At 9.30 A.M., 27th April, a copy of the French Operation Orders was
received from Second Army. From these it became apparent that the French
were to continue the offensive both from the west and the south. From
this latter direction the Moroccan Brigade of Colonel Savy was to
attack, as before, along the west of the Langemarck road. Arrangements
for co-operating with this Brigade were therefore put in hand. The
Artillery bombardment was timed by the French to begin at 12.30 P.M. and
the assault at 1.15 P.M.
At 11.20 a message was received from the Second Army, giving the
intentions of the Army commander as regards the action to be taken by
the Lahore Division. In this it was made clear that the Division was to
be prepared to take advantage at once of any advance made by the French
to gain ground; but that it was not to be committed to the attack until
the advance of the French had assured the safety of its left flank. The
Artillery of the Fifth Corps and Lahore Division, which bore on the line
of advance, were to co-operate. The Headquarters of the 27th and
Canadian Divisional Artillery were in dug-outs close beside that
occupied by Lahore Division Headquarters at Potijze. The following were
the dispositions: Sirhind Brigade to attack with their right on an
oblong farm, and the left along the Langemarck road. 1/4th Gurkhas on
the right, 1/1st Gurkhas on the left. In support were a part of the
Highland Light Infantry and the 15th Sikhs and 4th King’s Liverpools.
The Ferozepore Brigade was to prolong the Sirhind Brigade’s right and to
move forward under cover of the bombardment, so as to be up in line with
Sirhind Brigade at 1.15 P.M. 9th Bhopals on the right, 4th Londons on
the left, in touch with Sirhind’s right. The Connaught Rangers in
support, with the 57th Rifles and 129th Baluchis in reserve.
As has already been stated, not only were many of these units very weak
before the battle, but had after the previous day’s losses dwindled to
shadows of battalions.
At 12.20 P.M., 27th April, the Ferozepore Brigade started and their
advance was systematically reported. The Sirhind Brigade advanced before
the time fixed and by 1.15 P.M., when the bombardment ceased, the
leading battalions of this Brigade had reached the edge of some enclosed
ground on the slope towards the valley. The heavy enfilade fire caused
the 1/1st Gurkhas to swing north-north-west to face it. The 4th Gurkhas
maintained their direction but were held up. At 1.30 P.M. it was
reported to the Divisional commander that the French were attacking to
the north-west of an adjoining farm, and though losing heavily were
continuing to form a firing-line. Our own front line was also reported
as being checked and suffering heavy loss.
In its advance the Sirhind Brigade had to pass through heavy machine-gun
and rifle fire, and casualties came fast. Before a party of the 4th
Gurkhas had reached an old farmhouse, which they tenaciously held, the
C.O., Major Brodhurst, had been killed, and his Adjutant, Captain
Hartwell, wounded. Two other officers, Captain E. C. Lentaigne and
Lieut. C. F. Moore, were also hit. The Gurkhas, however, held on to the
farm. A Gurkha officer, Jemadar Nain Singh Rana, was amongst the killed.
Meantime, the 1st Gurkhas rushed another farm 250 yards from the enemy
trench, which was held by a company till dark. The greater part of the
battalion, however, was held up at some hundred yards farther back. The
Adjutant, Lieutenant St. George, was mortally wounded, and nearly all
the other British officers present were wounded. Rifleman Ramkishan
Thapa won the I.O.M. for a particularly plucky act.
A fire fight now ensued, which continued till 4 P.M., at which time the
O.C. 4th King’s, seeing that the 4th Gurkhas could make no progress,
decided to reinforce them with part of his battalion. The King’s
advanced with great gallantry, and, although suffering severe losses,
carried the line forward for some distance. A party under Major Beall
got to within 200 yards of the German trenches.
The advance of the 4th King’s was a very fine feat of arms. Straight
from home they had joined in the tumult of Neuve Chapelle, and this day
by their valour, which would take no denial, had already established
themselves as a veteran battalion. Lieut.-Colonel Allen, the C.O., was
awarded the C.M.G., and Major Beall the D.S.O. A few N.C.O.’s and men
won the D.C.M. The casualties, as was to be expected, were very heavy,
380 of all ranks, including 2nd Lieut. Lloyd (killed), besides eight
other officers wounded.
The Ferozepore Brigade as it advanced lost heavily from Artillery, and
later from rifle fire. The attack of this Brigade was also eventually
checked.
It was at this time that Major Jamieson, 9th Bhopals, of whom I had much
to say in describing the fight before Neuve Chapelle in the autumn of
1914, was wounded. He was later killed in Mesopotamia. This battalion
suffered 120 casualties, including Captain Etlinger, the Adjutant,
killed. The 9th Bhopals had in India paid me a very special compliment
by making me a life honorary member of their mess, and I hope I may one
day again avail myself of the privilege.
