BATTLE OF THE COWPENS.--BATTLE OF GUILFORD COURT-HOUSE.
The stress of war, as Washington apprehended, was at present shifted
to the South. In a former chapter we left General Greene, in the
latter part of December, posted with one division of his army on the
east side of the Pedee River in North Carolina, having detached
General Morgan with the other division, one thousand strong, to take
post near the confluence of the Pacolet and Broad Rivers in South
Carolina.
Cornwallis lay encamped about seventy miles to the southwest of
Greene, at Winnsborough, in Fairfield district. General Leslie had
recently arrived at Charleston from Virginia, and was advancing to
reinforce him with fifteen hundred men. This would give Cornwallis
such a superiority of force, that he prepared for a second invasion of
North Carolina. His plan was to leave Lord Rawdon at the central post
of Camden with a considerable body of troops to keep all quiet, while
his lordship by rapid marches would throw himself between Greene and
Virginia, cut him off from all reinforcements in that quarter, and
oblige him either to make battle with his present force, or retreat
precipitately from North Carolina. By recent information, he learnt
that Morgan had passed both the Catawba and Broad Rivers, and was
about seventy miles to the northwest of him, on his way to the
district of Ninety-Six. As he might prove extremely formidable if left
in his rear, Tarleton was sent in quest of him, with about three
hundred and fifty of his famous cavalry, a corps of legion and light
infantry, and a number of the royal artillery with two field-pieces;
about eleven hundred choice troops in all.
Cornwallis moved with his main force on the 12th of December, in a
northwest direction between the Broad River and the Catawba, leading
toward the back country. This was for the purpose of crossing the
great rivers at their fords near their sources; for they are fed by
innumerable petty streams which drain the mountains, and are apt in
the winter time, when storms of rain prevail, to swell and become
impassable below their forks. He took this route also, to cut off
Morgan's retreat, or prevent his junction with Greene, should
Tarleton's expedition fail of its object.
Tarleton, after several days' hard marching, came upon the traces of
Morgan, who was posted on the north bank of the Pacolet, to guard the
passes of that river. He sent word to Cornwallis of his intention to
force a passage across the river, and compel Morgan either to fight or
retreat, and suggested that his lordship should proceed up the eastern
bank of Broad River, so as to be at hand to co-operate. His lordship,
in consequence, took up a position at Turkey Creek, on Broad River.
Morgan had been recruited by North Carolina and Georgia militia, so
that his force was nearly equal in number to that of Tarleton, but, in
point of cavalry and discipline, vastly inferior. Cornwallis, too, was
on his left, and might get in his rear; checking his impulse,
therefore, to dispute the passage of the Pacolet, he crossed that
stream and retreated towards the upper fords of Broad River. Tarleton
reached the Pacolet on the evening of the 15th, and pressed on in
pursuit. At ten o'clock at night he reached an encampment which Morgan
had abandoned a few hours previously, apparently in great haste, for
the camp fires were still smoking, and provisions had been left behind
half-cooked. Eager to come upon his enemy while in the confusion of a
hurried flight, Tarleton allowed his exhausted troops but a brief
repose, and, leaving his baggage under a guard, resumed his dogged
march about two o'clock in the night. A little before daylight of the
17th, he captured two videttes, from whom he learnt, to his surprise,
that Morgan, instead of a headlong retreat, had taken a night's
repose, and was actually preparing to give him battle.
Morgan, in fact, had been urged by his officers to retreat across
Broad River, which was near by, and make for the mountainous country;
but, closely pressed as he was, he feared to be overtaken while
fording the river, and while his troops were fatigued and in
confusion; beside, being now nearly equal in number to the enemy,
military pride would not suffer him to avoid a combat. The place where
he came to halt was known in the early grants by the name of Hannah's
Cowpens, being part of a grazing establishment of a man named Hannah.
It was in an open wood, favorable to the action of cavalry. There were
two eminences of unequal height, and separated from each other by an
interval about eighty yards wide. To the first eminence, which was the
highest, there was an easy ascent of about three hundred yards. On
these heights Morgan had posted himself.
In arranging his troops for action, he drew out his infantry in two
lines. The first was composed of the North and South Carolina militia,
under Colonel Pickens, having an advanced corps of North Carolina and
Georgia volunteer riflemen. This line, on which he had the least
dependence, was charged to wait until the enemy were within dead shot;
then to take good aim, fire two volleys and fall back. The second
line, drawn up a moderate distance in the rear of the first, and near
the brow of the main eminence, was composed of Colonel Howard's light
infantry and the Virginia riflemen; all Continental troops. They were
informed of the orders which had been given to the first line, lest
they should mistake their falling back for a retreat. Colonel Howard
had the command of this line, on which the greatest reliance was
placed. About a hundred and fifty yards in the rear of the second
line, and on the slope of the lesser eminence, was Colonel
Washington's troop of cavalry, about eighty strong; with about fifty
mounted Carolinian volunteers, under Major McCall, armed with sabres
and pistols.
