Return of the Enemy to Washington.--War transferred to the
Frontier.--Condition of Maryland.--Crossing the Potomac.--
Evacuation of Martinsburg.--Advance into Maryland.--Large Force of
the Enemy.--Resistance at Boonesboro.--Surrender of Harper's
Ferry.--Our Forces reach Sharpsburg.--Letter of the President to
General Lee.--Address of General Lee to the People.--Position of
our Forces at Sharpsburg.--Battle of Sharpsburg.--Our Strength.--
Forces withdrawn.--Casualties.
The enemy having retired to the protection of the fortifications
around Washington and Alexandria, Lee's army marched, on September
3d, toward Leesburg. The armies of Generals McClellan and Pope had
now been brought back to the point from which they set out on the
campaign of the spring and summer. The objects of those campaigns had
been frustrated, and the hostile designs against the coast of North
Carolina and in western Virginia, thwarted by the withdrawal of the
main body of the forces from those regions.
Northeastern Virginia was freed from the presence of the invader. His
forces had withdrawn to the intrenchments of Washington. Soon after
the arrival of our army at Leesburg, information was received that
the hostile troops which had occupied Winchester had retired to
Harper's Ferry. The war was thus transferred from the interior to the
frontier, and the supplies of rich and productive districts were made
accessible to our army. To prolong a state of affairs, in every way
desirable, and not to permit the season for active operations to pass
without endeavoring to impose further check on our assailant, the
best course appeared to be the transfer of our army into Maryland.
Although not properly equipped for invasion, lacking much of the
material of war, and deficient in transportation, the troops poorly
provided with clothing, and thousands of them without shoes, it was
yet believed to be strong enough to detain the opposing army upon the
northern frontier until the approach of winter should render its
advance into Virginia difficult, if not impracticable.
The condition of Maryland encouraged the belief that the presence of
our army, though numerically inferior to that of the North, would
induce the Washington Government to retain all its available force to
provide against contingencies which its conduct toward the people of
that State gave reason to apprehend. At the same time it was hoped
that military success might afford us an opportunity to aid the
citizens of Maryland in any efforts they should be disposed to make
to recover their liberty. The difficulties that surrounded them were
fully appreciated, and we expected to derive more assistance in the
attainment of our object from the just fears of the Washington
Government than from any active demonstration on the part of the
people of Maryland, unless success should enable us to give them
assurance of continued protection. Influenced by these considerations,
the army was put in motion.
It was decided to cross the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, in order,
by threatening Washington and Baltimore, to cause the enemy to
withdraw from the south bank, where his presence endangered our
communications and the safety of those engaged in the removal of our
wounded and the captured property from the late battle-field. Having
accomplished this result, it was proposed to move the army into
western Maryland, establish our communication with Richmond through
the Valley of the Shenandoah, and, by threatening Pennsylvania,
induce the enemy to withdraw from our territory for the protection of
his own.
General D. H. Hill's division, being in advance, crossed the Potomac,
between September 4th and 7th, at the ford near Leesburg, and
encamped in the vicinity of Frederick. It had been supposed that this
advance would lead to the evacuation of Martinsburg and Harper's
Ferry, thus opening the line of communication through the Shenandoah
Valley. This not having occurred, it became necessary to dislodge the
garrisons from those positions before concentrating the army west of
the mountains. For this purpose General Jackson marched very rapidly,
crossed the Potomac near Williamsport on the 11th, sent Hill's
division directly to Martinsburg, and disposed of the rest of the
command so as to cut off retreat to the westward. The enemy evacuated
Martinsburg and retired to Harper's Ferry on the night of the 11th,
and Jackson entered the former on the 12th. Meanwhile General McLaws
had been ordered to seize Maryland Heights on the north side of the
Potomac, opposite Harper's Ferry, and General Walker took possession
of Loudon Heights, on the east side of the Shenandoah, where it
unites with the Potomac, and was in readiness to open fire upon
Harper's Ferry. But McLaws found the heights in possession of the
foe, with infantry and artillery, protected by intrenchments. On the
13th he assailed the works, and after a spirited contest they were
carried; the troops made good their retreat to Harper's Ferry, and on
the next day its investment was complete.
