Ladies and Gentlemen; On Saturday last, Judge Douglas and myself first
met in public discussion. He spoke one hour, I an hour and a half, and
he replied for half an hour. The order is now reversed. I am to speak
an hour, he an hour and a half, and then I am to reply for half an
hour. I propose to devote myself during the first hour to the scope of
what was brought within the range of his half-hour speech at Ottawa.
Of course, there was brought within the scope of that half-hour's
speech something of his own opening speech. In the course of that
opening argument Judge Douglas proposed to me seven distinct
interrogatories. In my speech of an hour and a half, I attended to
some other parts of his speech, and incidentally, as I thought,
answered one of the interrogatories then. I then distinctly intimated
to him that I would answer the rest of his interrogatories on condition
only that he should agree to answer as many for me. He made no
intimation at the time of the proposition, nor did he in his reply
allude at all to that suggestion of mine. I do him no injustice in
saying that he occupied at least half of his reply in dealing with me
as though I had _refused_ to answer his interrogatories. I now propose
that I will answer any of the interrogatories, upon condition that he
will answer questions from me not exceeding the same number. I give
him an opportunity to respond. The Judge remains silent. I now say
that I will answer his interrogatories, whether he answers mine or not;
and that after I have done so, I shall propound mine to him.
I have supposed myself, since the organization of the Republican party
at Bloomington, in May, 1856, bound as a party man by the platforms of
the party, then and since. If in any interrogatories which I shall
answer I go beyond the scope of what is within these platforms, it will
be perceived that no one is responsible but myself.
Having said thus much, I will take up the Judge's interrogatories as I
find them printed in the Chicago _Times_, and answer them _seriatim_.
In order that there may be no mistake about it, I have copied the
interrogatories in writing, and also my answers to them. The first one
of these interrogatories is in these words:
Question 1. "I desire to know whether Lincoln today stands as he did
in 1854, in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave
Law?"
Answer. I do not now, nor ever did, stand in favor of the
unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law.
Q. 2. "I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to-day as he
did in 1854, against the admission of any more slave States into the
Union, even if the people want them?"
A. I do not now, nor ever did, stand pledged against the admission of
any more slave States into the Union.
Q. 3. "I want to know whether he stands pledged against the admission
of a new State into the Union with such a constitution as the people of
that State may see fit to make?"
A. I do not stand pledged against the admission of a new State into
the Union with such a constitution as the people of that State may see
fit to make.
Q. 4. "I want to know whether he stands to-day pledged to the
abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia?"
A. I do not stand to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the
District of Columbia.
Q. 5. "I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to the
prohibition of the slave-trade between the different States?"
A. I do not stand pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade
between the different States.
Q. 6. "I desire to know whether he stands pledged to prohibit slavery
in all the Territories of the United States, North as well as South of
the Missouri Compromise line?"
A. I am impliedly, if not expressly, pledged to a belief in the
_right_ and _duty_ of Congress to prohibit slavery in all the United
States Territories.
Q. 7. "I desire him to answer whether he is opposed to the acquisition
of any new territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein?"
A. I am not generally opposed to honest acquisition of territory; and,
in any given case, I would or would not oppose such acquisition,
accordingly as I might think such acquisition would or would not
aggravate the slavery question among ourselves.
Now, my friends, it will be perceived upon an examination of these
questions and answers, that so far I have only answered that I was not
_pledged_ to this, that, or the other. The Judge has not framed his
interrogatories to ask me anything more than this, and I have answered
in strict accordance with the interrogatories, and have answered truly
that I am not _pledged_ at all upon any of the points to which I have
answered. But I am not disposed to hang upon the exact form of his
interrogatory. I am really disposed to take up at least some of these
questions, and state what I really think upon them.
As to the first one, in regard to the Fugitive Slave law, I have never
hesitated to say, and I do not now hesitate to say, that I think, under
the Constitution of the United States, the people of the Southern
States are entitled to a Congressional Fugitive Slave law. Having said
that, I have had nothing to say in regard to the existing Fugitive
Slave law, further than that I think it should have been framed so as
to be free from some of the objections that pertain to it, without
lessening its efficiency. And inasmuch as we are now not in an
agitation in regard to an alteration or modification of that law, I
would not be the man to introduce it as a new subject of agitation upon
the general question of slavery.
