Retreat of the Enemy.--Pursuit and Battle.-Night.--Further Retreat
of the Enemy.--Progress of General Jackson.--The Enemy at Frazier's
Farm.--Position of General Holmes.--Advance of General
Longstreet.--Remarkable Features of the Battle.--Malvern Hill.--
Our Position.--The Attack.--Expedition of General Stuart.--
Destruction of the Enemy's Stores.--Assaults on the Enemy.--Retreat
to Westover on the James.--Siege of Richmond raised.--Number of
Prisoners taken.--Strength of our Forces.--Strength of our Forces
at Seven Pines and after.--Strength of the Enemy.
During the night I visited the several commands along the
intrenchment on the south side of the Chickahominy. General Huger's
was on the right, General McLaws's in the center, and General
Magruder's on the left. The night was quite dark, especially so in
the woods in front of our line, and, in expressing my opinion to the
officers that the enemy would commence a retreat before morning, I
gave special instructions as to the precautions necessary in order
certainly to hear when the movement commenced. In the confusion of
such a movement, with narrow roads and heavy trains, a favorable
opportunity was offered for attack. It fell out, however, that the
enemy did move before morning, and that the fact of the works having
been evacuated was first learned by an officer on the north side of
the river, who, the next morning, the 29th, about sunrise, was
examining their works by the aid of a field-glass.
Generals Longstreet and A. P. Hill were promptly ordered to recross
the Chickahominy at New Bridge, and move by the Darbytown and Long
Bridge roads. General Lee, having sent his engineer. Captain Meade,
to examine the condition of the abandoned works, came to the south
side of the Chickahominy to unite his command and direct its
movements.
Magruder and Huger found the whole line of works deserted, and large
quantities of military stores of every description abandoned or
destroyed. They were immediately ordered in pursuit, the former by
the Charles City road, so as to take the enemy's army in flank; and
the latter by the Williamsburg road, to attack his rear. Jackson was
directed to cross the "Grapevine" Bridge, and move down the south
side of the Chickahominy. Magruder reached the vicinity of Savage
Station, where he came upon the rear-guard of the retreating army.
Being informed that it was advancing, he halted and sent for
reënforcements. Two brigades of Huger's division were ordered to his
support, but were subsequently withdrawn, it having been ascertained
that the force in Magruder's front was merely covering the retreat of
the main body.
Jackson's route led to the flank and rear of Savage Station, but he
was delayed by the necessity of reconstructing the "Grapevine" Bridge.
Late in the afternoon Magruder attacked the enemy with one of his
divisions and two regiments of another. A severe action ensued, and
continued about two hours, when night put an end to the conflict. The
troops displayed great gallantry, and inflicted heavy loss; but,
owing to the lateness of the hour and the small force engaged, the
result was not decisive, and the enemy continued his retreat under
cover of night, leaving several hundred prisoners, with his dead and
wounded, in our hands. Our loss was small in numbers but great in
value. Among others who could ill be spared, here fell the gallant
soldier, the useful citizen, the true friend and Christian gentleman,
Brigadier-General Richard Griffith. He had served with distinction in
foreign war, and, when the South was invaded, was among the first to
take up arms in defense of our rights.
At Savage Station were found about twenty-five hundred men in
hospital, and a large amount of property. Stores of much value had
been destroyed, including the necessary medical supplies for the sick
and wounded. The night was so dark that, before the battle ended, it
was only by challenging that on several occasions it was determined
whether the troops in front were friends or foes. It was therefore
deemed unadvisable to attempt immediate pursuit.
Our troops slept upon their arms, and in the morning it was found
that the enemy had retreated during the night, and, by the time thus
gained, he was enabled to cross the White-Oak Creek, and destroy the
bridge.
Early on the 30th Jackson reached Savage Station. He was directed to
pursue the enemy on the road he had taken, and Magruder to follow
Longstreet by the Darbytown road. As Jackson advanced, he captured so
many prisoners and collected so large a number of arms, that two
regiments had to be detached for their security. His progress at
White-Oak Swamp was checked by the enemy, who occupied the opposite
side, and obstinately resisted the rebuilding of the bridge.