At the same time that the march of these troops upon Harper's Ferry
began, the remainder of General Longstreet's command and the division
of D. H. Hill crossed the South Mountain and moved toward Boonsboro.
General Stuart with the cavalry remained east of the mountains to
observe the enemy and retard his advance. Longstreet continued his
march to Hagerstown, and Hill halted near Boonsboro to support the
cavalry and to prevent the force invested at Harper's Ferry from
escaping through Pleasant Valley. The advance of the hostile army was
then so slow as to justify the belief that the reduction of Harper's
Ferry would be accomplished and our troops concentrated before they
would be called upon to meet the foe. In that event it had not been
intended to oppose his passage through South Mountain, as it was
desired to engage him as far as possible from his base. But a copy of
Lee's order, directing the movement of the army from Frederick,
happening to fall into the hands of McClellan, disclosed to him the
disposition of our forces. He immediately began to push forward
rapidly, and on the afternoon of the 13th was reported as approaching
the pass in South Mountain on the Boonsboro and Frederick road.
General Stuart's cavalry impeded his progress, and time was thus
gained for preparations to oppose his advance.
In Taylor's "Four Years with General Lee" some facts relative to this
lost order are stated. An order of battle was issued, stating in
detail the position and duly assigned to each command of the army:
"It was the custom to send copies of such orders, marked
'confidential,' to the commanders of separate corps or divisions
only, and to place the address of such separate commander in the
bottom left-hand comer of the sheet containing the order. General D.
H. Hill was in command of a division which had not been attached to
nor incorporated with either of the two wings of the Army of Northern
Virginia. A copy of the order was, therefore, in the usual course,
sent to him. After the evacuation of Frederick City by our forces, a
copy of General Lee's order was found in a deserted camp by a
soldier, and was soon in the hands of General McClellan. The copy of
the order, it was stated at the time, was addressed to 'General D. H
Hill, commanding division.' General Hill has assured me that it could
not have been his copy, because he still has the original order
received by him in his possession." [62]
General D. H. Hill guarded the Boonsboro Gap, and Longstreet was
ordered to support him, in order to prevent a force from penetrating
the mountains at this point, in the rear of McLaws, so as to relieve
the garrison at Harper's Ferry. Early on the 14th a large body of the
enemy attempted to force its way to the rear of the position held by
Hill, by a road south of the Boonsboro and Frederick turnpike. The
small command of Hill, with Garland's brigade, repelled the repeated
assaults of the army, and held it in check for five hours.
Longstreet, leaving a brigade at Hagerstown, hurried to the
assistance of Hill, and reached the scene of action between 3 and 4
P.M. The battle continued with great animation until night. On the
south of the turnpike the assailant was driven back some distance,
and his attack on the center repulsed with loss. Darkness put an end
to the contest.
The effort to force the pass of the mountain had failed, but it was
manifest that without reënforcements Lee could not hazard a renewal
of the engagement; for McClellan, by his great superiority of
numbers, could easily turn either flank. Information was also
received that another large body of his troops had, during the
afternoon, forced its way through Crampton Gap, only five miles in
rear of McLaws. Under these circumstances it was determined to retire
to Sharpsburg, where we would be on the flank and rear of the enemy
should he move against McLaws, and where we could more readily unite
with the rest of our army. This movement, skillfully and efficiently
covered by the cavalry brigade of General Fitzhugh Lee, was
accomplished without interruption. The advance of McClellan's army
did not appear on the west side of the pass at Boonsboro until about
8 A.M. on the following morning.
The resistance that our troops had offered there secured sufficient
time to enable General Jackson to complete the reduction of Harper's
Ferry. The attack on the garrison began at dawn on the 15th. A rapid
and vigorous fire was opened by the batteries of General Jackson, in
conjunction with those on Maryland and Loudon Heights. In about two
hours, the garrison, consisting of more than eleven thousand men,
surrendered. Seventy-three pieces of artillery, about thirteen
thousand small-arms, and a large quantity of military stores fell
into our hands. General A. P. Hill remained formally to receive the
surrender of the troops and to secure the captured property.
