On every occasion the Corps had so far been called on to take part in
any definite operation, I had felt sure it would acquit itself well, and
had cause for satisfaction. But by this time the numbers and composition
of the Indian Infantry units had been so reduced that it became a
question how to allocate the duties in any offensive movement which
might be ordered. At the end of March my recommendation for reorganising
the Army Corps had been approved, and the two Divisions had been
practically reconstituted. Each of the six Infantry Brigades was now
composed of one Regular, one Territorial, and three Indian battalions.
In a later chapter I shall give some figures which will show that,
notwithstanding a battalion having been added, the strength per Brigade
was in most cases so far short of war establishment as to amount to a
nominal figure. But still the orders came for a Division to do this and
a Brigade something else.
Stern business was before us, and immediately the Lahore Division
returned from Ypres it again took its place in the old trenches before
Neuve Chapelle, whilst the Meerut Division got ready for the operations
about to be undertaken for the capture of the Aubers Ridge and
neighbouring villages and farms. The fighting for these lasted, as far
as we were concerned, from the 9th to the 22nd of May, and during this
period it was almost incessant. One attack succeeded another in
monotonous sequence; if it was not on a farm it was on a strong point,
or a distillery, or some position in a map square. Anyhow, it was the
most unsatisfactory job that fell to our lot in France, and we were not
alone in this respect, for the Fourth Corps on our left and the First on
our right, as well as the Canadians, were to expend a great many lives
and much effort with little gain to any of them.
The French were making an offensive between the right of the British
line and Arras, and Sir John French, in pursuance of a promise to
support the Allied Commander-in-Chief, directed the First Army to carry
out an attack on the German trenches in the neighbourhood of Rouges
Banes by the Fourth Corps, and between Neuve Chapelle and Givenchy by
the First and Indian Corps. A reason which we all thoroughly
appreciated.
What, however, apparently was not appreciated was that we were unlikely
to find the Germans napping again as we had at Neuve Chapelle in March,
and that the defences of those days had probably been quadrupled in
strength. This, in fact, we very soon learned to our cost, and the
cheery optimism which named Don and other places we were likely to reach
was about to receive a severe shock. But, after all, this is far better
than being pessimistic, and even the modern Attila in the very early
days of the war probably got more out of his Huns by telling them they
would be in Paris before the autumn leaves had fallen, than he would
have done by only naming, say, Verdun and Rheims.
The share of the Indian Corps in these operations was to attack between
the First Corps on our right and the Fourth Corps on our left. Our
immediate objective was the Ferme du Biez, after which we were to direct
our advance on Ligny-le-Grand-La Cliqueterie Farm. The Fourth Corps,
after carrying out its rôle on our left, was also to advance on
Cliqueterie and effect a junction with the Indian Corps. I remember
well, in imagination, picturing our Indian soldiers on the Aubers Ridge,
the huge delight of the Gurkhas and Pathans at being actually high above
a flat bog, and looking down on something instead of always looking up
from a fetid trench. When I again visit India to see my friends, many
will flatly maintain that the war was fought on a dead plain and the
only mountain near it was the poor little Aubers Ridge.
However, to my story. The Meerut Division was detailed for the attack;
the Lahore Division to hold the line, and the guns of both Divisions,
supplemented by others, were to support the attack. The assault was to
be delivered by the Dehra Dun Brigade, the Bareilly Brigade being in
support and three battalions of the Garhwal Brigade in reserve. The
first attempt was carried out on 9th May on a front of 650 yards. The
objectives were successively:
(_a_) Enemy’s front and support trenches.
(_b_) La Tourelle and houses near three named points.
(_c_) The Distillery, Ferme du Biez, S.W. edge of the Bois du Biez.
(_d_) Ligny-le-Petit.
(_e_) Ligny-le-Grand-La Cliqueterie Ferme. The Bois du Biez was to be
engaged simultaneously with the advance on Ligny-le-Petit by a special
body of troops consisting of the Garhwal Rifles and 2/8th Gurkhas with
two trench guns, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Drake-Brockman,
39th Garhwalis.
General Anderson, commanding the Meerut Division, had made every
preparation. He, his Staff, his Brigadiers, and his Commanding officers
had each and all studied every possible situation that could be
imagined, and at dawn I felt that if success did not attend their
efforts, they certainly deserved it. As I read the Corps and Divisional
Orders now, I do not believe any better could have been written at the
time.
All troops were in position as ordered with but trifling casualties and
the night of 8th-9th May passed quietly. Our own wire had been cut and
bridges laid as directed. The bombardment commenced punctually at 5 A.M.
and the enemy’s wire was cut satisfactorily, but many of our rounds were
reported as falling short.
At the appointed hour, the battalions of the Dehra Dun Brigade, the
2/2nd Gurkhas, 1/4th Seaforths, 1st Seaforths (6th Jats and 1/9th
Gurkhas in support) went over the top preparatory to the assault. Even
with the certainty of being met by an inferno of fire within a few
seconds, one young officer was heard to ask another if he knew the
Report Centre of his Brigade, and on his replying that he was not sure,
a laugh was raised by the questioner saying, “Why, you have often been
there, it is 96 Piccadilly”; and in fact it was so, but situated for the
time being in the Rue du Bois.
The morning was bright, and from all appearances the Germans appeared
quite unaware of our concentration and proposed attack. However,
immediately the Infantry crossed over the parapet to form up preparatory
to the assault, heavy machine-gun fire was opened on them from guns
sited almost on the ground level. The enemy’s Infantry also manned the
trenches.
The 2nd Gurkhas as they started their rush met a terrific fire, and all
the officers who had crossed the parapet were shot down. Lieut. Collins
and Captain C. M. Mullaly were killed at this time, and Captain Kenneth
Park, a nephew of mine, who had insisted on joining in the battle
although in very poor health, was mortally wounded. The men from Nepal,
notwithstanding every effort, were literally cut down and unable to
advance beyond a ditch in their front.
