Mr. President and Fellow-Citizens of New York: The facts with which I
shall deal this evening are mainly old and familiar; nor is there
anything new in the general use I shall make of them. If there shall
be any novelty, it will be in the mode of presenting the facts, and the
inferences and observations following that presentation.
In his speech last autumn, at Columbus, Ohio, as reported in the New
York Times, Senator Douglas said:
Our fathers, when they framed the Government under which we live,
understood this question just as well, and even better, than we do now.
I fully indorse this, and I adopt it as a text for this discourse. I
so adopt it because it furnishes a precise and agreed starting point
for a discussion between Republicans and that wing of the Democracy
headed by Senator Douglas. It simply leaves the inquiry:
"What was the understanding those fathers had of the question
mentioned?"
What is the frame of Government under which we live?
The answer must be, "The Constitution of the United States." That
Constitution consists of the original, framed in 1787 (and under which
the present Government first went into operation), and twelve
subsequently framed amendments, the first ten of which were framed in
1789.
Who were our fathers that framed the Constitution? I suppose the
"thirty-nine" who signed the original instrument may be fairly called
our fathers who framed that part of the present Government. It is
almost exactly true to say they framed it, and it is altogether true to
say they fairly represented the opinion and sentiment of the whole
nation at that time. Their names, being familiar to nearly all, and
accessible to quite all, need not now be repeated.
I take these "thirty-nine," for the present, as being "our fathers who
framed the Government under which we live."
What is the question which, according to the text, those fathers
understood "just as well, and even better, than we do now?"
It is this: Does the proper division of local from Federal authority,
or anything in the Constitution, forbid our Federal Government to
control as to slavery in our Federal Territories?
Upon this, Senator Douglas holds the affirmative, and Republicans the
negative. This affirmation and denial form an issue; and this
issue--this question--is precisely what the text declares our fathers
understood "better than we."
Let us now, inquire whether the "thirty-nine," or any of them, ever
acted upon this question; and if they did, how they acted upon it--how
they expressed that better understanding.
In 1784, three years before the Constitution, the United States then
owning the Northwestern Territory, and no other, the Congress of the
Confederation had before them the question of prohibiting slavery in
that Territory; and four of the "thirty-nine" who afterward framed the
Constitution were in that Congress, and voted on that question. Of
these, Roger Sherman, Thomas Mifflin, and Hugh Williamson voted for the
prohibition, thus showing that, in their understanding, no line
dividing local from Federal authority, nor anything else, properly
forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in Federal
territory. The other of the four--James McHenry--voted against the
prohibition, showing that for some cause he thought it improper to vote
for it.
In 1787, still before the Constitution, but while the Convention was in
session framing it, and while the Northwestern Territory still was the
only territory owned by the United States, the same question of
prohibiting slavery in the Territory again came before the Congress of
the Confederation; and three more of the "thirty-nine" who afterward
signed the Constitution were in that Congress, and voted on the
question. They were William Blount, William Few, and Abraham Baldwin;
and they all voted for the prohibition--thus showing that, in their
understanding, no line dividing local from Federal authority, nor
anything else, properly forbade the Federal Government to control as to
slavery in Federal territory. This time the prohibition became a law,
being part of what is now well known as the Ordinance of '87.
The question of Federal control of slavery in the Territories seems not
to have been directly before the convention which framed the original
Constitution; and hence it is not recorded that the "thirty-nine," or
any of them, while engaged on that instrument, expressed any opinion on
that precise question.
In 1789, by the first Congress which sat under the Constitution, an act
was passed to enforce the Ordinance of '87, including the prohibition
of slavery in the Northwestern Territory. The bill for this act was
reported by one of the "thirty-nine," Thomas Fitzsimmons, then a member
of the House of Representatives from Pennsylvania. It went through all
its stages without a word of opposition, and finally passed both
branches without ayes and nays, which is equivalent to an unanimous
passage. In this Congress there were sixteen of the "thirty-nine"
fathers who framed the original Constitution. They were John Langdon,
Nicholas Gilman, Wm. S. Johnson, Roger Sherman, Robert Morris, Thos.
Fitzsimmons, William Few, Abraham Baldwin, Rufus King, William
Patterson, George Clymer, Richard Bassett, George Read, Pierce Butler,
Daniel Carroll, and James Madison.