The commands of Longstreet and D. H. Hill reached Sharpsburg on the
morning of the 15th. General Jackson arrived early on the 16th, and
General J. G. Walker came up in the afternoon. The movements of
General McLaws were embarrassed by the presence of the enemy in
Crampton Gap. He retained his position until the 14th, when, finding
that he was not to be attacked, he gradually withdrew his command
toward the Potomac, then crossed at Harper's Ferry, and marched by
way of Shepardstown. His progress was slow, and he did not reach the
battle-field at Sharpsburg until some time after the engagement of
the 17th began.
At this time the letter, from which the following extract is made,
was addressed by me to General R. E. Lee, commanding our forces in
Maryland:
"SIR: It is deemed proper that you should, in accordance with
established usage, announce, by proclamation, to the people of
Maryland, the motives and purposes of your presence among them at the
head of an invading army; and you are instructed in such proclamation
to make known," etc.
In obedience to instructions, General Lee issued the following
address:
"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, NEAR FREDERICK,
_September 8, 1862._
"TO THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND: It is right that you should know the
purpose that has brought the army under my command within the limits
of your State, so far as that purpose concerns yourselves.
"The people of the Confederate States have long watched, with the
deepest sympathy, the wrongs and outrages that have been inflicted
upon the citizens of a Commonwealth allied to the States of the South
by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties, and reduced
to the condition of a conquered province.
"Under the pretense of supporting the Constitution, but in violation
of its most valuable provisions, your citizens have been arrested and
imprisoned upon no charge, and contrary to the forms of law.
"A faithful and manly protest against this outrage, made by a
venerable and illustrious Marylander, to whom in his better days no
citizen appealed for right in vain, was treated with scorn and
contempt.
"The government of your chief city has been usurped by armed
strangers; your Legislature has been dissolved by the unlawful arrest
of its members; freedom of the press and of speech has been
suppressed; words have been declared offenses by an arbitrary decree
of the Federal Executive; and citizens ordered to be tried by
military commissions for what they may dare to speak.
"Believing that the people of Maryland possess a spirit too lofty to
submit to such a Government, the people of the South have long wished
to aid yon in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to
enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen, and restore the independence
and sovereignty of your State.
"In obedience to this wish, our army has come among you, and is
prepared to assist yon with the power of its arms in regaining the
rights of which you have been so unjustly despoiled.
"This, citizens of Maryland, is our mission, so far as yon are
concerned. No restraint upon your free-will is intended; no
intimidation will be allowed within the limits of this army at least.
Marylanders shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought
and speech. We know no enemies among you, and will protect all of you
in every opinion.
"It is for you to decide your destiny freely and without constraint.
This army will respect your choice, whatever it may be; and while the
Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position
among them, they will only welcome you when you come of your own free
will.
"R. E. LEE, _General commanding._"
The commands of Longstreet and D. H. Hill, on their arrival at
Sharpsburg, were placed in position along the range of hills between
the town and the Antietam, nearly parallel to the course of that
stream, Longstreet on the right of the road to Boonsboro and Hill on
the left. The advance of the enemy was delayed by the determined
opposition he encountered from Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, and he did not
appear on the opposite side of the Antietam until about 2 P.M. During
the afternoon the batteries on each side were partially engaged. On
the 16th the artillery-fire became warm, and continued throughout the
day. A column crossed the Antietam beyond the reach of our batteries
and menaced our left. In anticipation of this movement Hood's two
brigades had been transferred from the right and posted between D. H.