In regard to the other question, of whether I am pledged to the
admission of any more slave States into the Union, I state to you very
frankly that I would be exceedingly sorry ever to be put in a position
of having to pass upon that question. I should be exceedingly glad to
know that there would never be another slave State admitted into the
Union; but I must add, that if slavery shall be kept out of the
Territories during the territorial existence of any one given
Territory, and then the people shall, having a fair chance and a clear
field, when they come to adopt the Constitution, do such an
extraordinary thing as to adopt a slave Constitution, uninfluenced by
the actual presence of the institution among them, I see no
alternative, if we own the country, but to admit them into the Union.
The third interrogatory is answered by the answer to the second, it
being, as I conceive, the same as the second.
The fourth one is in regard to the abolition of slavery in the District
of Columbia. In relation to that, I have my mind very distinctly made
up. I should be exceedingly glad to see slavery abolished in the
District of Columbia. I believe that Congress possesses the
constitutional power to abolish it. Yet, as a member of Congress, I
should not, with my present views, be in favor of endeavoring to
abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, unless it would be upon
these conditions; First, that the abolition should be gradual; second,
that it should be on a vote of the majority of qualified voters in the
District; and third, that compensation should be made to unwilling
owners. With these three conditions, I confess I would be exceedingly
glad to see Congress abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and,
in the language of Henry Clay, "sweep from our Capital that foul blot
upon our nation."
In regard to the fifth interrogatory, I must say here that as to the
question of the abolition of the slave-trade between the different
States, I can truly answer, as I have, that I am pledged to nothing
about it. It is a subject to which I have not given that mature
consideration that would make me feel authorized to state a position so
as to hold myself entirely bound by it. In other words, that question
has never been prominently enough before me to induce me to investigate
whether we really have the constitutional power to do it. I could
investigate it if I had sufficient time to bring myself to a conclusion
upon that subject, but I have not done so, and I say so frankly to you
here and to Judge Douglas. I must say, however, that if I should be of
opinion that Congress does possess the constitutional power to abolish
the slave-trade among the different States, I should still not be in
favor of the exercise of that power unless upon some conservative
principle, as I conceive it, akin to what I have said in relation to
the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.
My answer as to whether I desire that slavery should be prohibited in
all the Territories of the United States is full and explicit within
itself, and cannot be made clearer by any comments of mine. So I
suppose in regard to the question whether I am opposed to the
acquisition of any more territory unless slavery is first prohibited
therein, my answer is such that I could add nothing by way of
illustration, or making myself better understood, than the answer which
I have placed in writing.
Now in all this the Judge has me, and he has me on the record. I
suppose he had flattered himself that I was really entertaining one set
of opinions for one place and another set for another place--that I was
afraid to say at one place what I uttered at another. What I am saying
here I suppose I say to a vast audience as strongly tending to
Abolitionism as any audience in the State of Illinois, and I believe I
am saying that which, if it would be offensive to any persons and
render them enemies to myself, would be offensive to persons in this
audience.
I now proceed to propound to the Judge the interrogatories, so far as I
have framed them. I will bring forward a new instalment when I get
them ready. I will bring them forward now, only reaching to number
four.
The first one is:
Question 1. If the people of Kansas shall, by means entirely
unobjectionable in all other respects, adopt a State Constitution, and
ask admission into the Union under it, before they have the requisite
number of inhabitants according to the English bill,--some ninety-three
thousand,--will you vote to admit them?
Q. 2. Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way,
against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery
from its limits prior to the formation of a State Constitution?
Q. 3. If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that
States cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of
acquiescing in, adopting, and following such decision as a rule of
political action?
Q. 4. Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory, in disregard
of how such acquisition may affect the nation on the slavery question?
