THE FIELD ORDER, THE ESTIMATE, THE DECISION, THE EXPRESSION
“Upon the information of the enemy and of the terrain obtained
by reconnaissance, and, as far as time will permit, upon the
study of the terrain made by the leader in the field of probable
operations, the plan of action is based.” So state our Field Service
Regulations.[4] Decision, then, is built upon the amount of material
that the observation and attention of a commander can collect. And
it is only _his_ observation and attention which count. It is only
what he himself has fixed in his own mind which is going to do the
troops harm or good. He may receive dozens of excellent messages,
or may view the battle-field for twenty miles; yet it is only what
he himself appropriates to his own straight thinking, which can
influence the outcome. The reports or the visions of others cannot
enter into the decision, unless he has transferred those reports or
visions to his own calculations. How can he weigh what he has not
handled—consider what he has not absorbed? _The decision of a leader
issues from the door of his own observation and attention._ The most
pertinent facts may be laid at that threshold only to be shut out
because he has not increased his capacity to take them in. And no
one else can enter there in order to do the work for him unless the
intruder becomes virtually, if not actually, the leader.
THE ESTIMATE
Let us suppose that the observation and attention have taken in all
that they should. These various items lying in a more or less jumbled
mass must now be sorted. Information of one class must not be found
mixed with that of another class. Each organized body of information
must approach the leader’s judgment by itself so that: (1) nothing
will be overlooked; so that (2) each item will be with its proper
set. After they have all passed through his thought, certain ones,
of course, may be discarded; but they all must none the less be
first reviewed consciously by the leader. This process is called the
_estimate of the situation_. In order, therefore, to comply with
the full conditions of such an estimate, a fixed classification of
all the essentials which should go through the hopper of a leader’s
judgment has been made. After his information has been obtained and
before his decision has been formed, the leader must say to himself:—
1. What is my mission?
2. What are the forces—the enemy’s and my own?
3. What conditions are favorable and what unfavorable?
4. What is the enemy doing and what will he probably do?
5. What effect has the terrain upon my mission?
6. What different courses are open to me in order to carry out my
mission, and what are the advantages and disadvantages of each?
The method just described is no more than that of collecting,
classifying, and weighing data. It is the very process we must
follow before we can write a decent theme, article, report, or
anything fit to read. An estimate of a situation is nothing more
than an outline of observations made in order to arrive at a proper
conclusion. The leader has no time to write down the points. But he
nevertheless assembles in his own mind everything which bears on his
subject—unity; he classifies all this into groups with a certain
orderly arrangement—coherence; and he considers the effect of each
item upon his mission and situation—clear thinking.
THE DECISION
As soon as he has finished with this estimate of the situation, there
should stand forth as a result of this clear thinking his decision.
If he has been in the habit of making his ideas unmistakable in
conversation or writing—if he has been accustomed to dealing in good
exposition, his plan ought to be clear and simple. For no man can
make clear statements without first thinking clear thoughts. If then
he has habitually insisted upon his own use of only the clearest
phraseology, he ought certainly to arrive at a clear plan whatever
may be its tactical value.
THE EXPRESSION
To give this plan expression is the purpose of the field order.
Certainly if the decision is clear and simple, the translation
into language ought to be easy. Infantry Drill Regulations state:
“Ambiguity or vagueness indicates either vacillation or inability
to formulate orders.” Since vacillation is a matter of character,
the discussion of such a trait is outside of this course; but the
inability to formulate orders is not. In fact it belongs only in
the course of Rhetoric or English. The following terms are found in
our Regulations and Text Books: “Clear and concise instructions are
given as to the action to be taken in combat”;[5] “an order must
be definite and the expression of a fixed decision”;[5] “field
orders are brief”;[6] “field orders must be brief and definite”;[6]
“clear and decisive orders are the logical result of definite and
sure decisions and are the means of transforming the decision into
action”;[6] “Make your order short and make it definite”;[7] “above
all do not give vague orders”;[7] “be positive and definite”;[7]
“a plan, promising success, may fail if it does not find correct
expression in an order.”[8] And so our manuals keep on telling us
to use correct English, but failing to tell us how. Putting the
clarified decision into the form of an order is the business of
Rhetoric. And the process requires the application of every rule for
correct English we have learned or are going to learn.
