[Sidenote: § 1. Ferdinand looks about for help.]
Unless Ferdinand could find help elsewhere than in his own subjects he
was lost. Abroad he could look to Spain. But Spain could not do very
much under the eyes of Richelieu. Some amount of money it could send,
and some advice. But that was all.
[Sidenote: 1631.
§ 2. The Spaniards recommend the recall of Wallenstein.]
What that advice would be could hardly be doubted. The dismissal of
Wallenstein had been a check for Spain. He had been willing to join
Spain in a war with France. The electors had prevailed against him with
French support, and the treaty of Cherasco, by which the German troops
had been withdrawn from fighting in support of the Spanish domination in
Italy, had been the result. Even before the battle of Breitenfeld had
been fought, the Spanish government had recommended the reinstatement of
Wallenstein, and the Spaniards found a support in Eggenberg,
Wallenstein's old protector at court.
[Sidenote: § 3. Wallenstein as the rival of Gustavus.]
Soon after the battle of Breitenfeld, Wallenstein broke off his
intercourse with Gustavus. By that time it was evident that in any
alliance which Gustavus might make he meant to occupy the first place
himself. Even if this had been otherwise, the moral character and the
political instincts of the two men were too diverse to make co-operation
possible between them. Gustavus was a king as well as a soldier, and he
hoped to base his military power upon the political reconstruction of
Protestant Germany, perhaps even of the whole Empire. Wallenstein owed
everything to the sword, and he wished to bring all Germany under the
empire of the sword.
[Sidenote: § 4. His plan of a reconciliation with John George.]
The arrival of the Saxons in Bohemia inspired Wallenstein with the hope
of a new combination, which would place the destinies of Germany in his
hands. The reluctance with which John George had abandoned the Emperor
was well known. If only Ferdinand, taught by experience, could be
induced to sacrifice the Edict of Restitution, might not the Saxons be
won over from their new allies? Wallenstein's former plans would be
realized, and united Germany, nominally under Ferdinand, in reality
under his general, would rise to expel the foreigner and to bar the door
against the Frenchman and the Swede.
[Sidenote: § 5. He is reinstated in the command.]
In November, 1631, Wallenstein met his old lieutenant, Arnim, now the
Saxon commander, to discuss the chances of the future. In December, just
as Gustavus was approaching the Rhine, he received a visit from
Eggenberg, at Znaim. Eggenberg had come expressly to persuade him to
accept the command once more. Wallenstein gave his consent, on condition
that the ecclesiastical lands should be left as they were before the
Edict of Restitution. And besides this he was to wield an authority such
as no general had ever claimed before. No army could be introduced into
the Empire excepting under his command. To him alone was to belong the
right of confiscation and of pardon. As Gustavus was proposing to deal
with the ecclesiastical territories, so would Wallenstein deal with the
princes who refused to renounce their alliance with the Swede. A new
class of princes would arise, owing their existence to him alone. As for
his own claims, if Mecklenburg could not be recovered, a princely
territory was to be found for him elsewhere.
[Sidenote: § 6. Wallenstein's army.]
After all it was not upon written documents that Wallenstein's power was
founded. The army which he gathered round him was no Austrian army in
any real sense of the word. It was the army of Wallenstein--of the Duke
of Friedland, as the soldiers loved to call him, thinking perhaps that
his duchy of Mecklenburg would prove but a transitory possession. Its
first expenses were met with the help of Spanish subsidies. But after
that it had to depend on itself. Nor was it more than an accident that
it was levied and equipped in Bohemia. If Gustavus had been at Vienna
instead of at Munich, the thousands of stalwart men who trooped in at
Wallenstein's bare word would have gathered to any place where he had
set up his standards. Gustavus had to face the old evil of the war,
which had grown worse and worse from the days of Mansfeld to those of
Wallenstein, the evil of a military force existing by itself and for
itself. From far distant shores men practised in arms came eagerly to
the summons; from sunny Italy, from hardy Scotland, from every German
land between the Baltic and the Alps. Protestant and Catholic were alike
welcome there. The great German poet has breathed the spirit of this
heterogeneous force into one of its officers, himself a wanderer from
distant Ireland, ever prodigal of her blood in the quarrels of others.