This shows that, in their understanding, no line dividing local from
Federal authority, nor anything in the Constitution, properly forbade
Congress to prohibit slavery in the Federal territory; else both their
fidelity to correct principle, and their oath to support the
Constitution, would have constrained them to oppose the prohibition.
Again, George Washington, another of the "thirty-nine," was then
President of the United States, and as such, approved and signed the
bill, thus completing its validity as a law, and thus showing that, in
his understanding, no line dividing local from Federal authority, nor
anything in the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control
as to slavery in Federal territory.
No great while after the adoption of the original Constitution, North
Carolina ceded to the Federal Government the country now constituting
the State of Tennessee; and a few years later Georgia ceded that which
now constitutes the States of Mississippi and Alabama. In both deeds
of cession it was made a condition by the ceding States that the
Federal Government should not prohibit slavery in the ceded country.
Besides this, slavery was then actually in the ceded country. Under
these circumstances, Congress, on taking charge of these countries, did
not absolutely prohibit slavery within them. But they did interfere
with it--take control of it--even there, to a certain extent. In 1798,
Congress organized the Territory of Mississippi. In the act of
organization they prohibited the bringing of slaves into the Territory
from any place without the United States, by fine, and giving freedom
to slaves so brought. This act passed both branches of Congress
without yeas and nays. In that Congress were three of the
"thirty-nine" who framed the original Constitution. They were John
Langdon, George Read, and Abraham Baldwin. They all probably voted for
it. Certainly they would have placed their opposition to it upon
record if, in their understanding, any line dividing local from Federal
authority, or anything in the Constitution, properly forbade the
Federal Government to control as to slavery in Federal territory.
In 1803, the Federal Government purchased the Louisiana country. Our
former territorial acquisitions came from certain of our own States;
but this Louisiana country was acquired from a foreign nation. In
1804, Congress gave a territorial organization to that part of it which
now constitutes the State of Louisiana. New Orleans, lying within that
part, was an old and comparatively large city. There were other
considerable towns and settlements, and slavery was extensively and
thoroughly intermingled with the people. Congress did not, in the
Territorial Act, prohibit slavery; but they did interfere with it--take
control of it--in a more marked and extensive way than they did in the
case of Mississippi. The substance of the provision therein made in
relation to slaves was:
First. That no slave should be imported into the Territory from
foreign parts.
Second. That no slave should be carried into it who had been imported
into the United States since the first day of May, 1798.
Third. That no slave should be carried into it, except by the owner,
and for his own use as a settler; the penalty in all the cases being a
fine upon the violator of the law, and freedom to the slave.
This act also was passed without ayes and nays. In the Congress which
passed it there were two of the "thirty-nine." They were Abraham
Baldwin and Jonathan Dayton. As stated in the case of Mississippi, it
is probable they both voted for it. They would not have allowed it to
pass without recording their opposition to it if, in their
understanding, it violated either the line properly dividing local from
Federal authority, or any provision of the Constitution.
In 1819-20 came and passed the Missouri question. Many votes were
taken, by yeas and nays, in both branches of Congress, upon the various
phases of the general question. Two of the "thirty-nine"--Rufus King
and Charles Pinckney--were members of that Congress. Mr. King steadily
voted for slavery prohibition and against all compromises, while Mr.
Pinckney as steadily voted against slavery prohibition and against all
compromises. By this, Mr. King showed that, in his understanding, no
line dividing local from Federal authority, nor anything in the
Constitution, was violated by Congress prohibiting slavery in Federal
territory; while Mr. Pinckney, by his votes, showed that, in his
understanding, there was some sufficient reason for opposing such
prohibition in that case.
The cases I have mentioned are the only acts of the "thirty-nine," or
of any of them, upon the direct issue, which I have been able to
discover.
To enumerate the persons who thus acted as being four in 1784, three in
1787, seventeen in 1789, three in 1798, two in 1804, and two in
1819-20, there would be thirty of them. But this would be counting
John Langdon, Roger Sherman, William Few, Rufus King, and George Read
each twice, and Abraham Baldwin three times. The true number of those
of the "thirty-nine" whom I have shown to have acted upon the question
which, by the text, they understood better than we, is twenty-three,
leaving sixteen not shown to have acted upon it in any way.