Longstreet and A. P. Hill, continuing their advance, on the 30th came
upon the foe strongly posted near the intersection of the Long Bridge
and Charles City roads, at the place known in the military reports as
Frazier's Farm.
Huger's route led to the right of this position, Jackson's to the
rear, and the arrival of their commands was awaited, to begin the
attack.
On the 29th General Holmes had crossed from the south side of the
James River, and, on the 30th, was reënforced by a detachment of
General Wise's brigade. He moved down the River road, with a view to
gain, near to Malvern Hill, a position which would command the
supposed route of the retreating army.
It is an extraordinary fact that, though the capital had been
threatened by an attack from the seaboard on the right, though our
army had retreated from Yorktown up to the Chickahominy, and, after
encamping there for a time, had crossed the river and moved up to
Richmond, yet, when at the close of the battles around Richmond
McClellan retreated and was pursued toward the James River, we had no
maps of the country in which we were operating; our generals were
ignorant of the roads, and their guides knew little more than the way
from their homes to Richmond. It was this fatal defect in
preparation, and the erroneous answers of the guides, that caused
General Lee first to post Holmes and Wise, when they came down the
River road, at New Market, where, he was told, was the route that
McClellan must pursue in his retreat to the James. Subsequently
learning that there was another road, by the Willis church, which
would better serve the purpose of the retreating foe, Holmes's
command was moved up to a position on that road where, at the foot of
a hill which concealed from view the enemy's line, he remained under
the fire of the enemy's gunboats, the huge, shrieking shells from
which dispersed a portion of his cavalry and artillery, though the
faithful old soldier remained with the rest of his command, waiting,
according to his orders, for the enemy with his trains to pass; but,
taking neither of the roads pointed out to General Lee, he retreated
by the shorter and better route, which led by Dr. Poindexter's house
to Harrison's Landing. It has been alleged that General Holmes was
tardy in getting into position, and failed to use his artillery as he
had been ordered. Both statements are incorrect. He first took
position when and where he was directed, and, soon after, he moved to
the last position to which he was assigned. The dust of his advancing
column caused a heavy fire from the gunboats to be opened upon him,
and, in men who had never before seen the huge shells then fired,
they inspired a degree of terror not justified by their
effectiveness. The enemy, instead of being a straggling mass moving
toward the James River, as had been reported, were found halted
between West's house and Malvern Hill on ground commanding Holmes's
position, with an open field between them.
General Holmes ordered his chief of artillery to commence firing upon
the enemy's infantry, which immediately gave way, but a heavy fire of
twenty-five or thirty guns promptly replied to our battery, and
formed, with the gunboats, a cross-fire upon General Holmes's
command. The numerical superiority of the opposing force, both in
infantry and artillery, would have made it worse than useless to
attempt an assault unless previously reënforced, and, as no
reënforcements arrived, Holmes, about an hour after nightfall,
withdrew to a point somewhat in advance of the one he had held in the
morning. Though the enemy continued their cannonade until after dark,
and most of the troops were new levies, General Holmes reported that
they behaved well under the trying circumstances to which they were
exposed, except a portion of his artillery and cavalry, which gave
way in disorder, probably from the effect of the ten-inch shells,
which were to them a novel implement of war; for when I met them, say
half a mile from the point they had left, and succeeded in stopping
them, another shell fell and exploded near us in the top of a
wide-spreading tree, giving a shower of metal and limbs, which soon
after caused them to resume their flight in a manner that plainly
showed no moral power could stop them within the range of those
shells. It was after a personal and hazardous reconnaissance that
General Lee assigned General Holmes to his last position; and when I
remonstrated with General Lee, whom I met returning from his
reconnaissance, on account of the exposure to which he had subjected
himself, he said he could not get the required information otherwise,
and therefore had gone himself.
After the close of the battle of Malvern Hill, General Holmes found
that a deep ravine led up to the rear of the left flank of the
enemy's line, and expressed his regret that it had not been known,
and that he had not been ordered, when the attack was made in front,
to move up that ravine and simultaneously assail in flank and
reverse. It was not until after he had explained with regret the
lost, because unknown, opportunity, that he was criticised as having
failed to do his whole duty at the battle of Malvern Hill.