The 4th Seaforths and 1st Seaforths advanced with their usual bravery
but met with the same fate and lay for hours under a leaden sheet,
getting back as best they could after dark. In the 4th Seaforths,
Lieutenants Tennant, Railton, and Bastian were killed.
Notwithstanding the most gallant efforts to cross the fire-swept ground,
by 6 A.M. it was definitely known our attack had failed to reach its
first objective. One company 6th Jats, which had been directed between
the left of First Corps and our right was practically annihilated, and
Captain Dudley and Subadar Lekh Ram were killed. The hostile guns, which
up to now had not done much firing, opened a searching and heavy fire on
our trenches and the Rue du Bois, in consequence of which the Dehra Dun
and Bareilly Brigades suffered numerous casualties; the 41st Dogras
being particularly unfortunate in this respect.
Howitzer fire was accordingly turned on to the German trenches, and
preparatory arrangements for a fresh assault were commenced. At 6.35
A.M., the G.O.C. 1st Division on our right informed General Anderson
that the first assault of that Division had also failed. An hour later
the 1st Seaforths made a second attempt to assault, but like the first
this attempt also met with little success, and they too had to lie in
the open with the other battalions unable to advance or retire. A
special Howitzer bombardment of enemy trenches was arranged to commence
at 7.45 A.M. and to last for twenty-five minutes, under cover of which
it was hoped that the 2nd Gurkhas and 4th Seaforths would be able to
advance.
The O.C. 4th Seaforths at this time reported that the enemy was being
reinforced and was of opinion they would counter-attack. The G.O.C.
Dehra Dun Brigade accordingly sent up two companies 9th Gurkhas to
assist the 1st Seaforths, who had suffered very heavy losses, and
ordered the O.C. 9th Gurkhas to support the 4th Seaforths with the
remainder of his battalion, but owing to the congested state of the
communication trenches only 200 men were able to move forward. At 8 A.M.
the First British Division informed the G.O.C. Meerut Division that the
attack of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades had failed, and that the 1st Brigade
would hold the line while they were withdrawn.
At 8.20 A.M. I sent an order directing the further attempt at attack by
the Dehra Dun Brigade fixed for 8.45 A.M. to be stayed, and that another
assault should be organised to coincide with that of the First Division,
which could not be ready for another two hours. The assault was
consequently stopped.
As the attack by the 2nd and 3rd Brigades on our right had failed owing
to the enemy’s wire not being sufficiently cut, instructions were
received from the Army commander to recommence operations at 12 noon
after a further bombardment with H.E. 18-pr., by which it was hoped to
break down the enemy’s parapets and knock out his machine-guns.
On the urgent representation of the G.O.C. Dehra Dun Brigade, the hour
for a fresh attack had been altered to 2.40 P.M. on this same date, 9th
May. The Bareilly Brigade was also warned that it would have to relieve
the Dehra Dun Brigade, and carry out the next assault. This assault was
to be delivered by the 2nd Black Watch on the right, 58th Rifles in the
centre, and 41st Dogras on the left, the 1/4th Black Watch and
machine-guns of the 125th Rifles being in Brigade reserve. Meanwhile the
Germans were reported by G.O.C. 1st Group H.A.R. to be strongly
reinforcing their second line, which appeared to be held in strength.
At 10 A.M. the G.O.C. Seventh British Division reported that the Eighth
Division on our left was unable to make much headway beyond the front
line of German trenches owing to fortified posts in rear, which were
being bombarded afresh. The Garhwal Brigade was placed in support of the
Bareilly Brigade. The 9th Gurkhas, which so far had not been seriously
engaged, was ordered to join the Garhwal Brigade, which was short of
Lieut.-Colonel Drake-Brockman’s detachment. The relief of the Dehra Dun
by the Bareilly Brigade was commenced and carried out with considerable
difficulty as the communication trenches were full of dead and wounded,
and the movement being observed by the enemy, a heavy shell-fire was
kept up by them. Owing to the destruction of our trenches it was found
impossible to carry out the fresh attack, even at the altered hour, and
the First Army directed that both the Meerut and First Divisions should
assault at 4 P.M.
At 12 noon the G.O.C. Bareilly Brigade reported to General Anderson that
in the opinion of the G.O.C. Dehra Dun Brigade (the morning attacking
Brigade) the enemy’s position had been in no way weakened and that the
machine-gun fire which had caused the check of all efforts of the Dehra
Dun Brigade was as heavy as ever. He added that the parapets were
somewhat battered by our artillery, but that this was compensated for by
the German reinforcements which had since come up; that three of his
battalions had been exposed to heavy shell-fire, and that he wished the
above situation to be known before the assault commenced.
On receipt of this report General Anderson considered it advisable to
inform me, but instructed the G.O.C. Bareilly Brigade that meantime the
attack would take place as ordered. Whatever the circumstances, I
considered it imperative to carry out this assault, and sent
instructions that it was to be pressed at all costs, and the Divisional
Commander added to this that it was to be carried on into the night if
necessary. The orders of the First Army were distinct, and the movements
of the First Division on my right depended on ours. I therefore felt
bound to do all in my power to comply with the Army orders.
By 4 P.M. the 2nd Black Watch had relieved the 2/2nd Gurkhas on the
right, the 41st Dogras the 1st Seaforths on the left, and the 58th
Rifles had taken the place of the 1/4th Seaforths in the centre. The
1/4th Black Watch was in reserve.
The 1st Seaforths, on this 9th May 1915, had, if possible, beaten all
their records for dogged valour. Nothing in war could exceed the
determination to win through displayed by all ranks, and where they
failed no other Corps could have succeeded. When I received their
casualty roll I could have wept and felt no sense of weakness: seven
officers and 130 other ranks killed or missing; ten officers and 350
other ranks wounded, and mostly within a few short moments.
Gashed with honourable scars,
Low in glory’s lap they lie;
Though they fell, they fell like stars,
Streaming splendours through the sky.