Here, then, we have twenty-three out of our "thirty-nine" fathers "who
framed the government under which we live," who have, upon their
official responsibility and their corporal oaths, acted upon the very
question which the text affirms they "understood just as well, and even
better, than we do now;" and twenty-one of them--a clear majority of
the whole "thirty-nine"--so acting upon it as to make them guilty of
gross political impropriety and wilful perjury if, in their
understanding, any proper division between local and Federal authority,
or anything in the Constitution they had made themselves, and sworn to
support, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the
Federal Territories. Thus the twenty-one acted; and, as actions speak
louder than words, so actions under such responsibility speak still
louder.
Two of the twenty-three voted against Congressional prohibition of
slavery in the Federal Territories, in the instances in which they
acted upon the question. But for what reasons they so voted is not
known. They may have done so because they thought a proper division of
local from Federal authority, or some provision or principle of the
Constitution, stood in the way; or they may, without any such question,
have voted against the prohibition on what appeared to them to be
sufficient grounds of expediency. No one who has sworn to support the
Constitution can conscientiously vote for what he understands to be an
unconstitutional measure, however expedient he may think it; but one
may and ought to vote against a measure which he deems constitutional
if, at the same time, he deems it inexpedient. It, therefore, would be
unsafe to set down even the two who voted against the prohibition as
having done so because, in their understanding, any proper division of
local from Federal authority, or anything in the Constitution, forbade
the Federal Government to control as to slavery in Federal territory.
The remaining sixteen of the "thirty-nine," so far as I have
discovered, have left no record of their understanding upon the direct
question of Federal control of slavery in the Federal Territories. But
there is much reason to believe that their understanding upon that
question would not have appeared different from that of their
twenty-three compeers, had it been manifested at all.
For the purpose of adhering rigidly to the text, I have purposely
omitted whatever understanding may have been manifested by any person,
however distinguished, other than the thirty-nine fathers who framed
the original Constitution; and, for the same reason, I have also
omitted whatever understanding may have been manifested by any of the
"thirty-nine" even on any other phase of the general question of
slavery. If we should look into their acts and declarations on those
other phases, as the foreign slave-trade, and the morality and policy
of slavery generally, it would appear to us that on the direct question
of Federal control of slavery in Federal Territories, the sixteen, if
they had acted at all, would probably have acted just as the
twenty-three did. Among that sixteen were several of the most noted
anti-slavery men of those times,--as Dr. Franklin, Alexander Hamilton,
and Gouverneur Morris,--while there was not one now known to have been
otherwise, unless it may be John Rutledge, of South Carolina.
The sum of the whole is that of our "thirty-nine" fathers who framed
the original Constitution, twenty-one--a clear majority of the
whole--certainly understood that no proper division of local from
Federal authority, nor any part of the Constitution, forbade the
Federal Government to control slavery in the Federal Territories; while
all the rest probably had the same understanding. Such,
unquestionably, was the understanding of our fathers who framed the
original Constitution; and the text affirms that they understood the
question "better than we."
But, so far, I have been considering the understanding of the question
manifested by the framers of the original Constitution. In and by the
original instrument, a mode was provided for amending it; and, as I
have already stated, the present frame of "the government under which
we live" consists of that original, and twelve amendatory articles
framed and adopted since. Those who now insist that Federal control of
slavery in Federal Territories violates the Constitution, point us to
the provisions which they suppose it thus violates; and, I understand,
they all fix upon provisions in these amendatory articles, and not in
the original instrument. The Supreme Court, in the Dred Scott case,
plant themselves upon the fifth amendment, which provides that "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law;" while Senator Douglas and his peculiar adherents plant
themselves upon the tenth amendment, providing that "the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."
Now, it so happens that these amendments were framed by the first
Congress which sat under the Constitution--the identical Congress which
passed the act already mentioned, enforcing the prohibition of slavery
in the Northwestern Territory. Not only was it the same Congress, but
they were the identical, same individual men who, at the same session,
and at the same time within the session, had under consideration, and
in progress toward maturity, these constitutional amendments, and this
act prohibiting slavery in all the territory the nation then owned.
The constitutional amendments were introduced before, and passed after,
the act enforcing the Ordinance of '87; so that, during the whole
pendency of the act to enforce the Ordinance, the constitutional
amendments were also pending.
That Congress, consisting in all of seventy-six members, including
sixteen of the framers of the original Constitution, as before stated,
were preeminently our fathers who framed that part of "the Government
under which we live," which is now claimed as forbidding the Federal
Government to control slavery in the Federal Territories.