He has passed beyond the reach of censure or of praise, after serving
his country on many fields wisely and well. I, who knew him from our
schoolboy days, who served with him in garrison and in the field, and
with pride watched him as he gallantly led a storming party up a
rocky height at Monterey, and was intimately acquainted with his
whole career during our sectional war, bear willing testimony to the
purity, self-abnegation, generosity, fidelity, and gallantry which
characterized him as a man and a soldier.
General Huger reported that his progress was delayed by trees which
his opponent had felled across the Williamsburg road. In the
afternoon, after passing the obstructions and driving off the men who
were still cutting down trees, they came upon an open field (P.
Williams's), where they were assailed by a battery of rifled guns.
The artillery was brought up, and replied to the fire. In the mean
time a column of infantry was moved to the right, so as to turn the
battery, and the combat was ended. The report of this firing was
heard at Frazier's Farm, and erroneously supposed to indicate the
near approach of Huger's column, and, it has been frequently stated,
induced General Longstreet to open fire with some of his batteries as
notice to General Huger where our troops were, and that thus the
engagement was brought on. General A. P. Hill, who was in front and
had made the dispositions of our troops while hopefully waiting for
the arrival of Jackson and Huger, states that the fight commenced by
fire from the enemy's artillery, which swept down the road, etc. This
not only concurs with my recollection of the event, but is more in
keeping with the design to wait for the expected reënforcements.
The detention of Huger, as above stated, and the failure of Jackson
to force a passage of the White-Oak Swamp, left Longstreet and Hill,
without the expected support, to maintain the unequal conflict as
best they might. The superiority of numbers and advantage of position
were on the side of the enemy. The battle raged furiously until 9
P.M. By that time the enemy had been driven with great slaughter from
every position but one, which he maintained until he was enabled to
withdraw under cover of darkness. At the close of the struggle nearly
the entire field remained in our possession, covered with the enemy's
dead and wounded. Many prisoners, including a general of division,
were captured, and several batteries with some thousands of
small-arms were taken.
After this engagement, Magruder, who had been ordered to go to the
support of Holmes, was recalled, to relieve the troops of Longstreet
and Hill. He arrived during the night, with the troops of his command
much fatigued by the long, hot march.
In the battle of Frazier's Farm the troops of Longstreet and Hill,
though disappointed in the expectation of support, and contending
against superior numbers advantageously posted, made their attack
successful by the most heroic courage and unfaltering determination.
Nothing could surpass the bearing of General Hill on that occasion,
and I often recur with admiration to the manner in which Longstreet,
when Hill's command seemed about to be overborne, steadily led his
reserve to the rescue, as he might have marched on a parade. The
mutual confidence between himself and his men was manifested by the
calm manner in which they went into the desperate struggle. The skill
and courage which made that corps illustrious on former as well as
future fields were never more needed or better exemplified than on
this.
The current of the battle which was then setting against us was
reversed, and the results which have been stated were gained. That
more important consequences would have followed had Huger and
Jackson, or either of them, arrived in time to take part in the
conflict, is unquestionable; and there is little hazard in saying
that the army of McClellan would have been riven in twain, beaten in
detail, and could never, as an organized body, have reached the James
River.
Our troops slept on the battle-field they had that day won, and
couriers were sent in the night with instructions to hasten the march
of the troops who had been expected during the day.
Valor less true or devotion to their cause less sincere than that
which pervaded our army and sustained its commanders would, in this
hour of thinned ranks and physical exhaustion, have thought of the
expedient of retreat; but, so far as I remember, no such resort was
contemplated. To bring up reënforcements and attack again was alike
the expectation and the wish.
During the night, humanity, the crowning grace of the knightly
soldier, secured for the wounded such care as was possible, not only
to those of our own army, but also to those of the enemy who had been
left upon the field.
This battle was in many respects one of the most remarkable of the
war. Here occurred on several occasions the capture of batteries by
the impetuous charge of our infantry, defying the canister and grape
which plowed through their ranks, and many hand-to-hand conflicts,
where bayonet-wounds were freely given and received, and men fought
with clubbed muskets in the life-and-death encounter.