The bombardment commenced punctually at 3.20 P.M., 9th May, and at 3.40
P.M. the assaulting troops crossed the parapet and formed up prior to
the assault. Each battalion was formed in two lines, two companies in
each line. The right battalion (2nd Black Watch) and right company of
centre battalion (58th Rifles) were met by a heavy, well-directed
machine-gun and rifle fire from their front, left front, and left flank
directly they showed over the parapets, and but few men succeeded in
crossing the ditch to their front, the majority being disabled before
reaching it. The left company of the 58th Rifles succeeded in advancing
about 100 yards; but when our guns lifted they were at once exposed to a
heavy fire and were unable to advance farther. The 41st Dogras on the
left, in particular, had been exposed to an extremely heavy shelling
from H.E. and shrapnel, both while getting forward and whilst waiting in
the front line. In consequence, one company consisted of only
twenty-eight men. The companies (what remained of them) crossed the
parapet and aligned themselves with the 58th Rifles; but rifle and
machine-gun fire brought them to a halt. Further attempts to advance by
bringing up men from the rear companies did not help them, as in
crossing the parapet most of them were shot down.
Our artillery bombardment at this stage was quite ineffective and short,
and the Germans were not appreciably shaken by it. Their infantry was
lining the parapets from the time we commenced to assemble in front of
our own trenches, and the situation was for the time being entirely in
their favour. About 4 P.M. orders were issued for battalions to
reorganise, and be prepared for a fresh assault if ordered.
A good instance of the _camaraderie_ between British and Indian soldiers
was shown on this day. A Seaforth Highlander, who was badly wounded in
the first attack in the morning, was lying out unable to be got in. A
Dogra sepoy was wounded in the second assault during the afternoon and
was lying near him. Hearing the Highlander groaning, he dragged himself
up to him, patted his arm, and said he would stay by him and take him in
later on. When darkness came on the Dogra dragged himself back and
reported to his own battalion that he wanted some men to come and bring
in the wounded Highlander. The officer commanding the company he went to
said he would see about it and ordered him to get back to the
dressing-station. He refused to go, as he said he had promised the
_ghāgra_ (kilted man) to save him, and intended to do that first and
then go to hospital. The Highlander was rescued.
Then cease all ye who, in your pride, the creed of others would deride.
The Hindu idol; crescent’s sign; the Shinto doctrine, laws divine.
Confucius made and Christ decreed, all to one common substance lead,
No matter by what faith enthralled; ’tis what men _do_ not what they’re
called.
In the ranks of the 2nd Black Watch was a Lance-Corporal, David Finlay
by name, a fine specimen of a fine Corps. As he topped the parapet a
shell exploding near him knocked him flat, but quickly recovering
himself he rushed on with his bombing party of a dozen men, defying
death. Ten out of his twelve gallant comrades were killed or
incapacitated before he cried a halt, but then only to add to his
daring, for seeing a badly wounded man he carried him for 100 yards
through a whirl of fire and brought him into our own trenches safely.
David Finlay did not live long to wear the Victoria Cross he was
awarded. Such brave souls never rest as ordinary men can. He lies ’neath
the desert sands of Mesopotamia. And of the battalion whose fame he so
much enhanced, three officers—Lieutenants W. Brownlow, the Hon. K.
Stewart, and Sinclair—and seventy others gave their lives; whilst the
total casualties numbered 265, or fifty per cent of the strength which
fought that day.
The 41st Dogras, who were engaged in their first offensive battle as a
complete battalion, suffered very heavy losses. Lieut.-Colonel
Hutchinson, whilst leading a double company, received three wounds, and
his company officer, Lieutenant Vaughan, was totally disabled. At one
time the only unwounded officer was a Dogra subadar, Jai Singh (attached
from 37th Dogras). He behaved splendidly, but was himself twice wounded
before the share of the battalion in this day of carnage had ended. The
C.O., Colonel Tribe, received a shell-wound and Major Milne (82nd
Punjabis), whom I had known well in the Peshawar Division, was severely
wounded in the advance. In fact the Dogras were almost broken up as a
unit. Five of the ten British officers present and seven of the Indian
officers were rendered _hors de combat_; and the battalion suffered in
all over 400 casualties out of a muster roll of 650. I well know the
hills and vales from which most of these gallant soldiers came. I can
hear ethereal voices, wafted on the warm summer breezes as they top the
ridges of the sub-Himalayan hills, soughing, “Well done, loyal Dogras!”
The 58th Rifles had a total of 250 killed, missing, and wounded,
including Lieutenant Mackmillan, who died of wounds.
By 5 P.M., 9th May, it was clear from reports received from G.O.C.
Bareilly Brigade, Artillery observation-officers, and the First British
Division that all attacks, both of the First and Meerut Divisions had
failed. After a telephonic conversation with the G.O.C. Meerut Division
the Garhwal Brigade was ordered to take over the front line from
Bareilly, and this was finally effected by 1 A.M. midnight of the
9th-10th May. The failure of the attacks on this day were due to the
insufficient effect produced by the Artillery bombardment and to the
great volume of extremely accurate machine-gun fire from front and
flanks. As regards the insufficient effect of the Artillery bombardment,
it must be remembered that, after their experience in front of Neuve
Chapelle on 10th to 13th March, the Germans realised that breastworks of
exceptional strength were required, and had accordingly devoted their
energies to the construction of improved parapets of great thickness,
especially on both sides of the Estaires-La Bassée road, as to the
safety of which they were anxious. They had also largely increased the
number of machine-guns employed in their front line, locating them in
dug-outs heavily strutted with timber, which admitted of the
machine-guns being fired just above ground level, and ensured the safety
of the detachments during the bombardment. The light shell of our field
guns appeared to produce but small results on these improved parapets,
and even high-explosive shell had only very local effects. A very
considerable proportion of our H.E. shell also failed to detonate
satisfactorily. The fire of our 18-pounder guns was accurate enough, as
proved by the manner in which the enemy’s wire entanglements had been
cut, but owing to some defect in the construction of the shell there
were, and continued to be, a very unduly large number of prematures. As
regards the fire of our howitzers, both those of 4·5-inch and those of
6·0-inch calibre, the extreme accuracy which we had become accustomed to
obtain with them had fallen off considerably as the guns became worn by
the large number of rounds fired. In the various intensive bombardments,
too, it was reported by the Infantry that a large proportion of our
shell had fallen short of the enemy’s front line parapets. This was
largely accounted for by the error of the gun, which at the ranges fired
at hardly ensured more than twenty-five per cent of shell actually
hitting the point aimed at.
