear 180 versts away. A
rapid success here would have certainly resulted in just the disaster
that the Germans were hoping would be the outcome of their programme.
The movement on the North from the direction of Mlawa toward
Przasnys-Ciechanow was of course a direct threat on the
Warsaw-Petrograd line of communications. Success here would have forced
the evacuation of the city and a general change of the Russian line;
but even had it been a sweeping one, it had not the potentialities
of the calamity which a similar success on the Cholm line would have
had. Perhaps the Germans estimated both to be of approximately equal
importance, and a double success, occurring simultaneously, would
have undoubtedly repeated the Moukden fiasco on an infinitely larger
scale. It must be remembered that when this movement started, the
Russians in the South were at the end of a gruelling campaign of nearly
two months’ continuous warfare, in which, through lack of munitions,
they were obliged to withdraw under difficult and extremely delicate
circumstances. The army defending the Cholm-Lublin line was in name
the same that had been so very badly cut up six weeks earlier, and the
Germans no doubt believed that every one of the Russian Armies engaged
from the Bukowina to the Vistula had been so badly shaken up that any
effective resistance would be impossible. It was because their estimate
was so far out that their programme was doomed to disappointment.
[Illustration: The retreat from Warsaw. Wounded in a barn outside
Warsaw.]
My own observation of the Russian Armies is that if they are given a
fortnight, or even a week, in which to recuperate, they are good for
a month of continuous fighting. With almost any other army in the
world, after such an experience as the Russians had had for six weeks
in Galicia, the defence on the Cholm-Lublin line would have failed,
and the Germans might well have driven through to Brest in two or
three weeks, as they no doubt firmly believed that they would. But
the Russians on the Cholm-Lublin line had the benefit of interior
lines of communications, and had also the brief breathing space which
enabled them to pull themselves together. Besides this, a new General,
General Loesche, was in command, and with him were an important number
of the best corps in the Russian Army. Excellent field works had been
prepared, and personally, after visiting the positions I felt sure
that whatever the outcome of the German move against him might be, it
would not result in anything like the Dunajec enterprise, nor would
the enemy be able to drive through to Brest with sufficient rapidity
to cut off the retreat of the Warsaw army or those lying south of
it. The movement in the South started with such terrific impetus,
that for several days it seemed possible that in spite of the stamina
and leadership of the Russians the enemy would have their way; but
after ten days of fighting it became clear that though the enemy were
advancing, their progress was going to be of so slow and arduous a
nature that they would never be able to inflict a smashing disaster on
the Russian Armies.
The details of the battles that raged here for weeks would fill a
volume. Although I visited this army several times during this stage,
and was in four different corps on this Front, I have still but the
vaguest outline in my own mind of the fighting except as a whole. Every
day there was something raging on some part of the line, first in one
place and then in another. The Germans used the same practice that
was so successful in Galicia and massed their batteries heavily. This
method, backed by the Prussian Guards, enabled them to take Krasnystav.
The best trenches that I have ever seen in field operations were washed
away in a day by a torrent of big shells. The Russians did not retreat.
They remained and died, and the Germans simply marched through the
hole in the line, making a change of front necessary.
[Illustration: The retreat from Warsaw. German prisoners housed in a
barn. Note the Russian soldiers have German rifles.]
But this time there was no disorganization of the line as a whole. The
moment the Germans were beyond their supporting artillery, the Russian
infantry were at their throats with the bayonet and drove them back.
The fighting from day to day for weeks was a great zig-zag, with German
advances and retreats before Russian counter-attacks. But each advance
left the enemy a little nearer their objective, and it was clear that
slowly but surely they were, by superior forces, vastly superior
supplies of ammunition and a constant flow of reserves, forcing the
Russians back toward the Lublin-Cholm-Kovel line of railroad. It became
equally obvious however after ten days that they would never reach
Brest in time to menace seriously the future of the Warsaw army, even
if they could and would spare the men to turn the trick.