It was about eight o'clock in the morning (Jan. 17th), when Tarleton
came up. The position of the Americans seemed to him to give great
advantage to his cavalry, and he made hasty preparation for immediate
attack, anticipating an easy victory. Part of his infantry he formed
into a line, with dragoons on each flank. The rest of the infantry and
cavalry were to be a reserve, and to wait for orders. Impetuous at all
times, he did not even wait until the reserve could be placed, but led
on his first line, which rushed shouting to the attack. The North
Carolina and Georgia riflemen in the advance, delivered their fire
with effect, and fell back to the flanks of Picken's militia. These,
as they had been instructed, waited until the enemy were within fifty
yards, and then made a destructive volley, but soon gave way before
the push of the bayonet. The British infantry pressed up to the second
line, while forty of their cavalry attacked it on the right, seeking
to turn its flank. Colonel Howard seeing himself in danger of being
outflanked, endeavored to change his front to the right. His orders
were misunderstood, and his troops were falling into confusion, when
Morgan rode up and ordered them to retreat over the hill, where
Colonel Washington's cavalry were hurried forward for their
protection.
The British, seeing the troops retiring over the hill, rushed forward
irregularly in pursuit of what they deemed a routed foe. To their
astonishment they were met by Colonel Washington's dragoons, who
spurred on them impetuously, while Howard's infantry, facing about,
gave them an effective volley of musketry, and then charged with the
bayonet. The enemy now fell into complete confusion. Some few
artillerymen attempted to defend their guns, but were cut down or
taken prisoners, and the cannon and colors captured. A panic seized
upon the British troops. Tarleton endeavored to bring his legion
cavalry into action to retrieve the day. They had stood aloof as a
reserve, and now, infected by the panic, turned their backs upon their
commander, and galloped off through the woods, riding over the flying
infantry. Fourteen of his officers, however, and forty of his
dragoons, remained true to him; with these he attempted to withstand
the attack of Washington's cavalry, and a fierce melée took place; but
on the approach of Howard's infantry, Tarleton gave up all for lost,
and spurred off with his few but faithful adherents, trusting to the
speed of their horses for safety.
The loss of the British in this action was ten officers and above one
hundred men killed, two hundred wounded, and between five and six
hundred rank and file made prisoners; while the Americans had but
twelve men killed and sixty wounded. The spoils taken by Morgan,
according to his own account, were two field-pieces, two standards,
eight hundred muskets, one traveling forge, thirty-five wagons,
seventy negroes, upwards of one hundred dragoon-horses, and all the
music. The enemy, however, had destroyed most of their baggage, which
was immense.
Morgan did not linger on the field of battle. Leaving Colonel Pickens
with a body of militia under the protection of a flag, to bury the
dead and provide for the wounded of both armies, he set out the same
day about noon with his prisoners and spoils. Lord Cornwallis, with
his main force, was at Turkey Creek, only twenty-five miles distant,
and must soon hear of the late battle. His object was to get to the
Catawba before he could be intercepted by his lordship, who lay nearer
than he did to the fords of that river. Before nightfall he crossed
Broad river at the Cherokee ford, and halted for a few hours on its
northern bank. Before daylight of the 18th he was again on the march.
Colonel Washington, who had been in pursuit of the enemy, rejoined him
in the course of the day, as also did Colonel Pickens, who had left
such of the wounded as could not be moved, under the protection of the
flag of truce.
Cornwallis, on the eventful day of the 17th, was at his camp on Turkey
Creek, confidently waiting for tidings from Tarleton of a new triumph,
when, towards evening, some of his routed dragoons came straggling
into camp, haggard and forlorn, to tell the tale of his defeat. It was
a thunder-stroke. Tarleton defeated! and by the rude soldier he had
been so sure of entrapping! It seemed incredible. It was confirmed,
however, the next morning, by the arrival of Tarleton himself,
discomfited and crest-fallen. In his account of the recent battle, he
represented the force under Morgan to be two thousand. This
exaggerated estimate, together with the idea that the militia would
now be out in great force, rendered his lordship cautious. He remained
a day or two at Turkey Creek to collect the scattered remains of
Tarleton's forces, and to await the arrival of General Leslie.
On the 19th, having been rejoined by Leslie, his lordship moved
towards King's Creek, and thence in the direction of King's Mountain,
until informed of Morgan's retreat toward the Catawba. Cornwallis now
altered his course in that direction, and, trusting that Morgan,
encumbered, as he supposed him to be, by prisoners and spoils, might
be overtaken before he could cross that river, detached a part of his
force, without baggage, in pursuit of him, while he followed on with
the remainder.