The endeavour displayed by the Infantry in the various assaults left
nothing to be desired. The successive attempts to reach the enemy
trenches were brought to a standstill by the disablement of all but a
small percentage of the assaulting columns, and by machine-gun and rifle
fire. This fire started from the moment the first of our men showed
above our breastworks, and numbers were put out of action within a few
yards of our own front line. Of those who succeeded, in spite of the
heaviest losses, in getting out half-way between our lines and the
Germans, the small number of unwounded men found themselves pinned to
the ground, unable to advance or retire in face of the enemy’s fire.
The casualties suffered on the 9th and 10th May were heavy, amounting to
sixty-eight British officers, thirty Indian officers, and a total of all
ranks, British and Indian, of over 2000, or about thirty-six per cent of
strength.
On the 10th May General Anderson came to my Headquarters, and I
communicated to him an order I had received, and which stated that it
was vitally important not a round of gun ammunition should be wasted. At
this interview I told him that no attack would take place on the 10th or
night 10th-11th, but that one might take place on the night 11th-12th.
That evening the Garhwal Brigade took over some 230 yards’ extra front
from the British Division on our right in anticipation of the attack.
The Sirhind Brigade was ordered back from Croix Barbée, and again came
under the orders of the Lahore Division, while the Dehra Dun Brigade was
replaced at the disposal of the Meerut Division.
On the morning of 12th May the situation was as follows: the Garhwal
Brigade held the line, the Bareilly Brigade was in support with
Headquarters at Lansdowne Post, and the Dehra Dun Brigade in Divisional
reserve at La Couture and Vieille Chapelle. I informed the G.O.C. Meerut
Division that his Division, less the Dehra Dun Brigade and with the
Sirhind Brigade added, would probably attack on a 300 yards’ front on
the night 13th-14th May, in co-operation with the First Corps on its
right, the front of attack being between two points designated V 5 and V
6, well known to us all.
I have since I first wrote this visited (1919) this bit of ground and
located my friends V 5 and V 6, and I touched my hat not only to the
brave men who died for us, but also to the German dead who held them so
tenaciously and died like gentlemen.
At 4 P.M. this day, 12th May, the Meerut Division was ordered to be
prepared to take over the Rue du Bois front, to Chocolat Menier Corner
inclusive, during the night. At night I proceeded to Meerut Divisional
Headquarters and discussed the arrangements for the attack with
Anderson; but next morning, 13th May, I was informed that the proposed
night operations were postponed for twenty-four hours, viz. till the
night 14th-15th May. Orders were therefore issued directing the
bombardment of the enemy’s position which was to be attacked. It was to
be deliberate and continuous till the assault was made. This bombardment
commenced at 12 noon and was maintained till the attack was delivered,
and it drew in reply a strong continuous fire on the trenches held by
the Meerut Division.
The general outlines of the operations were as follows:
The First and Indian Corps were to renew the attack and to press
forwards towards Violaines and Beau Puits, and to establish a defensive
flank along the La Bassée road on the left, maintaining the right at
Givenchy. The line to be established in the first instance was the
general line of the road Festubert-La Quinque Rue-La Tourelle
cross-roads-Port Arthur, which position was to be consolidated. The
First Corps was to assault with the Second Division on the right of the
Meerut Division, and the assault of both Divisions was to be
simultaneous. The subsequent advance was to be with the object of
securing the Ferme d’Avoué and certain named roads.
The Seventh Division on our left was to deliver an assault in the early
hours of the 15th May.
The Meerut Division, less Dehra Dun Brigade and one Brigade R.F.A., with
the Sirhind Brigade added, was ordered to make the attack of the Indian
Corps. The assault was to be made against named front-line trenches, all
details being given. Should the first two objectives be attained, as the
attack of the Second Division progressed our own was to push on and
secure the road from Port Arthur to La Tourelle cross-roads inclusive,
and consolidate itself thereon.
A deliberate Artillery bombardment was to precede the assault and was to
be maintained for thirty-six hours. Owing, however, to the further
postponement of the attack for twenty-four hours it was actually
maintained for sixty hours.
No. 4 Trench howitzer battery was placed at the disposal of the Garhwal
Brigade for the operations, and this Brigade was detailed to carry out
the assault on the enemy’s front-line trenches on a two-battalion front.
The Sirhind Brigade was in support of the Garhwal Brigade. The Bareilly
Brigade was in Divisional reserve at Croix Barbée, and the Dehra Dun
Brigade was in Corps reserve.
The 4th Indian Cavalry rendezvoused on 15th May in fields and orchards
between Vieille Chapelle and La Couture. Nos. 3 and 4 Companies Sappers
and Miners and the 107th Pioneers rendezvoused at St. Vaast on the
evening of the 14th May. All assaulting troops wore masks soaked in
solution. These were the early days of gas, and some of the devices to
ward off this poisonous innovation were grotesque. Fond parents, wives,
and relations had sent out every form of anti-gas invention. A Hindu
sepoy best explained what the Indians thought of it all when he said: “I
believe the British have been converted to our religion and are trying
to imitate our many Gods. I have already seen many ‘Hunumans,’ and
‘Ganesh’ will shortly follow.”
At 3.30 P.M. on the 14th May orders were received from First Army
directing the assault to be delayed for another twenty-four hours, as
the effect of the bombardment was not considered to have been
sufficient; the weather also was wet and the ground was soft and
holding.