Hill and the Hagerstown road. General Jackson was now directed to
take position on Hood's left, and formed his line with his right
resting on the Hagerstown road and his left extending toward the
Potomac, protected by General Stuart with the cavalry and
horse-artillery. General Walker with his two brigades was stationed
on Longstreet's right. As evening approached, the enemy fired more
vigorously with his artillery and bore down heavily with his infantry
upon Hood, but the attack was gallantly repulsed. At 10 P.M. Hood's
troops were relieved by the brigades of Lawton and Trimble, of
Ewell's division, commanded by General Lawton. Jackson's own
division, under General J. K. Jones, was on Lawton's left, supported
by the remaining brigades of Ewell.
At early dawn on the 17th his artillery opened vigorously from both
sides of the Antietam, the heaviest fire being directed against our
left. Under cover of this fire a large force of infantry attacked
General Jackson's division. They were met by his troops with the
utmost resolution, and for several hours the conflict raged with
intense fury and alternate success. Our troops advanced with great
spirit; the enemy's lines were repeatedly broken and forced to
retire. Fresh troops, however, soon replaced those that were beaten,
and Jackson's men were in turn compelled to fall back. Nearly all the
field officers, with a large proportion of the men, were killed or
wounded. Our troops slowly yielded to overwhelming numbers, and fell
back, obstinately disputing every point. General Early, in command of
Ewell's division, was ordered with his brigade to take the place of
Jackson's division, most of which was withdrawn, its ammunition being
nearly exhausted and its numbers much reduced. The battle now raged
with great violence, the small commands under Hood and Early holding
their ground against many times their own infantry force and under a
tremendous fire of artillery. Hood was reënforced; then the enemy's
lines were broken and driven back, but fresh numbers advanced to
their support, and they began to gain ground. The desperate
resistance they encountered, however, delayed their progress until
the troops of McLaws arrived, and those of General J. G. Walker could
be brought from the right. Hood's brigade, though it had suffered
extraordinary loss, only withdrew to replenish their ammunition,
their supply being entirely exhausted. They were relieved by Walker's
command, who immediately attacked vigorously, driving his combatant
back with much slaughter. Upon the arrival of the reënforcements
under McLaws, General Early attacked resolutely the large force
opposed to him. McLaws advanced at the same time, and the forces
before them were driven back in confusion, closely followed by our
troops beyond the position occupied at the beginning of the
engagement.
The attack on our left was speedily followed by one in heavy force on
the center. This was met by part of Walker's division and the
brigades of G. B. Anderson and Rodes, of D. H. Hill's command,
assisted by a few pieces of artillery. General R, H. Anderson's
division came to Hill's support, and formed in rear of his line. At
this time, by a mistake of orders, Rodes's brigade was withdrawn from
its position; during the absence of that command a column pressed
through the gap thus created, and G. B. Anderson's brigade was broken
and retired. The heavy masses moved forward, being opposed only by
four pieces of artillery, supported by a few hundred of our men
belonging to different brigades rallied by Hill and other officers,
and parts of Walker's and B. H. Anderson's commands. Colonel Cooke,
with the Twenty-seventh North Carolina Regiment, stood boldly in line
without a cartridge. The firm front presented by this small force and
the well-directed fire of the artillery checked the progress of the
enemy, and in about an hour and a half he retired. Another attack was
made soon afterward a little farther to the right, but was repulsed
by Miller's guns, of the Washington Artillery, which continued to
hold the ground until the close of the engagement, supported by a
part of R. H. Anderson's troops. The corps designated the Washington
Artillery was composed of Louisiana batteries, organized at New
Orleans in the beginning of the war, under Colonel I. B. Walton. It
was distinguished by its services in the first great battle of
Manassas, and in nearly every important conflict, as well of the army
of Virginia as that of Tennessee, to the close of the war. In the
official reports and in the traditions of both armies the names of
the batteries of the Washington Artillery have frequent and honorable
mention.