Is it not a little presumptuous in any one at this day to affirm that
the two things which that Congress deliberately framed, and carried to
maturity at the same time, are absolutely inconsistent with each other?
And does not such affirmation become impudently absurd when coupled
with the other affirmation, from the same mouth, that those who did the
two things, alleged to be inconsistent, understood whether they really
were inconsistent better than we--better than he who affirms that they
are inconsistent?
It is surely safe to assume that the thirty-nine framers of the
original Constitution, and the seventy-six members of the Congress
which framed the amendments thereto, taken together, do certainly
include those who may be fairly called "our fathers who framed the
government under which we live." And so assuming, I defy any man to
show that any one of them ever, in his whole life, declared that, in
his understanding, any proper division of local from Federal authority,
or any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to
control as to slavery in the Federal Territories. I go a step further.
I defy any one to show that any living man, in the whole world ever
did, prior to the beginning of the present century (and I might almost
say prior to the beginning of the last half of the present century),
declare that, in his understanding, any proper division of local from
Federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal
Government to control as to slavery in the Federal Territories. To
those who now so declare I give not only "our fathers who framed the
Government under which we live," but with them all other living men
within the century in which it was framed, among whom to search, and
they shall not be able to find the evidence of a single man agreeing
with them.
Now, and here let me guard a little against being misunderstood. I do
not mean to say we are bound to follow implicitly in whatever our
fathers did. To do so would be to discard all the lights of current
experience--to reject all progress, all improvement. What I do say is,
that if we would supplant the opinions and policy of our fathers in any
case, we should do so upon evidence so conclusive, and argument so
clear, that even their great authority, fairly considered and weighed,
cannot stand; and most surely not in a case whereof we ourselves
declare they understood the question better than we.
If any man at this day sincerely believes that a proper division of
local from Federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbids
the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the Federal
Territories, he is right to say so, and to enforce his position by all
truthful evidence and fair argument which he can. But he has no right
to mislead others, who have less access to history, and less leisure to
study it, into the false belief that "our fathers who framed the
Government under which we live" were of the same opinion--thus
substituting falsehood and deception for truthful evidence and fair
argument. If any man at this day sincerely believes "our fathers who
framed the Government under which we live" used and applied principles,
in other cases, which ought to have led them to understand that a
proper division of local from Federal authority, or some part of the
Constitution, forbids the Federal Government to control as to slavery
in the Federal Territories, he is right to say so. But he should, at
the same time, brave the responsibility of declaring that, in his
opinion, he understands their principles better than they did
themselves; and especially should he not shirk that responsibility by
asserting that they "understood the question just as well, and even
better, than we do now."
But enough. Let all who believe that "our fathers who framed the
government under which we live understood this question just as well,
and even better, than we do now," speak as they spoke, and act as they
acted upon it. This is all Republicans ask--all Republicans desire--in
relation to slavery. As those fathers marked it, so let it be again
marked, as an evil not to be extended, but to be tolerated and
protected only because of and so far as its actual presence among us
makes that toleration and protection a necessity. Let all the
guaranties those fathers gave it be not grudgingly, but fully and
fairly, maintained. For this Republicans contend, and with this, so
far as I know or believe, they will be content.
And now, if they would listen--as I suppose they will not--I would
address a few words to the Southern people.
I would say to them: You consider yourselves a reasonable and a just
people; and I consider that in the general qualities of reason and
justice you are not inferior to any other people. Still, when you
speak of us Republicans, you do so only to denounce us as reptiles, or,
at the best, as no better than outlaws. You will grant a hearing to
pirates or murderers, but nothing like it to "Black Republicans." In
all your contentions with one another, each of you deems an
unconditional condemnation of "Black Republicanism" as the first thing
to be attended to. Indeed, such condemnation of us seems to be an
indispensable prerequisite--license, so to speak--among you to be
admitted or permitted to speak at all.
Now, can you, or not, be prevailed upon to pause and to consider
whether this is quite just to us, or even to yourselves?
Bring forward your charges and specifications, and then be patient long
enough to hear us deny or justify.
You say we are sectional. We deny it. That makes an issue; and the
burden of proof is upon you. You produce your proof; and what is it?