As introductory to these interrogatories which Judge Douglas propounded
to me at Ottawa, he read a set of resolutions which he said Judge
Trumbull and myself had participated in adopting, in the first
Republican State Convention, held at Springfield, in October, 1854. He
insisted that I and Judge Trumbull, and perhaps the entire Republican
party, were responsible for the doctrines contained in the set of
resolutions which he read, and I understand that it was from that set
of resolutions that he deduced the interrogatories which he propounded
to me, using these resolutions as a sort of authority for propounding
those questions to me. Now I say here to-day that I do not answer his
interrogatories because of their springing at all from that set of
resolutions which he read. I answered them because Judge Douglas
thought fit to ask them. I do not now, nor ever did, recognize any
responsibility upon myself in that set of resolutions. When I replied
to him on that occasion, I assured him that I never had anything to do
with them. I repeat here to-day, that I never in any possible form had
anything to do with that set of resolutions. It turns out, I believe,
that those resolutions were never passed at any convention held in
Springfield. It turns out that they were never passed at any
convention or any public meeting that I had any part in. I believe it
turns out, in addition to all this, that there was not, in the fall of
1854, any convention holding a session in Springfield calling itself a
Republican State convention; yet it is true there was a convention, or
assemblage of men calling themselves a convention, at Springfield, that
did pass _some_ resolutions. But so little did I really know of the
proceedings of that convention, or what set of resolutions they had
passed, though having a general knowledge that there had been such an
assemblage of men there, that when Judge Douglas read the resolutions,
I really did not know but that they had been the resolutions passed
then and there. I did not question that they were the resolutions
adopted. For I could not bring myself to suppose that Judge Douglas
could say what he did upon this subject without _knowing_ that it was
true. I contented myself, on that occasion, with denying, as I truly
could, all connection with them, not denying or affirming whether they
were passed at Springfield. Now it turns out that he had got hold of
some resolutions passed at some convention or public meeting in Kane
County. I wish to say here, that I don't conceive that in any fair and
just mind this discovery relieves me at all. I had just as much to do
with the convention in Kane County as that at Springfield. I am just
as much responsible for the resolutions at Kane County as those at
Springfield, the amount of the responsibility being exactly nothing in
either case; no more than there would be in regard to a set of
resolutions passed in the moon.
I allude to this extraordinary matter in this canvass for some further
purpose than anything yet advanced. Judge Douglas did not make his
statement upon that occasion as matters that he believed to be true,
but he stated them roundly as _being true_, in such form as to pledge
his veracity for their truth. When the whole matter turns out as it
does, and when we consider who Judge Douglas is,--that he is a
distinguished Senator of the United States; that he has served nearly
twelve years as such; that his character is not at all limited as an
ordinary Senator of the United States, but that his name has become of
world-wide renown,--it is _most extraordinary_ that he should so far
forget all the suggestions of justice to an adversary, or of prudence
to himself, as to venture upon the assertion of that which the
slightest investigation would have shown him to be wholly false. I can
only account for his having done so upon the supposition that that evil
genius which has attended him through his life, giving to him an
apparent astonishing prosperity, such as to lead very many good men to
doubt there being any advantage in virtue over vice--I say I can only
account for it on the supposition that that evil genius has at last
made up its mind to forsake him.
And I may add that another extraordinary feature of the Judge's conduct
in this canvass--made more extraordinary by this incident--is, that he
is in the habit, in almost all the speeches he makes, of charging
falsehood upon his adversaries, myself and others. I now ask whether
he is able to find in anything that Judge Trumbull, for instance, has
said, or in anything that I have said, a justification at all compared
with what we have, in this instance, for that sort of vulgarity.
I have been in the habit of charging as a matter of belief on my part,
that, in the introduction of the Nebraska bill into Congress, there was
a conspiracy to make slavery perpetual and national. I have arranged
from time to time the evidence which establishes and proves the truth
of this charge. I recurred to this charge at Ottawa. I shall not now
have time to dwell upon it at very great length; but, inasmuch as Judge
Douglas in his reply of half an hour made some points upon me in
relation to it, I propose noticing a few of them.
The Judge insists that, in the first speech I made, in which I very
distinctly made that charge, he thought for a good while I was in
fun!--that I was playful--that I was not sincere about it--and that he
only grew angry and somewhat excited when he found that I insisted upon
it as a matter of earnestness. He says he characterized it as a
falsehood as far as I implicated his _moral character_ in that
transaction. Well, I did not know, till he presented that view, that I
had implicated his moral character. He is very much in the habit, when
he argues me up into a position I never thought of occupying, of very
cozily saying he has no doubt Lincoln is "conscientious" in saying so.