The estimated strength of the enemy was double our own, and he had
the advantage of being in position. From both causes it necessarily
resulted that our loss was very heavy. To the official reports and
the minute accounts of others, the want of space compels me to refer
the reader for a detailed statement of the deeds of those who in our
day served their country so bravely and so well.
During the night those who fought us at Frazier's Farm fell back to
the stronger position of Malvern Hill, and by a night-march the force
which had detained Jackson at White-Oak Swamp effected a junction
with the other portion of the enemy. Early on the 1st of July Jackson
reached the battlefield of the previous day, having forced the
passage of White-Oak Swamp, where he captured some artillery and a
number of prisoners. He was directed to follow the route of the
enemy's retreat, but soon found him in position on a high ridge in
front of Malvern Hill. Here, on a line of great natural strength, he
had posted his powerful artillery, supported by his large force of
infantry, covered by hastily constructed intrenchments. His left
rested near Crew's house and his right near Binford's. Immediately in
his front the ground was open, varying in width from a quarter to
half a mile, and, sloping gradually from the crest, was completely
swept by the fire of his infantry and artillery. To reach this open
ground our troops had to advance through a broken and thickly wooded
country, traversed nearly throughout its whole extent by a swamp
passable at only a few places and difficult at these. The whole was
within range of the batteries on the heights and the gunboats in the
river, under whose incessant fire our movements had to be executed.
Jackson formed his line with Whiting's division on his left and D. H.
Hill's on his right, one of Ewell's brigades occupying the interval.
The rest of Ewell's and Jackson's own division were held in reserve.
Magruder was directed to take position on Jackson's right, but before
his arrival two of Huger's brigades came up and were placed next to
Hill. Magruder subsequently formed on the right of these brigades,
which, with a third of Huger's, were placed under his command.
Longstreet and A. P. Hill were held in reserve, and took no part in
the engagement. Owing to ignorance of the country, the dense forests
impeding necessary communications, and the extreme difficulty of the
ground, the whole line was not formed until a late hour in the
afternoon. The obstacles presented by the woods and swamp made it
impracticable to bring up a sufficient amount of artillery to oppose
successfully the extraordinary force of that arm employed by the
enemy, while the field itself afforded us few positions favorable for
its use, and none for its proper concentration.
General W. N. Pendleton, in whom were happily combined the highest
characteristics of the soldier, the patriot, and the Christian, was
in chief command of the artillery, and energetically strove to bring
his long-range guns and reserve artillery into a position where they
might be effectively used against the enemy, but the difficulties
before mentioned were found insuperable.
Orders were issued for a general advance at a given signal, but the
causes referred to prevented a proper concert of action among the
troops. D. H. Hill pressed forward across the open field, and engaged
the enemy gallantly, breaking and driving back his first line; but, a
simultaneous advance of the other troops not taking place, he found
himself unable to maintain the ground he had gained against the
overwhelming numbers and numerous batteries opposed to him. Jackson
sent to his support his own division and that part of Ewell's which
was in reserve; but, owing to the increasing darkness and intricacy
of the forest and swamp, they did not arrive in time to render the
desired assistance. Hill was therefore compelled to abandon part of
the ground he had gained, after suffering severe loss and inflicting
heavy damage.
On the right the attack was gallantly made by Huger's and Magruder's
commands. Two brigades of the former commenced the action, the other
two were subsequently sent to the support of Magruder and Hill.
Several determined efforts were made to storm the hill at Crew's
house. The brigade advanced bravely across the open field, raked by
the fire of a hundred cannon and the musketry of large bodies of
infantry. Some were broken and gave way; others approached close to
the guns, driving back the infantry, compelling the advance batteries
to retire to escape capture, and mingling their dead with those of
the enemy. For want of coöperation by the attacking columns, their
assaults were too weak to break the enemy's line; and, after
struggling gallantly, sustaining and inflicting great loss, they were
compelled successively to retire. Night was approaching when the
attack began, and it soon became difficult to distinguish friend from
foe. The firing continued until after 9 P.M., but no decided result
was gained.
Part of our troops were withdrawn to their original positions; others
remained in the open field; and some rested within a hundred yards of
the batteries that had been so bravely but vainly assailed. The
lateness of the hour at which the attack necessarily began gave the
foe the full advantage of his superior position, and augmented the
natural difficulties of our own.