“_Often a faulty expression, a word too much or too little, or an
omission, may become the source of serious consequences_,” declares
Buddecke. Even in the orders of the greatest commanders, a twist of
phrase or a wrong word has given an unintentional meaning, so that
troops have from the very construction of the order acted contrary to
the will of the chief. Napoleon, in a despatch to Davout before the
battles of Auerstadt and Jena, stated: “If the Prince of Portecorvo
(Bernadotte) is with you, you may march together; but the Emperor
hopes that he will be already in the position assigned him at
Dornberg.” Bernadotte, as it happened, had not gone to Dornberg. He
was with Davout. He determined, from the last clause of the order and
from the word “may,” that Napoleon desired him to be at Dornberg. To
Dornberg he marched, and there he calmly waited within sound of the
guns, while the battles of Auerstadt and Jena were fought. He was
useless both to Napoleon and to Davout. Indeed, he was seriously
needed by Davout who, with 27,000 was opposed to 51,000 Prussians.
Yet the error is attributable not to Bernadotte but to Napoleon, who
meant to say, “You should march together; but the Emperor hopes that
he has arrived,” etc. Napoleon for once did not say what he meant. It
is likely we may be found more wanting in this regard.
There is no error in the expressiveness of a field order which the
analytical and synthetical study of English will not overcome. We
must first learn by analysis to recognize mistakes when we see them.
We must then try to manipulate our language so that those mistakes
will not occur. Indeed, we must go further than the mere negative
avoidance of mistakes. We must not be satisfied until we have made
our expressions exert a positive force. The ways and means of so
doing are found in the simple rules of rhetoric.
It is, perhaps, not too much to say that the American works against
heavier odds than the European. The syntax of the inflected
languages of Europe demands that the speaker pay a proper attention
to the changes of number, gender, and case, if he would not appear
ridiculous, whereas the English language, being almost without
inflections, permits its speaker to toss his words about with an
ease unknown to Continental speech, and still be intelligible. The
result is that the European is trained to more care, and, therefore,
greater exactness, than is demanded of the American. Moreover, the
average American’s commercial education does not include a careful,
analytical study of an inflected language. His geographical aloofness
from the rest of the world insures him also a linguistic isolation.
The European, on the other hand, has an added advantage in that by
traversing a territory no larger than three or four of our big
states, he will encounter a half-dozen languages, of all of which he
must have some knowledge if he is to be a financial success.
The American, then, in writing orders is competing against a
handicap. Von Kiessing, a foreigner, states that “the best of plans,
the most skilful combinations, may fail, if the commander or his
staff officers cannot express them properly”; and Buddecke, also a
foreigner, insists that “a plan, promising success, may fail if it
does not find correct expression in an order.” If these men, schooled
in language as well as in tactics, find admonition so emphatically
necessary, how must we look upon the matter?
The form and composition of the order, if practiced now, ought to
give us a certain amount of independence when we come to practical
and strategical considerations later. For certainly, we shall be far
ahead of our fellows who must try at once, and for the first time,
both tactics and composition.
THE FORM OF THE FIELD ORDER
“To enable the will of the commander to be quickly understood, to
secure prompt cooperation among his subordinates, and for ready
reference, field orders are required to follow a general form. This
form divides an order into sections or parts and assigns to each a
particular class of information.
The parts of the field order are:
THE HEADING.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS (in certain orders).
THE BODY.
THE ENDING.”[9]
The only difference between the divisions of the field message and
the field order, then, is that the latter contains in certain orders
_The Distribution of Troops_.
THE HEADING.—The heading contains:
THE TITLE OR NAME OF ISSUING OFFICER’S COMMAND.
THE PLACE.
THE DATE.
THE HOUR OF ISSUE.
THE NUMBER OF THE ORDER.
THE REFERENCE TO MAP USED.
The _Title_ or _Name_ corresponds to the _Name_ of Sending Detachment
in the field message. But a title is the name applied to the
temporary duty of a command, such as, “Advance Guard, Det. 21st
Div.,” whereas the name itself might be “162d Inf., Det. 21st Div.”
_The Place_ does not need to be given so specifically as in the field
message, because the command issuing a field order takes up much more
space than a reconnaissance party. The _Date_ and _Hour of Issue_
are written as in the field message. Field Orders are numbered in
sequence usually annually. The _Reference_ to _Map Used_ is placed
immediately below the number. The Heading of a field order would
appear thus:
Field Orders: Det. 21st Div., 12th Corps,
No. 22 Leavenworth, Kansas,
(Geological Survey Sheet) 9 Dec. 28, 8-15 p. m.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS.—“The distribution of troops shows the
tactical components into which a command is divided (advance guard,
main body, etc.) and the troops assigned to each. It is generally
used in march orders and in the first field order applying to a
command newly created or organized. In other cases it is usually more
convenient to name the troops in the body of the order, where their
duties are prescribed.