Why, that our party has no existence in your section--gets no votes in
your section. The fact is substantially true; but does it prove the
issue? If it does, then in case we should, without change of
principle, begin to get votes in your section, we should thereby cease
to be sectional. You cannot escape this conclusion; and yet, are you
willing to abide by it? If you are, you will probably soon find that
we have ceased to be sectional, for we shall get votes in your section
this very year. You will then begin to discover, as the truth plainly
is, that your proof does not touch the issue. The fact that we get no
votes in your section is a fact of your making, and not of ours. And
if there be fault in that fact, that fault is primarily yours, and
remains so until you show that we repel you by some wrong principle or
practice. If we do repel you by any wrong principle or practice, the
fault is ours; but this brings you to where you ought to have
started--to discussion of the right or wrong of our principle. If our
principle, put in practice, would wrong your section for the benefit of
ours, or for any other object, then our principle, and we with it, are
sectional, and are justly opposed and denounced as such. Meet us,
then, on the question of whether our principle, put in practice, would
wrong your section; and so meet us as if it were possible that
something may be said on our side. Do you accept the challenge? No?
Then you really believe that the principle which "our fathers who
framed the Government under which we live" thought so clearly right as
to adopt it, and indorse it again and again, upon their official oaths,
is in fact so clearly wrong as to demand your condemnation without a
moment's consideration.
Some of you delight to flaunt in our faces the warning against
sectional parties given by Washington in his Farewell Address. Less
than eight years before Washington gave that warning, he had, as
President of the United States, approved and signed an act of Congress
enforcing the prohibition of slavery in the Northwestern Territory,
which act embodied the policy of the Government upon that subject up to
and at the very moment he penned that warning; and about one year after
he penned it, he wrote Lafayette that he considered that prohibition a
wise measure, expressing in the same connection his hope that we should
at some time have a confederacy of free States.
Bearing this in mind, and seeing that sectionalism has since arisen
upon this same subject, is that warning a weapon in your hands against
us, or in our hands against you? Could Washington himself speak, would
he cast the blame of that sectionalism upon us, who sustain his policy,
or upon you, who repudiate it? We respect that warning of Washington,
and we commend it to you, together with his example pointing to the
right application of it.
But you say you are conservative--eminently conservative--while we are
revolutionary, destructive, or something of the sort. What is
conservatism? Is it not adherence to the old and tried, against the
new and untried? We stick to, contend for, the identical old policy on
the point in controversy which was adopted by "our fathers who framed
the Government under which we live;" while you with one accord reject,
and scout, and spit upon that old policy, and insist upon substituting
something new. True, you disagree among yourselves as to what that
substitute shall be. You are divided on new propositions and plans,
but you are unanimous in rejecting and denouncing the old policy of the
fathers. Some of you are for reviving the foreign slave-trade; some
for a congressional slave-code for the Territories; some for Congress
forbidding the Territories to prohibit slavery within their limits;
some for maintaining slavery in the Territories through the judiciary;
some for the "gur-reat pur-rinciple" that "if one man would enslave
another, no third man should object," fantastically called "Popular
Sovereignty;" but never a man among you is in favor of Federal
prohibition of slavery in Federal Territories, according to the
practice of "our fathers who framed the Government under which we
live." Not one of all your various plans can show a precedent or an
advocate in the century within which our Government originated.
Consider, then, whether your claim of conservatism for yourselves, and
your charge of destructiveness against us, are based on the most clear
and stable foundations.
Again, you say we have made the slavery question more prominent than it
formerly was. We deny it. We admit that it is more prominent, but we
deny that we made it so. It was not we, but you, who discarded the old
policy of the fathers. We resisted, and still resist, your innovation;
and thence comes the greater prominence of the question. Would you
have that question reduced to its former proportions? Go back to that
old policy. What has been will be again, under the same conditions.
If you would have the peace of the old times, readopt the precepts and
policy of the old times.
You charge that we stir up insurrections among your slaves. We deny
it; and what is your proof? Harper's Ferry! John Brown!! John Brown
was no Republican; and you have failed to implicate a single Republican
in his Harper's Ferry enterprise. If any member of our party is guilty
in that matter, you know it, or you do not know it. If you do know it,
you are inexcusable for not designating the man and proving the fact.
If you do not know it, you are inexcusable to assert it, and especially
to persist in the assertion after you have tried and failed to make the
proof. You need not be told that persisting in a charge which one does
not know to be true, is simply malicious slander.
Some of you admit that no Republican designedly aided or encouraged the
Harper's Ferry affair, but still insist that our doctrines and
declarations necessarily lead to such results. We do not believe it.