At the cessation of firing, several fragments of different commands
were lying down and holding their ground within a short distance of
the enemy's line, and, as soon as the fighting ceased, an informal
truce was established by common consent. Numerous parties from both
armies, with lanterns and litters, wandered over the field seeking
for the wounded, whose groans and calls on all sides could not fail
to move with pity the hearts of friend and foe.
The morning dawned with heavy rain, and the enemy's position was seen
to have been entirely deserted. The ground was covered with his dead
and wounded, and his route exhibited evidence of a precipitate
retreat. To the fatigue of hard marches and successive battles,
enough to have disqualified our troops for rapid pursuit, was added
the discomfort of being thoroughly wet and chilled by rain. I sent
out to the neighboring houses to buy, if it could be had, at any
price, enough whisky to give to each of the men a single gill, but it
could not be found.
The foe had silently withdrawn in the night by a route which had been
unknown to us, but which was the most direct road to Harrison's
Landing, and he had so many hours the start, that, among the general
officers who expressed to me their opinion, there was but one who
thought it was possible to pursue effectively. That was General T. J.
Jackson, who quietly said, "They have not all got away if we go
immediately after them." During the pursuit, which has just been
described, the cavalry of our army had been absent, having been
detached on a service which was reported as follows: After seizing
the York River Railroad, on June 28th, and driving the enemy across
the Chickahominy, the force under General Stuart proceeded down the
railroad to ascertain if there was any movement of the enemy in that
direction. He encountered but little opposition, and reached the
vicinity of the White House on the 29th. On his approach the enemy
destroyed the greater part of the immense stores accumulated at that
depot, and retreated toward Fortress Monroe. With one gun and some
dismounted men General Stuart drove off a gunboat, which lay near the
White House, and rescued a large amount of property, including more
than ten thousand stand of small-arms, partially burned. General
Stuart describes his march down the enemy's line of communication
with the York River as one in which he was but feebly resisted. He
says:
"We advanced until, coming in view of the White House (a former
plantation residence of General George Washington), at a distance of
a quarter of a mile, a large gunboat was discovered lying at the
landing. . . . I was convinced that a few bold sharpshooters could
compel the gunboat to leave. I accordingly ordered down about
seventy-five, partly of the First and Fourth Virginia Cavalry, and
partly of the Jeff Davis Legion, armed with the rifled carbines. They
advanced on this monster so terrible to our fancy, and a body of
sharpshooters was sent ashore from the boat to meet them. . . . To
save time I ordered up the howitzer, a few shells from which, fired
with great accuracy, and bursting directly over her decks, caused an
instantaneous withdrawal of the sharpshooters, and a precipitous
flight under headway of steam down the river. . . . An opportunity
was here offered for observing the deceitfulness of the enemy's
pretended reverence for everything associated with the name of
Washington--for the dwelling-house was burned to the ground, not a
vestige left except what told of desolation and vandalism.
"Nine large barges, laden with stores, were on fire as we approached;
immense numbers of tents, wagons, and cars in long trains, loaded,
and five locomotives; a number of forges; quantities of every species
of quartermaster's stores and property, making a total of many
millions of dollars--all more or less destroyed. . . . I replied (to
a note from the commanding General) that there was no evidence of a
retreat of the main body down the Williamsburg road, and I had no
doubt that the enemy, since his defeat, was endeavoring to reach the
James as a new base, being _compelled_ to surrender his connection
with the York. If the Federal people can be convinced that this was a
part of McClellan's plan, that it was in his original design for
Jackson to turn his right flank, and our generals to force him from
his strongholds, they certainly never can forgive him for the
millions of public treasure that his superb strategy cost."
Leaving one squadron at the White House, he returned to guard the
lower bridges of the Chickahominy. On the 30th he was directed to
recross and coöperate with Jackson. After a long march, he reached
the rear of the enemy at Malvern Hill, on the night of July 1st, at
the close of the engagement.