When a ‘distribution’ is used, it is headed ‘Troops,’ and in written
or printed orders is placed on the left of _The Body_, occupying
about one-third of the page. The tactical components are marked
with lettered subheads (a), (b), etc., the troops listed under each
performing the task prescribed in the similarly marked paragraph of
the body of the order.
When orders are dictated or sent by wire or signals, the distribution
of troops (if used) is given immediately after paragraph 2, without
number.”[10] In orders for a regiment and smaller bodies the
_Distribution_ of _Troops_ is usually omitted.
The Distribution of Troops in a field order would appear thus:
_Troops._
(a) Independent Cavalry:
Col. Adams.
1st & 2d Sqs. 1st Cav.
(less one troop)
(b) Advance Guard:
Col. Byron.
1st Inf., 1st Cav.,
Btry. B, 5th F. A.
Det. Co. A, Engrs.
Det. Amb. Co. No. 1.
(c) Main Body, in order of march:
1st Bn, 2d Inf.
1st Bn, 5th F. A.
(less 1 btry).
1st Brig. (less 1st Inf. and
1st Bn. 2d Inf.).
4th Inf.
Co. A, Engrs. (less det.).
Amb. Co. No. 1 (less det.).
1st F. Hosp.
(d) Signal Troops:
Lieut. Dash.
1 plat., Co. A.
THE BODY.—The Body, of course, is the main part of the order. It
contains the information and instructions for the command. It is to
this part that Buddecke refers when he says: “_The order, which is to
transform decision into action, is of the utmost importance._”
The Sentence and the Paragraph, then, should be perfectly
constructed. Each one of those elements should be tested to see
that it is unified, coherent, and emphatic. _The examples herein
given, or any set phrasing, should never be imitated._ Every leader
must compose his own words, his own decision. He must give to his
subordinates the language that best suits the particular occasion.
Otherwise there will be no unity of structure and little likelihood
of unity of action. Every military situation is a a law unto itself,
and the language of the field order should fit that law.
Nevertheless there are certain aids, as we shall see, in composing
_the Body_. The topic of each paragraph is to be found in our
Regulations. We must see that nothing enters the paragraph or
sub-paragraph but that which belongs in the topic assigned. We must
see, also, that all of the matter belonging in a paragraph is
placed there, and that every sentence in the paragraph is free from
violations of Unity, Coherence, and Emphasis.
“Paragraph 1 contains such information of the enemy and of our
supporting troops as it is desirable that subordinates should know.”
“Paragraph 2 contains the general plan of the commander, or so much
thereof as will insure cooperation of all parts of the command.”
“Paragraph 3 contains the detailed tactical dispositions adopted
by the commander to carry out the plan outlined in paragraph 2,
including the tasks assigned to each of the several combatant
fractions of the command. These tasks are given under lettered
subheads (a), (b), etc., the leading fraction, or the one having the
most important duty to perform, being generally considered first.
For instance: In an attack order it is customary to consider the
artillery first; in a march order troops are considered according to
their position in column.”
“Instructions applicable to all of these fractions may be embodied in
a sub-paragraph, letter (X), at the end of paragraph 3.”
“Paragraph 4 contains instructions for the trains, and may designate
the position of ammunition distributing stations, dressing stations,
and stations for slightly wounded.”
“The last paragraph, usually paragraph 5, shows where the commander
can be found or messages may be sent. In orders of subordinate
commanders, this paragraph also gives the location of lines of
information, if any have been established.”
“If additional paragraphs are necessary, they are incorporated,
properly numbered, after paragraph 4. Sometimes it is unnecessary
to include instructions for the trains; but whatever the number of
paragraphs the last always shows where the commander can be found,
etc.”[11]
Briefly, then, the paragraphs may be epitomized as follows:
1. Enemy (sub-paragraph neither numbered nor lettered).
Your own troops (sub-paragraph neither numbered
nor lettered).
2. Plan (single paragraph).
3. (a) Task of the leading, or the most important,
fraction of command.
(b) Task of next, or next important, fraction of
command. (X) Anything which applies to all
fractions of command.
4. Trains.
5. Location of commander or place to which messages
are to be sent (sub-paragraph neither numbered
nor lettered).
Location of lines of information (sub-paragraph
neither numbered nor lettered).
The Body of a field order would appear thus:
1. The enemy’s cavalry patrols
have been seen north of
KICKAPOO. His infantry
and artillery are reported
at ATCHISON.
Our division is 8 miles south
of LEAVENWORTH.