As a fact it became apparent here for almost the first time, that the
Germans in spite of their anxiety to attain their objective, were
endeavouring to spare their troops. For the first time I heard the
general comment among officers, that the artillery was now the main arm
in modern warfare, and the infantry its support. I think this potential
failure of their programme dawned on the Germans even before it did on
the Russians; for while all eyes were still on the Southern Front,
the Germans were reinforcing and pushing their Northern attack which
aimed to hit through Pultusk and Wyszkow to the Petrograd-Warsaw line
at Lochow. Perhaps after the first two weeks in the South this really
was their greatest aim. Personally I think their chance for inflicting
a disaster slipped when they failed to defeat definitely, or destroy
the army of Loesche. To him and to the left flanking corps of Evert,
must be accorded the credit of saving this sector with all its menaces
to the future of the campaign and perhaps the whole European situation.
For the last two weeks before the abandonment of Warsaw, these two
great battles, one in the North and one in the South, were raging
simultaneously.
I left Cholm for the last time on July 22, feeling that the fate of
Warsaw would not be decided from that quarter, and, for the balance
of the campaign, divided my time between the South Vistula armies and
those defending the Narew line. It now became clear that the great
menace lay from the Northern blow, and here we have a very similar
story to that of the Southern army. With terrific drives the enemy took
Przasnys, Ciechanow, Makow and at last Pultusk, and finally succeeded
in getting across the Narew with ten divisions of excellent troops. On
this Front, to the best of my judgment, the Germans at this time had
131 battalions of their very best available troops and perhaps fifteen
reserve battalions with their usual heavy artillery support. When the
crossing of the Narew was accomplished it seemed inevitable that Warsaw
must fall and immediately the civil evacuation of the city began.
[Illustration: The retreat from Warsaw. Artillery on the road.]
It seemed then that the Germans might in a few days drive through to
the railroad, and to save the army in Warsaw an immediate evacuation
in hot haste would prove imperative. But the Russian Army defending
this sector rallied just as their brothers did in the South. The
German drive on Wyszkow took them within 4 versts of the town, while
the Russian counter-attack threw them back fifteen, with heavy losses
in casualties and prisoners. Then there began here the same sort of
slow stubborn fighting that for weeks had been progressing in the
South; only here the German advances were slower, and the attainment
of their objective less certain. About the same time (July 25-26) the
Germans made a try on the Warsaw line itself, but failed miserably,
and abandoned any serious effort against the new Blonie line to which
the Russians, in order to get the most out of their men and to shorten
their line, had withdrawn. It must never be forgotten that the Russian
Front was 1,200 miles long, and the inability to supply it with men
and munitions had made it necessary to shorten their Front to get the
best results from their numbers. It is hard to say what numbers both
belligerents had, and even if I knew exactly our strength the censor
would not pass my statement. I think it safe to say however, that
during these days the Austro-German forces outnumbered the Russians
by at least 50 per cent., counting effectives only. This shortening
left simply Warsaw itself with its Blonie line from Novo-Georgievsk to
Gorakalwara in Russian hands west of the Vistula.
By the 27th-28th of July there came a wave of hope, and those who
had lost all optimism picked up their courage once more. I know from
the very best authority that up to August 1 it was hoped that Warsaw
might still be saved, though every preparation was being made for its
evacuation. The cause of this burst of optimism was due to the fact
that the terrific German blows both North and South were not gaining
the headway that had been expected. Besides, the Russians were getting
more and more ammunition, and it seemed more than possible that the
Germans might fail of their objective if only they did not receive
increasing reinforcements. These two great battles North and South,
each seeming equally important, had drawn everything that could be
spared to either one point or the other. It was clear then that there
must be some link in the chain weaker than the others, and the
Germans set out to find this.
[Illustration: During the retreat from Warsaw. Note wounded man.]
Without weakening for a moment their attacks on their main objectives,
they began (with new reinforcements) to spear about for a point against
which to launch still a third attack. Several attempts disclosed the
Russians in strength, but at last the enemy discovered that the weakest
spot was on the Vistula south of Warsaw. As this was the easiest to
defend on account of the river being approximately the line, the
Russians had fewer troops and thus the Germans were able to effect a
crossing of the river. I am not able to state absolutely the day or the
place of crossing, but I am inclined to place it about July 27-28, and
I think the first crossing was near the mouth of the Radomika, while I
believe another was made about the same date somewhere near the mouth
of the Pilica river. The enemy gained an initial advantage at first,
but as usual was driven back by a counter-attack, though he still held
his position on the East bank of the river.