Nothing, say the British chroniclers, could exceed the exertions of
the detachment; but Morgan succeeded in reaching the Catawba and
crossing it in the evening, just two hours before those in pursuit of
him arrived on its banks. A heavy rain came on and fell all night, and
by daybreak the river was so swollen as to be impassable. It continued
for several days, and gave Morgan time to send off his prisoners who
had crossed several miles above, and to call out the militia of
Mecklenburg and Rowan Counties to guard the fords of the river.
Lord Cornwallis had moved slowly with his main body. He was encumbered
by an immense train of baggage; the roads were through deep red clay,
and the country was cut up by streams and morasses. It was not until
the 25th that he assembled his whole force at Ramsour's Mills, on the
Little Catawba, as the south fork of that river is called, and learnt
that Morgan had crossed the main stream. Now he felt the loss he had
sustained in the late defeat of Tarleton, of a great part of his light
troops. In this crippled condition, he determined to relieve his army
of everything that could impede rapid movement in his future
operations. Two days, therefore, were spent by him at Ramsour's Mills,
in destroying all such baggage and stores as could possibly be spared.
General Greene was gladdened by a letter from Morgan, written shortly
after his defeat of Tarleton, and transmitted the news to Washington
with his own generous comments. He had recently received intelligence
of the landing of troops at Wilmington, from a British squadron,
supposed to be a force under Arnold, destined to push up Cape Fear
River, and co-operate with Cornwallis; he had to prepare, therefore,
not only to succor Morgan, but to prevent this co-operation. He
accordingly detached General Stevens with his Virginia militia (whose
term of service was nearly expired) to take charge of Morgan's
prisoners, and conduct them to Charlottesville in Virginia. At the
same time he wrote to the governors of North Carolina and Virginia for
all the aid they could furnish; to Steuben to hasten forward his
recruits, and to Shelby, Campbell and others to take arms once more
and rival their achievements at King's Mountain.
This done, he left General Huger in command of the division on the
Pedee, with orders to hasten on by forced marches to Salisbury, to
join the other division; in the meantime he set off on horseback for
Morgan's camp, attended merely by a guide, an aide-de-camp, and a
sergeant's guard of dragoons. His object was to aid Morgan in
assembling militia and checking the enemy until the junction of his
forces could be effected. It was a hard ride of upwards of a hundred
miles through a rough country. On the last day of January he reached
Morgan's camp at Sherrard's ford on the east side of the Catawba. The
British army lay on the opposite side of the river, but a few miles
distant from it, and appeared to be making preparations to force a
passage across, as it was subsiding, and would soon be fordable.
Greene supposed Cornwallis had in view a junction with Arnold at Cape
Fear; he wrote, therefore, to General Huger to hurry on, so that with
their united forces they could give his lordship a defeat before he
could effect the junction.
More correct information relieved him from the apprehension of a
co-operation of Arnold and Cornwallis. The British troops which had
landed at Wilmington, were merely a small detachment sent from
Charleston to establish a military depot for the use of Cornwallis in
his southern campaign. They had taken possession of Wilmington without
opposition. Greene now changed his plans. He was aware of the
ill-provided state of the British army, from the voluntary destruction
of their wagons, tents and baggage. His plan now was to tempt the
enemy continually with the prospect of a battle, but continually to
elude one; to harass them by a long pursuit, draw them higher into the
country, and gain time for the division advancing under Huger to join
him. It was the Fabian policy that he had learnt under Washington, of
whom he prided himself on being a disciple.
As the subsiding of the Catawba would enable Cornwallis to cross,
Greene ordered Morgan to move off silently with his division on the
evening of the 31st, and to press his march all night, so as to gain a
good start in advance, while he (Greene) would remain to bring on the
militia, who were employed to check the enemy. These militia,
assembled from the neighboring counties, did not exceed five hundred.
Two hundred of them were distributed at different fords: the remaining
three hundred, forming a corps of mounted riflemen under General
Davidson, were to watch the movements of the enemy, and attack him
wherever he should make his main attempt to cross. When the enemy
should have actually crossed, the different bodies of militia were to
make the best of their way to a rendezvous, sixteen miles distant, on
the road to Salisbury. While these dispositions were being made by the
American commander, Cornwallis was preparing to cross the river. The
night of the 31st was chosen for the attempt. To divert the attention
of the Americans, he detached Colonels Webster and Tarleton with a
part of the army to a public ford called Beattie's ford, where he
supposed Davidson to be stationed. There they were to make a feint of
forcing a passage. The main attempt, however, was to be made six miles
lower down, where little, if any, opposition was anticipated.