The 4th Londons on the left of the Bhopals, keeping touch with the
advance on both flanks, moved on until the general line of both Brigades
was assimilated, when like the others they were brought to a halt.
Captain Saunders was mortally wounded whilst engaged in reinforcing with
his company. Lieut. Coates was also killed in the extreme front of the
advance. Two N.C.O.’s who behaved most gallantly were awarded the
D.C.M., and the M.C. was the reward of 2nd Lieut. Pyper.
The 1st Gurkhas of the Sirhind Brigade established their line beyond
four heavy French guns, which had been abandoned, and which were thus
enabled to be withdrawn at night.
An order from the Second Army directing the attack to be pressed
vigorously was received by the G.O.C. Lahore Division at 2.40 P.M., and
in order to give weight to this, the Composite Brigade, consisting of
battalions of the Cornwall Light Infantry, York and Lancasters, West
Ridings, and Royal Lancasters, but numbering less than 1300 all told,
was placed at General Keary’s disposal. This Brigade was commanded by
Colonel Tuson, and left Potijze with orders to push forward and
establish connection with the Sirhind Brigade. If the position
permitted, a heavy bombardment was then to be carried out, prior to a
fresh assault.
At 4.25 P.M., 27th April, a report was received from the Sirhind Brigade
that their front lines were far enough from the enemy to permit of a
fresh bombardment. This was accordingly arranged as soon as possible,
and all guns opened fire. It began at 5.30 P.M., and under its cover the
Highland Light Infantry (except a detachment who were facing
north-north-west, 100 yards from the German trenches) and the 15th Sikhs
pushed forward, but were temporarily checked, as there was nothing
behind them to give the necessary support.
The Highland Light Infantry, however, moved on, and eventually in order
to hold its ground, when the French Colonials on the left were once more
forced back by renewed gas attacks, the battalion entrenched itself as
best it could and held on to its position. Captain Tarrant, of whom I
have already written, and his immortal detachment were found still
occupying their isolated trench only 100 yards from the German line.
Allied, British, and Indian soldiers had been driven before the terrible
gas; shells and bullets had swept in tornadoes over them, but nothing
could discourage that noble band. The brave commander paid for his
valour with his life, but the Highlands will long re-echo his name and
treasure the memory of those true sons of Scotland. If posthumous
rewards cannot be given under present rules, the sooner such rules are
changed to meet the exigencies of this great war the better. Is it too
late?
With Tarrant was his Company Sergeant-Major, R. Bell, who, when a party
of carriers coming up with ammunition were literally swept away by fire,
went out with a few brave men and returned, to wear the Distinguished
Conduct Medal he so well merited.
The 15th Sikhs, the other battalion in the front line of the Brigade,
was met by severe shrapnel fire, whilst the incessant rain of bullets of
course never varied. Lieut.-Colonel C. A. Vivian was killed. In the
pages of _The Indian Corps in France_ will be found a story of this
officer’s gallantry during the very early days of the war, which I can
supplement by another instance of his keen courage. One night in
December 1914 he asked to see me and did not wish any one else to be
present. He then unfolded a plan to disguise himself and wander into the
German lines. His intention was to gain certain information which he
knew was badly needed. He felt sure of success and said it was well
worth risking, and it was only because of the shortage of British
officers with Indian battalions that he had come to ask permission
instead of going off on his own. He begged me not to mention the matter
to any one, which, of course, I only do now that he is no more. I had to
refuse his unselfish offer, but a few days later his restless spirit
prompted him to go through the adventure related in the book above
mentioned.
Sepoy Bakshi Singh during the advance repeatedly performed acts of
signal bravery and was awarded the I.O.M. Major Carden, the next senior
officer to Vivian, was killed while endeavouring to save a brother
officer, Captain A. H. Muir, who had been wounded. The 15th Sikhs during
the second battle of Ypres suffered a total of 100 casualties.
The commander of the Moroccan Brigade, who was in close touch with the
G.O.C. Sirhind Brigade, now informed him that he would assault again at
7 P.M., 28th April. The arrival of the Composite Brigade was expected
before that time, and arrangements for a combined assault were carried
out.
The French assault commenced punctually under cover of heavy Artillery
fire and the Sirhind Brigade moved forward once more. Shortly after, the
Moroccans were observed streaming to the rear, but observation was
difficult, owing to the clouds of smoke and asphyxiating gas. Suspecting
a counter-attack on the left of the Brigade, the 15th Sikhs wheeled
round to cover the left flank. Two battalions of the Composite Brigade
were also deployed in the same direction, and the Brigade was then
ordered to consolidate its position. The Highland Light Infantry and
15th Sikhs took over the front line, and the two Gurkha battalions and
the 4th King’s Liverpools were withdrawn to reorganise. The 34th
Pioneers and Sappers and Miners were sent up to assist and the Composite
Brigade was withdrawn into reserve. By 9 P.M. our Allies had gone
forward again and touch had been re-established with the Moroccans. The
deployment and advance of the Brigade had been carried out in full view
of the enemy, and during the whole day the troops were subjected to a
heavy enfilade and Artillery fire. They had behaved with the greatest
firmness and done all that was possible to attain their object.