2. This detachment will march
tomorrow to KICKAPOO.
3. (a) The independent cavalry
will start at 5-30 a. m.,
covering the movement.
(b) The advance guard will
clear the northern exit of
LEAVENWORTH at 6
a. m., marching by the
ATCHISON CROSS-FRENCHMAN
road.
(c) The main body will follow
the advance guard at
1,200 yards.
(d) The signal troops will
establish a line of information
along the line of
march between the independent
cavalry and
LEAVENWORTH, one
of the stations being at
FRENCHMAN.
4. The field train, escorted by
one company 4th Inf., will
follow the main body as far
as FRENCHMAN.
5. The detachment commander
will be with the main body
until 7 a. m., and thereafter
with the advance
guard.
THE ENDING.—“The ending contains the authentication of the order
and a statement of how it is communicated to the command. This
statement is an important feature of a field order and is made by the
officer signing the order, he being responsible that it is properly
distributed.”[12]
The ending then would appear thus:
By order of Brig.-Gen. Forse:
J. G. HAMILTON,
Lt. Col. 1st Inf.,
_Act. Chief of Staff_.
Copies to Colonels Adams and Byron, commanders of artillery and
engineers, and to staff; to division commander by wire.
The various parts of the field order, when assembled, appear as
follows:
Det. 21st Div. 12th Corps,
Field Orders: Leavenworth, Kansas,
No. 22. 9 Dec. 28, 8-15 p. m.
(Geological Survey Sheet.)
_Troops._
(a) Independent 1. The enemy’s cavalry patrols
Cavalry: have been seen north of
Col. Adams. KICKAPOO. His infantry
1st & 2d Sqs. 1st and artillery are reported
Cav. at ATCHISON.
(less 1 troop). Our division is 8 miles south
of LEAVENWORTH.
2. This detachment will march
tomorrow to KICKAPOO.
(b) Advance Guard:
Col. Byron. 3. (a) The Independent Cavalry
1st Inf. will start at 5-30 a. m.,
1 Troop, 1st Cav. covering the movement.
Btry. B, 5th F. A.
Det. Amb. Co. (b) The advance guard will
No. 1. clear the northern exit of
LEAVENWORTH at 6
a. m., marching by the
ATCHISON CROSS-FRENCHMAN
road.
(c) Main Body, in (c) The main body will follow
order of march: the advance guard at
1st Bn. 2d Inf. 1,200 yards.
1st Bn. 5th F. A.
(less 1 btry). (d) The Signal troops will
1st Brig. (less 1st establish a line of information
Inf. and 1st Bn. along the line of
2d Inf.). march between the independent
4th Inf. cavalry and
Co. A, Engrs. LEAVENWORTH, one
(less det.). of the stations being at
Amb. Co. No. 1 FRENCHMAN.
(less det.).
1st F. Hosp. 4. The field train, escorted by
one company 4th Infantry,
will follow the main body
as far as FRENCHMAN.
5. The detachment commander
will be with the
main body until 7 a. m.,
(d) Signal Troops: and thereafter with the advance
Lieut. Dash. guard.
1 plat. Co. A.
By order of Brig.-Gen. Forse:
J. G. HAMILTON,
Lt. Col., 1st Inf.,
_Acting Chief of Staff_.
Copies to Colonels Adams and Byron, commanders of artillery
and engineers, and to staff; to division commander by wire.
There are certain
SPECIAL CAUTIONS
in regard to the writing of the field order.
1.—What is required in paragraph 3 of the _Body_ is that the order be
logical—coherent.[13]
2.—An order tells a subordinate _what_ to do but not _how_ to do it.
3.—Conjectures, expectations, reasons for measures adopted, and
detailed instructions for a variety of possible events, do not
inspire confidence, and should be avoided.
4.—As a rule, an affirmative form of expression is used. Such an
order as: “The supply train will not accompany the division,” is
defective, because the gist of the order depends upon the single word
“not.” It is far better to say, “The supply train will remain at
so-and-so until further orders.”
5.—Do not use such expressions as “attempt to capture,” “try to
hold,” “as far as possible,” “as well as you can.” Besides being
indefinite, they divide responsibility. You, for example, receive
an order “to try to capture” a certain position. Immediately there
pops into your mind the suspicion that the commanding officer did
not believe that the place could be taken, or was not anxious about
having it captured. The commanding officer by the very wording of
his order has taken on himself a part of the responsibility in the
event of a repulse. At least he has not placed all the burden of
the undertaking upon you. In the latter case he has been guilty of
improper subordination.