Cornwallis set out with the main body of his army at one o'clock in
the morning. The night was dark and rainy. It was near daybreak by the
time the head of the column reached the ford. To their surprise, they
beheld numerous camp fires on the opposite bank. Word was hastily
carried to Cornwallis that the ford was guarded. It was so indeed:
Davidson was there with his riflemen. At that place the Catawba was
nearly five hundred yards wide, about three feet deep, very rapid, and
full of large stones. The troops entered the river in platoons, to
support each other against the current, and were ordered not to fire
until they should gain the opposite bank. Colonel Hall, of the light
infantry of the guards, led the way; the grenadiers followed. The
noise of the water and the darkness covered their movements until they
were nearly half-way across, when they were descried by an American
sentinel. He challenged them three times, and receiving no answer,
fired. Terrified by the report, the man who was guiding the British
turned and fled. Colonel Hall, thus abandoned, led the way directly
across the river; whereas the true ford inclined diagonally further
down. Hall had to pass through deeper water, but he reached a part of
the bank where it was unguarded. The American pickets, too, which had
turned out at the alarm given by the sentinel, had to deliver a
distant and slanting fire. Still it had its effect. Three of the
British were killed, and thirty-six wounded. Colonel Hall pushed on
gallantly, but was shot down as he ascended the bank.
General Davidson hastened with his men towards the place where the
British were landing. The latter formed as soon as they found
themselves on firm ground, charged Davidson's men before he had time
to get them in order, killed and wounded about forty, and put the rest
to flight. General Davidson was the last to leave the ground, and was
killed just as he was mounting his horse.
General Greene, informed that the enemy had crossed the Catawba at
daybreak, awaited anxiously at the rendezvous the arrival of the
militia. It was not until after midnight that he heard of their utter
dispersion, and of the death of Davidson. Apprehending the rapid
advance of Cornwallis, he hastened to rejoin Morgan, who with his
division was pushing forward for the Yadkin, first sending orders to
General Huger to conduct the other division by the most direct route
to Guilford Court-house, where the forces were to be united. Greene
spurred forward through heavy rain and deep miry roads. It was a
dreary ride and a lonely one, for he had detached his aides-de-camp in
different directions to collect the scattered militia.
Cornwallis did not advance so rapidly as had been apprehended. After
crossing the Catawba, he had to wait for his wagons and artillery,
which had remained on the other side in the woods; so that by
nightfall of the 1st of February he was not more than five miles on
the road to Salisbury. Eager to come up with the Americans, he mounted
some of the infantry upon the baggage horses, joined them to the
cavalry, and sent the whole forward under General O'Hara. They arrived
on the banks of the Yadkin at night, between the 2d and 3d of
February, just in time to capture a few wagons lingering in the rear
of the American army, which had passed. The riflemen who guarded them
retreated after a short skirmish. There were no boats with which to
cross; the Americans had secured them on the other side. The rain
which had fallen throughout the day had overflooded the ford by which
the American cavalry had passed. The pursuers were again brought to a
stand. After some doubt and delay, Cornwallis took his course up the
south side of the Yadkin, and crossed by what is still called the
Shallow ford, while Greene continued on unmolested to Guilford
Court-house, where he was joined by General Huger and his division on
the 9th. Cornwallis was now encamped about twenty-five miles above
them, at the old Moravian town of Salem.
The great object of Greene now was to get across the river Dan, and
throw himself into Virginia. With the reinforcements and assistance he
might there expect to find, he hoped to effect the salvation of the
South, and prevent the dismemberment of the Union. The object of
Cornwallis was to get between him and Virginia, force him to a combat
before he could receive those reinforcements, or enclose him in
between the great rivers on the west, the sea on the east, and the two
divisions of the British army under himself and Lord Rawdon on the
north and south. His lordship had been informed that the lower part of
the Dan, at present, could only be crossed in boats, and that the
country could not afford a sufficient number for the passage of
Greene's army; he trusted, therefore, to cut him off from the upper
part of the river, where alone it was fordable. Greene, however, had
provided against such a contingency. Boats had been secured at various
places by his agents, and could be collected at a few hours' notice at
the lower ferries. Instead, therefore, of striving with his lordship
for the upper fords, Greene shaped his course for Boyd's and Irwin's
fords, just above the confluence of the Dan and Staunton rivers which
forms the Roanoke, and about seventy miles from Guilford Court-house.
This would give him twenty-five miles advantage of Lord Cornwallis at
the outset. General Kosciuszko was sent with a party in advance to
collect the boats and throw up breastworks at the ferries.
In ordering his march, General Greene took the lead with the main
body, the baggage, and stores. General Morgan would have had the
command of the rear-guard, but being disabled by a violent attack of
ague and rheumatism, it was given to Colonel Otho H. Williams
(formerly adjutant-general), who had with him Colonels Howard,
Washington and Lee. This corps, detached some distance in the rear,
did infinite service. Being lightly equipped, it could manoeuvre in
front of the British line of march, break down bridges, sweep off
provisions, and impede its progress, in a variety of ways, while the
main body moved forward unmolested. It was now that Cornwallis most
felt the severity of the blow he had received at the battle of the
Cowpens in the loss of his light troops, having so few to cope with
the élite corps under Williams.