We know we hold no doctrine, and make no declaration, which were not
held to and made by "our fathers who framed the Government under which
we live." You never dealt fairly by us in relation to this affair.
When it occurred, some important State elections were near at hand, and
you were in evident glee with the belief that, by charging the blame
upon us, you could get an advantage of us in those elections. The
elections came, and your expectations were not quite fulfilled. Every
Republican man knew that, as to himself at least, your charge was a
slander, and he was not much inclined by it to cast his vote in your
favor. Republican doctrines and declarations are accompanied with a
continual protest against any interference whatever with your slaves,
or with you about your slaves. Surely, this does not encourage them to
revolt. True, we do, in common with "our fathers who framed the
Government under which we live," declare our belief that slavery is
wrong; but the slaves do not hear us declare even this. For anything
we say or do, the slaves would scarcely know there is a Republican
party. I believe they would not, in fact, generally know it but for
your misrepresentations of us in their hearing. In your political
contests among yourselves, each faction charges the other with sympathy
with Black Republicanism; and then, to give point to the charge,
defines Black Republicanism to simply be insurrection, blood, and
thunder among the slaves.
Slave insurrections are no more common now than they were before the
Republican party was organized. What induced the Southampton
insurrection, twenty-eight years ago, in which at least three times as
many lives were lost as at Harper's Ferry? You can scarcely stretch
your very elastic fancy to the conclusion that Southampton was "got up
by Black Republicanism." In the present state of things in the United
States, I do not think a general, or even a very extensive, slave
insurrection is possible. The indispensable concert of action cannot
be obtained. The slaves have no means of rapid communication; nor can
incendiary freemen, black or white, supply it. The explosive materials
are everywhere in parcels; but there neither are, nor can be supplied,
the indispensable connecting trains.
Much is said by Southern people about the affection of slaves for their
masters and mistresses; and a part of it, at least, is true. A plot
for an uprising could scarcely be devised and communicated to twenty
individuals before some one of them, to save the life of a favorite
master or mistress, would divulge it. This is the rule; and the slave
revolution in Hayti was not an exception to it, but a case occurring
under peculiar circumstances. The gunpowder plot of British history,
though not connected with slaves, was more in point. In that case,
only about twenty were admitted to the secret; and yet one of them, in
his anxiety to save a friend, betrayed the plot to that friend, and, by
consequence, averted the calamity. Occasional poisonings from the
kitchen, and open or stealthy assassinations in the field, and local
revolts extending to a score or so will continue to occur as the
natural results of slavery; but no general insurrection of slaves, as I
think, can happen in this country for a long time. Whoever much fears,
or much hopes, for such an event, will be alike disappointed.
In the language of Mr. Jefferson, uttered many years ago, "It is still
in our power to direct the process of emancipation and deportation
peaceably, and in such slow degrees, as that the evil will wear off
insensibly; and their places be, _pari passu_, filled up by free white
laborers. If, on the contrary, it is left to force itself on, human
nature must shudder at the prospect held up."
Mr. Jefferson did not mean to say, nor do I, that the power of
emancipation is in the Federal Government. He spoke of Virginia; and,
as to the power of emancipation, I speak of the slaveholding States
only.
The Federal Government, however, as we insist, has the power of
restraining the extension of the institution--the power to insure that
a slave insurrection shall never occur on any American soil which is
now free from slavery.
John Brown's effort was peculiar. It was not a slave insurrection. It
was an attempt by white men to get up a revolt among slaves, in which
the slaves refused to participate. In fact, it was so absurd that the
slaves, with all their ignorance, saw plainly enough it could not
succeed. That affair, in its philosophy, corresponds with the many
attempts, related in history, at the assassination of kings and
emperors. An enthusiast broods over the oppression of a people till he
fancies himself commissioned by Heaven to liberate them. He ventures
the attempt, which ends in little else than in his own execution.
Orsini's attempt on Louis Napoleon, and John Brown's attempt at
Harper's Ferry, were, in their philosophy, precisely the same. The
eagerness to cast blame on old England in the one case, and on New
England in the other, does not disprove the sameness of the two things.
And how much would it avail you, if you could, by the use of John
Brown, Helper's Book, and the like, break up the Republican
organization? Human action can be modified to some extent, but human
nature cannot be changed. There is a judgment and a feeling against
slavery in this nation, which cast at least a million and a half of
votes. You cannot destroy that judgment and feeling--that
sentiment--by breaking up the political organization which rallies
around it. You can scarcely scatter and disperse an army which has
been formed into order in the face of your heaviest fire; but if you
could, how much would you gain by forcing the sentiment which created
it out of the peaceful channel of the ballot-box into some other
channel? What would that other channel probably be? Would the number
of John Browns be lessened or enlarged by the operation?
