The Enemy's Position.--His Intention.--The Plan of Operations.--
Movements of General Jackson.--Daring and Fortitude of Lee.--
Offensive-Defensive Policy.--General Stuart's Movement.--Order of
Attack.--Critical Position of McClellan.--Order of Mr. Lincoln
creating the Army of Virginia.--Arrival of Jackson.--Position of
the Enemy.--Diversion of General Longstreet.--The Enemy forced back
south of the Chickahominy.--Abandonment of the Railroad.
When riding from the field of battle with General Robert E. Lee on
the previous day, I informed him that he would be assigned to the
command of the army, _vice_ General Johnston, wounded, and that he
could make his preparations as soon as he reached his quarters, as I
should send the order to him as soon as arrived at mine. On the next
morning, as above stated, he proceeded to the field and took command
of the troops. During the night our forces on the left had fallen
back from their position at the close of the previous day's battle,
but those on the right remained in the one they had gained, and some
combats occurred there between the opposing forces. The enemy
proceeded further to fortify his position on the Chickahominy,
covering his communication with his base of supplies on York River.
His left was on the south side of the Chickahominy, between White-Oak
Swamp and New Bridge, and was covered by a strong intrenchment, with
heavy guns, and with abatis in front. His right wing was north of the
Chickahominy, extending to Mechanicsville, and the approaches
defended by strong works.
Our army was in line in front of Richmond, but without intrenchments.
General Lee immediately commenced the construction of an earthwork
for a battery on our left flank, and a line of intrenchment to the
right, necessarily feeble because of our deficiency in tools. It
seemed to be the intention of the enemy to assail Richmond by regular
approaches, which our numerical inferiority and want of engineer
troops, as well as the deficiency of proper utensils, made it
improbable that we should be able to resist. The day after General
Lee assumed command, I was riding out to the army, when I saw at a
house on my left a number of horses, and among them one I recognized
as belonging to him. I dismounted and entered the house, where I
found him in consultation with a number of his general officers. The
tone of the conversation was quite despondent, and one, especially,
pointed out the inevitable consequence of the enemy's advance by
throwing out _boyaux_ and constructing successive parallels. I
expressed, in marked terms, my disappointment at hearing such views,
and General Lee remarked that he had, before I came in, said very
much the same thing. I then withdrew and rode to the front, where,
after a short time, General Lee joined me, and entered into
conversation as to what, under the circumstances, I thought it most
advisable to do. I then said to him, substantially, that I knew of
nothing better than the plan he had previously explained to me, which
was to have been executed by General Johnston, but which was not
carried out; that the change of circumstances would make one
modification necessary--that, instead, as then proposed, of bringing
General A. P. Hill, with his division, on the rear flank of the
enemy, it would, because of the preparation for defense made in the
mean time, now be necessary to bring the stronger force of General T.
J. Jackson from the Valley of the Shenandoah. So far as we were then
informed, General Jackson was hotly engaged with a force superior to
his own, and, before he could be withdrawn, it was necessary that the
enemy should be driven out of the Valley. For this purpose, as well
as to mask the design of bringing Jackson's forces to make a junction
with those of Lee, a strong division under General Whiting was
detached to go by rail to the Valley to join General Jackson, and, by
a vigorous assault, to drive the enemy across the Potomac. As soon as
he commenced a retreat which unmistakably showed that his flight
would not stop within the limits of Virginia, General Jackson was
instructed, with his whole force, to move rapidly on the right flank
of the enemy north of the Chickahominy. The manner in which the
division was detached to reënforce General Jackson was so open that
it was not doubted General McClellan would soon be apprised of it,
and would probably attribute it to any other than the real motive,
and would confirm him in his exaggerated estimate of our strength.
By the rapidity of movement and skill with which General Jackson
handled his troops, he, after several severe engagements, finally
routed the enemy before the reënforcement of Whiting arrived; and he
then, on the 17th of June, proceeded, with that celerity which gave
to his infantry its wonderful fame and efficiency, to execute the
orders which General Lee had sent to him.
As evidence of the daring and unfaltering fortitude of General Lee, I
will here recite an impressive conversation which occurred between us
in regard to this movement. His plan was to throw forward his left
across the Meadow Bridge, drive back the enemy's right flank, and
then, crossing by the Mechanicsville Bridge with another column, to
attack in front, hoping by his combined forces to be victorious on
the north side of the Chickahominy; while the small force on the
intrenched line south of the Chickahominy should hold the left of the
enemy in check. I pointed out to him that our force and intrenched
line between that left flank and Richmond was too weak for a
protracted resistance, and, if McClellan was the man I took him for
when I nominated him for promotion in a new regiment of cavalry, and
subsequently selected him for one of the military commission sent to
Europe during the War of the Crimea, as soon as he found that the
bulk of our army was on the north side of the Chickahominy, he would
not stop to try conclusions with it there, but would immediately move
upon his objective point, the city of Richmond. If, on the other
hand, he should behave like an engineer officer, and deem it his
first duty to protect his line of communication, I thought the plan
proposed was not only the best, but would be a success. Something of
his old _esprit de corps_ manifested itself in General Lee's first
response, that he did not know engineer officers were more likely
than others to make such mistakes, but, immediately passing to the
main subject, he added, "If you will hold him as long as you can at
the intrenchment, and then fall back on the detached works around the
city, I will be upon the enemy's heels before he gets there."