We forbear to enter into the details of this masterly retreat, the
many stratagems and manoeuvres of the covering party to delay and
hoodwink the enemy. Tarleton himself bears witness, in his narrative,
that every measure of the Americans was judiciously designed and
vigorously executed. So much had Cornwallis been misinformed at the
outset as to the means below of passing the river, that he pushed on
in the firm conviction that he was driving the American army into a
trap, and would give it a signal blow before it could cross the Dan.
In the meantime, Greene, with the main body, reached the banks of the
river, and succeeded in crossing over with ease in the course of a
single day at Boyd's and Irwin's ferries, sending back word to
Williams, who with his covering party was far in the rear. That
intelligent officer encamped, as usual, in the evening, at a wary
distance in front of the enemy, but stole a march upon them after
dark, leaving his camp fires burning. He pushed on all night, arrived
at the ferry in the morning of the 15th, having marched forty miles
within the last four and twenty hours; and made such despatch in
crossing, that his last troops had landed on the Virginia shore by the
time the astonished enemy arrived on the opposite bank.
For a day the two armies lay panting within sight of each other on the
opposite banks of the river, which had put an end to the race. On the
16th, the river began to subside; the enemy might soon be able to
cross. Greene prepared for a further retreat by sending forward his
baggage on the road to Halifax, and securing the passage of the
Staunton. At Halifax he was resolved to make a stand, rather than
suffer the enemy to take possession of it without a struggle. Its
situation on the Roanoke would make it a strong position for their
army, supported by a fleet, and would favor their designs both on
Virginia and the Carolinas. With a view to its defence, intrenchments
had already been thrown up, under the direction of Kosciuszko.
Lord Cornwallis, however, did not deem it prudent, under present
circumstances, to venture into Virginia, where Greene would be sure of
powerful reinforcements. North Carolina was in a state of the utmost
disorder and confusion; he thought it better to remain in it for a
time, and profit by having compelled Greene to abandon it. After
giving his troops a day's repose, therefore, he put them once more in
motion on the 18th, along the road by which he had pursued Greene.
This changed the game. Lee, with his legion, strengthened by two
veteran Maryland companies, and Pickens, with a corps of South
Carolina militia, all light troops, were transported across the Dan in
the boats, with orders to gain the front of Cornwallis, hover as near
as safety would permit, cut off his intercourse with the disaffected
parts of the country, and check the rising of the royalists. Greene,
in the meanwhile, remained with his main force on the northern bank of
the Dan; waiting to ascertain his lordship's real designs, and ready
to cross at a moment's warning.
The movements of Cornwallis, for a day or two, were of a dubious
nature, designed to perplex his opponents; or the 20th, however, he
took post at Hillsborough. Here he issued a proclamation, inviting all
loyal subjects to assist in suppressing the remains of rebellion, and
re-establishing good order and constitutional government. By another
instrument, all who could raise independent companies were called upon
to give in their names at head-quarters, and a bounty in money and
lands was promised to those who should enlist under them. Tarleton was
detached with the cavalry and a small body of infantry to a region of
country lying between the Haw and Deep Rivers, to bring on a
considerable number of loyalists who were said to be assembling there.
Rumor, in the meantime, had magnified the effect of his lordship's
proclamations. Word was brought to Greene, that the tories were
flocking from all quarters to the royal standard. Seven companies, it
was said, had been raised in a single day. At this time the
reinforcements to the American camp had been little more than six
hundred Virginia militia, under General Stevens. Greene saw that at
this rate, if Cornwallis was allowed to remain undisturbed, he would
soon have complete command of North Carolina; he boldly determined,
therefore, to recross the Dan at all hazards with the scanty force at
his command, and give his lordship check. In this spirit he broke up
his camp and crossed the river on the 23d.
In the meantime, Lee and Pickens, who were scouring the country about
Hillsborough, received information of Tarleton's recruiting
expedition. There was no foe they were more eager to cope with; and
they resolved to give him a surprise. Having forded the Haw one day
about noon, they learned that he was encamped about three miles off,
that his horses were unsaddled, and that everything indicated
confident security. They now pushed on under covert of the woods,
prepared to give the bold partisan a blow after his own fashion.
Before they reached the place, Tarleton had marched on. Being informed
that he was to halt for the night at the distance of six miles, they
still trusted to surprise him. On the way, however, they had an
encounter with a body of three or four hundred mounted royalists,
armed with rifles, and commanded by a Colonel Pyle, marching in quest
of Tarleton. As Lee with his cavalry was in the advance, he was
mistaken for Tarleton, and hailed with loyal acclamations. He favored
the mistake, and was taking measures to capture the royalists, when
some of them, seeing the infantry under Pickens, discovered their
error and fired upon the rear-guard. The cavalry instantly charged
upon them; ninety were cut down and slain, and a great number wounded;
among the latter was Colonel Pyle himself, who took refuge among the
thickets on the borders of a piece of water which still bears his
name.