But you will break up the Union rather than submit to a denial of your
Constitutional rights.
That has a somewhat reckless sound; but it would be palliated, if not
fully justified, were we proposing, by the mere force of numbers, to
deprive you of some right plainly written down in the Constitution.
But we are proposing no such thing.
When you make these declarations you have a specific and well
understood allusion to an assumed constitutional right of yours to take
slaves into the Federal Territories, and to hold them there as
property. But no such right is specifically written in the
Constitution. That instrument is literally silent about any such
right. We, on the contrary, deny that such a right has any existence
in the Constitution, even by implication.
Your purpose, then, plainly stated, is that you will destroy the
Government, unless you be allowed to construe and force the
Constitution as you please, on all points in dispute between you and
us. You will rule or ruin in all events.
This, plainly stated, is your language. Perhaps you will say the
Supreme Court has decided the disputed Constitutional question in your
favor. Not quite so. But waiving the lawyer's distinction between
dictum and decision, the court has decided the question for you in a
sort of way. The court has substantially said, it is your
constitutional right to take slaves into the Federal Territories, and
to hold them there as property.
When I say the decision was made in a sort of way, I mean it was made
in a divided court, by a bare majority of the judges, and they not
quite agreeing with one another in the reasons for making it; that it
is so made as that its avowed supporters disagree with one another
about its meaning, and that it was mainly based upon a mistaken
statement of fact--the statement in the opinion that "the right of
property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the
Constitution."
An inspection of the Constitution will show that the right of property
in a slave is not "distinctly and expressly affirmed" in it. Bear in
mind, the judges do not pledge their judicial opinion that such right
is impliedly affirmed in the Constitution; but they pledge their
veracity that it is "distinctly and expressly" affirmed
there--"distinctly," that is, not mingled with anything
else--"expressly," that is, in words meaning just that, without the aid
of any inference, and susceptible of no other meaning.
If they had only pledged their judicial opinion that such right is
affirmed in the instrument by implication, it would be open to others
to show that neither the word "slave" nor "slavery" is to be found in
the Constitution, nor the word "property" even, in any connection with
language alluding to the things slave, or slavery; and that wherever in
that instrument the slave is alluded to, he is called a "person;" and
wherever his master's legal right in relation to him is alluded to, it
is spoken of as "service or labor which may be due"--as a debt payable
in service or labor. Also it would be open to show, by contemporaneous
history, that this mode of alluding to slaves and slavery, instead of
speaking of them, was employed on purpose to exclude from the
Constitution the idea that there could be property in man.
To show all this is easy and certain.
When this obvious mistake of the judges shall be brought to their
notice, is it not reasonable to expect that they will withdraw the
mistaken statement, and reconsider the conclusion based upon it?
And then it is to be remembered that "our fathers who framed the
Government under which we live"--the men who made the
Constitution--decided this same Constitutional question in our favor
long ago: decided it without a division among themselves when making
the decision; without division among themselves about the meaning of it
after it was made, and so far as any evidence is left, without basing
it upon any mistaken statement of facts.
Under all these circumstances, do you really feel yourself justified to
break up this Government unless such a court decision as yours is shall
be at once submitted to as a conclusive and final rule of political
action?
But you will not abide the election of a Republican president! In that
supposed event, you say, you will destroy the Union; and then, you say,
the great crime of having destroyed it will be upon us!
That is cool. A highwayman holds a pistol to my ear, and mutters
through his teeth, "Stand and deliver, or I shall kill you, and then
you will be a murderer!"
To be sure, what the robber demanded of me--my money--was my own; and I
had a clear right to keep it; but it was no more my own than my vote is
my own; and the threat of death to me, to extort my money, and the
threat of destruction to the Union, to extort my vote, can scarcely be
distinguished in principle.
A few words now to Republicans. It is exceedingly desirable that all
parts of this great Confederacy shall be at peace, and in harmony one
with another. Let us Republicans do our part to have it so. Even
though much provoked, let us do nothing through passion and ill temper.