The night of the 14th-15th passed without any special incident. At 3.30
P.M. on the 15th May I sent the following instructions to the G.O.C.
Meerut Division:
(_a_) If the night attack succeeds, hold on to V 6 at all costs, even
if the Second Division on your right fails.
(_b_) If the night attack fails, you will not persist in it, unless
the Second Division on the right has succeeded, when use every
endeavour to connect with its left.
(_c_) If the attack of both the Meerut and Second Divisions fail, make
a fresh attack at 3.15 A.M., to synchronise with that of the Seventh
Division; this attack is to be preceded by a fresh bombardment,
commencing at 2.45 A.M. and lasting till 3.15 A.M.
(_d_) If you fail again, re-form and prepare for another attack, which
should be preceded by a further bombardment, probably six hours later,
but further instructions will be issued as to the hour and class of
this bombardment.
At 10.50 P.M., 15th May, all troops were in position. The 2nd Leicesters
with six machine-guns were to assault with the right in the ditch
passing through V 5, and were ordered to get into touch with the Second
Division on their right. The Garhwal Rifles, with six machine-guns, were
on the left, with their right in touch with the left of the Leicesters.
The 3rd Londons and two companies 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles were in support of
the Garhwal Rifles and 2nd Leicesters respectively. The remainder of the
3rd Gurkha Rifles was in Brigade reserve. The 2/8th Gurkha Rifles were
holding the line in rear. The units of the Sirhind Brigade were disposed
as follows:
1st Highland Light Infantry, and 1/1st Gurkha Rifles in assembly
trenches east of Garhwal Brigade Reserve.
15th Sikhs in trenches east of Lansdowne Post.
1/4th King’s Liverpools in trenches about Lansdowne Post.
1/4th Gurkha Rifles in Lansdowne Post.
Immediately the bridges were in position the Leicesters and Garhwal
Rifles commenced to move out, and by 11.25 P.M. were in position.
The assault started at 11.30 P.M., and at once the German machine-gun
and rifle fire commenced, while their trenches appeared full of men. The
enemy front was lit, not only by the ordinary flares but also by bombs
thrown over the parapet, which burned on the ground. In spite of
repeated efforts to reach the German trenches, the advance of both
battalions was brought to a standstill, and each successive attempt was
similarly stopped.
At 12.30 A.M., 16th May, the G.O.C. Garhwal Brigade reported that the
Leicesters were held up and that the Garhwal Rifles had been unable to
get forward more than thirty yards owing to heavy machine-gun fire. At
this time General Anderson became aware that, though the battalion of
the British Division on his immediate right had also not succeeded in
reaching the German trenches, others of the 5th and 6th Infantry
Brigades had done so. This proved that strong-point V 6 and its vicinity
assigned to us were, as I had understood all along, one of the most
formidable obstacles on our whole front. The Leicesters and the Garhwal
Rifles were accordingly withdrawn and replaced by the 3rd Gurkhas and
1/3rd Londons, and the G.O.C. Brigade was directed to make a further
effort at 3.15 A.M.
In the meanwhile touch was maintained with the left of the Second
Division, and the G.O.C. was informed that the Garhwal Brigade would
again attack at 3.15 A.M. In reply, he stated that his left would
simultaneously make another attack. An intense bombardment commenced at
2.45 A.M., 16th May, and at 3 A.M. the battalions detailed to attack
were in position with their leading platoons in the firing-trenches. It
was impossible, owing to the light, to launch the assault from the
enemy’s side of the ditch, as the troops could not reach that position
unseen.
At 3.15 A.M. the assault was commenced, but the moment the men showed
the enemy opened a heavy rifle, machine-gun, and artillery fire. The
majority of them were shot down as they crossed our parapet, and this
assault also was entirely held up.
In both advances a certain number of officers and men arrived within a
few yards of the German wire before they were shot, but none were able
to reach the parapets. The battalions were now ordered to reorganise,
and it was decided that no further attempts to break through on this
front were to be made, but that troops should be pushed in through the
opening already made on our right.
In these assaults the German machine-guns again succeeded, in spite of
the previous heavy bombardment by Artillery and bomb-guns, in
maintaining themselves in their covered positions and in coming into
immediate action on our assault being launched. Both assaults were thus
met by heavy fire from the front and from right and left flanks, and
were brought to a standstill just as those on the 9th May had been.
The casualties, owing to the smaller front attacked, were not so
numerous as those experienced on the 9th, but they were regrettably
heavy, namely, twenty-one British officers, five Indian officers, 300
other British ranks, and 590 other ranks Indian, or about thirty per
cent of the strength of the Brigade engaged.
In these difficult operations the Garhwal Rifles suffered 150
casualties, and the Leicesters lost in killed four subalterns, viz.
Tayler, Brown, Gandy, and Crosse, besides twenty other ranks, and the
wounded and missing, including five officers, numbered over 200. It is a
sad tale to tell, this continuous long roll of dead and wounded, but it
is necessary in order to explain the difficulties we had to encounter
and the heroism of the troops, British and Indian, who, notwithstanding
the hopelessness of the task, never hesitated to go manfully forward.
The 3rd Londons suffered over 100 casualties, and the 3rd Gurkhas over
seventy, including two British officers killed. Lieutenant Nott-Bower
was shot whilst bravely trying to save a wounded man of the Leicesters
and a brother officer, Captain Grigg, was hit by a splinter of shell.
Captain F. Hodgson of the 84th Punjabis, a personal friend, was another
gallant soul who passed away in honour this day.
By 4.30 A.M., 16th May, the 6th British Brigade had taken the Orchard
and the 5th Brigade had been able to continue its advance, but the
battalion on our immediate right had again been unable to get on, as its
flank was exposed. The G.O.C. Bareilly Brigade was now directed to be
prepared to take over the front held by the Garhwal Brigade. The Army
commander had meantime decided to form a flank where the left of the
Second Division had got through, and I received orders to hold our
trenches as a defensive front.