After all, Lee and Pickens missed the object of their enterprise. The
approach of night and the fatigue of their troops, made them defer
their attack upon Tarleton until morning. In the meantime, the latter
had received an express from Cornwallis, informing him that Greene had
passed the Dan, and ordering him to return to Hillsborough as soon as
possible. He hastened to obey. Lee with his legion was in the saddle
before daybreak; but Tarleton's troops were already on the march.
Before sunrise, he had forded the Haw, and "Light-horse Harry" gave
over the pursuit.
The re-appearance of Greene and his army in North Carolina, heralded
by the scourings of Lee and Pickens, disconcerted the schemes of Lord
Cornwallis. The recruiting service was interrupted. Many royalists,
who were on the way to his camp, returned home. Forage and provisions
became scarce in the neighborhood. He found himself, he said, "amongst
timid friends and adjoining to inveterate rebels." On the 26th,
therefore, he abandoned Hillsborough, threw himself across the Haw,
and encamped near Alamance Creek, one of its principal tributaries, in
a country favorable to supplies and with a tory population. His
position was commanding, at the point of concurrence of roads from
Salisbury, Guilford, High Rockford, Cross Creek, and Hillsborough. It
covered also the communication with Wilmington, where a dépôt of
military stores, so important to his half-destitute army, had recently
been established.
Greene with his main army took post about fifteen miles above him, on
the heights between Troublesome Creek and Reedy Fork, one of the
tributaries of the Haw. His plan was to cut the enemy off from the
upper counties; to harass him by skirmishes, but to avoid a general
battle; thus gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements daily
expected.
On the 6th of March, Cornwallis, learning that the light troops under
Williams were very carelessly posted, put his army suddenly in motion,
and crossed the Alamance in a thick fog; with the design to beat up
their quarters, drive them in upon the main army, and bring Greene to
action should he come to their assistance. His movement was discovered
by the American patrols, and the alarm given. Williams hastily called
in his detachments, and retreated with his light troops across Reedy
Fork, while Lee with his legion manoeuvred in front of the enemy. A
stand was made by the Americans at Wetzell's Mill, but they were
obliged to retire with the loss of fifty killed and wounded.
Cornwallis did not pursue; evening was approaching, and he had failed
in his main object; that of bringing Greene to action. The latter,
fixed in his resolve of avoiding a conflict, had retreated across the
Haw.
Greene's long-expected reinforcements now arrived, having been hurried
on by forced marches. They consisted of a brigade of Virginia militia,
under General Lawson, two brigades of North Carolina militia, under
Generals Butler and Eaton, and four hundred regulars, enlisted for
eighteen months. His whole effective force, according to official
returns, amounted to four thousand two hundred and forty-three foot,
and one hundred and sixty-one cavalry. Of his infantry, not quite two
thousand were regulars, and of these, three-fourths were new levies.
His force nearly doubled in number that of Cornwallis, which did not
exceed two thousand four hundred men; but many of Greene's troops were
raw and inexperienced, and had never been in battle; those of the
enemy were veterans, schooled in warfare. Greene knew the inferiority
of his troops in this respect; his reinforcements, too, fell far short
of what he had been led to expect, yet he determined to accept the
battle which had so long been offered. All detachments were ordered to
assemble at Guilford, within eight miles of the enemy, where he
encamped on the 14th, sending his wagons and heavy baggage to the Iron
Works at Troublesome Creek, ten miles in his rear.
Cornwallis sent his carriages and baggage to Bell's Mills, on Deep
River, and set out at daybreak on the 15th for Guilford. Within four
miles of that place, near the New Garden Meeting-house, Tarleton with
the advanced guard came upon the American advance-guard, composed of
Lee's partisan legion, and some mountaineers and Virginia militia.
Tarleton and Lee were well matched in military prowess, and the
skirmish between them was severe. Lee's horses, being from Virginia
and Pennsylvania, were superior in weight and strength to those of his
opponent, which had been chiefly taken from plantations in South
Carolina. The latter were borne down by a charge in close column.
Tarleton, seeing that his weakly-mounted men fought to a disadvantage,
sounded a retreat; Lee endeavored to cut him off. A general conflict
of the vanguards, horse and foot, ensued, when the appearance of the
main body of the enemy obliged Lee, in his turn, to retire with
precipitation.