Thus was inaugurated the offensive-defensive campaign which resulted
so gloriously to our arms, and turned from the capital of the
Confederacy a danger so momentous that, looking at it retrospectively,
it is not seen how a policy less daring or less firmly pursued could
have saved the capital from capture.
To resume the connected thread of our narrative. Preparatory to this
campaign, a light intrenchment for infantry cover, with some works
for field-guns, was constructed on the south side of the Chickahominy,
and General Whiting, with two brigades, as before stated, was sent to
reënforce General Jackson in the Valley, so as to hasten the expulsion
of the enemy, after which Jackson was to move rapidly from the Valley
so as to arrive in the vicinity of Ashland by the 24th of June, and, by
striking the enemy on his right flank, to aid in the proposed attack.
The better to insure the success of this movement, General Lawton, who
was coming with a brigade from Georgia to join General Lee, was directed
to change his line of march and unite with General Jackson in the Valley.
As General Whiting went by railroad, it was expected that the enemy
would be cognizant of the fact, but not, probably, assign to it the
real motive; and that such was the case is shown by an unsuccessful
attack of the 26th, made on the Williamsburg road, with the apparent
intention of advancing by that route to Richmond.
To observe the enemy, as well as to prevent him from learning of the
approach of General Jackson, General J. E. B. Stuart was sent with a
cavalry force on June 8th to cover the route by which the former was
to march, and to ascertain whether the enemy had any defensive works
or troops in position to interfere with the advance of those forces.
He reported favorably on both these points, as well as to the natural
features of the country. On the 26th of June General Stuart received
confidential instructions from General Lee, the execution of which is
so interwoven with the seven days' battles as to be more
appropriately noticed in connection with them, of which it is
proposed now to give a brief account.
Our order of battle directed General Jackson to march from Ashland on
the 25th toward Slash Church, encamping for the night west of the
Central Railroad; to advance at 3 A.M. on the 26th, and to turn
Beaver-Dam Creek. General A. P. Hill was to cross the Chickahominy at
Meadow Bridge when Jackson advanced beyond that point, and to move
directly upon Mechanicsville. As soon as the bridge there should be
uncovered, Longstreet and D. H. Hill were to cross, the former to
proceed to the support of A. P. Hill and the latter to that of
Jackson.
The four commands were directed to sweep down the north side of the
Chickahominy toward the York River Railroad--Jackson on the left and
in advance; Longstreet nearest the river and in the rear. Huger,
McLaws, and Magruder, remaining on the south side of the
Chickahominy, were ordered to hold their positions as long as
possible against any assault of the enemy; to observe his movements,
and to follow him closely if he should retreat. General Stuart, with
the cavalry, was thrown out on Jackson's left to guard his flank and
give notice of the enemy's movements. Brigadier-General Pendleton was
directed to employ the reserve artillery so as to resist any advance
toward Richmond, to superintend that portion of it posted to aid in
the operations on the north bank, and hold the remainder for use
where needed. The whole of Jackson's command did not arrive in time
to reach the point designated on the 25th. He had, therefore, more
distance to move on the 26th, and he was retarded by the enemy.
Not until 3 P.M. did A. P. Hill begin to move. Then he crossed the
river and advanced upon Mechanicsville. After a sharp conflict he
drove the enemy from his intrenchments, and forced him to take refuge
in his works, on the left bank of Beaver Dam, about a mile distant.
This position was naturally strong, the banks of the creek in front
being high and almost perpendicular, and the approach to it was over
open fields commanded by the fire of artillery and infantry under
cover on the opposite side. The difficulty of crossing the stream had
been increased by felling the fringe of woods on its banks and
destroying the bridges. Jackson was expected to pass Beaver Dam
above, and turn the enemy's right, so General Hill made no direct
attack. Longstreet and D. H. Hill crossed the Mechanicsville Bridge
as soon as it was uncovered and could be repaired, but it was late
before they reached the north bank of the Chickahominy. An effort was
made by two brigades, one of A. P. Hill and the other Ripley's of D.