Even though the Southern people will not so much as listen to us, let
us calmly consider their demands, and yield to them if, in our
deliberate view of our duty, we possibly can. Judging by all they say
and do, and by the subject and nature of their controversy with us, let
us determine if we can, what will satisfy them.
Will they be satisfied if the Territories be unconditionally
surrendered to them? We know they will not. In all their present
complaints against us, the Territories are scarcely mentioned.
Invasions and insurrections are the rage now. Will it satisfy them if,
in the future, we have nothing to do with invasions and insurrections?
We know it will not. We so know, because we know we never had anything
to do with invasions and insurrections; and yet this total abstaining
does not exempt us from the charge and the denunciation.
The question recurs, What will satisfy them? Simply this: we must not
only let them alone, but we must somehow convince them that we do let
them alone. This, we know by experience, is no easy task. We have
been so trying to convince them from the very beginning of our
organization, but with no success. In all our platforms and speeches
we have constantly protested our purpose to let them alone; but this
has had no tendency to convince them. Alike unavailing to convince
them is the fact that they have never detected a man of us in any
attempt to disturb them.
These natural and apparently adequate means all failing, what will
convince them? This, and this only: cease to call slavery _wrong_, and
join them in calling it _right_. And this must be done
thoroughly--done in _acts_ as well as in _words_. Silence will not be
tolerated--we must place ourselves avowedly with them. Senator
Douglas's new sedition law must be enacted and enforced, suppressing
all declarations that slavery is wrong, whether made in politics, in
presses, in pulpits, or in private. We must arrest and return their
fugitive slaves with greedy pleasure. We must pull down our Free-State
constitutions. The whole atmosphere must be disinfected from all taint
of opposition to slavery, before they will cease to believe that all
their troubles proceed from us.
I am quite aware they do not state their case precisely in this way.
Most of them would probably say to us, "Let us alone; do nothing to us,
and say what you please about slavery." But we do let them
alone,--have never disturbed them,--so that, after all, it is what we
say which dissatisfies them. They will continue to accuse us of doing,
until we cease saying.
I am also aware they have not as yet in terms demanded the overthrow of
our Free-State constitutions. Yet those constitutions declare the
wrong of slavery with more solemn emphasis than do all other sayings
against it; and when all these other sayings shall have been silenced,
the overthrow of these constitutions will be demanded, and nothing be
left to resist the demand. It is nothing to the contrary that they do
not demand the whole of this just now. Demanding what they do, and for
the reason they do, they can voluntarily stop nowhere short of this
consummation. Holding, as they do, that slavery is morally right and
socially elevating, they cannot cease to demand a full national
recognition of it as a legal right and a social blessing.
Nor can we justifiably withhold this on any ground save our conviction
that slavery is wrong. If slavery is right, all words, acts, laws, and
constitutions against it are themselves wrong, and should be silenced
and swept away. If it is right, we cannot justly object to its
nationality--its universality; if it is wrong, they cannot justly
insist upon its extension--its enlargement. All they ask we could
readily grant, if we thought slavery right; all we ask they could as
readily grant, if they thought it wrong. Their thinking it right and
our thinking it wrong is the precise fact upon which depends the whole
controversy. Thinking it right, as they do, they are not to blame for
desiring its full recognition as being right; but thinking it wrong, as
we do, can we yield to them? Can we cast our votes with their view,
and against our own? In view of our moral, social, and political
responsibilities, can we do this?
Wrong as we think slavery is, we can yet afford to let it alone where
it is, because that much is due to the necessity arising from its
actual presence in the nation; but can we, while our votes will prevent
it, allow it to spread into the national Territories, and to overrun us
here in these free States? If our sense of duty forbids this, then let
us stand by our duty fearlessly and effectively. Let us be diverted by
none of those sophistical contrivances wherewith we are so
industriously plied and belabored--contrivances such as groping for
some middle ground between the right and the wrong: vain as the search
for a man who should be neither a living man nor a dead man; such as a
policy of "don't care" on a question about which all true men do care;
such as Union appeals beseeching true Union men to yield to
Disunionists, reversing the divine rule, and calling, not the sinners,
but the righteous to repentance; such as invocations to Washington,
imploring men to unsay what Washington said and undo what Washington
did.
Neither let us be slandered from our duty by false accusations against
us, nor frightened from it by menaces of destruction to the government,
nor of dungeons to ourselves. Let us have faith that right makes
might, and in that faith let us to the end dare to do our duty as we
understand it.