During this time, Greene was preparing for action on a woody eminence,
a little more than a mile south of Guilford Court-house. The
neighboring country was covered with forest, excepting some cultivated
fields about the court-house, and along the Salisbury road, which
passed through the centre of the place, from south to north. He had
drawn out his troops in three lines. The first, composed of North
Carolina militia, volunteers and riflemen, under Generals Butler and
Eaton, was posted behind a fence, with an open field in front, and
woods on the flanks and in the rear. About three hundred yards behind
this, was the second line, composed of Virginia militia, under
Generals Stevens and Lawson, drawn up across the road, and covered by
a wood. The third line, about four hundred yards in the rear of the
second, was composed of Continental troops or regulars; those of
Virginia under General Huger on the right, those of Maryland under
Colonel Williams on the left. Colonel Washington with a body of
dragoons, Kirkwood's Delaware infantry, and a battalion of Virginia
militia covered the right flank; Lee's legion, with the Virginia
riflemen under Colonel Campbell, covered the left. Two six-pounders
were in the road, in advance of the first line; two field-pieces with
the rear-line near the court-house, where General Greene took his
station.
About noon the head of the British army was descried advancing
spiritedly from the south along the Salisbury road, and defiling into
the fields. A cannonade was opened from the two six-pounders, in front
of the first American line. It was answered by the British artillery.
Neither produced much effect. The enemy now advanced coolly and
steadily in three columns; the Hessians and Highlanders under General
Leslie on the right, the Royal artillery and guards in the centre, and
Webster's brigade on the left. The North Carolinians, who formed the
first line, waited until the enemy were within one hundred and fifty
yards, when, agitated by their martial array and undaunted movement,
they began to fall into confusion; some fired off their pieces without
taking aim; others threw them down, and took to flight. A volley from
the foe, a shout, and a charge of the bayonet, completed their
discomfiture. Some fled to the woods, others fell back upon the
Virginians, who formed the second line. General Stevens, who commanded
the latter, ordered his men to open and let the fugitives pass,
pretending that they had orders to retire. Under his spirited command
and example, the Virginians kept their ground and fought bravely.
The action became much broken up and diversified by the extent of the
ground. The thickness of the woods impeded the movements of the
cavalry. The reserves on both sides were called up. The British
bayonet again succeeded; the second line gave way, and General
Stevens, who had kept the field for some time, after being wounded in
the thigh by a musket-ball, ordered a retreat. The enemy pressed with
increasing ardor against the third line, composed of Continental
troops, and supported by Colonel Washington's dragoons and Kirkwood's
Delawares. Greene counted on these to retrieve the day. They were
regulars; they were fresh, and in perfect order. He rode along the
line, calling on them to stand firm, and give the enemy a warm
reception.
The first Maryland regiment which was on the right wing, was attacked
by Colonel Webster, with the British left. It stood the shock bravely,
and being seconded by some Virginia troops, and Kirkwood's Delawares,
drove Webster across a ravine. The second Maryland regiment was not so
successful. Impetuously attacked by Colonel Stewart, with a battalion
of the guards and a company of grenadiers, it faltered, gave way and
fled, abandoning two field-pieces, which were seized by the enemy.
Stewart was pursuing, when the first regiment which had driven Webster
across the ravine, came to the rescue with fixed bayonets, while
Colonel Washington spurred up with his cavalry. The fight now was
fierce and bloody. Stewart was slain; the two field-pieces were
retaken, and the enemy in their turn gave way and were pursued with
slaughter; a destructive fire of grape-shot from the enemy's artillery
checked the pursuit. Two regiments approached on the right and left;
Webster recrossed the ravine and fell upon Kirkwood's Delawares. There
was intrepid fighting in different parts of the field; but Greene saw
that the day was lost; there was no retrieving the effect produced by
the first flight of the North Carolinians. Unwilling to risk the utter
destruction of his army, he directed a retreat, which was made in good
order, but they had to leave their artillery on the field, most of the
horses having been killed. About three miles from the field of action
he made a halt to collect stragglers, and then continued on to the
place of rendezvous at Speedwell's Iron Works on Troublesome Creek.
The British were too much cut up and fatigued to follow up their
victory. Two regiments, with Tarleton's cavalry, attempted a pursuit,
but were called back.
The loss of the Americans in this hard-fought affair was never fully
ascertained. Their official returns, made immediately after the
action, give little more than four hundred killed and wounded, and
between eight and nine hundred missing; but Lord Cornwallis states in
his despatches, that between two and three hundred of the Americans
were found dead on the field of battle. The loss sustained by his
lordship, even if numerically less, was far more fatal; for, in the
circumstances in which he was placed, it was not to be supplied, and
it completely maimed him. Of his small army, ninety-three had fallen,
four hundred and thirteen were wounded, and twenty-six missing. Among
the killed and wounded were several officers of note. Thus, one-fourth
of his army was either killed or disabled; his troops were exhausted
by fatigue and hunger; his camp was encumbered by the wounded. His
victory, in fact, was almost as ruinous as a defeat.
Greene lay for two days within ten miles of him, near the Iron Works
on Troublesome Creek, gathering up his scattered troops. He had
imbibed the spirit of Washington, and remained undismayed by hardships
or reverses. Cornwallis, so far from being able to advance in the
career of victory, could not even hold the ground he had so bravely
won, but was obliged to retreat from the scene of triumph to some
secure position where he might obtain supplies for his famished army.