H. Hill, to turn the enemy's left, but the troops were unable in the
growing darkness to overcome the obstructions, and were withdrawn.
The engagement ceased about 9 P.M. Our troops retained the ground
from which the foe had been driven.
According to the published reports, General McClellan's position was
regarded at this time as extremely critical. If he concentrated on
the left bank of the Chickahominy, he abandoned the attempt to
capture Richmond, and risked a retreat upon the White House and
Yorktown, where he had no reserves, or reason to expect further
support. If he moved to the right bank of the river, he risked the
loss of his communications with the White House, whence his supplies
were drawn by railroad. He would then have to attempt the capture of
Richmond by assault, or be forced to open new communications by the
James River, and move at once in that direction. There he would
receive the support of the enemy's navy. This latter movement had, it
appears, been thought of previously, and transports had been sent to
the James River. During the night, after the close of the contest
last mentioned, the whole of Porter's baggage was sent over to the
right bank of the river, and united with the train that set out on
the evening of the 27th for the James River.
It would almost seem as if the Government of the United States
anticipated, at this period, the failure of McClellan's expedition.
On June 27th President Lincoln issued an order creating the "Army of
Virginia," to consist of the forces of Fremont, in their Mountain
Department; of Banks, in their Shenandoah Department; and of
McDowell, at Fredericksburg. The command of this army was assigned to
Major-General John Pope. This cut off all reënforcements from
McDowell to McClellan.
In expectation of Jackson's arrival on the enemy's right, the battle
was renewed at dawn, and continued with animation about two hours,
during which the passage of the creek was attempted, and our troops
forced their way to its banks, where their progress was arrested by
the nature of the stream and the resistance encountered. They
maintained their position while preparations were being made to cross
at another point nearer the Chickahominy. Before these were
completed, Jackson crossed Beaver Dam above, and the enemy abandoned
his intrenchments, and retired rapidly down the river, destroying a
great deal of property, but leaving much in his deserted camps.
After repairing the bridges over Beaver Dam, the several columns
resumed their advance, as nearly as possible, as prescribed in the
order. Jackson, with whom D. H. Hill had united, bore to the left, in
order to cut off reënforcements to the enemy or intercept his retreat
in that direction. Longstreet and A. P. Hill moved nearer the
Chickahominy. Many prisoners were taken in their progress; and the
conflagration of wagons and stores marked the course of the
retreating army. Longstreet and Hill reached the vicinity of New
Bridge about noon. It was ascertained that the enemy had taken a
position behind Powhite Creek, prepared to dispute our progress. He
occupied a range of hills, with his right resting in the vicinity of
McGhee's house, and his left near that of Dr. Gaines, on a wooded
bluff, which rose abruptly from a deep ravine. The ravine was filled
with sharpshooters, to whom its banks gave protection. A second line
of infantry was stationed on the side of the hill, overlooking the
first, and protected by a breastwork of logs. A third occupied the
crest, strengthened with rifle-trenches, and crowned with artillery.
The approach to this position was over an open plain, about a quarter
of a mile wide, commanded by a triple line of fire, and swept by the
heavy batteries south of the Chickahominy. In front of his center and
right the ground was generally open, bounded on the side of our
approach by a wood, with dense and tangled undergrowth, and traversed
by a sluggish stream, which converted the soil into a deep morass.
The woods on the further side of the swamp were occupied by
sharpshooters, and trees had been felled to increase the difficulty
of its passage, and detain our advancing columns under the fire of
infantry massed on the slopes of the opposite hills, and of the
batteries on their crests.
Pressing on toward the York River Railroad, A. P. Hill, who was in
advance, reached the vicinity of New Cold Harbor about 2 P.M., where
he encountered the foe. He immediately formed his line nearly
parallel to the road leading from that place toward McGhee's house,
and soon became hotly engaged. The arrival of Jackson on our left was
momentarily expected, and it was supposed that his approach would
cause the extension of the opposing line in that direction. Under
this impression, Longstreet was held back until this movement should
commence. The principal part of the enemy's army was now on the north
side of the Chickahominy. Hill's single division met this large force
with the impetuous courage for which that officer and his troops were
distinguished. They drove it back, and assailed it in its strong
position on the ridge. The battle raged fiercely, and with varying
fortune, more than two hours. Three regiments pierced the enemy's
line, and forced their way to the crest of the hill on his left, but
were compelled to fall back before overwhelming numbers. This
superior force, assisted by the fire of the batteries south of the
Chickahominy, which played incessantly on our columns as they pressed
through the difficulties that obstructed their way, caused them to
recoil. Though most of the men had never been under fire until the
day before, they were rallied, and in turn repelled the advance of
our assailant Some brigades were broken, others stubbornly maintained
their positions, but it became apparent that the enemy was gradually
gaining ground. The attack on our left being delayed by the length of
Jackson's march and the obstacles he encountered, Longstreet was
ordered to make a diversion in Hill's favor by a feint on the enemy's
left. In making this demonstration, the great strength of the
position already described was discovered, and General Longstreet
perceived that, to render the diversion effectual, the feint must be
converted into an attack. He resolved, with his characteristic
determination, to carry the heights by assault. His column was
quickly formed near the open ground, and, as his preparations were
completed, Jackson arrived, and his right division--that of
Whiting--took position on the left of Longstreet. At the same time,
D. H. Hill formed on our extreme left, and, after a short but bloody
conflict, forced his way through the morass and obstructions, and
drove the foe from the woods on the opposite side. Ewell advanced on
Hill's right, and became hotly engaged. The first and fourth brigades
of Jackson's own division filled the interval between Ewell and A. P.