He should remember that I did not know but what _he_ was ALTOGETHER
"CONSCIENTIOUS" in that matter. I can conceive it possible for men to
conspire to do a good thing, and I really find nothing in Judge
Douglas's course of arguments that is contrary to or inconsistent with
his belief of a conspiracy to nationalize and spread slavery as being a
good and blessed thing, and so I hope he will understand that I do not
at all question but that in all this matter he is entirely
"conscientious."
But to draw your attention to one of the points I made in this case,
beginning at the beginning. When the Nebraska bill was introduced, or
a short time afterward, by an amendment, I believe, it was provided
that it must be considered "the true intent and meaning of this act not
to legislate slavery into any State or Territory, or to exclude it
therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and
regulate their own domestic institutions in their own way subject only
to the Constitution of the United States." I have called his attention
to the fact that when he and some others began arguing that they were
giving an increased degree of liberty to the people in the Territories
over and above what they formerly had on the question of slavery, a
question was raised whether the law was enacted to give such
unconditional liberty to the people; and to test the sincerity of this
mode of argument, Mr. Chase, of Ohio, introduced an amendment, in which
he made the law--if the amendment were adopted--expressly declare that
the people of the Territory should have the power to exclude slavery if
they saw fit. I have asked attention also to the fact that Judge
Douglas, and those who acted with him, voted that amendment down,
notwithstanding it expressed exactly the thing they said was the true
intent and meaning of the law. I have called attention to the fact
that in subsequent times a decision of the Supreme Court has been made
in which it has been declared that a Territorial Legislature has no
constitutional right to exclude slavery. And I have argued and said
that for men who did intend that the people of the Territory should
have the right to exclude slavery absolutely and unconditionally, the
voting down of Chase's amendment is wholly inexplicable. It is a
puzzle--a riddle. But I have said that with men who did look forward
to such a decision, or who had it in contemplation, that such a
decision of the Supreme Court would or might be made, the voting down
of that amendment would be perfectly rational and intelligible. It
would keep Congress from coming in collision with the decision when it
was made. Anybody can conceive that if there was an intention or
expectation that such a decision was to follow, it would not be a very
desirable party attitude to get into for the Supreme Court--all or
nearly all its members belonging to the same party--to decide one way,
when the party in Congress had decided the other way. Hence it would
be very rational for men expecting such a decision to keep the niche in
that law clear for it. After pointing this out, I tell Judge Douglas
that it looks to me as though here was the reason why Chase's amendment
was voted down. I tell him that as he did it, and knows why he did it,
if it was done for a reason different from this, _he knows what that
reason was, and can tell us what it was_. I tell him, also, it will be
vastly more satisfactory to the country for him to give some other
plausible, intelligible reason why it was voted down than to stand upon
his dignity and call people liars. Well, on Saturday he did make his
answer, and what do you think it was? He says if I had only taken upon
myself to tell the whole truth about that amendment of Chase's, no
explanation would have been necessary on his part--or words to that
effect. Now, I say here that I am quite unconscious of having
suppressed anything material to the case, and I am very frank to admit
if there is any sound reason other than that which appeared to me
material, it is quite fair for him to present it. What reason does he
propose? That when Chase came forward with his amendment expressly
authorizing the people to exclude slavery from the limits of every
Territory, General Cass proposed to Chase, if he (Chase) would add to
his amendment that the people should have the power to _introduce_ or
exclude, they would let it go. This is substantially all of his reply.
And because Chase would not do that they voted his amendment down.