On the 2d of July the pursuit was commenced, the cavalry under
General Stuart in advance. The knowledge acquired since the event
renders it more than probable that, could our infantry, with a fair
amount of artillery, during that day and the following night, have
been in position on the ridge which overlooked the plain where the
retreating enemy was encamped on the bank of the James River, a large
part of his army must have dispersed, and the residue would have been
captured. It appears, from the testimony taken before the United
States Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, that it was
not until July 3d that the heights which overlooked the encampment of
the retreating army were occupied, and, from the manuscript notes on
the war by General J. E. B. Stuart, we learn that he easily gained
and took possession of the heights, and with his light howitzer
opened fire upon the enemy's camp, producing great commotion. This
was described by the veteran soldier, General Casey, of the United
States Army, thus:
"The enemy had come down with some artillery upon our army massed
together on the river, the heights commanding the position not being
in our possession. Had the enemy come down and taken possession of
those heights with a force of twenty or thirty thousand men, they
would, in my opinion, have taken the whole of our army except that
small portion of it that might have got off on the transports."
General Lee was not a man of hesitation, and they have mistaken his
character who suppose caution was his vice. He was prone to attack,
and not slow to press an advantage when he gained it. Longstreet and
Jackson were ordered to advance, but a violent storm which prevailed
throughout the day greatly retarded their progress. The enemy,
harassed and closely followed by the cavalry, succeeded in gaining
Westover, on the James River, and the protection of his gunboats. His
position was one of great natural and artificial strength, after the
heights were occupied and intrenched. It was flanked on each side by
a creek, and the approach in front was commanded by the heavy guns of
his shipping, as well as by those mounted in his intrenchments. Under
these circumstances it was deemed inexpedient to attack him; and, in
view of the condition of our troops, who had been marching and
fighting almost incessantly for seven days, under the most trying
circumstances, it was determined to withdraw, in order to afford to
them the repose of which they stood so much in need.
Several days were spent in collecting arms and other property
abandoned by the enemy, and, in the mean time, some artillery and
cavalry were sent below Westover to annoy his transports. On July 8th
our army returned to the vicinity of Richmond.
Under ordinary circumstances the army of the enemy should have been
destroyed. Its escape was due to the causes already stated. Prominent
among these was the want of correct and timely information. This
fact, together with the character of the country, enabled General
McClellan skillfully to conceal his retreat, and to add much to the
obstructions with which nature had beset the way of our pursuing
columns. We had, however, effected our main purpose. The siege of
Richmond was raised, and the object of a campaign which had been
prosecuted after months of preparation, at an enormous expenditure of
men and money, was completely frustrated.[42]
More than ten thousand prisoners, including officers of rank,
fifty-two pieces of artillery, and upward of thirty-five thousand
stand of small-arms were captured. The stores and supplies of every
description which fell into our hands were great in amount and value,
but small in comparison with those destroyed by the enemy. His losses
in battle exceeded our own, as attested by the thousands of dead and
wounded left on every field, while his subsequent inaction shows in
what condition the survivors reached the protection of the gunboats.
In the archive office of the War Department in Washington there are
on file some of the field and monthly returns of the strength of the
Army of Northern Virginia. These are the original papers which were
taken from Richmond. They furnish an accurate statement of the number
of men in that army at the periods named. They were not made public
at the time, as I did not think it to be judicious to inform the
enemy of the numerical weakness of our forces. The following
statements have been taken from those papers by Major Walter H.
Taylor, of the staff of General Lee, who supervised for several years
the preparation of the original returns.
A statement of the strength of the troops under General Johnston
shows that on May 21, 1862, he had present for duty as follows:
Smith's division, consisting of the brigades of Whiting,
Hood, Hampton, Hatton, and Pettigrew . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,592
Longstreet's division, consisting of the brigades of A. P.
Hill, Pickett, R. H. Anderson, Wilson, Colston, and Pryor . . 13,816
Magruder's division, consisting of the brigades of McLaws,
Kershaw, Griffith, Cobb, Toombs, and D. R. Jones . . . . . . 15,680
D. H. Hill's division, consisting of the brigades of Early,
Rodes, Raines, Featherston, and the commands of Colonels Ward
and Crump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,151
Cavalry brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,289
Reserve artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,160
------
Total effective men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53,688
Statement of the Strength of the Army Commanded by General R. E. Lee
on July 20, 1862.