Leaving, therefore, about seventy of his officers and men, who were
too severely wounded to bear travelling, together with a number of
wounded Americans, under the protection of a flag of truce, he set
out, on the third day after the action, by easy marches, for Cross
Creek, an eastern branch of Cape Fear River, where was a settlement of
Scottish Highlanders, stout adherents, as he was led to believe, to
the royal cause. Here he expected to be plentifully supplied with
provisions, and to have his sick and wounded well taken care of.
Hence, too, he could open a communication by Cape Fear River, with
Wilmington.
No sooner did Greene learn that Cornwallis was retreating, than he set
out to follow him, determined to bring him again to action; and
presenting the singular spectacle of the vanquished pursuing the
victor. His troops, however, suffered greatly in this pursuit from
wintry weather, deep, wet, clayey roads, and scarcity of provisions.
On the 28th, Greene arrived at Ramsey's Mills, on Deep River, hard on
the traces of Cornwallis, who had left the place a few hours
previously with such precipitation, that several of his wounded, who
had died while on the march, were left behind unburied. At Deep River,
Greene was brought to a stand. Cornwallis had broken down the bridge
by which he had crossed; and further pursuit for the present was
impossible. The constancy of the militia now gave way. They had been
continually on the march with little to eat, less to drink, and
obliged to sleep in the woods in the midst of smoke. Every step had
led them from their homes and increased their privations. They were
now in want of everything, for the retreating enemy left a famished
country behind him. The term for which most of them had enlisted was
expired, and they now demanded their discharge. The demand was just
and reasonable, and, after striving in vain to shake their
determination, Greene felt compelled to comply with it. His force thus
reduced, it would be impossible to pursue the enemy further.
In this situation, remote from reinforcements, inferior to the enemy
in numbers, and without hope of support, what was to be done? "If the
enemy falls down toward Wilmington," said he, "they will be in a
position where it would be impossible for us to injure them if we had
a force." Suddenly he determined to change his course, and carry the
war into South Carolina. This would oblige the enemy either to follow
him, and thus abandon North Carolina, or to sacrifice all his posts in
the upper part of North Carolina and Georgia. To Washington, to whom
he considered himself accountable for his policy, and from whose
council he derived confidence and strength, he writes on the present
occasion: "All things considered, I think the movement is warranted by
the soundest reasons, both political and military...."
He apprised Sumter, Pickens, and Marion, by letter, of his intentions,
and called upon them to be ready to co-operate. On the 30th of March
he discharged all his militia, with many thanks for the courage and
fortitude with which they had followed him through so many scenes of
peril and hardship. Then, after giving his army a short taste of the
repose they needed, and having collected a few days' provisions, he
set forward on the 5th of April toward Camden, where Lord Rawdon had
his head-quarters.
Cornwallis, in the meantime, was grievously disappointed in the hopes
he had formed of obtaining ample provisions and forage at Cross Creek,
and strong reinforcements from the royalists in the neighborhood.
Neither could he open a communication by Cape Fear River for the
conveyance of his troops to Wilmington. The distance by water was
upwards of a hundred miles, the breadth of the river seldom above one
hundred yards, the banks high, and the inhabitants on each side
generally hostile. He was compelled, therefore, to continue his
retreat by land, quite to Wilmington, where he arrived on the 7th of
April.
It was his lordship's intention, as soon as he should have equipped
his own corps and received a part of the expected reinforcements from
Ireland, to return to the upper country, in hopes of giving protection
to the royal interests in South Carolina, and of preserving the health
of his troops until he should concert new measures with Sir Henry
Clinton. His plans were all disconcerted, however, by intelligence of
Greene's rapid march toward Camden. All thoughts of offensive
operations against North Carolina were at an end. Sickness, desertion,
and the loss sustained at Guilford Court-house, had reduced his little
army to fourteen hundred and thirty-five men. In this sad predicament,
after remaining several days in a painful state of irresolution he
determined to take advantage of Greene's having left the back part of
Virginia open, to march directly into that province, and attempt a
junction with the force acting there under General Phillips.
By this move, he might draw Greene back to the northward, and by the
reduction of Virginia, he might promote the subjugation of the South.
The move, however, he felt to be perilous. His troops were worn down
by upwards of eight hundred miles of marching and countermarching,
through an inhospitable and impracticable country; they had now three
hundred more before them; under still worse circumstances than those
in which they first set out. There was no time for hesitation or
delay; Greene might return and render the junction with Phillips
impracticable; having sent an express to the latter, therefore,
informing him of his coming, and appointing a meeting at Petersburg,
his lordship set off on the 25th of April, on his fated march into
Virginia.
We must now step back in dates to bring up events in the more northern
parts of the Union.