The Brigadier brought to special notice the dashing advance of the 4th
King’s, and the gallantry of the company 1st Highland Light Infantry
under Captain Tarrant. At noon on 28th April the Division was placed
under the orders of Plumer’s Force, which had just been formed.
During the 28th and 29th April, various plans for an attack by the
French were arranged and the rôle of our troops was laid down and
communicated to Brigadiers, but the attacks did not take place. By this
time it was known that the German position was a continuous line of
trenches of great strength with strong points here and there at farms
and other houses. During the night of 29th April, the Ferozepore and
Jalandar Brigades were withdrawn to Ouderdom huts under orders from
Plumer’s Force. No attack took place on the 30th April, but a continuous
bombardment was carried on, in which the co-operation of the Canadian
Artillery was specially acknowledged by General Keary.
At 6 P.M. on 30th April Colonel Savy, commanding the Moroccan Brigade,
was asked to state his intention, and informed the G.O.C. Division that
his losses had been very heavy and that he could not attack without
reinforcements. During the early hours of the morning of 1st May a
message was received from Plumer’s Force giving the substance of a
communication sent to General Plutz, commanding the French Army of
Belgium, in which it was explained to him that the Sirhind Brigade, the
only one available, could be utilised to support the French right in an
attack on the German trench line on Hill 29, and orders for the
Artillery were issued to suit the particular form the attack was to
take, and instructions allotting their objectives were sent to the
Artillery of the Canadian and Twenty-seventh Divisions, which were to
co-operate.
A message from Plumer’s Force made it clear that General Plutz
understood that the Sirhind Brigade would only advance to the attack in
conjunction with the French, and that their attack would not be
converging. The Brigadier reported that he would move off twenty minutes
before the French, so as to bring him level with the latter when the
assault began. The Artillery was ordered to support this movement with a
heavy fire, and at 2.50 P.M. the Brigade advanced in the following
formation:
Right battalion—1/4th Gurkhas. In support 1st Highland Light Infantry.
Left battalion—1/1st Gurkhas; with King’s Liverpools in support. The
15th Sikhs to hold the advanced trenches.
It is on record that the Gurkhas were so overjoyed at finding themselves
for once out of a bog that they literally tore over the rolling country
until within 300 yards of the German lines. An officer who was present,
and who afterwards went to Gallipoli, wrote to say that when his men saw
the barren hills there, they shouted, “Hurrah! at last we shall be able
to shoot on a hillside—no more snipe _jheels_ for us.” Oh! if some one
who knew what many of our Indian battalions could do (outside of eternal
mire) had given us a chance in France, even for a short spell, what an
opportunity it would have been of proving once for all that the hillmen
of India with British officers cannot be beaten in hilly country no
matter who the foe. But the depression caused by existence in the same
fetid morass for fourteen long and blood-stained months, without any
change, was enough to turn sour the cheeriest mortal that ever
shouldered a rifle. I make bold to say that no other Corps, Division,
Brigade, or unit in France was ever kept as long on such a narrow,
cheerless front as was the Indian Corps, nor, had they been, would they
have stuck it out any better.
The right battalion, 1/4th Gurkhas, in its rush arrived near the farm,
the vicinity of which had been the scene of Captain Tarrant’s exploit.
Here they were joined by their supporting battalion, the Highland Light
Infantry. In this operation the rapidity of the Gurkha advance served
them well, as only some fifty casualties were recorded. The Highlanders
had eighty casualties, including 2nd Lieut. McIntosh of the Indian Army
attached to the battalion, killed.
The 1st Gurkhas only finished their rush when but 200 yards severed them
from the German trenches—that fateful “No Man’s Land,” so familiar to
every soldier, so dreaded by every mother and wife, the Lethean zone
which alone separated civilisation from modern barbarism; that 200 yards
which was more difficult to cross than the 600 leagues over which
Xenophon retreated, or the vast expanses Marco Polo explored. But in the
ranks of the army of Great Britain’s King the occasion always finds the
man.
Close by the German front was a trench: Who was in it—friend or foe?
Havildar Bhakat Sing Rana of the 2/4th Gurkhas, attached to the 1st
battalion, offered to solve the riddle. With a small chosen band he
crept out and, cheating death, discovered it was held by our Allies. The
Indian Order of Merit could not have been better won.
The 1st Gurkhas had about seventy casualties in this attack, and the
supporting battalion, the 4th King’s Liverpools, added forty-five,
including Captain Lumsden killed, and Major Beall, who had led so well a
few days previously, wounded.
