[Sidenote: § 1. Gustavus proposes a league of cities.]
Long before John George's answer could reach Gustavus the war had blazed
out afresh. The Swedish king did not yet know how little reliance he
could place on the Elector for the realization of his grand plan, when
Wallenstein broke up from Bohemia, and directed his whole force upon
Nüremberg. Gustavus threw himself into the town to defend it. Here, too,
his head was busy with the _Corpus Evangelicorum_. Whilst he was
offering to Saxony to abandon the ecclesiastical territories, he
proposed to the citizens of Nüremberg to lay the foundations of a league
in which the citizens alone should ally themselves with him, leaving the
princes to come in afterwards if they would, whilst the ecclesiastical
territories should remain in his own hands. There is nothing really
discrepant in the two schemes. The one was a plan to be adopted only on
condition of a final and permanent peace. The other was a plan for use
as a weapon of war. The noticeable thing is the persistent way in which
Gustavus returned again and again to the idea of founding a political
union as the basis of military strength.
[Sidenote: § 2. His proposal unacceptable.]
He was no more successful with the citizens of Nüremberg than with the
Elector of Saxony. They replied that a matter of such importance should
be treated in common by all the cities and princes interested. "In that
case," he replied, bitterly, "the Elector of Saxony will dispute for
half a year in whose name the summons to the meeting ought to be issued.
When the cities, too, send deputies, they usually separate as they meet,
discovering that there is a defect in their instructions, and so refer
everything home again for further consideration, without coming to any
conclusion whatever." Can it be doubted that the political incompetence
of the Germans, caused by their internal divisions and their long disuse
of such institutions as would have enabled them to act in common, was a
thorn in the side of Gustavus, felt by him more deeply than the
appearance in the field, however unexpected, of Wallenstein and his
army?
[Sidenote: § 3. Gustavus and Wallenstein at Nüremberg.]
That army, however, must be met. Wallenstein had 60,000 men with him;
Gustavus but a third of the number. The war had blazed up along the
Rhine from Alsace to Coblentz. Pappenheim was fighting there, and the
Spaniards had sent troops of their own, and had summoned the Duke of
Lorraine to their aid. By-and-by it was seen how rightly Gustavus had
judged that France could not afford to quarrel with him. Though he had
dashed aside Richelieu's favourite scheme of leaving the ecclesiastical
territories untouched, and had refused to single out the House of
Austria as the sole object of the war, Richelieu could not fail to
support him against Spanish troops. In a few weeks the danger in his
rear was at an end, and the scattered detachments of the Swedish army
were hurrying to join their king at Nüremberg.
[Sidenote: § 4. Wallenstein entrenches himself.]
Gustavus was now ready for a battle. But a battle he could not have.
Wallenstein fell back upon his old tactics of refusing battle, except
when he had a manifest superiority of numbers. He entrenched himself
near Fürth, to the north of Nüremberg, on a commanding eminence
overlooking the whole plain around. For twelve miles his works protected
his newly-levied army. House, villages, advantages of the ground were
everywhere utilized for defence.
[Sidenote: § 5. Wants of the Swedish army.]
In the meanwhile, scarcity and pestilence were doing their terrible work
at Nüremberg. The country people had flocked in for refuge, and the
population was too great to be easily supplied with food. Even in the
army want began to be felt. And with want came the relaxation of that
discipline upon which Gustavus prided himself. He had large numbers of
German troops in his army now, and a long evil experience had taught
Germans the habits of marauders.
[Sidenote: § 6. Gustavus remonstrates.]
Gustavus was deeply irritated. Sending for the chief Germans in his
service, he rated them soundly. "His Majesty," says one who described
the scene, "was never before seen in such a rage."
[Sidenote: § 7. His speech to the officers.]
"You princes, counts, lords, and noblemen," he said, "you are showing
your disloyalty and wickedness on your own fatherland, which you are
ruining. You colonels, and officers from the highest to the lowest, it
is you who steal and rob every one, without making any exceptions. You
plunder your own brothers in the faith. You make me disgusted with you;
and God my Creator be my witness that my heart is filled with gall when
I see any one of you behaving so villanously. For you cause men to say
openly, 'The king, our friend, does us more harm than our enemies.' If
you were real Christians you would consider what I am doing for you, how
I am spending my life in your service. I have given up the treasures of
my crown for your sake, and have not had from your German Empire enough
to buy myself a bad suit of clothes with."
[Sidenote: § 8. Complains bitterly of them.]
After this strain he went on: "Enter into your hearts," he said, "and
think how sad you are making me, so that the tears stand in my eyes. You
treat me ill with your evil discipline; I do not say with your evil
fighting, for in that you have behaved like honourable gentlemen, and
for that I am much obliged to you. I am so grieved for you that I am
vexed that I ever had anything to do with so stiff-necked a nation.
Well, then, take my warning to heart; we will soon show our enemies that
we are honest men and honourable gentlemen."
[Sidenote: § 9. Punishes plunderers.]
One day the king caught a corporal stealing cows. "My son," he said, as
he delivered him over to the provost marshal, "it is better that I
should punish you, than that God should punish not only you, but me and
all of us for your sake."
[Sidenote: § 10. Fails to storm Wallenstein's lines.]
Such a state of things could not last long. On September 3 Gustavus led
his army to the shores of Wallenstein's entrenchments; but though he
made some impression, the lines were too skilfully drawn, and too well
defended, to be broken through. On the other hand, Gustavus was not a
Mansfeld, and Wallenstein did not venture, as at the Bridge of Dessau,
to follow up his successful defence by an offensive movement.
[Sidenote: § 11. Is obliged to march away.]
Want of supplies made it impossible for Gustavus to remain longer at
Nüremberg. For the first time since he landed in Germany he had failed
in securing a victory. With drums beating and banners flying, he marched
away past Wallenstein's encampment; but the wary man was not to be
enticed to a combat. As soon as he was gone, Wallenstein broke up his
camp. But he knew too well where his opponent's weakness lay to go in
pursuit of Gustavus. Throwing himself northwards, he established himself
firmly in Saxony, plundering and burning on every side. If only he could
work ruin enough, he might hope to detach the Elector from his alliance
with the Swedes.
[Sidenote: § 12. Wallenstein and Gustavus in Saxony.]
Gustavus could not choose but follow. Wallenstein had hoped to establish
himself as firmly in Saxony as he had established himself at Fürth. He
would seize Torgau and Halle, to make himself master of the passages
over the Elbe and Saale, whilst Erfurt and Naumburg would complete the
strength of his position. Gustavus might dash his head against it as he
pleased. Like Wellington at Torres Vedras, or Gustavus himself at
Werben, he would meet the attack of the enemy by establishing himself in
a carefully selected position of defence.