While the attack on the center and left was in progress, repeated
efforts were made to force the passage of the bridge over the
Antietam, opposite the right wing of Longstreet, commanded by
Brigadier-General D. R. Jones. The bridge was defended by General
Toombs with two regiments of his brigade and the batteries of General
Jones. This small command repulsed five different assaults, made by a
greatly superior force. In the afternoon the enemy, in large numbers,
having passed the stream, advanced against General Jones, who held
the ridge with less than two thousand men. After a determined and
brave resistance, he was forced to give way, and the summit was
gained. General A. P. Hill, having arrived from Harper's Ferry, was
now ordered to reënforce General Jones. He moved to his support and
attacked the force now flushed with success. Hill's batteries were
thrown forward and united their fire with those of Jones, and one of
D. H. Hill's also opened with good effect from the left of the
Boonsboro road. The progress of the enemy was immediately arrested,
and his line began to waver. At this moment General Jones ordered
Toombs to charge the flank, while Archer, supported by Branch and
Gregg, moved on the front of the enemy's line. After a brief
resistance, he broke and retreated in confusion toward the Antietam,
pursued by the troops of Hill and Jones, until he reached the
protection of the batteries on the opposite side of the river.
It was now nearly dark, and McClellan had massed a number of
batteries to sweep the approach to the Antietam, on the opposite side
of which the corps of General Porter, which had not been engaged, now
appeared to dispute our advance. Our troops were much exhausted, and
greatly reduced in numbers by fatigue and the casualties of battle.
Under these circumstances it was deemed injudicious to push our
advantage further in the face of these fresh troops added to an army
previously much exceeding the number of our own. Ours were
accordingly recalled, and formed on the line originally held by
General Jones. The repulse on the right ended the engagement, a
protracted and sanguinary conflict in which every effort to dislodge
us from our position had been defeated with severe loss.
This great battle was fought by less than forty thousand men on our
side, all of whom had undergone the greatest labors and hardships in
the field and on the march. Nothing could surpass the determined
valor with which they met the large army of the enemy, fully supplied
and equipped, and the result reflected the highest credit on the
officers and men engaged.[63]
On the 18th our forces occupied the position of the preceding day,
except in the center, where our line was drawn in about two hundred
yards, our ranks were increased by the arrival of a number of troops,
who had not been engaged the day before, and, though still too weak
to assume the offensive, Lee waited without apprehension a renewal of
the attack. The day passed without any hostile demonstration. During
the night of the 18th our army was withdrawn to the south side of the
Potomac, crossing near Shepardstown, without loss or molestation. The
enemy advanced on the next morning, but was held in check by General
Fitzhugh Lee with his cavalry. The condition of our troops now
demanded repose, and the army marched to the Opequan, near
Martinsburg, where it remained several days, and then moved to the
vicinity of Bunker Hill and Winchester. General McClellan seemed to
be concentrating in and near Harper's Ferry, but made no forward
movement.
The contest on our left in this battle was the most violent. This and
the deprivation of our men are very forcibly shown in the following
account of Major-General Hood:[64]
"On the morning of the 15th my forces were again in motion. My troops
at this period were sorely in need of shoes, clothing, and food. We
had had issued to us no meat for several days, and little or no
bread; the men had been forced to subsist principally on green corn
and green apples. Nevertheless, they were in high spirits and defiant
as we contended with the advanced guard of McClellan on the 15th and
forenoon of the 16th. During the afternoon of this day I was ordered,
after great fatigue and hunger endured by my soldiers, to take
position near the Hagerstown turnpike, in open field in front of the
Dunkard church. General Hooker's corps crossed the Antietam, swung
round with its front on the pike, and about an hour before sunset
encountered my division. I had stationed one or two batteries on a
hillock in a meadow, near the edge of a corn-field, and just by the
pike. The Texas Brigade had been disposed on the left, and that of
Law on the right. We opened fire, and a spirited action ensued, which
lasted till a late hour in the night. When the firing had in a great
measure ceased, we were so close to the enemy that we could
distinctly hear him massing his heavy bodies in our immediate front.