I will quote from General Keary’s report, which concisely explains the
movements of the Brigade:
The leading battalions, moving rapidly forward, advanced without
serious loss, and had passed before the enemy had formed a belt of
Artillery fire on the crest of the ridge on our side of the valley,
through which it subsequently became impossible to advance. Owing to
the German line being better known by this time, and owing to the more
detailed instructions as to Artillery support, the hostile rifle fire
was more effectively kept down on this day.
The troops advanced into the front French and British trenches. The
ground between them and the German trenches was a glacis slope, and by
5 P.M. it became apparent that the wire entanglement in front, some
four yards deep, had not been cut.
At 7 P.M. the officer commanding 4th Moroccan Brigade sent a message
to say that he had decided not to attack.
Accordingly orders were issued to the Sirhind Brigade to withdraw to
the huts at Ouderdom. Ends.
During the last four days of the operations the Lahore Divisional
Artillery was chiefly employed in assisting the French. It earned the
thanks of the French Commander for the accuracy and effectiveness of its
fire. General Keary specially brought to notice the great assistance he
had received from Brigadier-General Burstall and the Staff of the
Canadian Divisional Artillery; throughout the operations they had
co-operated with the utmost zeal and cordiality. He also acknowledged
the great help Brigadier-General Stokes and the Artillery of the
Twenty-seventh Division had rendered.
Of 16,000 combatants of all arms detached from the Indian Army Corps to
take part in the second battle of Ypres, over 24 per cent were returned
as casualties. General Keary, in forwarding his report on the battle,
wrote:
In conclusion, I consider that the troops did all that it was humanly
possible to do under most trying circumstances. They had to pass along
some miles of road and narrow streets under a hail of shell-fire,
advance to a position of assembly over open ground and from thence to
a position of deployment under the same conditions.
The Germans had prepared a position which required the most accurate
and intense gun fire to reduce it. Owing to the hurried nature of the
attack it was impossible to reconnoitre sufficiently to ensure such a
fire; nor were the guns registered. During the first two days the
Infantry advanced against a position on an open glacis which was
virtually unshaken. After the first two days only one Brigade was in
action, and its action depended on that of the French, whose right was
unable to advance to the attack.
In spite of all these disabilities the carrying of the position by the
French and British was only prevented by the use of asphyxiating
gases.
I think the following regiments deserve special mention for the
gallantry shown by them:
1st Manchesters.
Connaught Rangers.
1st Highland Light Infantry.
4th King’s (Liverpool Regiment).
47th Sikhs.
57th Rifles.
40th Pathans.
The following letter was received from the Second Army:
SECOND ARMY.
G.O.C. LAHORE DIVISION—Having read the very complete and excellent
report on the work of the Lahore Division in the heavy fighting near
Ypres on the 26th and 27th April 1915, the Commander of the Second
Army is confirmed in the views he formed at the time, that the
Division had been handled with great skill and determination by
Major-General Keary.
Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien fully realises the disadvantages under which
the attack was made, insufficient Artillery preparation on our side
and an open glacis-like slope to advance over in the face of
overwhelming shell, rifle, and machine-gun fire, and the employment of
poisonous gases on the enemy’s side; and that, in spite of these
disadvantages, the troops, although only partially successful in
wrenching ground from the enemy, effectually prevented his further
advance and thus ensured the safety of the town of Ypres.
Sir Horace, whilst deploring the heavy casualties, wishes to thank the
Divisional General, Brigadiers, and Commanding Officers and all ranks
of the several Arms employed, for the great service they performed for
the Second Army on those eventful two days.
[Illustration: LAHORE DIVISION deployed for attack, April 26. ]
In this respect he would specially mention the following regiments:
[The corps named by General Keary are then enumerated.]
(Sd.) GEO. F. MILNE, Maj.-Gen., G.S., Second Army.
_7th May 1915._
General Sir Herbert Plumer also wrote us follows:
G.O.C. LAHORE DIVISION—Will you please convey to the Brigadiers,
Commanding Officers, and all Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and
Men of your Division my thanks for the assistance they have rendered
in the recent severe fighting, and my appreciation of the way in which
they have carried out the very arduous duties entrusted to them while
under my command.
I deeply regret the very heavy casualties they have suffered.
By 5th May the Lahore Division had rejoined the Corps, and immediately
proceeded to take its share in the severe fighting round Festubert.
I took the opportunity to see as many units as possible during the short
interval, and it was a great pleasure to talk with Keary, and many
others of all ranks, British and Indian. The universal note was
satisfaction that they had tried to do their duty. General Keary again
commanded his Division at the battles near Festubert and Mauquissart, in
May and September 1915, but it was not till he had been in command of a
Division in Mesopotamia, much later on, that he was given any reward for
his distinguished services.