Department of Northern Virginia . . . . . . . . Present for Duty
and North Carolina Officers Enlisted men
Department of North Carolina . . . . . . . . 722 . . . . 11,509
Longstreet's division . . . . . . . . . . . . 557 . . . . 7,929
D. H. Hill's division . . . . . . . . . . . . 550 . . . . 8,998
McLaws's division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514 . . . . 7,188
A. P. Hill's division . . . . . . . . . . . . 519 . . . . 10,104
Anderson's division . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 . . . . 5,760
D. R. Jones's division . . . . . . . . . . . 213 . . . . 3,500
Whiting's division . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 . . . . 3,600
Stuart's cavalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 . . . . 3,740
Pendleton's artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 . . . . 1,716
Rhett's artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 . . . . 1,355
----- ------
Total, including Department of North Carolina 4,160 . . . 65,399
Army of Northern Virginia, September 22, 1862.
Present for Duty
Officers Enlisted men
Longstreet's command . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,410 . . . 19,001
Jackson's command:
D. H. Hill's division . . . . . . . . . . . 310 . . . . 4,739
A. P. Hill's division . . . . . . . . . . . 318 . . . . 4,435
Ewell's division . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 . . . . 3,144
Jackson's division . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 . . . . 2,367
----- -----
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,501 . . . 33,686
Army of Northern Virginia, September 30, 1862.
Present for Duty
Officers Enlisted men
Longstreet's command . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,927 . . . 26,489
Jackson's command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,629 . . . 21,728
Reserve artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 . . . 716
----- ------
Total[43] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,606 . . . 48,933
Major Taylor, in his work,[44] states:
"In addition to the troops above enumerated as the strength of
General Johnston on May 21, 1862, there were two brigades subject to
his orders then stationed in the vicinity of Hanover Junction, one
under the command of General Branch; they were subsequently
incorporated into the division of General A. P. Hill, and
participated in the battles around Richmond."
He has no official data by which to determine their numbers, but,
from careful estimates and conference with General Anderson, he
estimates the strength of the two at 4,000 effective.
Subsequent to the date of the return of the army around Richmond,
heretofore given, but previous to the battle of Seven Pines, General
Johnston was reënforced by General Huger's division of three
brigades. The total strength of these three brigades, according to
the "Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia," was
5,008 effectives. Taylor says:
"If the strength of these five be added to the return of May 21st, we
shall have sixty-two thousand six hundred and ninety-six (62,696) as
the effective strength of the army under General Johnston on May 31,
1862.
"Deduct the losses sustained in the battle of Seven Pines as shown by
the official reports of casualties, say 6,084, and we have 56,612 as
the effective strength of the army when General Lee assumed command."
There have been various attempts made to point out the advantage
which might have been obtained if General Lee, in succeeding to the
command, had renewed on the 1st of June the unfinished battle of the
31st of May; and the representation that he commenced his campaign,
known as the "Seven Days' Battles," only after he had collected a
great army, instead of moving with a force not greatly superior to
that which his predecessor had, has led to the full exposition of all
the facts bearing upon the case. In the "Southern Historical Society
Papers," June, 1876, is published an extract from an address of
Colonel Charles Marshall, secretary and aide-de-camp to General R. E.
Lee, before the Virginia Division of the Army of Northern Virginia.
In it Colonel Marshall quotes General J. E. Johnston as saying:
"General Lee did not attack the enemy until the 26th of June, because
he was employed from the 1st until then in forming a great army by
bringing to that which I had commanded 15,000 men from North Carolina
under Major-General Holmes, 22,000 men from South Carolina and
Georgia, and above 16,000 men from the 'Valley,' in the divisions of
Jackson and Ewell," etc.
These numbers added together make 53,000. Colonel Marshall then
proceeds, from official reports, to show that all these numbers were
exaggerated, and that one brigade, spoken of as seven thousand
strong--that of General Drayton--was not known to be in the Army of
Virginia until after the "seven days," and that another brigade, of
which General Johnston admitted he did not know the strength, Colonel
Marshall thought it safer to refer to as the "unknown brigade,"
which, he suggests, may have been "a small command under General
Evans, of South Carolina, who did not join the army until after it
moved from Richmond."