"This vast and mighty host," he says (Schiller, _The Piccolomini_, act
i. sc. 2),
is all obedient
To Friedland's captains; and its brave commanders.
Bred in one school, and nurtured with one milk,
Are all excited by one heart and soul.
They are strangers on the soil they tread.
The service is their only house and home.
No zeal inspires them for their country's cause,
For thousands like myself, were born abroad;
Nor care they for the Emperor, for one half,
Deserting other service, fled to ours,
Indifferent what their banner, whether 'twere
The Double Eagle, Lily, or the Lion;[A]
Yet one sole man can rein this fiery host,
By equal rule, by equal love and fear,
Blending the many-nationed whole in one.
Was it, forsooth, the Emperor's majesty
That gave the army ready to his hand,
And only sought a leader for it? No!
The army then had no existence. He,
Friedland, it was who called it into being,
And gave it to his sovereign--but receiving
No army at his hand;--nor did the Emperor
Give Wallenstein to us as General. No,
It was from Wallenstein we first received
The Emperor as our master and our sovereign;
And he, he only, binds us to our banner.
[A] That is to say, the standard of the Emperor, of France, or of
Sweden.
[Sidenote: 1632
§ 7. He receives full powers.]
Wallenstein at first accepted the command for three months only. In
April it was permanently conferred on him. The Emperor was practically
set aside in favour of a dictator.
[Sidenote: § 8. The Saxons driven out of Bohemia.]
Wallenstein turned first upon the Saxons. In one hand he held the olive
branch, in the other the sword. On May 21st his emissary was offering
peace on the terms of the retractation of the Edict of Restitution. On
the 22d Wallenstein himself fell upon the Saxon garrison of Prague, and
forced it to surrender. It was a plain hint to John George to make his
mind up quickly. Before long the Saxons had been driven out of the whole
of Bohemia.
[Sidenote: § 9. But John George will not treat alone.]
John George loved peace dearly, and he had joined Sweden sorely against
his will. But he was a man of his word, and he had promised Gustavus not
to come to terms with the enemy without his consent. He forwarded
Wallenstein's propositions to Gustavus.
[Sidenote: § 10. Demands of Gustavus.]
No man was so ready as Gustavus to change his plans in all matters of
secondary importance, as circumstances might require. In the face of
Wallenstein's armament and of the hesitations of the Saxon court, he at
once abandoned all thought of asking that the Rhine bishoprics should
remain in his hands. He was ready to assent to the solution of religious
questions which satisfied Wallenstein and John George. For himself, he
expected the cession of at least part of Pomerania, in order to protect
himself from a future naval attack proceeding from the Baltic ports. The
Elector of Brandenburg had claims upon Pomerania; but he might be
satisfied with some of the bishoprics which it had been agreed to leave
in Protestant hands.
[Sidenote: § 11. Impossibility of reconciling Gustavus and Wallenstein.]
Such terms would probably have met with opposition. But the real point
of difference lay elsewhere. Wallenstein would have restored the old
unity of the Empire, of which he hoped to be the inspiring genius.
Gustavus pressed for the formation of a separate Protestant league, if
not under his own guidance, at least in close alliance with Sweden.
Wallenstein asked for confidence in himself and the Emperor. Gustavus
had no confidence in either.
[Sidenote: § 12. Hesitation of John George.]
John George wavered between the two. He, too, distrusted Wallenstein.
But he did not see that he must either accept the Empire, or help on its
dissolution, unless he wished to leave the future of Germany to chance.
The imperial unity of Wallenstein was something. The _Corpus
Evangelicorum_ of Gustavus was something. The Protestant states, loosely
combined, were doomed to defeat and ruin.