At 8 A.M., 16th May, the situation was as follows:
Garhwal Brigade was holding the line as a defensive front. The Meerut,
Lahore, and Heavy Artillery were shelling the area V 6 and other
re-entrant objectives. The Bareilly Brigade was _en route_ to Lansdowne
Post. The Sirhind Brigade and 107th Pioneers were under orders of the
G.O.C. Second Division. Both companies Sappers and Miners and 125th
Rifles were at St. Vaast and Croix Barbée. 4th Indian Cavalry was in its
rendezvous at Vieille Chapelle; whilst the left battalion of the Second
Division, which could not advance, was still holding its old front line
in continuation of our right.
At 11.30 P.M. the Bareilly Brigade relieved the Garhwal Brigade on the
front line, with Headquarters at Lansdowne Post.
Before dawn on 17th May I received First Army Operation orders, which
directed the Indian Corps to remain in occupation of its line.
At 10 A.M. on 17th May, after a telephonic conversation with General
Anderson, it was arranged that we should seize any opportunity of
advancing into the enemy trenches. The Sirhind Brigade was again placed
at my disposal, for the purpose of ensuring touch being kept with the
left of Second Division in any advance which the latter might make.
At 11 A.M. the First Army directed that the duty of gradually
establishing a defensive flank on the left as the attack proceeded, was
assigned to the Indian Corps, and that as the attack of the Second
Division progressed we were to gradually extend to the right and relieve
troops of the Second Division as opportunity offered. The Bareilly and
Sirhind Brigades were detailed for this duty.
At 3.30 A.M. on 18th May the Germans attempted an attack on one company
of the 15th Sikhs, but were bombed and driven back. During the progress
of reliefs of certain battalions of the British Brigade on our right the
1st Highland Light Infantry had five officers and seventy other ranks
made casualties, including Lieutenant H. S. Davidson killed. It is
interesting to note here that the 1st battalion which belonged to the
Indian Corps actually relieved their own 2nd battalion which belonged to
the British Brigade fighting by our side. A chance meeting under such
conditions is rare, even under the varied circumstances in which the
British Army serves.
This 18th day of May was to witness a deed of heroism which for
sustained gallantry can surely not be surpassed. A British officer and
ten men of the 15th Sikhs were those who added a brilliant page to the
history of the Indian Army. Of the ten one Lance-Naik Mangal Singh and
three sepoys belonged to the battalion, whilst four of the others were
attached from the 19th Punjabis and two from the 45th Sikhs.
An isolated trench was held by a company of the 15th Sikhs, opposed to
an ever-increasing number of the enemy, who showed signs of an immediate
attack. Having expended all his bombs, the officer in command was in
urgent need of more, and Lieutenant J. Smyth offered to make the attempt
over the 250 yards which intervened. Ten Sikhs volunteered to accompany
him, carrying a hundred bombs in boxes between them. Moving for sixty
yards under cover, the party diverged, and at once came under heavy
fire. Crawling over dead and wounded, through such cover as battered
ditches and trenches could afford, they advanced under a galling and
aimed fire. Man after man was shot down, and by the time Smyth had got
to within thirty yards of his objective there were only three others
besides himself unwounded, but the precious boxes were still intact. The
Germans had seen and understood the object of this movement, and the
ground here was swept by a tornado of bullets, and to carry the boxes
any farther was absolutely impossible. Breaking them open, Smyth
distributed as many bombs as possible between the survivors. One of the
three gallant Sikhs was at the same time killed; and this splendid young
officer, with now but two others—a Naik and a sepoy—crawling on through
mire and water, reached their goal. Smyth, who is one of the most
modest, as he certainly is one of the bravest, of men, received the
Victoria Cross, and the Naik the Indian Order of Merit, whilst the
Indian Distinguished Service Medal was given to all who lived of that
glorious band. The Gurus of the Khalsa could have wished for no greater
proof of the right of the Sikh to style himself a Singh (lion).
On 18th May orders were received for the Indian Corps to attack the
Ferme du Bois at the same time as attacks were delivered by the Seventh
Division and the Guards Brigade more to the south.
The outlines of the operation were as follows: Meerut Division,
reinforced by Sirhind Brigade, was to attack the Ferme du Bois at 4.30
P.M., in conjunction with an attack by the Guards Brigade on Cour
d’Avoué, with the intention of obtaining possession of the Ferme du Bois
and of three trenches up to the La Tourelle-Quinque Rue road. Touch was
to be obtained with the Guards at a point marked Q 12.
The Artillery bombardment commenced at 2 P.M. The Sirhind Brigade was
directed on the Ferme du Bois and certain other points, and after
establishing itself at the Ferme, was to push forward in conjunction
with the progress of the attack by the Guards Brigade. The Bareilly
Brigade was to assist this attack by fire. The orders of the Sirhind
Brigade directed the bombing parties to be supported by half a company
1st Highland Light Infantry; and as the attack progressed the 4th King’s
had orders as to the part to be played by them.
At 4.20 P.M., 18th May, the Sirhind Brigade reported that, owing to the
heavy German Artillery fire, the bombing parties and troops intended for
the attack were being held up in their original trenches, and shortly
after communication with the front became very difficult owing to all
wires being cut.
By 5.40 P.M., 18th May, it was ascertained that the Guards Brigade were
getting forward by short rushes, and the G.O.C. Sirhind Brigade was
directed to use every possible endeavour to try and get his own attack
forward also.
At 6 P.M. he reported that the bombing parties had made three attempts
to cross, but had so far failed. As the attack appeared quite unable to
advance, I telephoned that if it could not attain its object by day it
must do so by night, and further Artillery support was promised.
As the troops of the Second Division on our right were being relieved
during the night 18th-19th May, I sent instructions that no attack
should be made till this relief was completed, but added that it must
then be made.