General Holmes's report, made July 15, 1862, states that on the 29th
of June he brought his command to the north side of the James River,
and was joined by General Wise's brigade. With this addition, his
force amounted to 6,000 infantry and six batteries of artillery.
General Ransom's brigade had been transferred from the division of
General Holmes to that of General Huger a short time before General
Holmes was ordered to join General Lee. The brigade of General Branch
had been detached at an earlier period; it was on duty near to
Hanover Junction, and under the command of General J. E. Johnston
before the battle of Seven Pines. These facts are mentioned to
account for the small size of General Holmes's division, which had
been reduced to two brigades. Ripley's brigade on the 26th of June
was reported to have an aggregate force of 2,366, including pioneers
and the ambulance corps. General Lawton's brigade, when moving up
from Georgia to Richmond, was ordered to change direction, and join
General Jackson in the Valley. He subsequently came down with General
Jackson, and reports the force which he led into the battle of Cold
Harbor, on the 27th of June, 1862, as 3,500 men.
General Lee, after the battle of Seven Pines, had sent two large
brigades under General Whiting to coöperate with General Jackson in
the Valley, and to return with him, according to instructions
furnished. These brigades were in the battle of Seven Pines, and were
counted in the force of the army when General Lee took command of it.
Lawton's Georgia brigade, as has been stated, was diverted from its
destination for a like temporary service, and is accounted for as
reënforcements brought from the south. These three brigades, though
coming with Jackson and Ewell, were not a part of their divisions,
and, if their numbers are made to swell the force which Jackson
brought, they should be elsewhere subtracted.
General J. A. Early, in the same number of the "Historical Society
Papers," in a letter addressed to General J. E. Johnston, February 4,
1875, makes an exhaustive examination from official reports, and
applies various methods of computation to the question at issue.
Among other facts, he states:
"Drayton's brigade did not come to Virginia until after the battles
around Richmond. It was composed of the Fifteenth South Carolina and
the Fiftieth and Fifty-first Georgia Regiments and Third South
Carolina Battalion. A part, if not all, of it was engaged in the
fight at Secessionville, South Carolina, on the 16th of June, 1862.
Its first engagement in Virginia was on the Rappahannock, 25th of
August, 1862. After Sharpsburg, it was so small that it was
distributed among some other brigades in Longstreet's corps."
After minute inquiry, General Early concludes that "the whole command
that came from the Valley, including the artillery, the regiment of
cavalry, and the Maryland regiment and a battery, then known as 'The
Maryland Line,' could not have exceeded 8,000 men." In this, General
Early does not include either Lawton's brigade or the two brigades
with Whiting, and reaches the conclusion that "the whole force
received by General Lee was about 23,000--about 30,000 less than
your estimate."
Taking the number given by General Early as the entire reënforcement
received by General Lee after the battle of Seven Pines and before
the commencement of the seven days' battles--which those who know
his extreme accuracy and minuteness of inquiry will be quite ready to
do--and deducting from the 23,000 the casualties in the battle of
Seven Pines (6,084), we have 16,916; if to this be added whatever
number of absentees may have joined the army in anticipation of
active operations, a number which I have no means of ascertaining,
the result will be the whole increment to the army with which General
Lee took the offensive against McClellan.
It appears from the official returns of the Army of the Potomac that
on June 20th General McClellan had present for duty 115,102 men. It
is stated that McClellan reached the James River with "between 85,000
and 90,000 men," and that his loss in the seven days' battles was
15,249; this would make the army 105,000 strong at the commencement
of the battles.[45] Probably General Dix's corps of 9,277 men,
stationed at Fortress Monroe, is not included in this last statement.
[Footnote 42: Reports of Generals Robert E. Lee, Pendleton, A. P. Hill,
Huger, Alexander, and Major W. H. Taylor, in his "Four Years with Lee,"
have been drawn upon for the foregoing.]
[Footnote 43: No report of cavalry]
[Footnote 44: "Four Years with General Lee."]
[Footnote 45: Swinton's "History of the Army of the Potomac."]