Well, it turns out, I believe, upon examination, that General Cass took
some part in the little running debate upon that amendment, _and then
ran away and did not vote on it at all_. Is not that the fact? So
confident, as I think, was General Cass that there was a snake
somewhere about, he chose to run away from the whole thing. This is an
inference I draw from the fact that, though he took part in the debate,
his name does not appear in the ayes and noes. But does Judge
Douglas's reply amount to a satisfactory answer? [Cries of "Yes,"
"Yes," and "No," "No."] There is some little difference of opinion
here. But I ask attention to a few more views bearing on the question
of whether it amounts to a satisfactory answer. The men who were
determined that that amendment should not get into the bill, and spoil
the place where the Dred Scott decision was to come in, sought an
excuse to get rid of it somewhere. One of these ways--one of these
excuses--was to ask Chase to add to his proposed amendment a provision
that the people might _introduce_ slavery if they wanted to. They very
well knew Chase would do no such thing--that Mr. Chase was one of the
men differing from them on the broad principle of his insisting that
freedom was _better_ than slavery--a man who would not consent to enact
a law, penned with his own hand, by which he was made to recognize
slavery on the one hand and liberty on the other as _precisely equal_;
and when they insisted on his doing this, they very well knew they
insisted on that which he would not for a moment think of doing, and
that they were only bluffing him. I believe--I have not, since he made
his answer, had a chance to examine the journals or _Congressional
Globe_, and therefore speak from memory--I believe the state of the
bill at that time, according to parliamentary rules, was such that no
member could propose an additional amendment to Chase's amendment. I
rather think this the truth--the Judge shakes his head. Very well. I
would, like to know then, _if they wanted Chase's amendment fixed over,
why somebody else could not have offered to do it_. If they wanted it
amended, why did they not offer the amendment? Why did they stand
there taunting and quibbling at Chase? Why did they not put it in
themselves? But, to put it on the other ground: suppose that there was
such an amendment offered and Chase's was an amendment to an amendment;
until one is disposed of by parliamentary law, you cannot pile another
on. Then all these gentlemen had to do was to vote Chase's on, and
then, in the amended form in which the whole stood, add their own
amendment to it if they wanted to put it in that shape. This was all
they were obliged to do, and the ayes and noes show that there were
thirty-six who voted it down, against ten who voted in favor of it.
The thirty-six held entire sway and control. They could in some form
or other have put that bill in the exact shape they wanted. If there
was a rule preventing their amending it at the time, they could pass
that, and then, Chase's amendment being merged, put it in the shape
they wanted. They did not choose to do so, but they went into a
quibble with Chase to get him to add what they knew he would not add,
and because he would not, they stand upon that flimsy pretext for
voting down what they argued was the meaning and intent of their own
bill. They left room thereby for this Dred Scott decision, which goes
very far to make slavery national throughout the United States.
I pass one or two points I have because my time will very soon expire,
but I must be allowed to say that Judge Douglas recurs again, as he did
upon one of two other occasions, to the enormity of Lincoln--an
insignificant individual like Lincoln--upon his _ipse dixit_ charging a
conspiracy upon a large number of members of Congress, the Supreme
Court, and two Presidents, to nationalize slavery. I want to say that,
in the first place, I have made no charge of this sort upon my _ipse
dixit_. I have only arrayed the evidence tending to prove it, and
presented it to the understanding of others, saying what I think it
proves, but giving you the means of judging whether it proves it or
not. This is precisely what I have done. I have not placed it upon my
_ipse dixit_ at all. On this occasion, I wish to recall his attention
to a piece of evidence which I brought forward at Ottawa on Saturday,
showing that he had made substantially the _same charge_ against
substantially the _same persons_, excluding his dear self from the
category. I ask him to give some attention to the evidence which I
brought forward, that he himself had discovered a "fatal blow being
struck" against the right of the people to exclude slavery from their
limits, which fatal blow he assumed as in evidence in an article in the
Washington _Union_, published "by authority." I ask by whose
authority? He discovers a similar or identical provision in the
Lecompton Constitution. Made by whom? The framers of that
constitution. Advocated by whom? By all the members of the party in
the nation who advocated the introduction of Kansas into the Union
under the Lecompton Constitution.
I have asked his attention to the evidence that he arrayed to prove
that such a fatal blow was being struck, and to the facts which he
brought forward in support of that charge--being identical with the one
which he thinks so villainous in me. He pointed it not at a newspaper
editor merely, but at the President and his Cabinet, and the members of
Congress advocating the Lecompton Constitution, and those framing that
instrument. I must again be permitted to remind him, that although my
_ipse dixit_ may not be as great as his, yet it somewhat reduces the
force of his calling my attention to the enormity of my making a like
charge against him.
Go on, Judge Douglas.