At 10 P.M. General Walker, V.C., in command of the Sirhind Brigade,
represented that he considered the German position round the Ferme du
Bois was such that the success of an attack was very doubtful, and that
the probable loss of life would be great until our present position
could be consolidated, and a front from which to advance was assured.
While again reminding the Division that it was most desirable the attack
should be made, I left it to the judgement of General Walker, an
experienced officer, on the spot, to decide.
At 11.10 P.M. it was definitely decided that the attack should not be
made. Throughout the night the Sirhind Brigade was in close touch with
the Germans to its front.
The 15th Sikhs had been undergoing many vicissitudes during all the
confused fighting of the past days, and as already related they had
given a fine example of the stuff of which the Khalsa is made. Attached
to the battalion was Captain F. C. Waterfield, 45th Sikhs, whom I had
known for years. This promising officer was killed. His own regiment of
Rattray’s Sikhs was the one Corps of the Indian Army which in my young
days I had most admired and had served alongside in Afghanistan. It was
always a fine battalion, and has on the plains of Mesopotamia added
still more to its reputation. As I said earlier in this book, if any
Sikh battalions are to remain as Class Corps, none is more worthy of
this honour than Rattray’s Sikhs.
On the 19th May the 15th Sikhs lost the services of two officers,
Captain Crozier and Lieutenant Thomson.
At dawn on 19th May I received orders to the effect that the Second and
Seventh Divisions were consolidating their gains and that operations
would continue on that day. The Artillery of the Indian Corps was to
assist by firing on the Ferme du Bois and certain named communication
trenches.
At 10.5 A.M. the G.O.C. Sirhind Brigade reported that owing to rain the
trenches were full of water and the parapets much damaged, and that in
consequence of reliefs of Second Division his men had been on the move
all night, and that his casualties during the past twenty-four hours had
been severe. He added that his battalions in the front line were
somewhat shaken, and he considered it essential to relieve the 15th
Sikhs by the 1st Gurkhas that night, as they were now reduced to about
250 men. He also recommended that the King’s should be relieved, and
stated that he hardly thought an attack could be got out of his men that
night.
At 6 P.M. the Germans made another attempt to bomb the left flank of
Sirhind Brigade, but this attack was stopped. On the top of all this
orders were received from the First Army that the Indian Corps was, at
all costs, to capture certain named trenches and points by the morning
of 22nd May. During the night 19th-20th the Garhwal Brigade relieved
Bareilly Brigade, and certain interbattalion reliefs desired by G.O.C.
Sirhind Brigade were also carried out. The situation remained normal
during the night.
On the morning of the 20th May I visited General Anderson’s Headquarters
and discussed the operations for the capture of the Ferme du Bois which
had been ordered by First Army. This was to co-ordinate with the general
plan, viz. that the Canadian and Highland Divisions should work
southwards and secure the group of houses south of the Ferme Cour
d’Avoué, and that the Indian Corps was to carry on active hostilities
continuously, with a view to harassing the enemy and wearing down his
resistance.
The orders issued by the Meerut Division were to the effect that the
Sirhind Brigade as a first objective was to secure named localities
about the Ferme du Bois before the morning of 22nd May, and that every
endeavour was to be made to carry out this order. The G.O.C. Sirhind
Brigade accordingly arranged that the 1st Gurkhas should establish
themselves in a named trench overnight, and that patrols were to push on
to the Ferme du Bois. Special patrols were also to be sent out to
ascertain the nature of obstacles parallel to our front; forming-up
trenches were to be dug for the assaulting battalions, and the 4th
King’s were to be relieved.
During the night a thorough reconnaissance of the position was carried
out and a picquet was established by the Sirhind Brigade 200 yards west
of the Ferme du Bois. Operation orders were telephoned to the Meerut
Division. The arrangements were as follows:
General Alderson’s force (Canadians, etc.) was to co-operate by
carrying out an intensive bombardment on Cour d’Avoué on 22nd May.
The Garhwal Brigade was to detail a bombing party, supported by one
company of infantry, and support the attack by bombing along trench V
1 to V 2 with a view to establishing themselves there. This party was
not to commence operations until ten minutes after the Sirhind Brigade
attack had started, unless the enemy opened fire on our attacking
troops, in which case it was to act at once.
A detailed artillery bombardment, which commenced at 1 P.M. on the
21st and was to continue till 5 A.M. on the 22nd, was arranged, on
trenches and area in and near the localities to be attacked, and to
form barrages to prevent arrival of reinforcements.
The Sirhind Brigade was to attack at 1 A.M. on 22nd May in the
following formation:
On the left the Highland Light Infantry had as objectives two named
trenches. In the centre were the 1st Gurkhas, and on the right the 4th
Gurkhas.
The 4th King’s were in support, and 15th Sikhs in reserve.
All columns were in position correctly, and the attacks were launched at
1 A.M. as arranged, and advanced without at first being fired on. The
right attack was checked by a ditch about twenty yards from the enemy’s
trenches, and here came under rifle and machine-gun fire from the
trenches in front, while the rear and right rear were also heavily fired
on; the south-east corner of the Ferme du Bois Orchard, in particular,
was under a severe fire, presumably from Cour d’Avoué. This ditch was
about six feet deep with three feet of water in it, and the ground
between it and the enemy’s trenches was wired. At this obstacle the
leading company of the 4th Gurkhas was checked, but Major Moule and
Captain Robinson with a detachment broke through the wire and were soon
at the German trenches. They had nobly carried out their task and never
returned to tell the tale. The battalion had 100 casualties.
Lieutenant Ballinger, 4th King’s, commanding the two machine-guns of his
battalion, had been detailed to follow the 4th Gurkhas. In his haste to
join in the fight he moved on sooner than his instructions had allowed,
and he and many of his men were killed close by the wire adjoining the
German trench—another brave set of Englishmen who died as so many others
did in the over-zealous discharge of duty.