At this time, as nearly as I can estimate, there were four Russian army
corps defending the Blonie line from Novo-Georgievsk to Gorakalwara.
With this strength the few sporadic attacks of the Germans were futile.
When the first crossing of the Vistula developed, the corps which
stood near Gorakalwara crossed the river and countered the northerly
crossing, while troops from the neighbouring army to the South, covered
the menace on that portion of the line, and it was believed that the
enemy had failed here in his objective which it was thought was the
Warsaw-Brest line at Nova Minsk. It was believed and probably rightly,
that even the three remaining corps on the Blonie line could hold that
front, and that the balance had been re-established, for the Russians
hoped that the Germans had in their fighting line all the loose
formations which were immediately available. About July 30-August 1,
the Germans developed three new divisions (believed to have come from
France), and these crossed the river, giving them practically two whole
corps against half the strength of Russians. It is possible that even
these odds might have been overcome by the stubbornness of the Russian
soldier, but the Russians learned that three Austrian divisions, said
to have come from the Serbian Front were available in immediate support.
[Illustration: The retreat from Warsaw. One of the last regiments to
pass through Warsaw.]
From this moment it was evident that Warsaw was doomed. To weaken the
Front on the Blonie line meant a break there, and re-inforcements
could not be sent either from the Narew line or the Southern Front
where actions still raged. It was then clearly a mate in a few moves,
if the Russians waited for it. But they did not. Instantly began
their military evacuation, the cleverness of which must I think
be credited to Alexieff and his brilliant Chief of Staff Goulevitch.
Those of us who have been studying the Warsaw situation for ten months,
imagined that when the evacuation came, if it ever did, it would be
through the city. What happened was entirely unexpected. The corps at
Gorakalwara slipped over the river on pontoon bridges in the night,
supporting the first corps that was already there, effecting the double
purpose of getting out of the Warsaw zone, and simultaneously coming
in between the Germans and the line of retreat toward Brest. About
the same time the corps that lay next to the Vistula, on the Northern
end of the Blonie line, slipped out over pontoon bridges and went to
support the Narew defenders, thus making impossible the immediate
breaking of that line. On August 4, by noon, there was probably not
over one corps on the West side of the Vistula. Half of that crossed
south of Warsaw before six, and probably the last division left about
midnight, and at three a.m. the bridges were blown up. The Germans
arrived at six in the morning, which seemed to indicate that they were
not even in touch with the Russian rearguard at the end.
What I have written above is to the best of my information the outline
of the Warsaw situation, but it may be in details somewhat inaccurate,
though I think the main points are correct. In any case there is no
question that the whole withdrawal was cleverly accomplished, and in
perfect order, and that when the Germans finally closed in, they found
an abandoned city. Their reports of having carried Warsaw by storm are
undoubtedly true to the extent that they were in contact with some
of the last troops to leave. Probably the trenches that they carried
by storm were held by a battalion or two of soldiers protecting the
rearguard. That the great body had gone long before the Germans know
perfectly well, and their claims of having carried the city by assault
would, I dare say, bring a smile even to the stolid face of the German
soldier.
During all these operations the Germans had at least five shells to
the Russians, one, and but for this great superiority they never would
have pushed back either the line of the Narew or the Cholm-Lublin line.
Russia could not convert her resources into ammunition, and Germany,
who for forty years has lived for this day, could. To this fact she
owes her capture of Warsaw. The Allies may be assured that Russia
stayed until the last minute and the last shell, and then extricated
herself from an extremely dangerous position, leaving the enemy to
pounce on the empty husk of a city from which had been taken every
movable thing of military value. The defence of and final escape from
Warsaw is one of the most spectacular and courageous bits of warfare
that history presents, and undoubtedly the fair-minded German admits it
in his own heart regardless of the published statements of the Staff.
[Illustration: Siberians leaving the last trench before Warsaw.]
CONCLUSION
[Illustration: A batch of German prisoners captured during the retreat
from Warsaw.]