"The extreme suffering of my troops for want of food induced me to
ride back to General Lee, and request him to send two or more
brigades to our relief, at least for the night, in order that the
soldiers might have a chance to cook their meager rations. He said
that he would cheerfully do so, but he knew of no command that could
be spared for the purpose; he, however, suggested that I should see
General Jackson, and endeavor to obtain assistance from him. After
riding a long time in search of the latter, I finally discovered him
alone, lying upon the ground asleep by the root of a tree. I aroused
him, and made known the half-starved condition of my troops; he
immediately ordered Lawton's, Trimble's, and Hays's brigades to our
relief. He exacted of me, however, a promise that I would come to the
support of these forces the moment I was called upon. I quickly rode
off in search of my wagons that the men might prepare and cook their
flour, as we were still without meat; unfortunately, the night was
then far advanced, and, although every effort was made in the
darkness to get the wagons forward, dawn of the morning of the 17th
broke upon us before many of the men had time to do more than prepare
the dough. Soon, thereafter, an officer of Lawton's staff dashed up
to me, saying, 'General Lawton sends his compliments, with the
request that you come at once to his support.' 'To arms!' was
instantly sounded, and quite a large number of my brave soldiers were
again obliged to march to the front, leaving their uncooked rations
in camp.
"Not far distant in our front were drawn up, in close array, heavy
columns of Federal infantry; not leas than two corps were in sight to
oppose my small command, numbering approximately two thousand
effectives. However, with the trusty Law on my right, in the edge of
the wood, and the gallant Colonel Wafford in command of the Texas
Brigade on the left, near the pike, we moved forward to the assault.
Notwithstanding the overwhelming odds of over ten to one against us,
we drove the enemy from the wood and corn-field back upon his
reserves, and forced him to abandon his guns on our left. This most
deadly combat raged till our last round of ammunition was expended.
The First Texas Regiment had lost in the corn-field fully two thirds
of its number; and whole ranks of brave men, whose deeds were
unrecorded save in the hearts of loved ones at home, were mowed down
in heaps to the right and left. Never before was I so continually
troubled with fear that my horse would further injure some wounded
fellow-soldier lying helpless upon the ground. Our right flank,
during this short but seemingly long space of time, was toward the
main line of the Federals, and, after several ineffectual efforts to
procure reënforcements and our last shot had been fired, I ordered my
troops back to Dunkard church for the same reason which had
previously compelled Lawton, Hays, and Trimble to retire (a want of
cartridges). Upon the arrival of McLaws's division we marched to the
rear, renewed our supply of ammunition, and returned to our position
in the wood near the church, which ground we held till a late hour in
the afternoon, when we moved somewhat farther to the right and
bivouacked for the night. With the close of this bloody day ceased
the hardest-fought battle of the war."
The following account of Colonel Taylor, in his "Four Years with
General Lee," is more comprehensive, embracing the other forces
besides Hood's brigade:
"On the afternoon of the 16th, General McClellan directed an attack
by Hooker's corps on the Confederate left--Hood's two brigades--and
during the whole of the 17th the battle was waged, with varying
intensity, along the entire line. When the issue was first joined, on
the afternoon of the 16th, General Lee had with him less than
eighteen thousand men, consisting of the commands of Longstreet and
D. H. Hill, the two divisions of Jackson, and two brigades under
Walker. Couriers were sent to the rear to hurry up the divisions of
A. P. Hill, Anderson, and McLaws, hastening from Harper's Ferry, and
these several commands, as they reached the front at intervals during
the day, on the 17th, were immediately deployed and put to work.
Every man was engaged. We had no reserve.