Hill. The second and third were sent to the right. The arrival of
these fresh troops enabled A. P. Hill to withdraw some of his
brigades, wearied and reduced by their long and arduous conflict. The
lines being now complete, a general advance from right to left was
ordered. On the right, the troops moved forward with steadiness,
unchecked by the terrible fire from the triple lines of infantry on
the hill, and the cannon on both sides of the river, which burst upon
them as they emerged upon the plain. The dead and wounded marked the
line of their intrepid advance, the brave Texans leading, closely
followed by their no less daring comrades. The enemy were driven from
the ravine to the first line of breastworks, over which our impetuous
column dashed up to the intrenchments on the crest. These were
quickly stormed, fourteen pieces of artillery captured, and the foe
driven into the field beyond. Fresh troops came to his support, and
he endeavored repeatedly to rally, but in vain. He was forced back
with great slaughter until he reached the woods on the banks of the
Chickahominy, and night put an end to the pursuit. Long lines of dead
and wounded marked each stand made by the enemy in his stubborn
resistance, and the field over which he retreated was strewed with
the slain. On the left, the attack was no less vigorous and
successful. D. H. Hill charged across the open ground in front, one
of his regiments having first bravely carried a battery whose fire
enfiladed his advance. Gallantly supported by the troops on his
right, who pressed forward with unfaltering resolution, he reached
the crest of the ridge, and, after a sanguinary struggle, broke the
enemy's line, captured several of his batteries, and drove him in
confusion toward the Chickahominy, until darkness rendered further
pursuit impossible. Our troops remained in undisturbed possession of
the field, covered with the dead and wounded of our opponent; and his
broken forces fled to the river or wandered through the woods. Owing
to the nature of the country, the cavalry was unable to participate
in the general engagement. It, however, rendered valuable service in
guarding Jackson's flank, and took a large number of prisoners.
On the morning of the 28th it was ascertained that none of the enemy
remained in our front north of the Chickahominy. As he might yet
intend to give battle to preserve his communications, the Ninth
Cavalry, supported by Ewell's division, was ordered to seize the York
River Railroad, and General Stuart with his main body to coöperate.
When the cavalry reached Dispatch Station, the enemy retreated to the
south bank of the Chickahominy, and burned the railroad-bridge.
During the forenoon, columns of dust south of the river showed that
he was in motion. The abandonment of the railroad and destruction of
the bridge proved that no further attempt would be made to hold that
line. But, from the position the enemy occupied, the roads which led
toward the James River would also enable him to reach the lower
bridges over the Chickahominy, and retreat down the Peninsula. In the
latter event, it was necessary that our troops should continue on the
north bank of the river, and, until the intention of General
McClellan was discovered, it was deemed injudicious to change their
disposition. Ewell was therefore ordered to proceed to Bottom's
Bridge, to guard that point, and the cavalry to watch the bridges
below. No certain indications of a retreat to the James River were
discovered by our forces on the south side of the Chickahominy, and
late in the afternoon the enemy's works were reported to be fully
manned. The strength of these fortifications prevented Generals Huger
and Magruder from discovering what was passing in their front. Below
the enemy's works the country was densely wooded and intersected by
swamps, concealing his movements and precluding reconnaissances
except by the regular roads, all of which were strongly guarded. The
bridges over the Chickahominy in rear of the enemy were destroyed,
and their reconstruction by us was impracticable in the presence of
his whole army and powerful batteries. We were therefore compelled to
wait until his purpose should be developed. Generals Huger and
Magruder were again directed to use the utmost vigilance, and to
pursue the foe vigorously should they discover that he was
retreating. During the afternoon of the 28th the signs were
suggestive of a general movement, and, no indications of his approach
to the lower bridges of the Chickahominy having been discovered by
the pickets in observation at those points, it became inferable that
General McClellan was about to retreat to the James River.