The attack did not progress beyond this ditch, which perhaps seemed a
greater obstacle in the night than it really was. The only remaining
British officer with the attacking companies returned at 1.50 A.M. to
take up reinforcements, but at 2.20 A.M., the senior officers with the
three attacking columns having consulted, decided that as the attack was
held up all along, it was inadvisable to send up more troops, and the
attackers were ordered to withdraw.
The centre attack reached the Ferme du Bois with but little loss, owing
to the protection afforded by the farm and ridge. A ditch was reached,
and the assault at once came under heavy fire from the front and right
flank. The leading company of the 1st Gurkhas, reinforced by a second,
assaulted and captured a line of trench some thirty yards beyond the
ditch. This trench had been covered by wire which had been cut by our
artillery, whose support had been most effective. About fifteen Germans
were killed here and the rest retired to a second trench twenty yards in
rear. By this time all the British officers with the attacking companies
had been killed or wounded, and Subadar Jit Sing Gurung, 1st Gurkhas,
assumed command but was shortly afterwards ordered to retire, an order
he carried out with coolness and judgement.
Lieutenant Heyland was killed while endeavouring to alter the
configuration of a captured trench in which his men were being mown
down. Three other British officers shared the same fate, Lieutenants
Fry, Herbert, and Gamble all bravely seconding his efforts. This
battalion paid dearly for its short but fierce fight, the total
casualties amounting to 120. Subadar Jit Sing Gurung was awarded the
Indian Order of Merit, and Captain Mellis earned the Military Cross.
The advance of the Highland Light Infantry on the left of the combined
attacks was also held up by the ditch and by machine-gun fire taking the
ditch in enfilade from the right and in the rear from the Cour d’Avoué.
This battalion was faced by the impossible, but with its proven valour
did all that could be done under the conditions, and in the attempt to
carry out its task paid with a loss of over 120 of all ranks, including
Lieut. J. Agnew killed, four officers wounded, and one wounded and
missing, Lieut. B. Ivy.
Communication with the Sirhind Brigade Headquarters was interrupted till
3 A.M., when from all reports that he could receive, the G.O.C. decided
that a second attack was impracticable. He directed the original
dispositions to be resumed and the trenches to be held, up to where they
had been barricaded, and this order was carried out.
In telling the story of incessant attacks or defensive actions in those
days the infantry soldier naturally looms large, whilst the less
conspicuous units sometimes escape notice. The corps of Indian Sappers
and Miners has furnished unlimited material for tales of daring, and on
this 22nd day of May 1915 a chivalrous gentleman, Captain Francis Douie
of the Royal Engineers, and his equally gallant orderly, Jiwa Khan of
No. 3 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners, did what one is proud to record.
In broad daylight they noticed a wounded man lying only eighty yards
from a German trench from which proceeded a heavy rifle fire, whilst our
own guns were shelling the self-same trench: but for such men death has
no terrors. They were soon over the parapet, and by sheer pluck and luck
combined reached and brought in their helpless comrade. Jiwa Khan may
well be proud of the Indian Order of Merit he wears, and Captain Douie
of the D.S.O. he that day added to the Military Cross he had already
won. I may add that it was only after very searching inquiry I was
enabled to get full details of these acts of bravery, as apparently both
actors appeared to be unconscious of having done anything beyond their
ordinary duty.
The attack failed owing to excessive casualties in British officers of
the attacking companies when these companies were held up. Of those with
the assault all became casualties except two subalterns. Also the
hindrance of a deep ditch in front of the objective under close rifle
and machine-gun fire was a very serious obstacle at night, and broke the
momentum of the advance. Issue from it would have involved facing
frontal rifle fire at very close range, while men in it were taken in
enfilade and reverse by machine-guns from south-east of Ferme du Bois
and from Cour d’Avoué. The fact that no simultaneous attack was being
made on the Cour d’Avoué left the enemy in that direction at liberty to
concentrate his fire on our assault at close ranges. Reconnaissance had
been unable to ascertain with accuracy where the German trenches and
machine-guns were located. Owing to the fact that the advance to the
point of attack was carried out deliberately and in complete silence, no
fire had opened on it until thirty-five minutes after the start, and the
officer commanding the party which was to bomb along the trench in
support of the attack, hearing nothing more than general heavy firing,
was in doubt whether the attack had actually started. Inquiry from the
nearest officer of the neighbouring battalion elicited the reply that it
had not done so, and he accordingly delayed starting his operations so
as to synchronise the two attacks.
It was now broad daylight and, of course, futile to order this attack to
recommence. The officers commanding units on the spot decided that with
the situation as it was known to them any further attempt, while the
enemy was in undisturbed occupation of the vicinity of Cour d’Avoué,
offered no chance of success, and would only have led to greatly
enhanced losses, and that withdrawal before it became too late was the
best course to pursue. It would, perhaps, have been better to have
ordered the attack at an earlier hour of the night, even though the
Germans would probably have been found more on the alert than they were.
The casualties in this assault were heavy: nine companies were engaged,
in which sixteen British officers, two Indian officers, 137 British
other ranks, and 173 Indian other ranks were returned as casualties.
Although the British Division on our right had, like ourselves, been
unable to make any advance during the early days of these prolonged
attacks, there is no doubt that once they got a forward move on, they
were severely handicapped by the inability of the Indian Corps to keep
up with them, and the left battalion of that Division in consequence
could not keep in touch with those farther to the right. The situation,
in fact, closely resembled that of our left Brigade at Neuve Chapelle,
where we originally reached as far as the Bois du Biez but were obliged
to again move back owing to the British Brigade of the Eighth Division
on our immediate left finding it impossible to overcome the German
defence to its front.
In the case now under review, we did all in our power to keep up with
the advance, but the strong point V 6 baffled our efforts. It might
possibly have been better if the dividing line between the British and
Indian Corps had not run just past this redoubt, but that is a matter of
opinion only. Be that as it may, it must be owned that notwithstanding
many gallant attempts we could not get on at all, and thus hampered the
later attacks of the British Division after it had captured its first
objective.