"The fighting was heaviest and most continuous on the Confederate
left. It is established by Federal evidence that the three corps of
Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner were completely shattered in the
repeated but fruitless efforts to turn this flank, and two of these
corps were rendered useless for further aggressive movements. The
aggregate strength of the attacking column at this point reached
forty thousand men, not counting the two divisions of Franklin's
corps, sent at a late hour in the day to rescue the Federal right
from the impending danger of being itself destroyed; while the
Confederates, from first to last, had less than fourteen thousand men
on this flank, consisting of Jackson's two divisions, McLaws's
division, and the two small divisions, of two brigades each, under
Hood and Walker, with which to resist their fierce and oft-repeated
assaults. The disproportion in the center and on our right was as
great as, or even more decided than, on our left."
In the "Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War," Part I, p.
368, General Sumner testifies as follows:
"General Hooker's corps was dispersed; there is no question about
that. I sent one of my staff-officers to find where they were, and
General Rickets, the only officer he could find, said that he could
not raise three hundred men of the corps. There were troops lying
down on the left, which I took to belong to Mansfield's command. In
the mean time General Mansfield had been killed, and a portion of his
corps had also been thrown into confusion."
The testimony of General McClellan, in the same report, Part I, p.
441, is to the same effect:
"The next morning (the 18th) I found that our loss had been so great,
and there was so much disorganization in name of the commands, that I
did not consider it proper to renew the attack that day, especially
as I was sure of the arrival that day of two fresh divisions,
amounting to about fifteen thousand men. As an instance of the
condition of some of the troops that morning, I happen to recollect
the returns of the First Corps. General Hooker's, made on the morning
of the 18th, by which there were thirty-five hundred men reported
present for duty. Four days after that, the returns of the same corps
showed thirteen thousand five hundred."
On the night of the 19th our forces crossed the Potomac, and some
brigades of the enemy followed. In the morning General A. P. Hill,
who commanded the rear-guard, was ordered to drive them back. Having
disposed his forces, an attack was made, and, as the foe massed in
front of General Pender's brigade and endeavored to turn his flank,
General Hill says, in his report:
"A simultaneous daring charge was made, and the enemy driven
pell-mell into the river. Then commenced the most terrible slaughter
that this war has yet witnessed. The broad surface of the Potomac was
blue with the floating bodies of our foe. But few escaped to tell the
tale. By their own account, they lost three thousand men killed and
drowned from one brigade alone. Some two hundred prisoners were
taken."
General McClellan states, in his official report, that he had in this
battle, in action, 87,164 men of all arms.
The official reports of the commanding officers of our forces, made
at the time, show our total effective infantry to have been 27,255.
The estimate made for the cavalry and artillery, which is rather
excessive, is 8,000. This would make General Lee's entire strength
35,255.
The official return of the Army of Northern Virginia, on September
22, 1862, after its return to Virginia, and when the stragglers had
rejoined their commands, shows present for duty, 36,187 infantry and
artillery; the cavalry, of which there is no report, would perhaps
increase these figures to 40,000 of all arms.[65]
The return of the United States Army of the Potomac on September 20,
1862, shows present for duty, at that date, of the commands that
participated in the battle of Sharpsburg, 85,930 of all arms.[66]
The loss of the enemy at Boonsboro and Sharpsburg was 14,794.[67]
[Footnote 62: To these remarks Colonel W. H. Taylor adds the following
note: "Colonel Venable, one of my associates on the staff of General
Lee, says in regard to this matter: 'This is very easily explained.
One copy was sent directly to Hill from headquarters. General Jackson
sent him a copy, as he regarded Hill in his command. It is Jackson's
copy, in his own handwriting, which General Hill has. The other was
undoubtedly left carelessly by some one at Hill's quarters." says
General McClellan, "Upon learning the contents of this order, I at
once gave orders for a vigorous pursuit."--(General McClellan's
testimony, "Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, p. 440.)]
[Footnote 63: Report of General R. E. Lee.]
[Footnote 64: "Advance and Retreat," by J. B. Hood, p. 41.]
[Footnote 65: Taylor's "Four Years with General Lee."]
[Footnote 66: Official return from Adjutant-General's office, United
States Army. "Report of Committee on Conduct of the War," Part I, p. 492.]
[Footnote 67: Ibid., p. 42.]